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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

THE LIBERTY INCIDENT

BY

A JAY CRISTOL

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty
of the University of Miami
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Coral Gables, Florida

June 1997

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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

THE LIBERTY INCIDENT

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CRISTOL, A JAY (Ph.D. International Studies)

The Liberty Incident (June 1997)

Abstract of a doctoral dissertation at the University of Miami.

Dissertation supervised by Professors Vendulka Kubalkova and Haim Shaked.

No. of pages in text 481.

All thirteen official investigations of the Liberty incident and various unofficial reports and explanations, including five television productions, were compiled and analyzed. Independent research was conducted in the United States, Israel, Egypt, England and elsewhere. Four Hundred and fifty-eight interviews of two hundred and twenty-two persons were conducted. Freedom of Information Act requests were used to obtain declassification of the Clark Clifford Report, twenty-four hot line messages, twenty-two National Security Agency documents and thirty-one National Security Council documents. Numerous classified Israeli documents were also obtained. Over 3,318 relevant documents have been collected in binders. The research confirmed and corroborated the official investigations and disproved the contrary explanations. The dissertation demonstrates that the Liberty incident was no more than a tragic mistake.

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to those of the military profession who gave their lives or their blood in the performance of their duty.

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INTRODUCTION

On the afternoon of June 8, 1967, Israeli Air Force aircraft and then Israeli motor torpedo boats attacked the U.S.S. Liberty, GTR 5, an intelligence gathering warship. It was sailing approximately twelve and one-half miles off the coast of the Sinai peninsula, in the vicinity of El Arish. Thirty-four U.S. personnel died in the attack and an additional 171 were wounded. Thirteen official investigations of the incident, three by Israel and ten by the United States (including five congressional investigations) have concluded either that there is no evidence that the attack or attacks were intentional or that there is evidence that the attacks were the result of a mistake in identification. Notwithstanding the official investigations, a large number of sources have refused to accept the official conclusions and have advanced various theories that the attacks were an intentional attack on a U.S. ship by Israel. The controversy has generated five television productions and continues to appear on op-ed pages of newspapers, on radio talk shows and on the internet.

I have studied all of the investigations and the theories of all the so-called doubters and all other available data on the incident. I have conducted 458 interviews, during which I interviewed 222 individuals, some of whom were interviewed multiple times. On the Israeli side, I have interviewed all

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the significant participants in the event from the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, Yitzhak Rabin, to the pilots who squeezed the triggers and the MTB (Motor Torpedo Boat) Commanders who launched the torpedoes. On the U.S. side I have interviewed the principal U.S. military and governmental persons involved in the incident. I have collected thousands of documents pertaining to the incident and have catalogued in binders over 3320 documents related to the event and its aftermath. I believe I have the largest existing collection of documentary material on this incident. I have searched everywhere for a smoking gun that would provide evidence in support of any of the doubters' theories.

In November of 1951, during the Korean Conflict, I withdrew from my last semester of college at the University of Miami and entered Navy flight training. Seventeen months, 337 hours of flight instruction, and twelve carrier landings later I was designated a Naval Aviator. I remained in the Navy and Naval Reserve for a total of thirty-eight years. The first eighteen years were spent as a naval aviator. During my active duty time I went to sea aboard the aircraft carrier Princeton (CVS-37) and flew day and night missions from the ship. After Korea, I returned home and entered the Naval Reserve, where I qualified as a four-engine transport plane commander. During the 1960s I flew volunteer air lifts to Vietnam. After eighteen years as a naval aviator, I became a Navy lawyer and spent twenty more years in that capacity. For

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almost a decade I went to Naval Justice school each summer, where I served as the Reserve Administrator of the annual Naval Reserve Judge Advocate program and taught the Law of War segment of the course. The Department of Defense also sent me a number of times to The International Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo, Italy, to lecture on Law of Naval Warfare. In 1988, I became sixty years old and retired from the Naval Reserve, although I keep in touch by lecturing occasionally at the Pentagon or Judge Advocate General (JAG) headquarters.

On the civilian side, when I returned from active duty, I went back to school and completed my Bachelor of Arts degree and obtained a Law degree, cum laude. I had an interesting and successful career as a lawyer for twenty five years. In 1985, I had the opportunity to be appointed a Federal Judge. I believed that this would give me the ability to slow down my life style as well as to teach at the University of Miami School of Law. I began taking courses at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Miami just for fun. After a while, I was approached by a member of the faculty and asked if I had decided on something to research and write about. When I confessed that I had not, it was suggested that, with my background as a naval aviator, Law of Naval Warfare lecturer, lawyer, and Federal Judge, I was well suited to research the Liberty Incident. I was aware of the

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event, but I replied that no one was interested in that subject. It had happened twenty years ago.

In 1987, the Ocean Policy Desk, OP-616, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations had a lawyer billet gaped (that is, the second international lawyer assigned to OP-616 had been reassigned and his replacement had not reported). I came on special active duty to assist the regular Navy international lawyer in getting ready for the 1987 Incidents at Sea conference between the Soviet Navy and the U.S. Navy. My plane landed at Washington National Airport within hours of the time the Iraqi Exocet AM-39 missiles hit the U.S.S. Stark on May 17, 1987. Thirty-seven U.S. Navy personnel died. I spent a busy two weeks focused on the Stark Incident, which was the direct responsibility of OP-616. Less than a year later, Stark was forgotten.[1] I wondered, how could Liberty be of interest to anyone? To my surprise, I learned that a revival of interest in the Liberty Incident began in about 1979. On June 5, 1987, an article by Ronald Fraser appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* titled "Stark Reminder of U.S.S. Liberty." The article contains misinformation, but stirred the pot of the Liberty Incident. The Arab-Israeli conflict continues, and the Liberty Incident has become one aspect of the propaganda campaigns that keep the conflict alive and active. Hence, I agreed to become a candidate for a Masters Degree. I thought I would do some research and complete a thesis in about a year. And so a great adventure began.

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In 1976, at our bi-centennial, we had a parade of tall ships pass in review before the Statute of Liberty in New York harbor. The tall ships were followed by a parade of military ships from many countries. Included in that parade were two Israeli Saar missile boats. Following the parade in New York, the two Israeli missile boats came to Miami. I was one of a delegation of U.S. Naval Reserve Officers who met the boats as they sailed into the Port of Miami. The Israeli Naval Attache' was on hand and we met during a tour of the boats. I was impressed by his keen sense of humor and we became friends. When the Attache' I met in 1976 was relieved, he introduced me to his successor. At that time Grumman Aviation was building a hydrofoil for the Navy of Israel at Lantana, Florida, a few miles up the coast from my home. When the Naval Attache' would fly into Miami to visit Grumman, we would occasionally meet for lunch. Likewise, when I went to JAG Headquarters or the Pentagon to perform active duty in the Reserve, we would occasionally lunch together in Washington. As a result, when I undertook this research project, I knew a contact person in the Israeli Navy and easily received cooperation and assistance.

Things were much more difficult with the Israeli Air Force and the Government of Israel. The students at San Remo were usually colonels and generals from thirty to forty different countries. In 1984, one of my students was an Israeli Military Advocate General in the international law

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branch of the IDF. Through him I was able to gain access to the President (our equivalent of Chief Justice) of the Supreme Court of Israel, Meir Shamgar. I wanted to talk to him about the Israeli investigations of the Liberty incident because in 1967, he was the Military Advocate General of the Israeli Defense Forces and he had ordered the inquires. When I showed up at the Supreme Court to meet him, wearing a shirt open at the collar, he was wearing a coat and tie, but that is another story. He was kind enough to introduce me to Ambassador Ephraim Evron, who was Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Israel in Washington on June 8, 1967. Ephraim Evron was Ambassador to the United States on December 17, 1980, when the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel exchanged diplomatic notes concluding the Liberty incident between the two countries. Ambassador Evron was quite knowledgeable about the subject and quite helpful to me in this research. In the study of his apartment on Rav Ashi in north Tel Aviv, he had five pictures, personally autographed to him, from five different Presidents of the United States. After answering my questions about how much sharing of information took place between Israel and the United States in June 1967, he added, "But don't take my word for it, ask your CIA chief of station." When I replied, "How would I find our CIA chief of station?", he provided me with the necessary information to locate the CIA chief of station in the United States. Locate him I did, and over the years we have become

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good friends. He has remained interested in my project and we have visited in person and by telephone many times. I now had a window on both the U.S. and the Israeli side. Later on I was able to confirm what Ambassador Evron told me through former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, when I interviewed him at Athens, Georgia.

Captain Ernest C. Castle, USN (ret) was the Naval Attache' (ALUSNA) at the United States Embassy at Tel Aviv, Israel, in June 1967. He, the CIA chief of station and the Defense Attache', were probably the three persons most deeply involved in gathering data on behalf of the United States in Tel Aviv following the event in June 1967. CAPT Castle had talked to no one since the event until 1986, when Thames TV began research for a documentary on the incident. The documentary first aired on January 27, 1987, and CAPT Castle was not satisfied with the Thames program because of the omission of substantial factual data which he had provided during their interview of him. He resolved not to talk about the incident again to anyone.

Had I contacted CAPT Castle at the wrong time, he would have declined my interview and this research would have been far poorer for it. Fortunately, his old friend, the CIA chief of station, called in advance of my request and said, "I know you have vowed not to talk about the Liberty again but you really ought to talk to this guy Cristol." CAPT Castle agreed and I travelled to Columbia, South Carolina, where he lived

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and taught at the University of South Carolina. He is a giant of a man in the area of military intelligence. He was on the short list for selection as Director of Naval Intelligence (DIR) and probably had more on the scene contact with the Israelis regarding this incident than any other U.S. national. It was he who LCOL (Sgan Aluf) Michael Bloch of the IDF Foreign Military Liaison called to advise that the attack had occurred. It was he who flew by helicopter to the Liberty on the afternoon on June 8, 1967. It was he who spoke directly to President Johnson by telephone following his overflight of the ship. Finally, it was he who was responsible for most of the U.S. investigation following the incident. CAPT Castle patiently allowed me to interview him for seventeen hours. When we concluded, he advised me that the research I was doing was far beyond the scope of a master's degree. He suggested that I discuss this with the faculty at the Graduate School of International Studies. The ensuing discussions resulted in the project being converted to a doctoral program.

I have kept in touch with CAPT Castle and we have become good friends. In June 1992, he and his wife met me in Tel Aviv, Israel. On one occasion we had dinner with LCOL Michael Bloch and on another we had dinner with Admiral Shlomo Erell, the Commander and Chief of the Israeli Navy in June 1967. We culminated this visit with a memorial flight. I rented a small airplane and I took off from Sde Dov airport, the airport from which CAPT Castle had taken off, twenty-five

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years before. Our off time was within minutes of his original off time in 1967, and using GPS (Global Positioning System) we flew to the precise point where records indicate he had overflown Liberty twenty-five years before. We circled the spot and CAPT Castle, who acted as a lay minister during his tour in Israel, said Christian prayers for the lost Liberty crewmen. We had also brought with us an Israeli Air Force Officer who said the Kaddish, the Hebrew prayer in remembrance of the dead, in honor of the Jewish crew member of Liberty who died with his shipmates. I opened the vent window and dropped thirty-four flowers, while reciting the names of the thirty-four that died that day in June 1967. Then Ernie recited the Navy Hymn. I turned and flew back to Sde Dov and landed within minutes of the time that Ernie had landed twenty-five years before.

The project has taken many years. It has taken me to Israel over fifteen times. Twice I have travelled by boat to the site of the event and twice I have piloted a plane over the scene of the Liberty action. I traveled to Egypt twice and to London, Paris and Rome. I have travelled the United States from Florida to Maine to Washington State to San Diego with trips to the Naval Historical Center and Naval Museum in Washington, D.C., and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas. I travelled to many other places in the United States and called many more on the telephone. I am certain I have worn out at least a dozen Freedom of Information Act

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Coordinators. I had the pleasure of meeting a fantastic number of Americans and Israelis who were involved in the making of history. In most cases, the meetings developed into friendships. This was an extra blessing because it allowed me to call or visit many of the subjects of my interviews numerous times. I believe I have gathered together the largest collection of data on this subject of any one in the world. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress has consulted with me regarding the Liberty Incident and cited me in a report for Congress on U.S. military operations. In 1995, I made a guest presentation on the Liberty Incident for the Center for Information Policy Research at Harvard University.

I have tried to be as precise as possible and, whenever possible, to rely on documents created in June 1967. Few people have a precise memory of exactly what occurred twenty or thirty years ago. I have tried to identify discrepancies in time or descriptions of events and to reconcile or explain same in a logical way. It is quite reasonable to assume that there may be minor errors in detail, but I believe the total mosaic that has been pieced together, shard by shard, is as accurate a presentation of the Incident as can be accomplished by one who begins to study an event after it has been history for many years. I am pleased to have completed the project but certainly I shall miss it.

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How is the project a contribution to knowledge? First, it is the most complete compilation in the world of data on the subject. Second, I have obtained declassification of the "Clark Clifford Report," all of the "Hot Line" messages sent during the Six Day War that were not previously declassified, twenty-two documents from the National Security Agency (NSA), and thirty-one documents from the National Security Files (National Security Council). I have additional declassification appeals pending before the CIA, NSA, and the Department of Defense. I have obtained numerous heretofore classified Israeli documents including gun camera film, war logs, and other Israeli documents which are now a part of the database along with some Israeli documents which remain classified.[2] My hundreds of personal interviews have further broadened the knowledge available on this incident in both the U.S. and in Israel. Through the construction of a detailed time line, I have demonstrated the impossibility of several of the doubters' theories.

I have done my best to provide as complete and as accurate an investigation as possible. I have attempted to provide sufficient data to permit anyone who wishes to validate some of my conclusions to do so with ease. I am certain the work is not perfect and for any errors, I take full responsibility. I believe the research is more complete than any prior investigation. There are only a few instances where I believe someone has prevaricated and I have

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specifically pointed out those special instances with my reason for coming to such a conclusion. Of those who espouse one or more of the doubters' theories, I generally attribute factual disputes to memory that is inaccurate or replaced by vivid imagination. In other cases the disagreement may be a difference in perspective or political point of view.

About the Dissertation

In order that my findings about the Liberty incident pass the criteria for a Ph.D. dissertation, I understand that I have to discuss the methodology that I use and explain the logic of my argument as reflected in the organization and sequence of the chapters.

Methodology

I do not use any of the sophisticated methodologies of political science, nor do I propose to discuss the debates about methodologies and other philosophical issues sweeping through the international relations field. I have decided to adopt the simplest and most straightforward methodology largely in order not to compound any further my problem of having too much data to handle in the first place. I also avoid as far as possible unnecessary political science jargon. I create a framework that helps me rather than hinders me, particularly in terms of the organization of the dissertation.

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The methodology I use is based on a mix of historical and political science analysis.

My approach is historical in the sense that I treat the events covered in the dissertation as unique and singular. Their authenticity rests in the surface of events themselves rather than being derived by reference to similar events.

My purpose is to explain one and only one incident and not to create a model for understanding similar events in the past or in the future. Therefore, I do not construct a model with numerous variables which would then be compared with a historic situation in the framework of a given case. That is why I have rejected a suggestion of using a bureaucratic politics model devised by G. Allison, applied with mixed success to the Cuban missile crisis. Except to make another argument, I consciously do not make comparisons with any other incidents of "friendly fire" throughout history or during the Cold War. My purpose is to contribute to our knowledge about one tragic, as yet not fully understood, incident.

To the basically historical method, I add a touch of political science methodology - and then only to be used as a rough guide. As I explain in Chapter 3, I take Carl Hempel's notion of "pattern of scientific explanation"* as a guide in order that I can organize more lucidly the massive material I

---

* Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966; and Carl G. Hempel, "Reasons and Covering Laws in Historical Explanations," in *The Philosophy of History*, edited by Patrick Gardiner, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 90-105.

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assembled. I take Hempel's dissection of elements involved in an explanation and, with its help, clarify the structure of my argument and the many different explanations of the Liberty incident. For the final question of which explanation is right or wrong, I am guided by Sir Karl Popper's falsificationism,** an approach still much in use in political science.

Chapter Outline

The mixture of my politico-historical falsificationist approach directs more or less the structure of my dissertation in terms of the understanding of mental processes involved in arriving at explanations as could be gleaned from the following Table I-1 which I borrow from Hempel and adapt to Liberty:

	E	Description of the Empirical Event - The Liberty Incident		}Explanandum
Explanation	C1, C2 ... Ck	Statements of Antecedent Conditions		}
logical deductions	L1, L2 ... L	Laws (or General Laws)		}Explanans
inferences		emotional/ideological biases		}

Thus, Chapter One ("8 June 1967"), provides a description of the Liberty tragedy together with those of the events immediately preceding, i.e., the antecedent conditions (E and

** For the discussion of the framework, see below, Chapter Three.

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uncontroversial Cs of Hempel's schema), which do not appear to be subject to controversy.

In Chapter Two ("The Various Explanations, Sources Concluding or Accepting the Mistake Theory"), I give an overview of the amazing range of different explanations of the same incident. I sort out the explanations according to their authors and their status (U.S., Israeli, etc., official reports, explanations by private individuals, journalists, writers, or scholars) and according to the conclusions they reach (whether the Liberty incident was or was not a mistake). In Hempel's terms, this is the amazing exercise epitomizing how different histories are made. All storytellers start with the same E, but since their understanding of what Hempel refers to as reasons and covering laws differs dramatically also reflecting their emotional and ideological biases (which I add to Hempel), we end up with not one story, but dozens, doubting whether the story tellers are actually talking about the same U.S.S. Liberty attacked on 8 June 1967.

Chapter 3 ("Explaining the Explanations") opens with a tabular presentation of all explanations, proceeding to categorizing in detail their structure, elements, and logic. In Hempel's terms, I study the different "antecedent conditions" adduced by the authors to constitute the **key**, or main proximate cause of their verdict and apply to many of them a falsification test. I point to the possibly erroneous

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C's due to misperception, misinformation, miscommunication, deception, sabotage, or straight incompetence.

In Chapter 4 ("Historiography"), I examine the author's vantage point or purpose that I subsume under Hempel's laws, by reference to which explicitly or implicitly the explanation is deduced from explanans and explanandum. I point to the ideological biases arguably clouding everybody's judgment or guiding the choice of evidence in the politically and emotionally fraught circumstances of the Cold War.

Chapter 5 ("What Happened and Why") removes from the stories of the Liberty incident the questionable parts and presents the story in as objective a manner as possible. The reader will note that the author does not sink into the cynical relativism of social science that postulates that all narrators have their stories, none of which is more true than the other and ultimately they refer not to one U.S.S. Liberty but to many different Libertys in stories which are "incommensurable." Instead, it postulates that values, such as U.S. or Israeli national interests and integrity of witnesses and writers, are real and have a legitimate place in historical enquiry. It is the author's conclusion, based on these explicitly acknowledged values and also on nine years of meticulous research and accumulation of massive evidence (some of which is included in Appendices and numerous charts), that the Liberty incident was no more than a tragic mistake.

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Structure of IDF Military Involved in the Attacks I-2



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Endnotes

1. In the Stark Incident, the Commanding Officer of the Stark, Glenn R. Brindel, was permitted to retire as a Commander, one rank below the rank he had achieved and he, as well as his Tactical Action Officer, LT Basil Moncrief, and the Executive Officer, LCDR R.J. Gajan, were issued letters of reprimand. After brief newspaper coverage and an agreement by Iraq to pay compensation for lives, injuries, and *damages*, the matter seemed to fade away. Department of the Navy, "Memorandum for NRIA List 60 (Series) Recipients," September 1987; and Don Oberdorfer and Edward Walsh, "Iraq to Pay Damages for Attack," *Washington Post*, May 22, 1987.

2. Israeli security is extremely tight. In Israel it is against the law to publish the name or print the picture of any member of the Israeli Defense Forces with the exception of the High Command; the Commanders of the Northern, Central and Southern Commands, and the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The I.D.F. History report in both Hebrew and English remains classified although a copy was delivered to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations. I obtained copies from several sources and the IDF spokesman is aware of my possession of same. I requested certain war logs, copies of transcripts of audio tapes, pictures, books and other documents. This information was delivered to me by the I.D.F. In some cases the time from request to acquisition was more than a year. I was asked to sign certain secrecy agreements and objected to same. I negotiated about the terms of the agreements but never actually came to terms or signed. I have honored my oral agreements with I.D.F. Field Security and have not disclosed information about certain places I was permitted to visit. All the documentation I received, I have included in my files and binders, that includes items which as far as I know were never declassified in the manner that the U.S. Department of Defense declassifies documents. Some documents still include legends like:

> This paper contains information concerning the country's security. Whoever finds this document must bring it immediately to the closest Police Station or Military Police Station. Whoever publishes this document or part of it as it is written will be brought to trial and punished according to law.
> Secret.

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CHAPTER ONE

8 JUNE 1967

On June 5, 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a series of strikes that left the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian air forces almost totally destroyed in less than eighty minutes. Three armored columns led by General (Aluf) Israel Tal, in the north, General (Aluf) Avraham Yoffe (a reserve officer) in the center and General (Aluf) Ariel Sharon in the south, pushed off into the Sinai. By Thursday, June 8, 1967, they had overcome almost all opposition, destroyed or encircled the Egyptian Third Army, and were within walking distance of the Suez Canal. Although Israel had requested that Jordan stay out of the war, Jordan had joined in and began shelling Israel. The Israeli response was an assault on the West Bank and east Jerusalem, led by central front commander, General (Aluf) Uzi Narkiss, resulting in the complete push back of the Jordan Legion and the capture of the entire West Bank including Hebron with its cave of Machpelah and east Jerusalem.

In the north, the Israelis fought a holding action against the Syrians while the local residents and the northern front commander, General (Aluf) David Eleazer, strongly urged for the opening of an offensive against Syria.

In the Mediterranean, there was some submarine activity and some shelling of Israeli forces from the sea in the vicinity of El Arish on Wednesday, June 7, 1967. On the night

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of June 7, 1967, the Israeli destroyer flotilla, consisting of three destroyers, was called to face three attacking destroyers, presumed to be Egyptian. This proved a false alarm. In the Red Sea, the Israeli navy landed a rubber boat commanded by Sergeant (Samal) Ami Aylon, who, with half a dozen sailors, captured Sharm el-Sheikh, which was undefended because the Egyptian forces had withdrawn. The Navy of Israel had also launched six underwater demolition teams into Egyptian and Syrian ports, but these attacks were generally ineffective.

By June 8, 1967, the war was going well for Israel and tanks and other armor were being transported north to the Syrian front. The primary route for this transport was within eye view of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. Israel kept the United States fully informed of its operations.[1] On June 8, 1967, the U.S. Ambassador, W. Barbour, sent two secret messages to the State Department in Washington commenting on the imminent Israeli attack on Syria.[2]

On June 8, the news around the world was that Israel was on a roll. Leading newspapers in the Western world, on June 8, 1967, carried the following headlines and leadlines:

London Times:
"ISRAEL OFFERS ARABS CEASE-FIRE"
"TANKS WITHIN SIGHT OF CANAL"
"Surrender in Gaza Strip"
"Husain flight to Europe reported"
"BLOW AT SYRIA NOW"[3]

Paris, Le Figaro:
"NOUVEL APPEL DU COUNSEIL DE SECURITE POUR UN CESSEZ-LE-FEU IMMEDIAT"

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(New appeal of Security Council for an immediate cease fire)
"TEL-AVIV: NOTRE VICTORIE EST TOTAL"
(TEL-AVIV: our victory is total)[4]

Rome, Il Messagero:
"GLI ARABI IGNORANO L' ONU SI CONTINUA A COMBATTERE"
"The Arabs ignore the United Nations organization, They continue the combat"
"IL CONSIGLIO DI SICUREZZA CONVOCATO NUOVAMENTE AVENA"
"The Security Counsel convenes a new meeting?"
"....-Larga parte del territorio Giordano Gi'a occupato Dalle truppe di Moshe Dayan"
"....-(A) large part of the territory of Jordan is occupied by troops of Moshe Dayan"
"HUSSEIN IN FUGA?"
"HUSSEIN IN RETREAT?"
"Mosca Minaccia misure contro Israele se non ferma subito le truppe - Gli Israeliana nella zona del canal di Suez - I Siriani entrano in Israele - Il re di Giordania avrebbe lasciato Amman"
"Moscow preparing measures against Israel if it does not stop the troops - The Israelis near the zone of the Suez Canal- the Syrians enter into Israel - Most of the Jordanians have left Amman"
"La travolgente marcia delle truppe di Dayan Gli Egiziani tentano una difesa al passo di Mitla."
"The majority consensus of the troops of Dayan, the Egyptians to maintain a defense of the Mitla pass."[5]

New York Times:
"ISRAELIS ROUT THE ARABS, APPROACH SUEZ, BREAK BLOCKADE, OCCUPY OLD JERUSALEM, AGREE TO CEASE-FIRE; UAR REJECTS IT"[6]

Wall Street Journal:
"WHATS NEWS ---- *** WORLD -WIDE, ISRAEL CLAIMED victory over Egypt as its forces broke the Gulf of Aqaba blockade."[7]

Chicago Tribune:
"ISRAEL, JORDAN O.K. TRUCE"
"Retreating Egyptians Fight Back - BATTLE TO FLEE ACROSS SUEZ CANAL - Blockade Broken by Israelis"[8]

Miami Herald:
"<u>Ceasefire With Jordan in Effect</u> ISRAEL CLAIMS VICTORY, OFFERS A 'JUST' PEACE"
Israel declared Wednesday it had defeated Egypt in three days of lighting warfare.... 'We made mincemeat of their air forces. We are now making

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> mincemeat of everything on the ground.' Israeli Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Itzhak Rabin said in an exultant news conference."[9]

Washington Post:

> "ISRAEL ROUTS ARABS, FREES GULF; TRUCE IN JORDAN; EGYPT DEFIANT"
>
> "Only Syria of the Arab States said its forces were advancing in Northeastern Israel but the indications were that the Israeli [*sic*] had considered this the lesser front; **perhaps yet to be dealt with**." (Emphasis added)[10]

In June 1967, it was less than five years since the world was on the brink of disaster with the October Cuban Missile Crisis.[11] The Hot Line linking Moscow and Washington, which was installed following the withdrawal of the world from the brink of nuclear disaster in 1962, had been used only once each year to transmit reciprocal New Year's greetings. It got its first real use on the first day of the war, June 5, 1967. Secretary McNamara was awakened in the middle of the night by a telephone call from a first class petty officer[12] in the Pentagon advising him that a message had arrived via Hot Line from Premier Kosygin addressed to President Johnson.[13] When McNamara asked why he was being called, he was told that the hotline ended in the Pentagon. There was no link to the White House. Secretary McNamara remembers thinking, "With billions in the defense budget, we cannot afford a telephone line from the hotline terminus in the Pentagon to the White House." He soon had that remedied.[14]

As the events in the Middle East began unfolding, the United States was mired in Vietnam. During the week of June 5, 1967, 187 U.S. military personnel were killed in Vietnam.

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The Cold War was intense. In the Middle East, the United States had suffered a series of fiascos and the Soviets had made significant gains, especially in Syria. In the Mediterranean the Soviets were flexing their newly developed naval power. Soviet warships and intelligence gatherers dogged the U.S. Sixth Fleet and both the United States and the Soviet warships played games of "chicken", where a warship would establish a collision course with another warship and each ship held course and speed while awaiting the opponent ship to break off or change course. There were a number of bumps and minor collisions over a period of a few years until much later when the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy signed the "Incidents at Sea Agreement" on May 25, 1972.[15] As the 1967 war continued, Soviet ships were cruising with and harassing the aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet during flight operations. This was quite hazardous and, on June 7, 1967, Vice Admiral Martin, the Sixth Fleet Commander sent a strong message to a Soviet ship demanding that they cease and desist their interference with flight operations.[16]

In 1967, the U.S. Navy consisted of 940 major warships and 8,300 naval aircraft.[17] Most of the ships were dedicated to the Vietnam effort in southeast Asia and attached to the Seventh Fleet. In the Mediterranean, part of the Sixth Fleet consisted of what are today called Battle Groups. Then they were referred to as Carrier Divisions or Task Groups. The United States had ordered its carriers near Crete, at least

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four hundred miles from the Egyptian-Israeli battle zone. The Sixth Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Martin was aboard his flagship, the cruiser, U.S.S. Little Rock commanding the aircraft carriers America, CV-66 and Saratoga, CV-60 each with their destroyer screens and support ships. They were in the area of Greece and their presence there conveyed to the Soviet Union an important symbolic message.

The Soviet Navy consisted of 1,860 ships of which about 610 were major warships as compared to the 940 major warships of the U.S. Navy. In 1967, the Soviets had no aircraft carriers to match the two U.S. aircraft carriers deployed in the Mediterranean.[18] On May 22, 1967, the Soviets gave notice pursuant to the Montreux Convention that they would be bringing ten warships from their bases in the Black Sea through the Bosphorus into the Eastern Mediterranean. The ten day notice provision of the convention would have permitted their passage and entry into the Mediterranean as early as June 1, 1967. There is no reliable information on the actions or positions of these ten Soviet warships as of June 8.

The British full size aircraft carrier HMS Victorious entered the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal on May 22, 1967. On June 8th it was somewhere west of Suez. The British carrier HMS Hermes departed Aden for Singapore on May 18, 1967. On June 8, it was somewhere in the Indian Ocean.[19]

The Egyptian Navy in 1967 consisted of 127 warships. Egypt had six former Soviet Skoryi Destroyers which have two

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smoke stacks. The rest of the Egyptian destroyers were a collection of former British destroyers, 2 "Z" or "ZED", 1 "Black Swan", 1 "River", 1 "Hunt", and 1 "Flower."[20] Of particular interest, because of its similar hull shape and configuration to the Liberty, is an Egyptian troop ship called the El Quesir.[21] This old ship had little offensive or defensive capability and was in poor condition. It was tied to a pier in Alexandria, Egypt on June 5, 1967. It is doubtful that it moved during the entire war. In the Egyptian Navy only the El Quesir and the Zed class destroyers had single smoke stacks.

The Syrian Navy consisted of 2 former Soviet "T 43" Minesweepers, 3 former French "Ch" Patrol Vessels, 10 former Soviet "Komar" missile boats and 15 former Soviet motor torpedo boats.[22] There is no indication that any Syrian Naval vessels ventured out of port during the war.

The Israeli Navy consisted of 29 warships.[23] Israel's destroyer flotilla, consisting of Eilat (formerly HMS Zealous), Jaffa (formerly HMS Zodiac), both British "Zed" class, ships and the Haifa (formerly Egyptian Destroyer, Ibrahim-al-Awal, formerly Chinese destroyer Lin Fu, originally HMS Mendip, a Hunt class) were patrolling the coast of Israel near Tel Aviv. The submarines were at sea and their positions are not known. Six of the motor torpedo boats were based at Ashdod and were operating from Latakia, Syria in the north to

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Alexandria, Egypt in the south. Three other motor torpedo boats were in the Red Sea.

In 1967, President Johnson was focused on his war on poverty and only begrudgingly gave his attention to Vietnam. On June 2, 1967, two USAF aircraft attacked the Soviet merchant ship, Turkestan, in the North Vietnamese port of Cam Pha. They dropped a bomb and strafed its deck killing one crew member and injuring others. The United States denied that any such attack had taken place.[24] Eventually, the facts became known and the United states was substantially embarrassed vis-a-vis the Soviets.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that since the Spring of 1967, the Soviets had been providing false information to Syria about an alleged Israeli military buildup on the Syrian/Israeli border. Egypt was heavily engaged militarily in the civil war in Yemen. Its military was further occupied in assisting Iraq maintain order in Baghdad. President Nasser of Egypt entered the war of words between Syria and Israel. Perhaps his intent was to support his claim to leadership of the Arab world. He rushed to become the defender of Syria against the non-existent Israeli threat. President Nasser declared a blockade of the Straits of Tiran and demanded the withdrawal of the U.N. Forces in the Sinai and Gaza.

He knew that as a condition to obtain withdrawal by Israel in 1957, the United States had assured Israel that the

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Straits of Tiran would remain open to Israeli navigation *and that the closing of the Straits would be a causus belli.* President Eisenhower made that assurance to Israel, and President Nasser had full knowledge of the promise and every reason to remember the promise. Under international law, a blockade is an act of war. In addition, this blockade was a specific breach of the Israeli/U.S./Egyptian agreement that it would be a *causus belli* if the Straits of Tiran were closed to Israel.

President Nasser's second move, the request for the withdrawal of the U.N. Force, was equally bold. Initially, Egypt asked only for a partial withdrawal. The United Nations responded that only a complete withdrawal was possible, they could not partially withdraw. U.N. Secretary General U-Thant acted with what some describe as undue haste. Without referring the Egyptian request to the Security Council or the General Assembly, he granted the request and began the withdrawal of U.N. Forces on May 19, 1996, at 1700 (5:00 P.M., Sinai Time). On that date, U.S.S. Liberty was in Abidjan, Ivory Coast on the west coast of Africa. U.N. Forces began withdrawing and Egypt announced its forces were entering the Sinai in large numbers.

U.S. satellite surveillance at the time was in its infancy.[25] The National Security Agency ordered U.S.S. Liberty to a position off the Sinai where it could observe and listen to the action on the coastal road, the Via Maris.

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Liberty was to report on the U.N. withdrawal and the Egyptian entry into the Sinai.

In the last days of May, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, made visits to Paris, London and Washington in an effort to work things out diplomatically. The reception he received during his two week mission was mixed. In Paris, General Charles de Gaulle was cold.[26] In London, Prime Minister Wilson was lukewarm.[27] In Washington, however, President Johnson was warm and sympathetic.[28] Johnson told Eban, you won't be alone if you don't go alone.[29]

The United States efforts to build a coalition of maritime nations to send an armada to break the blockade failed. U.N. Secretary General U-Thant tried to intervene and flew to Cairo to talk peace to Nasser. First he could not get an audience and then he could not get any kind of a commitment from Egypt. He left Cairo empty handed. Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State, put his hopes on a meeting with Egyptian Vice President Zakaria Muhyi al-Din (the name is frequently written Mohieddin or numerous other spellings) who was scheduled to arrive in Washington on Wednesday, June 7, 1967.

The region was abuzz with other diplomatic activities. On May 30, 1967, King Hussein of Jordan surprised the world by flying to Egypt and signing a joint military pact with Egypt which purportedly placed the Jordanian armed forces under Egyptian command. Also, the Iraqi army entered Jordan, en route to the Israeli border.

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While Dean Rusk waited the arrival of Egyptian Vice President Zakaria Muhyi al-Din, Israel perceived its position to be deteriorating. On Sunday, June 4, 1967, the national unity cabinet met and voted to strike on the morning of June 5, 1967. Moshe Dayan had been named to the cabinet on June 1, 1967, and given the Defense Portfolio. His appointment made little difference to the battle plans which had been completed long before his appointment by Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin.[30]

And it is thus that at 0745, Sinai time, 0145 Washington time of June 5, Israel launched its entire Air Force[31] against Egyptian air fields. In eighty minutes the Israeli Air Force destroyed a major portion of the Egyptian Air Force. The Israeli army began a three pronged attack across the Sinai towards the Suez Canal while also fighting on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts.

When the fighting began, the U.S.S. Liberty[32] was in the western Mediterranean, having left the U.S. Naval base at Rota, Spain, after reprovisioning and picking up some arabic linguists to add to her Russian linguists. There were no Hebrew linguists aboard.[33] Liberty was sailing towards her patrol sector off Sinai. As of the morning of June 5, 1967, the mission of Liberty had been overcome by events (OBE in military lingo). Unfortunately, Liberty's orders did not tell her commanding officer the "why" of her mission, only the "what." Ennes reported three Soviet Destroyers stalking

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Liberty at a distance of 6,000 yards following Liberty's entry into the Mediterranean, but no such contacts are entered in the Liberty log. Then she was alone for the remainder of her transit to point Alpha until at 1420 local time on June 7 she saw an "unidentified merchant ship" at 4800 yards (a little less than 2.5 nautical miles). The name of the ship, Bencleugh, was apparently observed and noted but she was logged as "registry unknown." Ten minutes later Liberty passed within 1,500 yards of a "Greek merchant, Ioanis Aspilotis."[34]

On June 7, 1967, the Israeli coast was shelled from the sea by Egyptian warships.[35] The log of the U.S.S. Liberty indicates that as the day of June 8, 1967 began, Liberty was at Latitude 31-59 North Longitude 32-24 East Latitude. This placed her in the Mediterranean about 300 statute miles[36] south of the coast of Turkey, about 170 miles west southwest of the tip of the island of Cyprus, about 150 miles from the nearest coastal point of Israel, about 150 miles northeast of Cairo, Egypt, almost abeam Port Said, and about 50 miles north of the coast of Egypt.[37]

Lieutenant James G. O'Conner was the Officer of the Day. Liberty was "steaming independently enroute from Rota, Spain to Op - Area 7-67. Course ... 090, Speed ... 10 knots IAW (in accordance with) CINCUSNAVEUR MOVORD 7-67. (Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe movement order 7-67.) Condition of readiness III modified and material condition Yoke[38]... set

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throughout the ship..."[39] Liberty was proceeding easterly to a point on the water designated in her orders as Point Alpha. This point was at Latitude 31-27 North and Longitude 34-00 East. The point was located 12.5 nautical miles north of the coast of the Sinai, about 18 miles east of the Village of El Arish.

The PLAN OF THE DAY for Thursday, June 8, 1967, called for Officers and Chief Petty Officers to wear Tropical Wash Khaki uniforms and prescribed Dungarees for the enlisted men.[40] It directed only routine activities in accordance with U.S.S. LIBERTY Instruction P5400.1. Under "Notes" the plan indicated the hours of operation of the Soda Fountain, Ship's Store and Clothing and Small Stores. As Note 1 and as Note 2., it provided "Chemical Warfare Information." It was signed by P.M. Armstrong, LCDR, USN, Executive Officer.

Liberty had received several sets of orders[41] since sailing from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, on May 25, 1967. The operative orders, as day began on board Liberty on June 8, 1967, were to proceed to point Alpha, which was west of the Gaza Strip and then turn westerly towards Egypt and begin a patrol from Point Alpha to point Bravo and then to point Charlie. At the conclusion of this patrol, Liberty was to return to Point Alpha and then repeat the patrol. The points formed a triangle starting near the border between The Sinai and Israel and running west from the border, along the coastal road, (Via Maris) towards Suez City and Port Said. At the

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time these orders were issued, the Gaza Strip was occupied and controlled by Egypt. This patrol did not place Liberty off any coast of Israel. Its closest direct distance from the ship's patrol course to Israel was across the Gaza Strip, a distance of 25 nautical miles.

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Map - Liberty Points A, B, C, and Israeli Point Boaz adapted from Page 30 of NSA Report 1-1


LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
ISRAEL
TEL AVIV
POINT A
POINT B
POINT C
POINT OF ATTACK
"BOAZ"
SUEZ CANAL
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
AL'ARISH
31°
32°
33°
34°
35°
SECRET
FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN FROM KIDD. DELIVER AT BREAKFAST.
1. REF TELECON, YOUR 1417482 NOT RCVD AS OF 1423552Z. HOWEVER
REQUESTED 8 JUNE CHRONOLOGY FOLLOWS:
A. APPROACHING LAND FROM THE WEST DURING THE EARLY MORNING
HOURS OF 8 JUNE, PROJECTED OPERATIONS OF LIBERTY FOR THE
MORNING AND AFTERNOON OF THE DAY WAS TO PROCEED TO A POINT
13 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE COAST OF UAR AT 31-27.2N 34-00E
(POINT ALPHA) THENCE TO 31-22.3N 33-42E (POINT BRAVO) THENCE
TO 31-31N 33-08E, (POINT CHARLIE) RETRACING THIS TRACK
UNTIL NEW ORDERS RECEIVED. SHIP WOULD OPERATE NORTH OF THIS
TRACK LINE AT ALL TIMES. IF FIXES COULD NOT BE ACCURATELY
OBTAINED AS POINT CHARLIE WAS APPROACHED IT WAS INTENDED
TO HEAD DUE NORTH UNTIL THE 100 FATHOM CURVE WAS CROSSED
AND THE TRACK MOVED TO THE NORTH TO MORE OR LESS MOVE BACK AND
FORTH ON THE GENERAL AVERAGE OF THE 100 FATHOM CURVE.
AN EXCERPT FROM
U.S. NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
EXHIBIT 27
PAGINATION 423
AJC TAD 111

Point "Boaz," about 31-36N 33-15E was the only exit point designated by the Israeli Air Force for all flights going into or out of Egypt and the Sinai

Note: The NSA apparently overlooked the dissolution of the UAR on Sept. 28, 1961.

(U) The projected track of the *Liberty* on the day of attack. Adapted from Page 30 of NSA Report (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

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As June 8, 1967, began, Israel had been at war for two days, sixteen hours and fifteen minutes. It was the fourth calendar day of the war and the war was going well for Israel. At the stroke of midnight in the combat area, the time in London was still the day before and two hours earlier. In Washington, D.C., it was also the day before and six hours earlier.

The crew of Liberty had gone to their bunks that night with the knowledge that radio broadcasts, to which they listened, were stressing that no U.S. ship was within three hundred miles of the combat area. They had been amused by the little secret to which they were privy; that in spite of the public pronouncements, by morning, Liberty would be in the combat area, or as one of the crew put it, "by the morning we'll be smelling smoke."[42]

Sunrise was at 0514 Sinai time.[43] The Liberty crew did not know that at least five messages changing Liberty's present orders and directing her to stay clear or pull back, were lost in the Naval communications system. The Naval communications system, which generally transmitted messages over encoded teletype, did not reach many ships at sea because their equipment did not handle messages of higher classification such as secret or top secret. Thus, messages so encrypted, such as the messages sent to the Liberty, would be received by higher authorities equipped to receive same and would be delayed in arriving at the ship to which it was

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directed. Some of the orders had been transmitted in error to the Philippines and would ultimately be received by Liberty after the air and naval attacks.[44] The "pull back" orders had their origin in the concern of Frank Raven at NSA[45] and were transmitted to Liberty by the JCS.[46]

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Plotting Map

The projected track of the Liberty.


Excerpt from Liberty Deck Log shows the arrival at Point Alpha and turning to 253° at 0849. The more widely accepted time of arrival at Point Alpha is 0832.
0800-12 STEAMING AS BEFORE 0808 CROSSED 100 FATHOM CURVE 0849 C/C TO 253. 0905 C/S TO 5 KNOTS. 0934 SIGHTED EL' ARISH MINERT, BRG. 283 DISTANCE 20 MILES. 1038 UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT ORBITED (2) MILES AFT PORT BEAM THEN RETURNED TO MAINLAND AT 1052. 1124 UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT CIRCLED SHIP. 1132 C/C TO 253.
W.L. MCGONAGLE CDR. USN
120/17 71.4 NM
1825
180/10 18 NM
2013
Estimated position at midnight, June 7, 1967
090/10 68 NM
0300
060/10 3 NM
123/10 29 NM
0553
123/10 14 NM
123/10 14 NM
190/10 3 NM
0630
0754
0613
0800
0849
POINT C
POINT OF ATTACK
POINT B
POINT A
100 FATHOM LINE
100 FATHOM LINE
Haifa
Tel Aviv
Jerusalem
Ashdod
ISRAEL
Gaza
Port Said
El'Arish
Suez Canal
SINAI

Note:

This chart is not constructed with the precision of current navigation standards. The data used is from the Liberty deck logs. This map fairly demonstrates Liberty's approach to Point Alpha.

At 0838,[47] Liberty reached Point Alpha.[48] She changed course to 253 degrees[49] and a few minutes later at 0903 she reduced speed from fifteen to five knots.[50] She steamed for point Bravo, 31-22 North, 33-42 East, which was achieved at about 1130.[51] Course was changed to 283 degrees to steer for point Charlie, 31-31 North, 33-00 East. Liberty was now sailing from east to west about 12 to 14 miles off the coast of the Sinai with her bow pointed in the direction of Port Said, Egypt. From early morning on, large numbers of military aircraft overflew or flew near Liberty.[52]

As June 8, 1967, began, the nearest elements of the United States Sixth Fleet were Task Group 60.1 (TG 60.1). The task group was commanded by Vice Admiral William I. Martin, Commander, Sixth Fleet. He was aboard his flag ship the U.S.S. Little Rock (CLG-4), which was steaming in company with the aircraft carrier America (CVA-66). The 1200 Little Rock position was 33-51.5N, 25-24.5E. America was commanded by Captain Don Engen, USN.[53] America had Commander Carrier Division Four, RADM Lawrence Geis, embarked.[54] At 1200 America was about 600 statute miles (520 nautical miles east and north of Point Alpha, just south of the island of Crete, 33-54.6N, 25-20.1E. America had in her screen two destroyers that would become players later that day and the next. U.S.S. Davis (DD 937) was at 34-14N, 23-40E and U.S.S. Massey (DD 778) was at 34-15N, 23-37E. The aircraft carrier Saratoga (CVA-60), commanded by Captain Joseph Tully, was about 20

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nautical miles north of America and about 100 nautical miles further west or away from Point Alpha, 35-15.2N, 23-39.3E. She was in passage from Majorca, Spain, to Soudha Bay, Crete.[55] Sara[56] was in the vicinity of Crete, Greece, about 500 to 600 nautical miles from the battle zone as had been publicly stated on the floor of the United Nations by the United States on June 4, 1967.[57] In fact, a news conference was scheduled for June 8, 1967, aboard the U.S.S. America.[58] On the previous day, President Nasser of Egypt, had charged that the air strikes against Egypt had been conducted not by the Israeli Air Force but by U.S. and British carrier based aircraft. The U.S. was about to refute that charge to the media, who were aboard the carrier, America, and who had first hand eye witness knowledge that U.S. carrier aircraft were nowhere near the combat zone.

During the morning, America was being harassed by a "U.S.S.R. Patrol Craft" which "began maneuvering within screen in close proximity" to America while she was conducting flight operations.[59] Saratoga traversed the distance from its 1200 position and was within a mile and a half (3000 yards) of America.[60]

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Map - Mediterranean Showing U.S. 6th Fleet (America, Saratoga, Little Rock, Davis, and Massey), British Warship Deployment, and Liberty 1-3



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Prior to 1200, Liberty observed a huge explosion in the town of El Arish.[61] At 1200 Liberty observed "thick black smoke extending for miles along the beach..."[62] Additional explosions at El Arish were observed at 1300 and 1330.[63] At 1310 Liberty conducted a general quarters drill. All hands manned their battle stations and the ship was made ready to fight. This was a drill which had been conducted every day at about this time since Liberty left Rota, Spain.[64] There is a certain irony here. As a matter of international law Liberty was a warship.[65] But she in fact was a converted freighter hull. Her speed was limited. Her protective armor was all but non-existent and her weaponry, offensive and defensive, consisted solely of her four fifty caliber Browning machine guns.[66] As a matter of fact, Liberty had neither the ability to attack nor to defend herself against any significant force.*

---

* What should have been self-evident following the Liberty incident was ignored with furtner tragic results. A little over a year later when Liberty's sister ship, the U.S.S. Pueblo, GER-2, was boarded and captured approximately thirteen nautical miles off the coast of North Korea on January 23, 1968. Pueblo was slightly smaller than Liberty and even less lightly armed.

On January 23, 1968, Pueblo was on an intelligence gathering mission in international waters in the sea of Japan. A North Korean patrol boat ordered the U.S. ship to heave to or be fired upon. Pueblo continued on course and the North Korean craft was joined by more patrol boats which fired on Pueblo, injuring four crewmen. The 92 man crew was taken prisoner and held until December 23, 1968. During their time in captivity the sailors were physically and psychologically tortured. Naval Internal Relations Activity (NIRA) bulletin INFORMATION FOR YOUR USE, August 1989, p. 6.

On December 22, 1989, Pueblo crew members were authorized by Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett III, to wear the Prisoner of War (POW) Medal. NIRA bulletin INFORMATION FOR YOUR USE, February 1990, p. 6.

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Fifty Caliber Gun Tub 1-4



LIBERTY 50 CALIBER GUN TUB
COURTESY OF STEPHEN J. RICHARD, FORMER LIBERTY CREWMAN

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Captain William McGonagle, the Commanding Officer of the Liberty, ordered secure from battle stations at 1348.[67] Liberty was indeed smelling smoke. None of the messages from the NSA (National Security Agency) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing her to stay 100 miles clear[68] had been received. The weather was clear and visibility was confirmed by Liberty as at least twenty-five miles. It was probably better. The Liberty was painted light gray and had four gun mounts aboard, two forward and two aft. A United States ensign (flag) was raised on the starboard halyard,[69] as is the custom of ships (both merchant ships and warships) on the high seas. The flag was five feet by eight feet in size. It was brand new and clean and bright of color when it was run up that morning.[70] On the Liberty, the Captain and crew were intent on carrying out their orders although they seemed to be aware of danger. The Captain had in fact conferred with LCDR Lewis about withdrawing back over the horizon.[71]

In the Pentagon and at NSA, it was, no doubt, initially presumed that Liberty received the first message and had stayed clear. As time passed with no confirmation of receipt of her message traffic, concern developed and additional messages were sent.[72]

In Israel, Naval Operations were controlled from Naval Headquarters in Haifa[73] while Air Force[74] and Army operations were controlled from a headquarters in Tel Aviv called the pit in the Kirya.[75]

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In 1948, the Israeli Navy had taken over an old British headquarters on the western slope of Mount Carmel, near the top. The complex consisted of a few buildings and some underground rooms or bunkers from which the British operated prior to 1948. There was a war room which was connected to Naval Intelligence headquarters by a hallway. The complex is called Stella Maris and remains a Naval facility today. It is no longer Naval Headquarters. One of the lessons the IDF believes it learned from the Liberty Incident is that splitting its command and control with the Army and Air Force at Tel Aviv, in the Kirya,[76] and the Navy in Haifa is not effective.

Prior to 0600 on the Morning of June 8, 1967, Israeli Naval Intelligence had information that both the United States and the Soviet Union were operating intelligence gathering ships in the eastern Mediterranean but had only position information on a Soviet trawler operating in the north near Syria.

When the Liberty arrived on station at Point Alpha, the Israel Defense Forces were engaged on the Syrian front in the north, on the Jordanian front in the east[77] and on the Egyptian front in the south. The major activity on the Egyptian front was in the vicinity of the Suez Canal about sixty miles west of the Liberty patrol station. There was some activity in the vicinity of El Arish.

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Explosions in the vicinity of El Arish were occurring within eyesight of Liberty. The explosions were recorded in the Liberty 1300 and 1330 log entries. Just as the crew of Liberty could see the explosions at El Arish, the forces at El Arish could see a gray ship at sea about 14 miles off El Arish.

At 1358, Liberty was attacked[78] by two Mirage IIIC aircraft which approached bow to stern. On the first strafing run, the U.S. flag was shot away from the mast.[79] Each Mirage made three runs and exhausted their ammunition. As the first flight, (Kursa Flight), finished at 1404, a second flight of two Super Mystere aircraft, (Royal Flight), rolled in on the target and continued the attack making their initial approaches from stern to bow and then crisscrossing the ship broadside. The aircraft fire was extremely accurate and devastating. At 1412, Royal Flight pulled off the target.

During the entire air attack, Liberty apparently did not fire a single shot at the attacking aircraft or if she did, the attacking aircraft were not aware thereof. The pilots reported to the chief air controller that there was no "triple A" or "Nun Mem." (An acronym for the hebrew, Neged Matossim, meaning "against aircraft." Today, the United States uses AA or triple A to refer to Anti-Aircraft fire or Anti-Aircraft Artillery fire. In World War II, the United States used FLAK, an acronym for the German word for anti aircraft gun, FlugzugAbWehrKanon.)

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On Liberty, at 1412, the Executive Officer, LCDR Philip Armstrong and LT Stephen Toth were dead and several others were dead or dying. Many were wounded. All electronic internal and external communication capability was destroyed except for single side band "Hi-Com" or plain voice transmission.[80] The mounted aldis lamps used for signaling were destroyed. A large fire was burning on the starboard side just forward of the bridge. At some time after 1412 and prior to 1425, Captain McGonagle ordered the ship's new holiday ensign be hoisted. He was aware that the original flag had been shot away on an early strafing run.[81] This flag was larger than the original ship's flag, being seven feet by thirteen feet.

Liberty immediately began to transmit on Hi-com, high frequency 11256.50 in plain voice. The rough radio log and smooth radio log show several transmissions commencing at 1158Z (1358 Sinai). The initial message was "ANY STATION FROM ROCK STAR WE ARE UNDER ATTACK, BE ADVISED WE ARE UNDER ATTACK (MY POSIT 31 23N 33 25E[82]) OVER." The response was "ROCK STAR FROM SCHEMATIC YOU ARE GARBLED, SAY AGAIN OVER." The logs indicate Liberty continued trying to reach Schematic, which was Saratoga or any station, without success. Liberty changed transmitters and continued to transmit.[83] The rough and smooth radio logs show that Liberty had been hit by a torpedo and was listing nine degrees at 1217Z (1417 Sinai). The air attack had ended only five minutes before at 1412 Sinai time.

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The logs then show that the MTBs came along side and offered help at 1427 Sinai time. This was almost eight minutes before the torpedo attack. When one is under intense fire, there are probably other things on one's mind than glancing at a clock or watch. It may be assumed that the Liberty radio shack began sending their message within minutes of the beginning of the attack and that the time entries of some of the ensuing events are not entirely accurate. The Liberty call for help was finally received on the U.S.S. Saratoga at 1432 Sinai time.[84] Saratoga sent a message to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe three minutes later.[85] Strangely, it was sent unclassified. "FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR[86] I AM UNDER ATTACK MY POSIT 31 23N 33 25E. I HAVE BEEN HIT. REQUEST IMMED ASSISTANCE."[87] Upon receipt of the message that Liberty was under attack, it was passed to Commanding Officer, Captain Joseph Tully, on the bridge of the Saratoga. Tully tried without success to communicate with his Carrier Division Commander by single side band.[88] At 1435 Captain Tully made a VHF voice Transmission to RADM Geis, the Carrier Division Commander aboard America, saying that he was turning Saratoga into the wind and launching his ready group unless ordered to the contrary. This immediate launch was possible as a result of the professionalism of LCDR Gerry Johnson, the strike operations officer, who had kept the Saratoga ready group fully fueled and armed. Saratoga turned into the wind, raised her foxtrot flag[89] and by 1450, launched her ready aircraft.[90]

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The speed and professionalism of the launch are not in doubt.[91] The aircraft launched were at least four A-1 Skyraiders, some A-4 Skyhawks and perhaps some F-4 Phantoms which made up the ready group. In addition, some A-4 Skyhawks configured as tankers may have been launched. Spitting six or more modern warplanes into the sky in less than ten minutes, with only five minutes notice to launch, is indeed noteworthy. Before the launched aircraft had disappeared over the horizon, RADM Geis had reservations (perhaps about commencing World War III without some order from higher authority) and after consultation with COMSIXTHFLT, ordered the aircraft to return.[92] Some of the aircraft were armed with ordinance that could not be safely brought back aboard ship and those aircraft were diverted to NAF Soudha Bay, Crete.[93]

America was engaged in a nuclear weapons training exercise[94] when the message from Liberty was received by Saratoga at 1432. Her deck was a mess[95] and required substantial respoting of aircraft in order to get ready for launch.[96] Word of the contents of the message from Liberty was forwarded to Vice Admiral Martin aboard Little Rock and passed with Flash precedence to Washington. VADM Martin ordered a second launch from both America and Saratoga at about 1516 Sinai time and recalled the second launch at 1609 Sinai time, 0809EDT.

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During or after the air attacks, Liberty turned to a northerly course which took her away from the Sinai coast. The coast at this point, runs east to west. On a June day at 1425, the sun is in the northern hemisphere, a little more than 20 degrees above the equator. At noon the sun is approximately overhead and descends to the west about 15 degrees an hour. At 1425 the sun was about 57 degrees above the western horizon. The starboard side of the Liberty was the shady side. The three Israeli MTB's approached into the sun.[97] The better position for an air or naval engagement during daylight hours is with the sun to the attacker's back and in the eyes of the defender. The initial Israeli air attack came out of the sun, as tactical doctrine would dictate.

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Air Attack Kursa

Two Mirage III C aircraft attack from bow to stern.

At about 1358 hours, the Liberty was steering 283° degrees, or west. The Sun's position was at an elevation of 58° 50", azimuth of 82° 20". Two Mirage III C aircraft made 3 passes each.



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Air Attack Royal

Two Dessault Super Mystère aircraft attack from stern to bow.

At about 1406 the Royal Flight approached from the stern to the bow and then made a left turn then attacked broadside west to east. Aircraft came from out of the sun on the second and third passes.



About fourteen minutes after the air attack ceased, at 1426, three Motor Torpedo Boats arrived and stopped or idled to the rear of Liberty on the starboard right-hand side about 6000 to 8000 yards, (three to four miles) east of Liberty.[98] At 1428, the motor torpedo boats flashed light signals to Liberty.[99] Captain Mcgonagle had difficulty seeing the signals through the smoke. He did not, at this time, know the nationality of the motor torpedo boats or for that matter the aircraft. Commander McGonagle had previously ordered his gunners to take the approaching torpedo boats under fire.[100] As he observed their light signals, he thought he saw the Israeli flag. He tried to cancel the order to fire on the torpedo boats but it was too late. At 1430 mount 51 fired at the torpedo boats. At 1431 mount 53 opened fire on the center of the three Motor Torpedo Boats.[101] McGonagle ordered Ensign Lucas to go on foot to the gun mount 53 and tell the gunners to cease fire. (There was no sound powered phone or bull horn or other electronic means of communication from the bridge to the gun mounts.) At 1431 the Motor Torpedo Boats returned the fire and began a torpedo and strafing run[102] from east to west, turning northerly down the starboard side of the Liberty. More U.S. sailors died from the strafing. At about 1434 torpedoes were launched. At 1435[103] one torpedo hit Liberty on the starboard side, forward. There was a tremendous explosion and Liberty went dead in the water.

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MTB Torpedo Attack

Torpedo attack all MTB's on the starboard side of Liberty. Attack was toward the sun at an elevation of 50° and azimuth 88°.

Boat 204 launched one torpedo which passed to the aft of the ship. Boat 206 launched two torpedoes which passed to the aft as well. Boat 203 launched two torpedoes, one passed forward and one struck the bow on the starboard side of the ship.



More Liberty crewman died in the NSA compartment and many more were wounded. The final casualty total was 34 killed and 171 wounded.

Soon after the Torpedo Boats completed their runs, they came back to within hailing distance of Liberty and an Israeli Officer hailed Liberty in English. He asked Liberty if she wanted help. The offer was declined. It was now 1440, 42 minutes after the first attack began.

At about 1445, a remarkably brief time after the torpedo hit, the Liberty, listing nine or ten degrees, regained power and got under way.

The Motor Torpedo Boats loitered in the area until about 1717[104] and then withdrew. A number of Israeli helicopters approached the ship and hovered and circled. There were no further attacks and ultimately the helicopters also withdrew.

Word of an attack on the Liberty reached the National Military Command Center in Washington at 0911EDT/1511Sinai time. A report that a U.S. ship was under attack was telephoned from Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR) to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon at 0911EDT (1511 Sinai time).[105] NMCC called NSA with the news at 0915EDT (1515 Sinai).[106]

First word of the attack was received at the White House and given to President Johnson in his bedroom. Johnson had been at work since 0730EDT when he ate his breakfast of chipped beef on toast and tea.[107] Walt Rostow called the

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President by telephone at 0949EDT (1549 Sinai) and advised him that a U.S. Navy ship was under attack in the eastern Mediterranean.[108] All he knew from the initial message from W. W. Rostow was that a U.S. ship was under attack in the eastern Mediterranean (which was all that was known to the Sixth Fleet). He did not initially know the identity of the attacker. This was one hour and fifty-one minutes after the air attack began and over an hour since the naval attack was over. President Johnson's press secretary, George Christian was with him. Christian remembers the President becoming very grave and saying to him, "If this attack is by the Russians, this means war."[109]

President Johnson immediately did two things. He sent a "Hot Line" message[110] to Soviet Premier Kosygin and called a meeting of his top advisors[111] in the Situation Room in the basement of the west wing of the White House.

At 1549 Sinai (0949 EDT), the very minute that Rostow was telling the President of the attack, a COM6thFLT message indicates CINCEUR was advised of the Israeli report of the attack. This is eleven minutes before the information was passed by Israel to the U.S. Naval Attache' in Tel Aviv. At 1600 Sinai (1000 EDT) a message was passed from the Israelis by LCOL (Sgan Aluf) Michael Bloch of the IDF Foreign Military liaison Office to Commander Ernest C. Castle, USN, the United States Naval attache' at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.[112] This is confirmed by a message from CINCUSNAVEUR to

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JCS//CNO//USCINCEUR.[113] The Defense Attache message was sent 1641 Sinai time (1041 EDT or Washington Time) The message advised that Israeli forces had attacked a U.S. ship by mistake and transmitted an apology. President Johnson entered the situation room in the basement of the White House at 1106 EDT (1706 Sinai time). The message from Israel had not yet reached the White House. The atmosphere was tense. Who was attacking? Was it the Egyptians? Not likely, they had lost their air force on the first day of the war. Was it the Soviet Union? Were they entering the conflict on the side of the Arabs? Was this the beginning of World War III? How should the United States respond? Would the situation escalate to a nuclear exchange?[114]

A few minutes after 1106EDT/1706 Sinai, the 1041/1641 the message from CDR Castle was received by the White House and rushed to the situation room. Israel was the attacker. A wave of relief swept through the situation room. The United States was not at war. The Soviets were not involved. The issue of a nuclear exchange was not on the table. The President swiftly adjourned the meeting and Secretary McNamara sent a message to the Sixth Fleet to recall the Naval aircraft en route to assist Liberty.[115] The aircraft had already been recalled by Admiral Martin, Commander of the Sixth Fleet.

Saratoga made its initial launch at 1450 Sinai time, (0950 Washington time).[116] These aircraft were recalled by RADM Geis almost at once. Both Saratoga and America launched

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aircraft about ninety minutes later. When word of the attack on Liberty reached America, an NBC foreign correspondent, Robert Goralski,[117] was on the bridge with CAPT Engen. A nuclear weapons drill was in progress and apparently some unarmed aircraft were aloft.[118] The Sixth Fleet did not know the identity of the attacker. Prior to the launch, the pilots were given strict instructions from Sixth Fleet to limit their action to defense of Liberty and not to overfly any land.[119] The A-4s are subsonic with a maximum speed of about 550 nautical miles per hour. Time from Saratoga to the Liberty at maximum speed was about an hour or the first launch could have arrived over Liberty at about 1600. The second launch which occurred at about 1616 could have arrived over Liberty at the ETA indicated in the CINCUSNAVEUR message (1715) Sinai or Liberty time.[120] The A-1s are propeller aircraft with a top speed of 300 knots. They would have arrived about 1550Z(1750 Liberty time). The F-4s are capable of supersonic speed up to 1500 knots in afterburner. They can operate in afterburner (AB) for 45 minutes if carrying external fuel tanks and 30 minutes without external tanks. Time to Liberty in AB[121] for the F-4's was about 25 minutes but that would have put them over Liberty with very low fuel state and probably not able to return to their carrier. As a matter of fact, AB is not a viable option for traveling to or from a contact point. It is used primarily while engaged in air to air combat and seldom used for more than a few minutes because of the massive fuel

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flow when engaged. Without a whale[122] to provide refueling for the return flight, arrival over Liberty would have been about the same time as the A-4s.

At about 1810, an Israeli Super Frelon Helicopter, SA 321 K, number 0-6, cruising speed, 155 mph, took off from Sde Dov airport, on the coast of Israel, just north of Tel Aviv. Aboard were CDR E. E. Castle, United States Navy, the U.S. Naval Attache' at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. He was accompanied by then, LT Lynn Blasch, an assistant Naval Attache'. The chopper was piloted by IAF Major (Rav Seren) Zvi Dagan.[123]

The Israeli Super Frelon arrived over Liberty at 1840[124] and tried to communicate. (The chopper probably had VHF frequency 121.5, the international VHF emergency channel and probably 243.0, the UHF emergency channel. Since these are aviation frequencies, not maritime frequencies, apparently Liberty did not have them. Radio communication could not be established between the chopper and the ship.) CDR Castle wished to be lowered aboard but Liberty could not or would not stop to allow it. After some hand signals CDR Castle wrote a note on the back of one of his calling cards asking "Do you have casualties?" He placed the card in an orange and threw it onto the deck of Liberty at 1852. Whatever signal Liberty sent, if any, was not recorded in the Liberty Deck log. The log did record the receipt of the message. No indication of casualties was understood by CDR Castle. At about 1900, the

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helicopter departed to the east and returned to Sde Dov airport with two very angry U.S. Naval Officers aboard. Sunset in the area was at 1914.[125]

Though wounded and bleeding, Captain McGonagle never left the bridge. He conned[126] the ship all night on a northwest heading. At times he lay on the deck on his back and navigated by looking up at the stars. He shouted orders which were delivered by messenger to after steering[127] as the normal steering was inoperable as well as the communications system. Through the combined leadership of the Captain and his Engineering Officer, LT George H. Golden, and the efforts of the crew, the ship was saved. Though wounded several times, Golden never left his battle station in the engine room. He and CPO Brooks got power back on the ship in ten minutes after the torpedo hit. He made hard choices as to use of power for propulsion and fire fighting on his own initiative since he was not in direct communication with the bridge. Some of his shipmates feel he should have received the Navy Cross rather than the Silver Star, which he was awarded. Captain McGonagle received the Medal of Honor and most of the crew were decorated, as well.[128]

At 0440Z Liberty sighted the Soviet ship, Proletrsk, and noted same in its log.[129] At 0627 on June 9, Liberty rendezvoused with the U.S.S. Davis (DD 937) and U.S.S. Massey (DD 778).[130]

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LTJG Paul E. Tobin, USN,[131] the engineering officer of the U.S.S. Davis came aboard and effectively took over operations and damage control. Liberty had run out of water and was without power. LTJG Tobin restored power and Liberty made her way first to a rendezvous with the aircraft carrier America and ultimately all the way to Valletta, Malta. There was great concern about what secret material might be drifting out the huge torpedo hole in her starboard bow. U.S. destroyers followed her picking up bits of flotsam and jetsam and trying to keep various Soviet vessels from getting into a position behind her, from which they might scoop up any free floating secret material. At Malta, she was met by RADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.,[132] and the U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry began.[133]

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Endnotes

1. In 1967, Ambassador Ephraim Evron was Deputy Chief of Mission of the Israeli Embassy in Washington. The author conducted an interview with Ambassador Evron, in Tel Aviv, on June 7, 1988, during which he stated that Israel was telling the United States everything it was doing including moving forces north to the Syrian front. Then he said "but don't take my word for it, ask your CIA Chief of Station." The CIA Chief of Station confirmed that Israel was completely forthcoming with this information in an interview on [date not to be disclosed as per agreement]. This was further confirmed by Dean Rusk at an interview in Athens, Georgia, on April 5, 1989. Follow-up interviews with Ambassador Evron were conducted in Tel Aviv on August 15, 1989, and on June 4, 1993; and by telephone (the author was in Miami and Ambassador Evron was in Tel Aviv) on January 16, 1990.

2. Messages from AMEMBASSY TELAVIV to SECSTATE WASHDC, 081510Z JUN 67 and 081640Z JUN 67. The date-time groups of these messages indicate that the information was already in the possession of the Embassy at the time of the attack on the Liberty.

3. *The Times*, Late London Edition, June 8, 1967, p. 1.

4. *Le Figaro*, June 8, 1967, edition de 5 heures, p. 4. "Les Forces Israeliennes ont atteint TEL-AVIV: NOTRE VICTORIE EST TOTAL" (The Forces of Israel Have Reached TEL-AVIV: Our Victory is total) [continued on page 5.] "Nous sommes a Jerusalem pour n'en plus rapartir" (We are in Jerusalem to never leave it again) [On page 5. continued from page 1.] "Hier le Canal de Suez et Char-el-Cheik" (the Suez Canal and Sharm el-Sheikh)" "Le Peuple d' Abraham a remis pied dans L'enceinte sacr'ee du temple de Salomon" (The people of Abraham have re-entered the sacred ground of the temple of Solomon) [Also on page 5. is printed the now famous picture of three Egyptian MIG aircraft destroyed on the tarmac.]

5. *Il Messaggero di Roma*, June 8, 1967, p. 1. The entire front page of Il Messaggero contained news relating to the war. A picture showed four men in uniform raising a flag over the caption "Tel-Aviv - La Bandiera Israel' ana viene issafa nell' aeroporto di El Arish subito popo L'occupazione (Telephoto A.P.)" [Tel Aviv - The Israeli flag was raised at the airport of El Arish immediately after the occupation.]

The front page also displayed a map of the war zone showing Israel at the Suez canal (graphics of tanks at Ismailia and Suez City) and paratroops at "Sharm el-Sheikh" and Israel, depicted by arrows, into the West Bank. The map also showed

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Syria and Jordan into Israel in the north at the point the Israeli, Syrian and Jordanian borders converge.

6. *The New York Times*, June 8, 1967, p. 1. Also on page 1 is a picture of Israeli soldiers at the wall and a photograph of the battle area taken from Gemini II. Under the picture is the caption: "Israeli troops took Sharm el-Sheikh, Drove to the Suez Canal, Seized control of the old city of Jerusalem."

7. *The Wall Street Journal*, Eastern Edition, June 8, 1967, p. 1.

8. *Chicago Tribune*, June 8, 1967, p. 1. Various articles and bulletins report, "Israel asserts it had defeated Egypt....", "Arthur Veysey, Chicago Tribune correspondent enters the Arab section of Jerusalem with Israeli Troops." "The Israelis said their forces controlled a vast sweep of Arab territory from the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the west bank of the Jordan River."

9. *The Miami Herald*, June 8, 1967, City Edition, p. 1.

10. *The Washington Post*, June 8, 1967, p. 1. On June 9, 1967, *The Washington Post*, p. 1, carried an article by Chalmers M. Roberts, entitled "U.S.-Russian Efforts Told," which stated: "But it was evident that the Israelis....could turn loose their military might on Syria."

11. For an excellent account of the October Missile crises see J. Bruce Allyn, G. James Blight, and A. David Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crises, and the Soviet Collapse*, New York: Pantheon Books, and Toronto: Random House of Canada Limited, 1993.

12. In his book *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, New York: Vintage Books, 1995, pp. 278-79, McNamara tells this same story except he says a general or admiral called him. It is not important whether it was an admiral or a petty officer who called. Memory dims after 28 years. Nevertheless, the author has the audio tape of the McNamara interview in which the voice of Robert McNamara describes the caller as a petty officer. The interview was conducted over the telephone (the author was in Miami and Robert McNamara was in Washington, D.C.) on December 17, 1995.

13. Hot line message, June 5, 1967. The body of the message, as translated from Russian, stated:

> Dear Mr. President,
>
> Having received information concerning the military clashes between Israel and the United Arab

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> Republic, the Soviet Government is convinced that the duty of all great powers is to secure the immediate cessation of the military conflict.
>
> The Soviet Government has acted and will act in this direction. We hope that the Government of the United States will also act in the same manner and will exert appropriate influence on the Government of Israel particularly since you have all opportunities of doing so. This is required in the highest interest of peace.
>
> Respectfully,
>
> A. Kosygin

14. Telephone interview with Robert McNamara, December 17, 1995.

15. The Incidents at Sea Agreement, "AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE HIGH SEAS," is unique in international relations because it is an agreement signed by the Secretary of the U.S. Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy without intervention of the Department of State of the United States or the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union. It is even more amusing that during the height of the cold war, the United States had documents classified, "FOR U.S. AND SOVIET EYES ONLY."

The complete text of the English and Russian versions appear in U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. vol 23. pt. 1. 1972, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 1168-1180.

16. *U.S.S. America Cruise Book* (1967), p. 230.

> Your actions for the past five days have interfered with our operations. By positioning your ship in the midst of our formation and shadowing our every move you are denying us the freedom of maneuver on the high seas that has been traditionally recognized by seafaring nations for centuries.
> In a few minutes the task force will commence maneuvering at high speeds and various courses. Your present position will be dangerous to your ship, as well as the ships of this formation.
> I request you clear our formation without delay and discontinue your interference and unsafe practices.

The message was sent by flashing light and voice radio from the U.S.S. America.

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17. Raymond V. B. Blackman, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1966-1967*, London: BPC Publishing Ltd., 1966, p. 333.

1	Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier
16	Large Attack Aircraft Carriers
11	Support Aircraft Carriers
9	Helicopter Carriers, Amphibious
5	Aircraft Transports, Ex-Carriers
15	Aircraft Ferries, Ex-Carriers
2	Communications Ships, Ex-Carriers
41	Missile Nuclear Powered Submarines
39	Fleet Nuclear Powered Submarines
127	Diesel Powered Submarines
4	Battleships
5	Flagships
1	Missile Nuclear Powered Cruiser
11	Guided Missile Cruisers
25	Cruisers, 2 Experimental
2	Missile Nuclear Powered Frigates
28	Guided Missile Frigates, Leaders
3	Frigates, Destroyer Leaders
25	Guided Missile Destroyers
320	Destroyers
10	Destroyer Minelayers
3	Guided Missile Escort Ships
258	Escort Ships, Destroyer Escorts

All ships were painted light gray overall, except submarines.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 449.

40	Nuclear Powered Submarines
340	Conventionally Powered Submarines
20	Cruisers
110	Destroyers
100	Escorts
300	Costal Escorts
300	Minesweepers
100	Missile Patrol Boats
350	Motor Torpedo Boats
200	Landing Craft excluding LCMs

Combatant ships were painted light gray, except submarines.

19. Jonathan Trumbull Howe, *Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1971, p. 149.

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20. Blackman, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1966-1967*, pp. 74-75.

13 Submarines
12 Destroyers, Escorts
10 Minesweepers
26 Patrol Boats
44 Torpedo Boats
24 Amphibious, etc.

They were painted a light gray, except submarines.

21. Because the ship is named in the Arabic alphabet, the transliteration to the English alphabet is sometimes varied and the ship has been referred to in English as Al Kassar, El Quesir, and El Kasir.

22. Blackman, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1966-1967*, p. 259.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 146 & 147.

4 Submarines (Diesel Powered)
3 Destroyers (1 Escort type)
9 Motor Torpedo Boats
2 High Speed Gun Boat
5 Patrol Vessels (1 Submarine Chaser)
6 Amphibious Craft

The warships were painted light gray, except for the submarines which were painted black or green.

24. Phil G. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security*, New York: Harper and Row, 1970, Chapter 5, pp. 139-140. "We attack the Russians-- and Deny It, June, 1967."

25. The United States started the Corona program in 1960. It provided photo images taken from space which were retrieved by Flying Boxcar (C-119) aircraft snagging film canisters from parachutes which returned the film to earth. Corona, though extremely valuable for strategic intelligence, was not real time and had no listening or Elint capability in 1967. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage*, New York: Random House, 1997, pp. 136-37.

26. Abba Eban, "Israel: A Nation is Born" [television documentary], Episode 4, October 6, 1992. Eban believed de Gaulle feared a war would become global. See also Abba Eban, *My Country: The Story of Modern Israel*, New York: Random House, 1972, p. 209.

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27. *Ibid.* Eban described the Wilson position as "He stood firm in rhetoric." See also, Eban, *My Country*, p. 210.

28. *Ibid.* Eban considered Johnson, "committed to keeping the straits open." See also Eban, *My Country*, p. 210.

29. *Ibid.* Eban quotes Johnson, "Israel will not be alone unless she decides to be alone." See also Eban, *My Country*, p. 210.

30. *Ibid.*

31. General Mordachai "Moti" Hod told the author during an interview near Tel Aviv on January 11, 1990, that only four aircraft were held back for air defense.

32. The U.S.S. Liberty was a modified World War II "Victory" ship, which was recommissioned on December 30, 1964. The displacement of the U.S.S. Liberty was 7,190 tons light (10,680 tons full load). The dimensions of the ship were 455 x 62 x 24 feet. R. V. B. Blackman, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1967-1968*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1967, p. 424; and R. V. B. Blackman, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1968-1969*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1968, p. 466.

33. Personal interview with the senior enlisted linguist, Marine Sergeant Bryce Lockwood, Washington D.C., June 8, 1991. Also see, *Liberty News*, Vol 14, Issue 1, 1st quarter 1996 at page 10.

> Also, as our mission did not directly concern the Arab-Israeli Six-Day-War, what was brought to light was the fact that we did not have Hebrew linguists aboard the USS Liberty (though that is not to say our shipmates of the Jewish faith did not understand Hebrew). Our intercept operator complement, that we picked up in Rota Spain, was comprised of Russian and Arabic linguists.

34. U.S.S. Liberty Deck log, 7 June 1996. Ennes describes passing a Texaco tanker in his book, *Assault on the Liberty*, on page 40. The Liberty log contains no such entry. Whether some ships were sighted and not logged is not certain. It is also possible that the ship described by Ennes is one of those mentioned in the log as the Bencleugh or the Ioanis Aspilotis.

35. George C. Wilson and Anthony Astrachen, "Egypt, Syria Accept Cease Fire; Israel Hits U.S. Ship, 10 Killed," *Washington Post*, June 9, 1967. This shelling was confirmed by a message from the USADO, the U.S. Defense Attache', COL Anthony Perna, 082100Z Jun 67: "EGYPTIAN SHELLING ATTACK FROM SEA IN GAZA AREA REPORTED BY IDF YESTERDAY. SEE DAO 0812."

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36. Normally, nautical miles will be used as all references in ships logs and aircraft navigation are represented in nautical miles. A nautical mile is slightly longer than a statute mile. Approximately 33 nautical miles equal 38 statute miles. 6240 feet (more commonly expressed as 2080 yards) equal a nautical mile. A statute mile is 5280 feet. For purposes of the location of the ship at 0000 on June 8, 1967, statute miles have been used. The conversion to nautical miles would not be of significance in understanding the location of the ship to a person unfamiliar with "nautical miles."

37. Log of the U.S.S. Liberty initialed by AFK, U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, Exhibit 19.

38. Warships set various conditions in accordance with operations and the potential threat to the warship. General Quarters is the highest state of alert and is also known as battle stations. During battle stations, condition Zebra is set. This means all Zebra or water tight doors, which are marked with a large "Z" are closed and dogged (sealed by means of handles which secure the doors). During condition Yoke, the Zebra doors remain open for access to all parts of the ship but all Yoke doors, marked with a large "Y" are kept sealed. Other classes of doors are marked X and are called XRAY doors and Circle Charlie door also remain Circle Charlie. These designations are from the old phonetic alphabet which was replaced by the current international phonetic alphabet in 1954. Some effort was made to change the door designations and for a short time, Zebra doors were Zulu doors, but the old names were too deeply entrenched and remain in use today. The phonetic alphabet in use today uses Zulu for "Z," Yankee for "Y," Xray for "X," and Charlie for "C."

39. U.S.S. Liberty "Underway Log", U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit 14. This log was written by hand on the bridge as events occurred. It was signed by the enlisted watch officer C/CWO Alan Kriner. It was no doubt later used to prepare the ships smooth log, or Deck Log, NAVPERS 3100/2 (1-66), which is signed by the Commanding Officer and the Navigator and forwarded to the Bureau of Naval Personnel at the end of each month.

40. The "Plan of the Day" of U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5) for Thursday, June 8, 1967.

41. First orders to point off Port Said, Message from COMSERVRON EIGHT to USS LIBERTY, 240020Z MAY 67. Final orders to Point Alpha, Message from JCS to USCINCEUR, info USS LIBERTY, 011545Z JUN 67.

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42. James M. Ennes, Jr., *Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship*, New York: Random House, 1979. James Ennes was a junior officer aboard Liberty on June 8, 1967. His book contains a reasonably accurate account of what took place aboard Liberty from the time of sailing from Rota, Spain until he was wounded on the bridge of Liberty about 1400 local time on June 8, 1967. In his book he describes the attitude of the crew to the radio newscasts heard aboard Liberty on June 7, 1967, reporting no American ship in the area:

> We chuckled as the newscaster quoted an American official assuring newsmen and the world that 'no American ship is within three hundred miles of the fighting.' Perhaps not at this moment, we thought, but by morning we'll be smelling smoke.

43. Expert Astronomer TM, a computer program of Expert Software, P.O. Box 143376 Coral Gables, FL, 33134 copyright 1991. Assumptions, geographic position 31-35.3N 33-29E. This would be in the vicinity of the Liberty operating area. A position variation of sixty miles would only affect the times and degrees a minute or two or a degree or two. 0514 Sinai = 0314 GMT = 07/2314 EDT.

44. House Armed Services Committee Review of Defense World Wide Communications, "Report of the Armed Services Investigating SubCommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives," Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, under authority of H. Res. 201 - May 10, 1971, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

45. NSA is an acronym for National Security Agency. It is sometimes referred to as "NO SUCH AGENCY" because it historically refused to acknowledge its own existence. Usually mail written to it was either returned marked 'no such address' or if not returned, not answered. The Agency has become more forthcoming under increased congressional oversight, but not on the Liberty Incident. Liberty was an intelligence gathering ship, operated by NSA who until this day responds to all inquiry with a no comment. The NSA has released a sanitized version of its in-house review of the Liberty Incident in a document Identified as SRH-256. This document contains a wealth of data and refers to several reports which concluded the attack to be a mistake. Some of the data in SRH-256 does not agree with other records of the event but the discrepancies are not considered important. SRH-256 is dated 1981 and bears the label, National Security Agency/Central Security Service. It was written by William D. Gerhard and another person whose name remains redacted.

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46. JCS is the acronym for Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military advisory group that reports to the President of the United States. JCS is not in any direct chain of command and consists of a Chairman appointed by the president and the chiefs of all the U.S. armed services. It has a considerable staff and is headquartered in the Pentagon.

47. U.S.S. Liberty Underway Log. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry Exhibit 14.

48. The U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry put the arrival time at 0842. The U.S.S. Liberty log reflects Point Alpha at 0849. The few minute discrepancy is not deemed significant.

49. U.S.S. Liberty Underway Log.

50. *Ibid.*, and Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 52.

51. U.S.S. Liberty Underway Log, and Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 56. Liberty Underway Log shows the course change at 1132.

52. The first overflight was at 0545 by an Israeli Nord Atlas 2501. This flight identified Liberty and passed the identification to Naval Headquarters at Stella Maris. Official IDF History, p. 7. This was a daily reconnaissance flight. (IDF History and statements and interviews of Pinchas Pinchasy in Haifa, Israel on January 12, 1990 and in Miami, Florida on February 2, 1990.)

53. Don Engen retired as a Vice Admiral. He served as President of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Safety Foundation for many years. He was commissioned to write the History of Naval Aviation for the Smithsonian Institution Air and Space Museum. He is presently serving as Director of the Smithsonian Institution Air and Space Museum.

54. Deck Log of CVA-66, U.S.S. America, for Thursday June 8, 1967, obtained from Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C.

The 00-04 log entry reads:

> 00-04 Steaming in company with TG 60.1, composed of USS LITTLE ROCK (CGL-4), COMSIXTHFLT embarked, USS AMERICA (CVA-66), COMCARDIV FOUR embarked, USS FORREST SHERMAN (DD-931), COMDESRON 10 embarked; USS THOMAS (DD-764), COMDESRON 102 embarked, USS BYRD (DDG-23), COMDESDIV 182 embarked, USS SAMPSON (DDG-10); USS ROAN (DD-853); USS LAWE (DD-763); USS RUSH (DD-714); and USS MCHALE (DD-693), operating in a special operating area in accordance with CTF 60 Op Order 50-66 modified by CTF 60 Op Schedule Nr. 7. The ship is formation guide. Formation

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> center bears 150 degrees 1000 yds. LITTLE ROCK is on station 150 degrees 2000 yds. SHERMAN, THOMAS, ROAN, LAWE, and SAMPSON are in a circular ASW screen. BYRD is operating independently within visual range. RUSH and MCHALE are operating independently to prosecute a sonar contact. Formation course is 000 degrees, speed 12 kts. SOPA is COMSIXTHFLT; OTC is COMCARDIV FOUR. Condition of readiness III and material condition YOKE are set. Ship is darkened except for normal navigational lights. 0100 c/c to 130 degrees. 0112 c/c to 160 degrees. 0119 c/c to 210 degrees. 0209 c/c to 180 degrees. 0300 c/c to 090 degrees.
>
> T.L. KEHRER, LTJG, USNR

55. U.S.S. Saratoga (CVA-60) Deck Log. Thursday, June 8, 1967.

56. Sara is the nickname for the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Saratoga, CVA-60.

57. Quoting a formal statement issued by the Department of Defense, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, stated to the U.N. Security Council, "All 6th Fleet aircraft are and have been several hundred miles from the area of conflict." Arthur Goldberg, "First Statement of June 6," U.N. Security Council Demands a Cease-Fire in the Near East, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 56 (June 26, 1967): 935; and NSA Report, p. 21.

58. Russ Report, Discussion following Finding of Fact number 30, p.27.

> The Secretary of Defense had directed, in a message directly to COMSIXTHFLT, that the press and media representatives be thoroughly briefed on SIXTHFLT operations as part of the effort in progress to refute the United Arab Republic allegations that the SIXTHFLT was actively supporting Israel. This briefing was to be conducted in the forenoon, 8 June, on the USS AMERICA and COMSIXTHFLT and his key staff officer had been engaged in preparations since 0600 local time.

59. U.S.S. America Deck Log, 08-12 Thursday June 8, 1967.

60. U.S.S. America Deck Log, 12-16 Thursday June 8, 1967. The U.S.S. Saratoga (CVA-60) Deck Log does not reflect the join up. Saratoga was on an easterly heading, steaming with U.S.S. Galveston (CLG 3) and U.S.S. Davis (DD 937) in accordance with CTF operation order 50-66. At 1027 course 090, (probable course change at 1106 to launch and recover aircraft) 1316

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again shows course change to 090, 1405 course 080, 1415 course 100, 1424 course 130, 1431 course 050. At 1441 Saratoga changed course to 315 and changed speed to 25 kts. This is consistent with CAPT Tully's account of turning into the wind shortly after 1435 and launching the ready aircraft. The log shows a reduction in speed at 1455 suggesting that flight operations were complete. At 1507 Saratoga increased speed to 26 kts which is consistent with recovering aircraft. The log notes CTG 60 became SOPA (Senior Officer Present Afloat) and OTC (Officer in Tactical Command) at 1539. This differs from the America log which reflects COM CAR DIV 4 assuming tactical command of the formation, including Saratoga at 1432. However, since COM CAR DIV 4 ordered Tully's ready aircraft back and they apparently came back a few minutes after 1500, the overall picture seems consistent.

61. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 56. Also, see Liberty Deck Log for June 8, 1967, entry 12-16, "At 1300 sighted explosion on coastline Range 13 miles. 1330 sighted explosion on coast bearing 130, range 25 miles..."

62. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 56.

63. Liberty Deck Log. "At 1300 sighted explosion on coastline Range 13 miles. 1330 Sighted explosion on coast bearing 130, range 25 miles..."

64. Telephone interview of George Golden (the author was in Miami and George Golden was in Norfolk, VA), Chief Engineer of the Liberty and her acting Commanding Officer after Commander McGonagle went to the hospital in Malta, March 11, 1991. A follow-up interview was conducted in Washington, D.C., on June 7, 1991.

65. In 1967 the U.S. Navy operated under NWIP-10-2, a nonregistered publication titled "LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE" promulgated by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operation in September 1955. NWIP-10-2 defines Warships as:

> c. WARSHIPS. The term "warships" includes all vessels commissioned as a part of the naval forces of a State and authorized to display the appropriate flag or pennant as evidence thereof. Such vessels must in addition be commanded by a member of the military forces of a state and must be manned by a crew subject to military discipline. CH 5, p. 5-3

The only other type of ship is a merchant vessel which may be privately or publicly owned or controlled, which is not

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in the warship category and which is solely engaged in ordinary commercial activities.

The United States Navy replaced NWIP 10-2 with NWP 9 in July 1987.

The definition of a warship remained essentially the same except that the following sentence was added to the definition. "In the U.S. Navy, those ships designated "USS" are "warships" as defined by international law." NWP 9, Chapter 2, 2.1.1.

66. Seaman Steve Richards, of the Liberty crew, recalls some talk of replacing the four 50 caliber Brownings with pompoms which would have doubled her fire power. It was not accomplished and had it been done the overall effect would have been minimal. Mr. Richards provided the photograph of the 50 caliber gun mount. Interview with the author, Washington, D.C., June 8, 1991.

67. Liberty Deck Log.

68. The first message said pull back twenty-five miles, the remaining four said one hundred miles. House Armed Services Review of Defense Communications.

69. A line or tackle for raising or lowering a flag or sail.

70. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 50-51.

> 'We must fly the new flag' I said, explaining that we were operating in a dangerous area and could afford to show only our clearest, brightest colors." Ennes quotes himself in explaining why he had Signalman Russell O. David, Jr., take down the soot darkened and badly tattered American flag that he had noticed had become "....fouled, having become tangled in the lines."

71. LCDR David E. Lewis, 548572/1610 advised Captain McGonagle that Liberty's capability was limited to mostly line of sight interception and that withdrawal of 7 to 10 miles or so over the horizon would "degrade their mission performance by 80%" *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

72. House Armed Services Committee Review of World Wide Defense Communications.

73. Naval Headquarters in Haifa was called Stella Maris and was located on the western slope of Mount Carmel.

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74. Prior to 1956, Israel Air Force Headquarters were located at Ramla. A lesson of the 1956 Suez campaign was the need to consolidate Air Force Headquarters at the Kirya in close proximity to the Chief of Staff. It was done soon after 1956. George Gawrych, *The Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars*, Fort Levenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990, p. 68.

75. The Kirya is the Israeli equivalent of the Pentagon. The Hebrew word kirya translates city or citadel. In the "Pit" or war room area which is a series of underground bunkers, the Minister of Defense had a very small room off the Army spaces. The Army command post had separate rooms for each Army function or theater. There was one very large room for meetings and briefings. One very important room was the incoming communications room. All incoming messages were received there and distributed to the room or rooms to which the incoming message related. The Army bunker was not like either the Navy command post or the Air Force command post as it had no real time plot of the entire situation. The Air Force command post was near but not directly accessible to the High Command or Army bunker.

The Air Force command post or war room was two stories in height from floor to ceiling. A large table top map displayed the entire country and portions of surrounding countries. Facing the map was a raised platform on which sat the Air Force Commander. To his left and behind a glass partition sat the Chief of Air Force Intelligence. To the right of the IAF Commander sat the deputy commander and to his right sat the Chief Air Controller. The platform had some depth and behind these four sat or stood various members of staff such as the deputy chief air controller behind his chief. On the opposite wall, data was posted for quick reference.

Airman worked on the floor around the table placing and moving wedges in similar manner to the scenes of RAF war rooms in World War II movies.

Below this platform were a series of additional rooms housing various other staff such as the air defense controller (who had very little work during the 1967 war) and the Naval Liaison Officer. The staff in the floor level rooms were linked electronically to the level above them and the Naval Liaison communicated with the Navy Command Post by telephone. A stairway went from below to the upper level.

The Navy command post was located in Haifa, about 60 miles north, atop Mount Carmel. It was at a base originally built by the British Royal Air Force in about the 1920's. The war room consisted of a room with a high ceiling, about 18

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feet, with a map of the country and surrounding navigable water on a table in the room. A raised platform looked down on the display or plot. The platform is not very wide or deep and there is little room behind the front row of the platform facing the map display. The Naval Officer in Command and the duty officer sat or stood on this platform with a full view of the plot before them and the data on the opposite wall. The opposite wall had displays of data, generally written in reverse on plexiglass plates, U.S. Navy style. Like the Air Force, sailors stood on the floor around the display and updated the situation by placing and moving wedges about the plot. The command post had radio communication with its ships and telephone communication with the Ministry of Defense, the High Command, Army and Air Force.

The author was privileged to visit the Navy war rooms at Stella Maris. It is now unused. The information on the "Pit" at the Kirya in Tel Aviv was obtained Tom Clancy style and is believed to be reasonably accurate. The 1967 facilities no longer exist in their original state. The present day war rooms are no doubt substantially different. The author visited the Navy command post at the Kirya on June 9, 1992. This installation did not exist in 1967. It is state of the art and there is no reason to assume that the remainder of the "Pit" is of any lesser quality than the Navy command post.

76. Kirya is a Hebrew word meaning "The city" or "The citadel." The Kirya is in north western Tel Aviv only a few minutes drive from the University of Tel Aviv. The High Command, Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff and the GOC (General Officer in Command) of the Army, Air Force and Navy are all based here and exercise command and control from the Kirya.

77. Jordan accepted a ceasefire at 1000 on June 8, 1967, about two and one half hours after Liberty arrived at Point Alpha.

78. The time of the initial attack is reported as 1358 to 1405 by various sources. 1400 is the most commonly accepted time and is the time reflected in the Liberty Deck Log. The Deck log is usually prepared in "smooth form" shortly after the completion of a watch. A quartermasters log or underway log is usually made as events occur. The Liberty Underway log reflects the commencement of the air attack at 1358 and is probably the best evidence of that event, Exhibit 19 of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry. 1358 is corroborated by the Liberty rough and smooth radio logs which reflect that the first distress calls were sent at 1158Z (1358 Sinai), U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry Exhibits 23 and 24. There are many reports of time that events occurred between 1400 and 1500 on June 8, 1967, which vary by several minutes. In the time line constructed as a part of this research project, the times

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listed are those that the author believes to be the most probable actual times. Discrepancies can be explained by different persons or locations not having the same exact time on their watches or clocks or by slight mistakes in recording the time. Neither this possible discrepancy of up to seven minutes, nor other minor discrepancies of similar duration have any effect on the questions of knowledge and intent which are the primary purpose of this research project. (The United States Central Intelligence Agency Report, though generally quite accurate, lists the time of the air attack at 1500. This was probably a misapplication of time zones rather than a full hour discrepancy.)

79. Testimony of Captain McGonagle at the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, pagination 31-54; Judge Advocate General repagination pp. 135-158.

80. Russ Report, Finding of Fact 34, p.28.

81. Testimony of Captain McGonagle before U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, pagination pp. 31 to 54; Repagination by Judge Advocate General, pp. 135 to 158; and statement of Captain McGonagle on video tape of press conference released by the U.S. Navy in 1967. A portion of the press conference appears in the Thames Television documentary, "Attack on the Liberty." First TV transmission on Tuesday January 27, 1987 at 10:30 P.M. (VTR/THS/37733-Prod. No. N. 1005) master tape No. 0380959.

82. Although the Liberty rough and smooth radio logs do not reflect transmission of the position coordinates, the 1432 message received by Saratoga and transmitted to CINCUSNAVEUR three minutes later include the coordinates. The coordinates were most likely transmitted but not recorded in the Liberty radio logs as a result of the stress of the situation.

83. U.S.S. Liberty radio logs, Court of Inquiry Documents, Exhibit 23, rough radio log and Exhibit 24, smooth radio log. [Note: Log times are Z (Greenwich Mean Time) - Sinai time is + 2 hours]

Exhibit 23 - rough radio log

Time	**Transmission**
1158Z	AS DE RS WE ARE UNDER ATTACK, BE ADVISED WE ARE UNDER
	ATTACK K
	RS DE SM U ARE GARBLED, SAY AGAIN K
	....
1218Z	SM DE RS BE ADVISED WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY TORPEDO LISTING
	ABOUT 9 DEG REQUEST IMMED ASSIST K
	....
1224Z	THREE UNIDENTIFIED A/C APPROACHING THE SHIP K

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[This is about the time the 3 MTB's approached. The]
[attacking aircraft have been gone for 12 minutes.]

Exhibit 24 - smooth radio log

Time	Transmission
1158Z	ANY STA DE RCK STR K
	A S DE R S Z K
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K
1200Z	R S DE SCHEMATIC U ARE GARBLED, SAY AGAIN K
	....
1217Z	S M DE R S BE ADVISED WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY TORPEDO
	LISTING ABOUT 9 DEG REQUEST IMMED ASSISTANCE K
	....
1224Z	R S DE R S THREE UNIDENTIFIED A/C APPROACHING SHIP K
	[See note above.]

84. Some messages indicate as early as 1430.

85. Russ Report, Finding of Fact number 34, p. 28. U.S.S. Saratoga message DTG 081235Z June 67.

86. ROCKSTAR was the code name for U.S.S. Liberty.

87. Naval Message FM USS SARATOGA TO CINCUSNAVEUR 081235Z JUN 67. Court of Inquiry Document 87, Exhibit 48.

88. Recollection of RADM Max Morris, USN (RET), telephone interview with the author (the author was in Miami and RADM Morris was in Jacksonville, Fl.), August 29, 1991. Commander Morris was the navigator aboard Saratoga on Jun 6, 1967, and was on the bridge with Captain Tully when the message was received.

89. The foxtrot flag is white with a red square offset in its center. It is the international signal flag for the letter F and signifies that flight operations are in progress.

90. This is according to the recollection of CAPT Tully. He recalls launching four A-4s, four A-1s, four F-4s and four A-4 tankers or whales. This recollection was as of June 7, 1991, at a personal interview with the author in Washington, D.C. There are no Naval Messages that deal with this launch. It is the recollection of RADM Morris that four A-1 aircraft and two F-4 aircraft were launched and perhaps some tankers. ADM Johnson remembers only the A-1 aircraft. The Saratoga did not publish a Cruise Book for this period. It is not significant if the launch consisted of four, six, eight or sixteen aircraft.

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91. Personal interview with the author, in Washington, D.C., June 8, 1991; and correspondence with Captain Joseph Tully, USN (RET), then Commanding Officer of Saratoga, RADM Max Morris, USN(RET), then Navigator of Saratoga and ADMIRAL Gerry Johnson, USN, then Strike Operations Officer of Saratoga. (ADM Johnson culminated his brilliant Naval Career as Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) of the United States Navy.)

92. *Ibid.*

93. *Ibid.* At this time the U.S. Navy had a shortage of 500 pound bombs, bull pup missiles and certain other ordinance because of our engagement in Vietnam. Captain Tully ordered the four A-4 and four A-1 aircraft diverted to the NATO Air Facility at Soudha Bay, Crete, in order to avoid the jettisoning of their ordinance.

94. This does not mean that nuclear warheads were lying around here and there. The exercise deals with how to release load and arm nuclear weapons if the order to employ them arrives. Then as now, that order may be given only by the President of the United States.

95. In 1967, aircraft carriers carried eighty to one hundred aircraft of different types. It is an extremely complex operation to move the tightly packed parked aircraft about the flight deck so that the specific planes required for a particular mission are located forward on the flight deck, near the catapults, from where they can be launched.

96. Personal interview with Captain Don Engen who was commanding Officer of America on that day. The interview was conducted in Washington, D.C., on May 3, 1990.

97. The assumptions as to the position of the sun are easily proven by looking at an almanac and if more precision is required, at any basic celestial navigation textbook. The approximate positions and headings of the Liberty and the MTB Division are not in dispute. The calculations used here are from computer astronomy software, Expert Astronomer TM. Calculations were made for a Liberty position at 1400 Sinai (1200Z) at 31-27N and 33-33W and for a Liberty position at 1435 Sinai (1240Z) at 31-34N and 33-28W are as follows:

> At 1400 the sun was at an elevation of 58 degrees and an azimuth of 82 degrees.
> At 1435 the sun was at an elevation of 50 degrees and an azimuth of 88 degrees.

The Liberty Log, Liberty messages and the map from the IDF History Official Report were used to locate the Liberty positions. They vary by as much as nine miles but this

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discrepancy is not considered significant relative to the solar plots constructed.

98. Liberty Deck Log, 1419 entry.

99. Testimony of CAPT McGonagle at U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry. Testimony as paginated in the record of the Court of Inquiry is from pages 31 to 54, see page 39. The Court of Inquiry record released by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy re-paginates the testimony and it is found on pages 135 to 158, see page 143. Also see video tape of CAPT McGonagle at a press conference held immediately following the event. A portion of this video tape in the Thames Television documentary, Attack on the Liberty. Further corroboration can be found in the Report of Israeli Navy (the Israeli Examining Judge's report) p. 4.

100. Testimony of Captain McGonagle at U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

101. Liberty Deck Log, 1430 and 1431 entries.

102. Liberty Deck Log, 1431 entry.

103. Some reports put the torpedo strike at 1438.

104. Liberty Deck Log, 1717 entry.

105. This time is confirmed by both NSA and CIA in their reports.

106. White House log of President Johnson's day, and personal interview with W.W. Rostow, National Security Advisor to President Johnson, in Austin, Texas, on March 7, 1990. It was Rostow who first informed the President of the attack and kept him informed as the situation developed. Rostow gives President Johnson credit for an immense improvement in the system of passing "Flash messages" to the President. In the past a Flash report would have gone to NSA or the National Command Center in the Pentagon and then been forwarded to the President by a duty officer. Johnson arranged to have the NSC (National Security Council) cut in on the loop so that the president's man, the National Security Advisor, got Flash messages at the same time they were received at NCC and NSA.

107. White House Log of Presidents day - June 8, 1967, obtained from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

108. There is a small discrepancy as to the time of receipt between the NSA document time of the receipt at the White House. The White House log for President Johnson and the dated and time noted memos of National Security Advisor, W. W.

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Rostow reflect first word received at 0949 EDT/1549 Sinai time. Word was passed to W. W. Rostow who called the President in his bedroom at the White House and advised him that a U.S. Navy ship was under attack in the eastern Mediterranean.

109. Personal recollection of George Christian as reported to the author during a telephone interview (the author was in Miami and George Christian was in Austin, Texas), on July 19, 1991.

110. Hot Line message from President Lyndon B. Johnson to Chairman Kosygin, June 8, 1967:

> Dear Mr. Kosygin,
>
> We have just learned that USS Liberty, an auxiliary [*sic*] ship, has apparently been torpedoed by Israel [*sic*] forces in error off Port Said. We have instructed our carrier, Saratoga now in the Mediterranean to dispatch aircraft to the scene to investigate. We wish you to know that investigation is the sole purpose of this flight of aircraft, and hope that you will take appropriate steps to see that proper parties are informed.
>
> We have passed this message to Chernyakov but feel that you should know of this development urgently.
>
> Respectfully,
>
> Lyndon B. Johnson

111. The White House Log of June 8, 1967, reflects that President Johnson went to the Oval Office at 1104EDT accompanied by George Christian and Tom Johnson and was met at the door by Marvin Watson. Two minutes later at 1106EDT "the President [went] to the Situation Room to join Sec. Robert McNamara; Sec. Dean Rusk; Hon. Clark Clifford; Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Under Sec. of State; Hon. Llewellyn Thompson, Amb. to the USSR; Hon. McGeorge Bundy; and Hon. Walt W. Rostow."

112. On the evening of June 11, 1992, LCOL Michael Bloch of the IDF, retired, and CAPT E.C. Castle of the USN, retired, were the dinner guests of the author in Tel Aviv, Israel.

113. CINCUSNAVEUR (Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe); CNO (Chief of Naval Operations); JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff).

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114. Personal interview conducted in Athens, Georgia, on April 5, 1989, with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was in attendance at the Situation Room meeting. Notes on the interview and a letter from Dean Rusk confirming the accuracy of the notes which were submitted to him for review and comment following the interview are in the author's file on Dean Rusk.

115. *Ibid.*

116. The Saratoga Deck Log shows an entry at "1601 c/s (change speed) 25 kts 1602 Commenced launch and recovery of aircraft...." The log does not mention Liberty nor does it describe the type or number of aircraft launched. This data obtained from personal interview with the Captain of America, Vice Admiral Don Engen, USN (Ret) in Washington, D.C., May 3, 1990, and from message traffic referring to the aircraft: Message from COMSIXTHFLT to U.S.S. SARATOGA, 081250Z JUN 67; Message from COMSIXTHFLT to CINCUSNAVEUR, 081452Z JUN 67; and Message from COMSIXTFLT to USCINCEUR, 081649Z JUN 67.

117. Robert Goralski was not interviewed. He died in 1986 or 1987 per his friend, Herb Kaplow formerly of NBC News and at the time of the interview, April 7, 1992, with ABC News, Washington, D.C.

118. Personal interview with CAPT now Vice Admiral retired Don D. Engen, in Washington D.C., May 3, 1990, and *U.S.S. America Cruise Book*, p. 236. Follow-up interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C., on September 1, 1994, and by telephone (the author was in Miami and VADM Engen was in Alexandria, Va.) on June 16, 1994.

119. Naval Message FROM COMSIXTHFLT TO USCINCEUR 081425Z (Court of Inquiry Document 72, Exhibit 48.) confirms this and explicitly quotes the Rules of Engagement issued to the pilots:

> YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE INCLUDING DESTRUCTION AS NECESSARY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. DO NOT SUE [*SIC*] MORE FORCE THAN REQUIRED. DO NOT PURSUE ANY UNIT TOWARD LAND FOR REPRISAL PURPOSES. PURPOSE OF COUNTER ATTACK IS TO PROTECT LIBERTY ONLY. ADDITIONALLY, ALL PILOTS BRIEFED THAT EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL LIMIT ONLY TWELVE (12) MILES AND LIBERTY RIGHT ON EDGE. DO NOT FLY BETWEEN LIBERTY AND SHORELINE EXCEPT AS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS OF ABOVE. FIGHTER COVER PILOTS BRIEFED THAT ANY ATTACKS ON ATTACK AIRCRAFT, LIBERTY OR THEMSELVES IS HOSTILE ACT AND ABOVE APPLIES.

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Naval Message FROM CINCUSNAVEUR TO JCS//CNO//USCINCEUR 081515Z Jun 67 (Court of Inquiry Document 66, Exhibit 48.) mentions only the second launch as follows:

> USS AMERICA (CVA-66) HAS LAUNCHED FOUR ARMED A-4s and USS SARATOGA (CVA-60) HAS LAUNCHED FOUR ARMED A-1s with FIGHTER COVER TO DEFEND LIBERTY. PILOTS DIRECTED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF LAND. ETA (estimated time of arrival) OF FIRST AIRCRAFT ON SCENE 1515Z.

That would have been 1715 Sinai time, (1115 Washington time). If the first launch had kept going, the earliest arrival over Liberty would have been 90 minutes sooner or 1545 Sinai time. That was more than an hour after the torpedo attack was over.

120. Naval Message FROM CINCUSNAVEUR TO JCS//CNO//USCINCEUR 081515Z Jun 67. "ETA FIRST AIRCRAFT ON SCENE 1515Z" which was 1715 Liberty time.

121. AB = after burner.

122. Whale = common aviator slang for a tanker aircraft to provide air to air refueling.

123. Major Dagan died in 1989. Information on Zvi was supplied by Zeev Be'erly, who was a foreign Military Liaison Officer with the IDF in 1967. He was interviewed in his home in Afeka, Tel Aviv, Israel on January 15, 1990. The U.S. Naval Attaches' Castle and Blasch, both remained in the U.S. Navy until they retired, each with the rank of Captain. Both have provided detailed personal interviews and have been most helpful in gathering the research for this project.

124. Liberty Deck Log entry at 1840.

125. Expert Astronomer. 1914 Sinai = 1714 GMT = 1314 EDT.

126. Con, conned, conning. A nautical term meaning to control the steering of a ship (by giving orders to the helmsman and the engine room).

127. "After steering" is a position on the rear of a ship in close proximity to the rudder. It is used for emergency steering when normal steering by means of the ships wheel on the bridge is damaged or inoperable.

128. CAPT William McGonagle won the Congressional Medal of Honor. The other decorations given were the Navy Cross, 2; Silver Star, 12; Bronze Star Medal with "V" device, 20; Purple Heart, 203; and Navy Commendation Medal with "V" device, 9. Robert L. Goldich and John C. Schaefer, "U.S. Military

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Operations, 1965-1994 (Not Including Vietnam): Data on Casualties, Decorations, and Personnel Involved," *CRS Report for Congress*, June 27, 1994, p. 18.

129. There is no such warship listed as a part of the Soviet fleet in Jane's Fighting Ships. It may well have been an intelligence gathering ship sailing as a merchant. Proletrsk translates from Russian as "proletariat."

130. The deck logs of Liberty, Davis, and Massey all record the rendezvous at 0627Z on 9 June 1967, but none of the logs reflect the geographic point of the rendezvous.

131. LTJG Paul E. Tobin was awarded a Silver Star for his work aboard Liberty. He continued his career in the U.S. Navy and by October 24, 1988, he had attained the rank of Rear Admiral (Lower half-upper half November 1, 1992). He became the oceanographer of the United States Navy on March 20, 1996.

132. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, is the son of Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Sr., a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, the flag officer on board the U.S.S. Arizona at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. He still rests with his ship and shipmates below the Arizona memorial on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. He was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously and it is displayed inside the front door of the home of Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. "Ike" Jr. advised that, on occasion, he has been accused of being Jewish by persons who disagree with the conclusions of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry on which he served as president. They support the accusation based on his first name, Isaac, being a Hebrew name. He is not Jewish. He is one of our greatest admirals, having achieved four star rank. Though retired many years, he is still consulted by the Navy as a result of his wisdom and expertise.

133. Telephone interview with RADM Paul E. Tobin, USN, while he was serving as Vice Chief of Naval Education and Training, November 18, 1995 (the author was in Miami and RADM Tobin was in Pensacola, Fl.). See also Paul E. Tobin, review of "The Violation of the Liberty," by R. K. Smith, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, (December 1978): pp. 104-107.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS

The official reports of the Liberty incident and the sources contesting the mistake theory have been charted and are presented below as Illustrations 2-1 and 2-2.

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OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT

NAME OF REPORT	DATE OF REPORT	CONCLUSION OF REPORT
U.S. Reports		
U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry	June 18, 1967	Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on Liberty on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken identity.
C.I.A. Report	June 13, 1967	"It remains our best judgment that the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty was not made in malice towards the United States and was a mistake."
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) - Russ Report	June 9 - 20, 1967	General Russ did not make any findings about the actual attack.
The Clifford Report	July 18, 1967	The information available does not reflect that the Israeli high command made premeditated attack on a ship known to be American.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations	June 12, July 14, July 26, 1967	"... the attack was not intentional."
Senate Armed Services Committee	February 1, 1967	Very difficult for a commander not on the scene to know what happened.
House Appropriations Committee	April & May 1968	"...the use and operational capabilities of the Defense Communications system is nothing less than pathetic, and the management of the system needs to be completely overhauled."
House Armed Services Comm. Invest.	May 10, 1971	"... Navy remains in the dark ages insofar as routine communications with its deployed ships."
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence	1979/1981	No merit to the claims of intentional attack.
National Security Agency	Dated only 1981	Liberty was mistaken for Egyptian ship as a result of miuscalculation and eggrarious errors.
House Armed Services Committee	1991/1992	No support for theory of intentional attack.
Israeli Reports		
Ram Ron Commission of Inquiry	June 16, 1967	"... the attack on the ship by the Israeli Defense Forces was made neither maliciously nor in gross negligence, but as a result of a bona fide mistake."
Preliminary Inquiry	July 21, 1967	No sufficient amount of prima facie evidence, justifying committing anyone for trial.
State of Israel - IDF History	June, 1982	Attack on American intelligence ship came about as a result of innocent error...

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SOURCES CONTESTING THE MISTAKE THEORY

THEORIST	NAME OF BOOK/SOURCE	EXPLANATION
John Loftus	"The Secret War Against the Jews"	C.I.A. sent the Liberty to spy on Israeli forces and information was passed to the Egyptians. Liberty was fighting on Egyptian side against Israel.
Ye. A. Primakov	"How Israel Began the Aggression"/ "The 'Dove' Has Been Released"	U.S. was on Israeli side fighting against Arabs. Attack on Liberty was made in collusion with the U.S. to cover up U.S. participation on behalf of Israel.
Ambass. Mahmoud Kassem	"The Defeat (The Six Day War")	Liberty was attacked to cover/prevent intercept of Israeli electronic warfare.
Stephen Green & Samuel Katz	"Taking Sides"	Liberty was attacked because listening devices heard American pilots talking on the radio in English.
Stephen St. John	"An Eight Part Peace Proposal for Greater Jerusalem" (Appendix C)	Meeting took place in Madrid between Syrian and Zionist representatives whereby Syrian conspirators promised to orchestrate retreat from Golan Heights against Israeli advance. Attack on Liberty was made to prevent world from learning of the Madrid Pact.
Norman F. Dacey	Advertisements in N.Y. Times & Wash. Post	Dayan personally ordered the attack on the Liberty.
Seth Mintz	"Confessions of a Israeli Major" Liberty Newsletter/N.B.C./Washington Post Evans and Novak	Mintz saw and heard unidentified Israeli officers examine photographs of the Liberty. With full knowledge that Liberty was flying U.S. flag, officers ordered attack. And other stories.
Anthony Pearson	Conspiracy of Silence	Liberty appeared off the coast of Sinai and began listening. Israelis radioed requests that Liberty leave the area. Liberty radioed back that she was in international waters and allowed to remain. Israelis threatened to attack if she did not withdraw. Liberty refused and Israelis attacked.
Jim Taylor	Pearl Harbor II	Attack on Liberty was to prevent U.S. from learning that Israel planned to open an offensive against Syria on June 9, 1967.
Richard K. Smith	"The Violation of the Liberty" Naval Institute Proceedings	Israel attacked Liberty to prevent the world from knowing its military victories until they could be presented as a political fait accompli.
Paul Findley	"Deliberate Deceptions" "They Dare to Speak Out"	The attack was no accident. Government cover-up in that C.I.A. had learned day before the attack that the Israelis planned to sink the ship.

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SOURCES CONTESTING THE MISTAKE THEORY

THEORIST	NAME OF BOOK /SOURCE	EXPLANATION
Donald Neff	"Warriors for Jerusalem"	President Johnson immediately advised Premier Kosygin of the Liberty incident. Although there was reported skepticism that attack was accidental, inclination of officials was to accept Israel's version since none could see why Israelis would risk losing U.S. support by such a dangerous action. Attack did not come as surprise to the U.S.
Dean Rusk	Various Public Statements	Secretary Rusk had no theory of why Israel attacked the Liberty. He simply refused to accept the Israeli explanation that the attack was a mistake.
Adm. Thomas Moorer	Various Public Statements	Although Adm. Moorer has no personal knowledge of the event, he has formed opinion that attack was intentional because Liberty was the "ugliest" ship in the Navy, and, as such, it had to have been identified.
James M. Ennes, Jr,	"Assault on the Liberty"	Israel attacked Liberty to keep U.S. from finding out that Liberty was going to open an offensive on the northern front against Syria.
Walter Jacobson	"A Judicial Examination of the Israeli Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty" Naval Law Review	Israel violated international law of Naval warfare by (i) not rendering assistance to after attack; (ii) firing at unoccupied life rafts on Liberty; and (iii) attacking Liberty with unmarked aircraft.
Rowland Evans & Robert Novak	Washington Post	Reported a Seth Mintz story and that Ambass. Porter, in Beirut, intercepted radio transmissions proving attack on Liberty was intentional.
The Liberty Veterans Association	Newsletter and other public statements	Attacks were intentional; however, the group is diverse and not all Liberty veterans agree with all association positions.
LCD David E. Lewis	Interview with David Crowley	Advised Crowley that orders to recall planes launched to aid Liberty came from Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Johnson by voice command.
Wilbur Eveland	"Ropes of Sand: Americas Failure in the Middle East"	Eveland states that President Johnson authorized James Jesus Angleton to inform Ephraim Evron that U.S. would prefer Israeli efforts to lessen tension but would not intervene to stop an attack on Egypt. Liberty, followed by Polaris nuclear submarine, sent to Israel's shore to monitor communication and follow fighting should Israel attack Egypt. Dyan ordered jets and torpedo boats to destroy Liberty and incriminating evidence.
John E. Borne	"The USS Liberty: Dissenting History vs. Official History"	Believes that attack was deliberate and that all available evidence he gathered points to this conclusion.

SOURCES CONCLUDING OR ACCEPTING THE MISTAKE THEORY

There have been a substantial number of official U.S. and Israeli investigations of the Liberty incident. They all conclude that the incident was a tragic mistake or that there is no evidence that the incident was other than a tragic mistake. A brief analysis of the official U.S. and Israeli investigations and a few other sources follow:

U.S. INVESTIGATIONS
U.S. NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
10 June 1967 - 18 June 1967

United States Navy Regulations require an investigation of all incidents in which any death, injury, loss, or damage of Navy property occurred.[1] The Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe ordered a Court of Inquiry be convened on the Liberty Incident. Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. was named president of the Court and two U.S. Navy Captains were designated as members. Captain Ward Boston, a Navy lawyer, was designated as counsel. The court convened at 2314 hours GMT (11:14 P.M.) on June 10, 1967, in London and took the testimony of Captain Leonard Robert Raish, the assistant chief of staff, CINCUSNAVEUR. The court remained in session until 0250 in the morning of June 11, 1967. Rear Admiral Kidd then travelled with CAPT Boston and a reporter to Soudha Bay, Crete, and boarded U.S.S. Liberty at sea on June 12, 1967, while she was en route to Valletta, Malta. On June 13, 1967, at 0730 the Court went into session aboard Liberty in port at

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Malta. Ultimately it heard from twenty-one witnesses which produced 154 pages of transcribed testimony. The court received into evidence forty-nine exhibits consisting of hundreds of documents and pictures. It completed taking evidence in Malta on June 15, 1967, and returned to London where it took additional evidence and finally closed at 1645, (4:45 p.m.) on June 16, 1967. The Court concluded its deliberations on June 18, 1967 and presented its fifty-two individually numbered findings together with the record of its proceedings to Admiral McCain[2] and his deputy, Vice Admiral Wylie.

While all of the findings of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry are interesting, the more important findings are:

> 1. Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on LIBERTY on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken identity.
>
> 2. The calm conditions and slow ship speed may well have made the American Flag difficult to identify.
>
> 6. There are no available indications that the attack was intended against a U.S. ship.

Admiral McCain's lawyer, Merwin Staring,[3] was not happy with the form of the bulky document, which contained typographical errors, but Admiral McCain and his staff prepared a five page "First Endorsement" and ordered "Ike" Kidd to deliver the findings and endorsement to the CNO in Washington.[4] The First Endorsement of Admiral McCain states in paragraph 15 on page 4:

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> 15. The foregoing comments by the convening authority lead to an overall conclusion that the attack was in fact a mistake....

For reasons never explained, the findings of the Court of Inquiry and the McCain endorsement were classified TOP SECRET and not declassified until June 29, 1976, nine years and twenty-one days after the event. A news release was issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) on June 28, 1967.

The "SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS" attached to the news release is somewhat strange. It omits the Court of Inquiry findings 1. and 6. as well as paragraph 15. of Admiral McCain's endorsement. The summary appears to go out of its way to say things not in the actual proceedings of the Court. It also contains errors of fact which are contradicted by the record of proceedings. For example it says, "LIBERTY fired her .50 cal machine guns at the aircraft and torpedo boats, but only after she had been attacked and hit." Liberty never fired her guns at the aircraft; however, she did fire her guns at the torpedo boats before they attacked. The transcript of Commander McGonagle confirms this.

One paragraph even seems to contradict the Court's findings 1. and 6.:

> Her configuration, as shown in the international standard naval identification book 'Jane's Fighting Ships,' and her standard markings, were clearly sufficient for the aircraft to identify her properly as the non-combatant ship LIBERTY.[5]

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Two paragraphs later the summary relates that this "non-combatant" ship was exercised at general quarters during most of the hour just prior to the air attack. When general quarters is sounded the boatswain shouts "All hands man your battle stations." One can only speculate as to why the press release omitted or distorted a number of significant aspects of the actual Findings of the Court.

After a long day in London, the record of proceedings and the First Endorsement by Admiral McCain were placed in a briefcase which was chained to the wrist of Rear Admiral Kidd. Also, a .45 caliber semi-automatic, in a shoulder holster was strapped to his chest. He was driven to the London airport and boarded a Pan American airliner. He was booked first class. As soon as he got into his seat, he fell asleep. He remembers waking in the middle of the night to find a stewardess trying to cover him with a blanket. He asked what was going on and the stewardess explained that she was trying to cover the huge .45 caliber semi-automatic on his chest as the lady in the opposite seat was terrorized by it. He then fell back asleep until the plane arrived in Washington. He was met at the airport and driven immediately to the Naval hospital at Bethesda, Maryland, where he arrived near dawn. Admiral David L. McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations was recovering from a bout with pneumonia. Ike felt it prudent not to awaken Admiral McDonald and waited outside his room.[6] As soon as McDonald awakened and heard that Ike was there, he

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sent for him. As Ike walked into the room, McDonald said, "Ike, was it intentional?" Ike replied, "No Admiral" and then they went through the record.[7] Since then, Ike Kidd had declined to talk about the matter.[8]

THE CIA REPORT
June 13, 1967

The CIA conducted an independent investigation of the Liberty Incident and issued a report on June 13, 1967.[9] The CIA Report is essentially accurate and is a remarkable piece of work to have been assembled in only five days. However, in its anxiousness to complete the report, the CIA overlooked the fact that while Washington, D.C. was observing daylight savings time on June 8, 1967, Israel was not. As a result, the times in the CIA report, though essentially accurate, are one hour off. That is, the incident began about 2:00 p.m. Sinai time, on June 8, 1967, but the CIA Report reflects the time as 3:00 p.m.[10] In addition, another CIA document on the Liberty was prepared on June 21, 1967. This document remains classified.[11] However, the official position of the CIA is that they believe the attacks on the U.S.S. Liberty were a mistake.[12]

Throughout the many accounts of the Liberty incident, there has been much ink and wind expended on the issue of the similarities between the U.S.S. Liberty and the Egyptian warship, the El Quesir.[13] The CIA report states:

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> Although the Liberty is some 200 feet longer than the Egyptian transport El Quesir, it could easily be mistaken for the latter vessel by an overzealous pilot. Both have similar hulls and arrangements of masts and stack.[14]

Responding to question 5. of a query from Senator James Abourezk on behalf of a Mr. Carl Marcy,[15] CIA director Stansfield Turner commented:

> 5. Finally, could I have your judgment and that of the Agency you head, based on information acquired by the agency from all sources, that the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty was deliberate or an honest mistake? Comment: It remains our best judgment that the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty was not made in malice towards the United States and was a mistake.[16]

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS) FACT FINDING TEAM
THE RUSS REPORT
9 June to 20 June 1967

Major General Joseph R. Russ, United States Army was directed by the JCS to commence a fact finding study which he began in Washington, D.C., on June 9, 1967.[17] In Part II, Section I the report outlined thirty-six "Findings of Fact", most of which are followed by "Discussion"; however, because of the charter of the fact finding team, General Russ did not make any findings about the actual attacks.[18] The team collected, compiled and analyzed all of the significant message traffic; therefore, the Russ report is an invaluable resource in the study of the Liberty Incident.

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THE CLIFFORD REPORT
July 18, 1967

In 1967, Clark Clifford was the Chair of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board[19] and a close advisor to President Johnson. He was tasked with two questions by the President through the President's National Security Advisor, W.W. Rostow. Question One was, "Who fired the first shot in the 1967 War? Question Two, "Was the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty intentional or a mistake?" Clifford's answer to the first question remains classified although it is generally known that he concluded that Israel fired the first shot.[20] Clifford had taken a stern position at the National Security Council meeting on June 9 and had urged the president to treat Israel exactly the same way that Egypt or the Soviet Union would have been treated if they had attacked Liberty. This position was stated by Clifford before details of the attack were known in Washington. Clifford's position was also deemed inconsistent, since he was known as a friend of Israel. In 1948, when the State of Israel came into being, there was a heated debate on whether the United States should recognize Israel. At that time, Clark Clifford was a Commander in the U.S. Navy and serving as executive assistant to President Truman. A team from the Department of State, including Dean Rusk, who was at that time an employee of the Department of State,[21] argued to President Truman that it was not in the best interest of the United States to recognize Israel. CDR Clifford, in the presence of Dean Rusk, argued to the

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President, "You have to recognize Israel, Mr. President, because it is the right thing to do." Although it was probably not Clifford's argument alone that persuaded President Truman to reject the advice of the Department of State and to recognize Israel, Rusk never forgot. When interviewed at his office at the Law School at the University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, on April 5, 1989, the author asked Dean Rusk if he had read the Clark Clifford report. He responded that he had not. When advised that Clifford concluded that the attacks were the result of mistaken identity, Rusk responded, "I would have expected him to side with the Zionists." Ironically, Clifford had not sided with the Zionists. He urged a tough position towards Israel on this matter, probably even harsher than the position taken by Rusk.

The Clifford Report on the question of whether the attacks were intentional or a mistake remained classified top secret until it was declassified on October 25, 1995.[22]

The Clifford report made the following significant conclusions:

> a. The information thus far available does not reflect that the Israeli high command made a premeditated attack on a ship known to be American....
> d. The best interpretation from available facts is that there were gross and inexcusable failures in the command and control of subordinate Israeli naval and air elements....
> f. The unprovoked attack on the Liberty constitutes a flagrant act of gross negligence for which the Israeli Government should be held completely

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> responsible, and the Israeli military personnel involved should be punished.[23]

The bottom line is that Clifford found no premeditation but "inexcusable failures" constituting "gross negligence" on the part of Israeli subordinate military personnel. Clifford, looking through American eyes, concluded further: "e. There is no justification for the failure of the IDF -- With the otherwise outstanding efficiency which it demonstrated in the course of the war--to ensure prompt alerting of all appropriate elements of the IDF of the fact that a U.S. Ship was in the area."[24]

It is also interesting to note that a number of sentences in the Clifford report are verbatim from the Defense department News Release of June 23, 1967.

In an interview with the author, Clark Clifford recalled that the Liberty Incident was "a matter of enormous delicacy."[25] He obtained material from the Department of Defense and after review, he concluded that the attack was a mistake, in effect a case of "Murphy's Law".[26]

He stated that his investigation had been conducted without staff. He said that he did not travel to the Pentagon. He recalls attending a couple of meetings in the "Map Room"[27] and after "looking into it and listening to electronically recorded material it seemed to establish that it was an accident."[28]

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS - 1967

Shortly after the attack, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held three days of hearings on S. 1872, a bill to amend the foreign assistance act of 1961. "The Israeli Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty" was put into question by Senators Aiken and Hickenlooper. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara gave the following testimony to the committee:

> ....In the case of the attack on the Liberty, it was the conclusion of the investigatory body headed by an Admiral of the Navy in whom we have great confidence that the attack was not intentional. I read the record of the investigation, and support that conclusion, ...
>
> It was not a conscious decision on the part of either the Government of Israel--
>
> Senator Hickenlooper. Perhaps not.
>
> Secretary McNamara. (Continuing) To attack a U.S. Vessel.
> ....
> Secretary McNamara. No. There is no evidence that the individuals attacking the Liberty knew they were attacking a U.S. ship, and there is some evidence, circumstantial, that they did not know it.
> ....
> Secretary McNamara. Senator Hickenlooper, I don't want to carry the torch for the Israeli. It was an inexcusable error in judgment.
> ....
> Secretary McNamara. And an inexcusable error of professional tactics. I would simply point out to you that, at the same time, I was denying that we had struck a Russian ship in Haiphong Harbor [*sic*];[29] and I proved to be in error. These errors do occur. We had no more intention of

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> attacking a Russian ship than Israel apparently did of attacking an American ship.[30]

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
February 1, 1968

On the afternoon of February 1, 1968, in the old Senate office Building, at a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara appeared accompanied by General Earle G. Wheeler to testify about the more recent Pueblo incident. Senator Symington asked Secretary of Defense, McNamara about air support for the Pueblo in its hour of need. In his response, Secretary McNamara compared the Pueblo incident to the Liberty incident and commented:

> The kind of uncertainty you have in that kind of a situation was illustrated by the Liberty incident. When the Liberty was attacked, We had a task force in the Mediterranean. We received a flash report here in the Pentagon at the time of the attack. We examined the situation. My first reaction--- that is the question I immediately posed to the Chiefs and the Joint Staff was: Is it not likely it was attacked by Soviet forces?
>
> We knew the location of certain Soviet forces in the area. Certainly the initial reaction, having known their location, would be to attack those forces. Within a half hour or 45 minutes, however, we concluded that a Soviet attack was unlikely.
>
> The next obvious answer was it had been attacked by Egyptians. Who else would have done it if it were not the Soviets or the Egyptians? Well that too proved in error. It took us a while to find that out.

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> What I am suggesting to you is that it is very difficult for a commander not on the scene to know what happened and how he should react,....[31]

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE - 1968
April and May 1968

Hearings were held before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session. The Defense Communications Agency requested $83,281,000 for the fiscal year 1969. The first witness on Monday, April 8, 1968, was Lieutenant General Richard P. Klocko, USAF. After his opening statement, Congressman Sikes indicated he wished to discuss the worldwide communication system of the Department of the Defense "with emphasis on the U.S.S. Liberty incident." Sikes began with the comment, "A general conclusion could be drawn from the staff reports that the use and operational capabilities of the Defense Communications system is nothing less than pathetic, and that the management of the system needs to be completely overhauled."[32]

A witness, Solis Horowitz, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), commented on an investigation of the Liberty incident by the Department of Defense (DOD) which made sixteen recommendations on November 16, 1967. He testified that some of the recommendations had been fully implemented. The focus of the DOD investigation and the House Appropriations hearing were both on the defects in the

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existing system that left Liberty in harms way. A great deal of testimony and conversation reviewed not only the Liberty incident, but other aspects of Defense Communications. Command structures, procedures and equipment as well as problems in Vietnam were on the table but the discussion seemed to keep coming back to Liberty. The comment of Congressman Rhodes is noteworthy:

> The record speaks for itself as far as the handling of this message to the U.S.S. Liberty. It is a comedy of errors. You could not have written it any better if you were writing a musical comedy.
>
> It would be funny if it were not so tragic. Here we are, with the most sophisticated communications system ever known to mankind and maybe it is so sophisticated we do not know how to operate it.[33]

It appears from the report that the committee felt there was some stonewalling by both the JCS and the Navy and although the committee adopted a "summary of study,"[34] it is apparent that the House Armed Services Committee Investigation of Worldwide Communications in 1971 had its genesis in the dissatisfaction of this committee with the cooperation of the JCS and the Navy to this investigation.

Upon publication of the House Appropriations Committee Report, excerpts of it were published in the Congressional Record - House under the caption,

> NAVY COMMUNICATIONS "FOULUP" CAUSED U.S.S. "LIBERTY'S" PRESENCE OFF SINAI COAST
>
> ....

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> Mr. Halpern. Mr. Speaker, I was shocked to learn that a Navy communications "foulup" led to the presence of the U.S.S. Liberty off the Sinai coast in June 1967 where it was mistaken for an Egyptian vessel and attacked by Israel torpedo boats and planes.[35]

Although almost all investigations relating to Liberty have been declassified, or partially declassified, a portion of the above report remains highly classified with a code name classification. All efforts to declassify the remainder of this report remain unsuccessful.[36]

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION - 1971
May 10, 1971

In 1971, the House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee conducted a Review of Department of Defense World Wide Communications.[37] The portion of the text of the Report regarding U.S.S. Liberty is deemed extremely important and highly instructive. Nonetheless, there are a few mistakes in the report. For example, it states that Liberty suffered 75 wounded instead of the correct number, 171.[38] The report traces each of the five delayed messages and catalogues the specific route of the message and attributes the reasons for the delays. The report discloses that deletions were made from the report on the recommendation of the Office of the Directorate of Security Review of the Department of Defense.[39] Rear Admiral Francis J. Fitzpatrick, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Communications, testified extensively before the committee in secret session.[40] The Admiral informed the

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committee on a number of facts and nuances which were deleted for security. In order to better appreciate the text of the report (see Appendix III), one should be aware that notwithstanding the fact that the United States has the world's finest Navy, for some reason even today, the Navy remains in the dark ages insofar as routine communications with its deployed ships. Major General Roscoe Cougill, speaking at Harvard University on the status of Naval communications during the Gulf War said: "Then Desert Storm began. I did have message backlogs when the war started, mainly in the priority and routine area and mainly with the U.S. Navy, which was still locked somewhere in the seventeenth century with its communications."[41]

In 1967, Fleet broadcasts and other Naval messages were sent by teletype. If the message was classified, the message was typed into the teletype machine which through a series of rotors, encrypted the message. When received, the message was decoded and printed. If the message was classified "secret" or "top secret" a different code and different rotors were used. At a small station like a ship, it might be necessary to change the rotors to receive or send a message of high classification. Some smaller stations did not have the capability to send or receive highly classified material. Thus a "secret" message sent from JCS to CINCUSNAVEUR might carry a ship or other unit as an information addressee, but

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that addressee might not receive the original message due to their lack of a secret rotor for their teletype.

Some of the "Findings and Conclusions" of the Report are noteworthy:

> 1. Communications systems are only as good as those who operate and use them in the command and decision making process....
>
> ....
>
> b. The Department of Defense Satellite Communications System will not achieve operational capability for some time. That system has lagged several years behind commercial systems....
>
> ....
>
> g. The time required for processing of messages, before and after their electronic transmission, has, prevented any significant improvement in "writer-to-reader" time, despite installation of automatic switch equipment. Statistics reflect that an average of 70 minutes is required for processing a "flash" message, whereas the average time for electronic transmission of such a message is only 5 minutes.
>
> 2. Unresponsive communications systems of the Department of Defense delayed the execution of command decisions and retarded the transmission of information to command officials in critical international situations....[42]

In the Summary of the report, a colloquy between Congressman Durward C. Hall of Missouri and Lieutenant General Richard P. Klocko, USAF,[43] the Director of the Defense Communications Agency is reprinted as follows:

> Mr. Hall. The clincher is to ask the General one question: Given another scenario like the Liberty, are you confident in your own mind that now we would have the necessary communications to promptly and effectively complete the command decision?
> General Klocko. No, sir, I couldn't guarantee that.
> Mr. Hall. Then we are in a hell of a mess Mr. Chairman.[44]

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE - 1979/1981

In 1979, the Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was Senator Birch Bayh (D IN) and the Vice Chair and Ranking Minority Member was Senator Barry Goldwater (R AZ). In 1979, a revival of interest in the Liberty incident had begun. Requests to some Senators on the Intelligence Committee initiated an interest in the subject. A major catalyst was a book written by James M. Ennes, Jr., a U.S. Naval officer who had been wounded during the air attack on Liberty and who claimed the attack was not a case of mistaken identity but rather a willful and deliberate attack by Israel on a U.S. Navy ship.[45] The Senate select committee on Intelligence began an investigation. Staff was sent to Israel and data was provided by the Israeli Air Force and Navy. The investigators were permitted to interview the pilots who attacked Liberty. The pilots sat behind a sheet or screen so they could not be seen by the investigators. They answered questions at great length.[46] In response to this inquiry the Israeli Defense Forces, Department of Combat History prepared a report on the incident.[47]

The introduction to the report states:

> ...the American Congress appointed a committee, headed by Adlai Stevenson, for the purpose of investigating the affair and publishing the results of the investigation.[48]

After an extensive investigation, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence became satisfied that there was no

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merit to the claims of intentional attack and laid the investigation to rest without filing any formal report.

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1981

The National Security Agency (NSA) published a seventy-seven page document fourteen years after the event. It was authored by two NSA personnel after they had retired. One author is William D. Gerhard and the name of the other remains classified and redacted[49] from the "Top Secret" document which was partially declassified and released in 1983.[50] Though a great deal of the document remains redacted, it nonetheless contains a wealth of data.

The NSA is very candid in shouldering more than its share of the blame. The foreword, written by Vincent J. Wilson, Jr., describes the document as follows:

> The passage of time has made it possible for the authors to reexamine the Liberty incident objectively and answer a number of persistent questions. The authors accordingly set forth the technical rational for the Liberty mission, the particulars of the Israeli miscalculation, the details of the American communications failures, a narrative of the attack [DELETED] and the lessons to be learned from the event." The unclassified table of contents indicates that in Chapter V, on page 38, the report sets forth the Israeli Prosecutor's Charges of Negligence (U), but page 38 of the document remains redacted with the exception of a picture of an Israeli Motor Torpedo Boat of the class which attacked Liberty and a note that the figure is unclassified. The document shows unclassified silhouettes which have been reproduced here from the NSA document.

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The document concludes as to the Israelis:

> (U) In summation, the judge concluded that in all the circumstances of the case the conduct of the naval officers concerned in the Liberty incident could not be considered unreasonable to an extent which would justify committal for trial.

EXPLANATION REEXAMINED (U)

> (U) Reexamination of Israel's explanation of why its air and naval forces attacked the Liberty reveals egregious errors in both command judgments and operational procedures.[51]

The NSA was certainly angry with Israel over the death of its own staff member[52] as well as the deaths of thirty-three Navy men aboard its platform which it sent to the war zone and was unable to extract in time to avert disaster. In spite of the obvious anger, the NSA concluded that Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian ship as a result of miscalculations and egregious errors.[53]

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 1991/1992 INVESTIGATION

In June 1991, the House Armed Services Sub-Committee on Investigations received a letter from the U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association asking "for a complete and comprehensive investigation of the LIBERTY incident."[54] The Chair of the Investigations Subcommittee, Congressman Nicholas Mavroules of Massachusetts, obtained the loan of Roy J. Kirk from the General Accounting Office and began an investigation that lasted almost a year. Warren Nelson, a member of the staff of Congressman Mavroules had security clearance higher than top secret. He personally reviewed the Clifford Report when it

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was still classified and the NSA document in its unredacted form and confirmed to Kirk and to the author that neither report contained any support for a theory of an intentional attack.[55] Kirk was able to read the Clifford Report with his security clearance and found it not significant. Ultimately the Investigations Staff concluded that the incident had been fully investigated in prior investigations and that there was no evidence to support the allegations made by the Liberty Veterans Association[56] and no reason for any further investigation. The Subcommittee did not issue a report of its investigation.

ISRAELI INVESTIGATIONS
THE RAM RON COMMISSION OF INQUIRY - 1967

As per Section 537 of "The Military Justice Law of 1955," on June 12, 1967, the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General (Rav Aluf) Yitzhak Rabin, appointed Colonel Ram Ron as a one-man Commission of Inquiry[57] "to investigate the circumstances under which the American ship 'Liberty' was hit by the Israeli Defence Forces."[58] Colonel Ron took testimony of twelve officers including the Chief of Air Force Intelligence and the Commanding Officer of the Motor Torpedo Boat whose torpedo had hit Liberty. He received additional exhibits and documents in evidence. In less than five days he rendered his report to the Chief of Staff. In view of the limited time and limited resources available to Colonel Ron, the report is an exceptional analysis though it contains a few errors of fact.

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For example, he reported that when Liberty was observed by the Nord 2501 reconnaissance aircraft, it bore the markings "R.T.R.-5."[59] Liberty's side number was "GTR-5" and those numbers were correctly reported to Naval Intelligence by LCDR (Rav Seren) Uri Meretz shortly after 6:00 A.M. Israeli time on June 8, 1967. He says the torpedo boats fired four torpedoes.[60] Actually, five torpedoes were launched.[61] These and a number of other minor errors of fact do not detract from a job well done by Colonel Ron.[62] Colonel Ron's conclusions were:

> The only clear conclusion arising from the facts determined as aforesaid (after having compared the various testimonies and unit journals of the relevant units) is **that the attack on the ship by the Israeli Defence Forces was made neither maliciously nor in gross negligence, but as the result of a bona fide mistake.**[63] [Emphasis added]

He went on to conclude the attack was the result of three mistakes by the IDF and one mistake by the Liberty. His recommendations were for the "Declarations of Dangerous Zones" and for additional training and procedures for the IDF. The Military Advocate General reviewed the report and forwarded his conclusions and recommendations to the Chief of Staff.[64]

The endorsement analyzed the conclusion of Colonel Ron that Liberty herself, made a "grave error" which resulted in the attack,

> ...it clearly appears that the American ship acted carelessly and placed herself in far reaching peril by approaching so near to the coast of an area known to her to be a war area - without giving notice of her presence to the Israeli authorities and without taking care to identify herself with

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> conspicuous markings, while at the same time the said area was not a navigation area crossed by maritime routes and in which ships do not usually sail.[65]

Paragraphs 9. and 10. of the endorsement of the Military Advocate General state:

> 9. The question is whether in these circumstances there is room for the institution of legal proceedings against any military personnel.... Thus, the officers involved may maintain that in maritime combat use was made, more than once in the past, of camouflage tricks as ruses of war,[66] and naval officers of all nations are trained to include this factor in their calculations. Therefore they may claim that the unfortunated[*sic*] incident be regarded as the consequence of an honest and reasonable mistake, which is not punishable by law.
>
> 10. We have not heard the contentions of the injured party, so that the data in our possession and our ability to draw final conclusions are necessarily limited.[67] At the same time we may conclude:
>
> > (a) That our mistakes and what is summarized in section 8 above, create the basis for a claim to adequate compensation against our forces.
> >
> > (b) That contributory negligence on the part of the vessel may be taken into account in the determination of the sum to be paid.

Most important, in his recommendations, Colonel Shamgar said:

> 11. Upon the evidence as taken by the Court of Inquiry, I am unable to decide whether legal proceedings should be instituted against military personnel involved. In view of the importance of the incident and its grave consequences, I recommend that the case be further investigated by a <u>judicial</u> body, that is an Examining Judge, appointed by the President of the Military Appeals Court, upon my request...

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THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY - 1967

Sections 283 through 298 of "The Military Justice Law of 1955" deal with "Preliminary Inquiry" which is analogous to the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry. Section 283 provides:

> 283. Where the Military Advocate General has directed that a preliminary inquiry be held, he shall notify the President of the Appeal Court Martial, who shall appoint an examining judge to hold it.

The inquiry may proceed when the Military Advocate General has reason to believe that an offense has been committed but no person has been charged.[68] At the termination of the preliminary inquiry, the examining judge shall decide whether or not there is a sufficient amount of prima facie evidence to justify the committal of an accused to trial.[69]

Upon receipt of the report of Colonel Ram Ron dated June 16, 1967, the Military Advocate General, Meir Shamgar,[70] ordered a Preliminary Inquiry. Judge Yeshayahu Yerushalmi[71] was appointed to conduct it. He took testimony from thirty-four witnesses including the Operations Officer of the Air Force, the Operations Officer at Military Headquarters, the Operations Officer of the Navy, the crews of the MTB's and the pilots of the aircraft.[72] Judge Yerushalmi rendered his decision on July 21, 1967.[73]

The first question that comes to mind is, "Why was there a preliminary inquiry?" A Commission of Inquiry, conducted by a respected senior military officer had found that the attacks

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were the result of mistaken identity. Why was a second investigation ordered? The Military Advocate General of the IDF in 1967 was Meir Shamgar. He ordered the Preliminary Inquiry. The question was put to him.[74] His answer was, "This was a serious matter. So many people were killed or injured. I wanted a full judicial review. A full and complete judicial procedure. Not just a military review. I did not want anyone to say that the military swept this under the rug. The United States was the only country in the world that had stood with Israel. We had killed and wounded so many of its sailors. I was not satisfied with only a military review. I wanted a judicial reconsideration of the errors that Colonel Ram Ron had established. While I never had the slightest doubt that there was no malicious intent involved, I wanted to know if the negligence that Colonel Ron established rose to the degree of criminal negligence."[75] His answer was very similar to the conclusion he made in his endorsement to the Commission of Inquiry Report in 1967.[76] President Shamgar was asked why he was so sure there was no malicious intent. He replied, "What logic is there in an attack on our only friend in the middle of our most fateful war? Why would we act to endanger the relationship with our most important ally and only friend? This was a time when the United States was most openly supportive of our position. The whole policy of the United States was pro Israel. The United States was our most outspoken friend. Such an act could only

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be counterproductive and out of any intellectual understanding. The Pueblo attack is understandable. The attackers were enemies of the United States. There is not an army in the history of the world that has not unintentionally hurt itself."

The first delivery was made by Deputy Chief of Mission, Ephraim Evron, to Nicholas de Katzenbach who at the time was the number two person at the U.S. Department of State. The Decision was handed to Mr. Katzenbach in his office at the Department of State. He read the report in the presence of Mr. Evron. When he finished reading he said to Mr. Evron, "It is an excellent report except for the last two sentences."[77]

The last two sentences of the Decision are:

> "Yet I have not discovered any deviation from the standard of reasonable conduct which would justify the committal of anyone for trial. In view of what has been said above, I hold, that there is no sufficient amount of prima facie evidence, justifying committing anyone for trial."

Judge Yerushalmi began the "Preliminary Inquiry" in the same manner that Admiral Kidd commenced the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry. That is, the taking of evidence was commenced without any one being designated as a party. This means that the initial inquiry was fact finding but not prosecutorial. The procedure is identical in both Israeli and U.S. law. At such point as the court deems it appropriate to designate a person as a party, the proceedings are halted and the designated party or parties are warned or cautioned as to their rights and given the opportunity to obtain counsel or

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counsel is appointed for them. The Chief Military Prosecutor of the Israeli Defense Force presented the evidence at the Inquiry and, upon taking evidence of the events which transpired, the Chief Military Prosecutor submitted a "plaint".[78]

At this point the Inquiry was adjourned and the designated parties were permitted to obtain counsel. The Prosecutor called thirty-four witnesses and introduced fourteen exhibits and attributed various offenses to various military personnel. The court designated only "the Acting Chief of Naval Operations" as an accused.[79] He was represented by the Chief Military Defence counsel, LCOL (Sgan Aluf) Villie Tein. The accused made a statement under oath, called three witnesses and offered five exhibits in evidence.

The charges in the "plaint" were:

> Count one: The failure to report the fact that the American ship "Liberty" was seen in the morning hours of the day of the incident, sailing in the vicinity of the Israeli Coast to the Head of the Naval Department.
>
> Count two: The failure to report the fact that the American ship "Liberty" was seen in the morning hours of the day of the incident, sailing in the vicinity of the Israeli Coast to Air Force Headquarters.
>
> Count three: The failure to properly investigate the reports of the shelling of El Arish from the sea.
>
> Counts four and five: These are alternative counts and allege negligence, in that the order to attack a target thought to be an enemy target, was given without checking its national identity and without taking into account that the ship "Liberty" was

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> observed in the morning hours of that day sailing in the vicinity of the Israel coast.
>
> Count six: The order of the Naval Department not to attack the ship was not delivered to the [MTB] division.
>
> Count seven: The aircraft of the Air Force and the torpedo boats attacked the American ship "Liberty" on the unfounded assumption that she was an Egyptian warship and failed to take reasonable steps to properly establish her identity. [The word "her" is used in the translation in reference to Liberty as is the American custom in assigning female gender to ships. In Hebrew, a ship is not referred to as "her."]

The prosecutor was apparently vigorous but not persuasive. The Judge rendered a well reasoned opinion which analyzed each of the seven counts in light of the evidence. It appears clear from the decision that the proceedings were detailed and precise. On review of the decision, Assistant Secretary of State Katzenbach indicated that he felt that the Judge should have ordered a court martial of the accused who was the target of Counts one and two. This issue will be considered further in Chapter 3.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL - IDF HISTORY - 1982

In 1981, the Israel Defense Forces, after learning of and cooperating with an investigation of the Liberty incident by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, decided that the IDF History Department would research and submit the official version of the State of Israel.[80] The official Israeli version concludes:

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CONCLUSION

> An examination of the facts in the 'Liberty' incident, in their proper context proves beyond any doubt that the attack on the American intelligence ship came about as a result of innocent error by the forces which operated on the spot and the HQs which supervised them.
>
> Though the attack of the armed forces of a friendly nation is a most regrettable and painful occurrence, incidents of this kind do occur in war-time.
>
> It goes without saying that such an incident must be thoroughly investigated, that all causes of the tragic encounter must be examined, conclusions drawn, and proper instructions issued which will prevent the occurrence of such an incident in the future. From Israel's point of view all these steps have been carried out in a most thorough and comprehensive manner. However, it is inappropriate to attribute malicious intent to Israel, when the evidence does not bear out such an attribution.[81]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY OF ISRAEL[82]

In June 1992, The Naval Reserve Association News carried an article by James M. Ennes, Jr. accusing Israel of intentionally attacking the U.S.S. Liberty. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of Israel[83] responded with a letter to Naval Reserve News. The letter is quite conciliatory. It points out the mistakes acknowledged by the United States and the mistakes admitted by Israel and again expresses an apology and condolences. (See Appendix IV)

UNOFFICIAL RESEARCH CONCLUDING MISTAKE

In addition to the official reports of the United States and Israel, several serious writers have treated the incident.

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The son and grandson of Winston Churchill, in their book *The Six Day War* came to the following conclusion:

> Explanations of the attack have been many and farfetched. One is that the Israelis believed they had a monopoly of listening in on other people's conversations in this part of the world and resented the intrusion; another, that the Israelis had done it at the request of the CIA to disprove Egyptian-inspired claims of collusion between Israel and the United States. However, there seems no reason to doubt the explanation given by the Israelis and accepted by the Americans that it was just one big mistake.[84]

Another unofficial analysis comes from Phil G. Goulding,[85] who at the time was serving in the Johnson administration as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). He published a fascinating book, *Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security*,[86] which tells of the interesting events with which he dealt during his tenure at the Pentagon. He was there, working closely with Robert McNamara and Cyrus Vance and was a participant in the Liberty incident from the perspective of the Johnson Administration. He devotes a chapter of his book to the Liberty incident.[87] Goulding is quoted frequently by persons who reject the official investigation results. In fact, Goulding said:

> Many stories spoke of the 'accidental attack.' There was nothing accidental about it. It was conducted deliberately - by aircraft and by motor torpedo boat, by rocket and bomb and torpedo and gun fire.[88]

Those who rely on Goulding to support a rejection of the mistake conclusion stop the quote as indicated above. They ignore Goulding's next sentence:

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> Whether it was a tragic mistake in identity is a separate question, but it was no accident.[89]

A few pages later Goulding feels:

> It is worth saying again: This deliberate attack was no accident - mistaken identity perhaps, but no accident.[90]

One must agree with Mr. Goulding in the sense that when the U.S.S. Saratoga on October 1, 1992, unintentionally launched sparrow missiles which locked onto the Turkish Destroyer Muavenet and struck its bridge, killing its captain and other crew members,[91] the firing of the missiles was an accident. In the Liberty incident, the firing of the weapons was done intentionally with the intent to inflict damage on the target. In that sense, it was no accident. But on the question of whether or not it was "a tragic mistake in identity" Goulding made his final conclusion quite clear:

> As weeks and months passed, we gradually picked up informal bits and pieces from various sources in Israel. It was impossible to guarantee the accuracy of most of them, and the government could do nothing with them formally. One could conclude - and I did - that the attackers did not know they were killing Americans and had not acted with malice or deliberation.[92]

Admiral Jonathan Trumbull Howe wrote a doctoral dissertation entitled "Seapower and the Multicrises," which was ultimately published as a book under the title *Multicrises*.[93] His interest was primarily on making command decisions during time of crises. His analysis is mistaken identity.

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The interest of naval Commander Joseph F. Bouchard, USN,[94] like Admiral Howe's, was in making command decisions during crises. He originally wrote a case study of the attacks on the U.S.S. Panay, the U.S.S. Liberty, and the U.S.S. Stark which was published in the Naval War College Review. His doctoral dissertation[95] of 1217 pages, completed at Stanford University, also studied the Liberty, as did his book, *Command in Crises*.[96] His analysis is mistaken identity.

SOURCES CONTESTING THE MISTAKE THEORY

JOHN LOFTUS, "THE SECRET WAR AGAINST THE JEWS"[97]

John Loftus is a well known author. He served as a U.S. Army Officer and worked in the Department of Justice, Office of Special Investigations whose function is to prosecute Nazi war criminals who entered the United States illegally after World War II. In his book, written with Mark Aarons, *The Secret War against the Jews*, in Chapter 12 titled "The Liberty Incident," he claims that the CIA sent the U.S.S. Liberty to its position off the Sinai to spy on the Israeli forces and the information obtained was passed to the Egyptians via a British Intelligence center on Cyprus. Loftus tells it this way:

> Aramco and the other big players in the oil business were extremely concerned that American aid to Israel would alienate the Arab oil producers. It was not enough to withhold military assistance in the coming war. Everyone in the Moslem world knew that the United States was still neutral in favor of Israel. The oil men wanted some under-the-table help for the Arabs. [This assertion is supported by its footnote 26 which reads, Confidential

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> interviews, former liaison to the NSA; former analyst, Naval Intelligence.]
>
> President Lyndon Johnson had been in the 'erl bidness' himself down in Texas and knew how the game was played. The oil producers got to LBJ or someone very close to him in the White House. Our sources were never able to find out who. The oil men asked if the President could throw the Arabs a bone, some sort of secret assistance that the public would never find out about but would make the Arab leadership grateful. The point was to keep the oil flowing no matter what happened in the 1967 war.
>
> The White House approved a contingency plan to send the Arabs a little intelligence about the Israel Defense Forces....[98]

The "little intelligence" Loftus refers to is the Liberty, which he described as having such sophisticated eavesdropping equipment that it was capable of hearing and recording every Israeli electronic transmission in the Sinai including radio transmissions of individual tanks. This electronic bonanza was sorted by the British on Cyprus using massive computers and passed to the Egyptian armed forces. Loftus claims, therefore, that in the 1967 war, on the southern front battlefield, the United States and Great Britain were supporting the Arab military against Israel.[99]

Ye. A. PRIMAKOV - SOVIET COOKING[100]

While serving as an editor of Pravda in 1967, Ye. A. Primakov wrote an article on the 1967 war which appeared in Pravda on July 27, 1967. The article refers to Liberty and states:

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> Now it is known that among the Liberty crew members were superlative Arab language experts. While moving along the Sinai towards the Israeli border, they were intercepting operative conversations between commanders on the Egyptian side. It was also leaked out that the Liberty maintained two-way communications with Israeli radio stations. It is possible that when it was necessary to cover up any evidence of U.S. espionage activity there was a scenario which was played out in the Israeli motor torpedo boat attack upon the Liberty, which turned out to be a tragedy for the crew of the ship. A similar version agrees that the Israeli head of government decided to mask the fact of its cooperation with the CIA by an attack on the Liberty, in any case, this has already been circulated in the world press.[101]

Thereafter, Primakov and others authored a book about the 1967 war titled, "The 'Dove' Has Been Released."[102] In this book it is claimed that the United States and Israel used Liberty to send false messages to the Egyptian forces in the Sinai, directing them to withdraw. Primakov further alleges, "In order to erase the participation of this ship in the Sinai campaign, it was necessary to stage an attack..."[103]

Thus, in the Soviet story, the United States was on the Israeli side actively fighting against the Arabs and the attack on Liberty was made in collusion with the United States to cover up the U.S. participation on behalf of Israel. Most Arabs interviewed have heard this story and accept it as true. The Arab affection for this Soviet version of the events was further reinforced by Primakov by insisting that the victory over the Arabs was enabled by the assistance of the United States, Britain and West Germany:

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> Newspaper reports that the U.S. and British planes participated in the raids on Arab airfields were not confirmed. But that in no way disproves the extensive indirect participation of the U.S., British and West German imperialist hordes in the Israeli venture.[104]

Primakov goes on to claim that Israeli officers received "extensive" military training in special camps in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, and were also trained by participating in the Viet Nam hostilities.[105]

AMBASSADOR MAHMOUD KASSEM - EGYPTIAN COOKING[106]

Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem,[107] who served in the foreign ministry of Egypt during the 1967 war, has written a book about the War which remains unpublished. In regard to the Sinai campaign and the Liberty incident he wrote:

> Surprisingly, in the annals of the 1967 Middle East War, there are some amusing stories to be mentioned, the most staggering of which is that of the American ship 'Liberty,' a spy vessel in the East Mediterranean, was using the most complex technological systems of communications of that time and apparently came across vital intelligence information that dramatized the outcome of the war between Israel and Jordan on June 9, 1967. The Israelis had no alternative but to destroy the 'Liberty,' and to sink her with the secret she had learned in her spying mission along the coasts of Israel and Egypt.
>
> There had been no indication that Jordan would join any fighting that might erupt between Egypt and Israel. Nasser, knowing the weak position of the Jordanian front, hadn't pressed for a Jordanian commitment and King Hussein hadn't offered one. But suddenly, after what was believed to be a telephone call from President Nasser alleging the sweeping advances of Egyptian troops into Israeli territory, King Hussein decided to join the fighting. He hoped to be included in a victory of the Egyptian army with little or no

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> Jordanian sacrifice. Unfortunately, President Nasser never telephoned King Hussein. It was a trap set by the Israelis to bring Jordan into the fiasco. For the Israelis, the big prize for such a fatal jump by the Jordanians was to conquest not only the West Bank of the Jordan, but all of East Jerusalem.
>
> Over the years since the war, many theories and hypotheses have been put forward concerning the mysterious telephone call received by King Hussein. The most logical explanation seems to be grounded in Israel's sudden hostile attitude toward the 'Liberty.' Israel had been aware of her presence in the area, and the nature of her mission and until that time had not felt compelled to act against her. The theory points out that Israel knew the 'Liberty' had intercepted the telephone message and knew the origin of the call and that it had not emanated from Egypt, although the voice was President Nasser's.
>
> The theory goes along these lines: Israel wanted to conquer the rest of Palestine, particularly Jerusalem which was still in the hands of Jordan. Israel knew that King Hussein would only join the fighting if he believed the Egyptian Army was marching to victory and what better way to assure him of that than a personal telephone call from President Nasser. The rest is history. King Hussein joined the losing battle and lost what the Israelis were precisely aiming at getting from him.
>
> As to how the Israelis managed to imitate Nasser's voice, it was not a problem. They recorded his voice and words from previous speeches and calls and composed the fake call to King Hussein. Here, the theory stops. This theory may give some logical explanation for the sudden and weird Israeli air attack on the 'Liberty' and the strange silence of the Americans in the light of that hostile behavior that caused great losses of American lives by a country considered a close ally.[108]

Ambassador Kassem "heard that Moshe Dayan ordered the sinking of the Liberty." He also raised the question: "What made Dayan give the order to sink the Liberty, knowing the political repercussions?" He also heard that the U.S.

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government had forbidden the families of the crewmen lost on the Liberty to conduct memorial services in their memory.[109]

STEPHEN GREEN & SAMUEL M. KATZ
THE U.S. RF4C's

Stephen Green's book, *Taking Sides*, tells a story of U.S. Air Force assistance to Israel and Samuel Katz picks it up and repeats it in his book, *Soldier Spies*. The story they tell is that on June 3, 1967, the United States, under a covert arrangement with Israel, sent four RF4C photo reconnaissance aircraft and their pilots from the USAF 38th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, an element of the 26th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing from Ramstein AFB in West Germany to Moron, Spain. They were joined by a C-141 cargo plane that contained a complete WS430a photo-reconnaissance system. They were told they would be flying to a remote section of the Negev Desert near Beersheba, believed to be Hatzerim Air Force Base. The pilots were issued civilian clothes and identification. The aircraft were painted with blue and white stars of David and Israeli tail numbers. The planes gathered intelligence during the war that allowed or assured the Israeli victory. On June 12, 1967, immediately following the war, the four F-4C aircraft flew back to Moron, Spain and then to their base in Ramstein, Germany.[110] Liberty was attacked because her listening devices heard the American pilots talking on the radio in English. The United States, according to Green had already taken sides with Israel and condoned the

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attack because of the U.S. joy in the Israeli successes in overcoming Soviet military hardware in the hands of the Arabs.

STEPHEN ST. JOHN - THE MADRID PACT

As appendix "C" of his Eight Part Peace Proposal for Greater Jerusalem, St. John explains how, "according to informed sources whose identities must remain secret for their own safety, a meeting took place between certain Syrian and Zionist representatives in the Spanish state, in Madrid... The result of this meeting was an agreement whereby the Syrian conspirators, in consideration of a stupendous sum of money, promised to orchestrate a retreat of the Syrian Armed Forces from the Golan Heights against the day of an Israeli advance." St. John points out that the story must be true because anyone can see for themselves that it is not possible to capture the "impregnable Golan Heights" by assault and, therefore, the only way the Israelis could have attained them was by being allowed to have them pursuant to the "Madrid Pact."

"Clearly, the U.S.S. Liberty's sudden and unexpected visit to the eastern Mediterranean put the Golan operation in jeopardy; secrecy could no longer be assured with this intelligence-gathering platform floating nearby." The attack on the Liberty was made to prevent the world from learning of the "Madrid Pact."[111]

St. John seems to believe that the passing of the Golan to Israel was nothing more than a real estate transaction[112]

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and infers that the money paid for the Golan may have acquired the Syrian Presidency for Hafez al-Asad. "The Syrian Minister of Defense at the time, an ambitious former Air Force general named Hafez al-Asad, was also a brilliant propagandist. Born in humble circumstances, Asad's love of western money eventually boosted him to the presidency in 1970; Asad is the only man in world history to become the leader of his nation right after losing a significant portion of its sovereign territory."[113]

NORMAN F. DACEY - "DAYAN DID IT"

In September 1977, the Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, traveled to the United States on an official visit. He was expected to hold talks with President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. On September 19, 1977, the New York Times carried a paid advertisement on page 26. It began with the large type headline:

Are We Welcoming The Murderer Of Our Sons?

Beneath the headline was the picture of Moshe Dayan. The ad then told of the June 8, 1967, attack on the U.S.S. Liberty and disclosed that "this Committee" had obtained three intelligence information documents under the Freedom of Information Act and proceeded to present "excerpts" from the three documents. The first document is a report of the

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opinion of the Turkish General Staff and the second report states that "Israeli forces did not make mistakes." These theories are treated elsewhere in this chapter. The third document which is more directly related to the advertisement is dated 9 November 1967, and is titled, "Attack on U.S.S. Liberty Ordered by Dayan." It then prints paragraph 2. of the redacted report.

> (Deleted) commented on the sinking of the U.S. communications ship LIBERTY. They said that Dayan personally ordered the attack on the ship, and that one of his generals adamantly opposed the action and said: 'This is pure murder!' One of the Admirals who was present also disapproved the action and it was he who ordered it stopped. (Deletion) believe that the attack against the U.S. vessel is (deletion) detrimental to any political ambitions Dayan may have.

The ad then asks a series of questions ending with:

> If for ten years you have had information disclosing the identity of the individual who deliberately ordered the attack which killed or maimed so many of our sons, why have you never demanded that he be brought to justice? While you have been deporting persons suspected of war crimes against Europeans 35 years ago, why have you done nothing about the perpetrator of this heinous war crime against American servicemen ten years ago?

The ad ends with the statement "It is time for the U.S. Government to end its silence on the LIBERTY tragedy. It is time for the American people were given the truth!" The ad was published by Norman F. Dacey, the national chairman of the American Palestine Committee. A separate news article in the same paper on page 7 described The American Palestine Committee as "a nationwide committee of Americans trying to help the Palestinians to get back into their homeland."[114]

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The story was carried by the Associated Press and United Press International and stories appeared in The Washington Post and The Washington Star and other newspapers.[115]

SETH MINTZ - CONFESSIONS OF AN ISRAELI MAJOR

Seth Mintz has told a number of conflicting stories about what he knows of the Liberty incident. Generally his story is that he was an intelligence officer in the Israeli Defense Forces during June 1967, and that he was sitting quietly in the Israeli "War Room" and saw and heard unidentified Israeli officers examine aerial photographs of the U.S.S. Liberty and then with full knowledge that Liberty was flying the U.S. flag, order the attack on the Liberty.

The Liberty Veterans Association newsletter, *Liberty News*, tells it this way:

> In January, one of our shipmates was approached by a man claiming to be a former Israeli major who had observed the attack from the Israeli war room. 'The business about no flag flying is a lie,' the man said. 'We could hear the pilots reporting during the attack that the ship flew an American flag.'....The man does claim that Embassy officials were asked to move the ship away from the Israeli coast, and he claims that U.S. Embassy officials insisted that there were no American ships in the area.[116]

A variation of this story was printed by United Press International, dateline March 18, 1984.[117]

Mintz claims he went to Israel under the name of Giora Dagan and served in the IDF with serial number 968409.

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ANTHONY PEARSON - CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE

In the summer of 1975, Anthony Pearson, a professional journalist, was recruited by Bob Guccione, the owner and publisher of *Penthouse* magazine to write two articles about the Liberty incident. The two articles about the Liberty incident were published in Penthouse magazine in May 1976[118] and June 1976.[119] He also told essentially the same story in his book, *Conspiracy of Silence*.[120] The book has a dramatic opening with an apparent Arab staggering out of the dessert into a remote British outpost in Yemen on May 15, 1967, where he discloses himself as a member of the Special Air Services regiment[121] and thus the Liberty story begins to unfold. According to Pearson, the Liberty appeared off the coast of the Sinai and began listening. The Israelis radioed requests to Liberty to go away. Liberty radioed back insisting that she was in international waters and legally allowed to remain. The exchanged messages grew more strident over several days until finally Israel threatened to attack Liberty if she would not withdraw. Liberty's answers remained unchanged and ultimately the Israelis attacked.

JIM TAYLOR - PEARL HARBOR II

The first 78 pages of this privately published book scarcely mention Liberty. Instead they contain an argument against Zionism and the State of Israel. After the personal feelings of Mr. Taylor, concerning Israel, are made quite

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clear, he argues that the attack was intentional for the purpose of preventing the United States from learning that Israel planned to open an offensive against Syria on June 9, 1967.[122] He claims that "the Johnson Administration and the CIA agreed to support a limited war against the Arabs for the purpose of regaining Jerusalem. But a firm agreement was made by Israel that no other Arab lands would be taken by force. "The Israelis clearly promised not to take any other Arab territory."[123]

RICHARD K. SMITH[124] - THE VIOLATION OF THE "LIBERTY"

An article by Richard K. Smith was published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.[125] It predates the Ennes book[126] and is a reasonably accurate account of what took place off El Arish on June 8, 1967. Smith rejects the Israeli explanation that the incident was a mistake and offers as the reason for the attack by Israel:

> A vital part of Israel's war plan was preventing the rest of the world from knowing about its military victories until they could be presented as a political *fait accompli*. After two or three days, this news blackout created great anxieties among the civilian population of Israel, but it was more important to keep foreign powers in the dark. The Israeli leaders feared superpower pressures for a cease-fire before they could seize the territory which they considered necessary for Israel's future security. Any instrument which sought to penetrate this smoke screen so carefully thrown around the normal 'fog of war' would have to be frustrated.[127]

Smith concludes that the Japanese were more regretful about the Panay incident than the Israelis were about the

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Liberty incident and he claims that the Japanese Naval officers involved were disciplined. He seems to identify with the British version of the Power Realist school of international relations in his conclusion when he sums up:

> If there is a timeless lesson to be relearned from the savage violation of the Liberty it is that nations do not have 'friends.' They have only interests.... In any given set of circumstances nations are guided to action by what they perceive to best serve their own interests...[128]

The Smith article generated twenty-two responses which are quite diverse, ranging from the rational to the emotional. (See Appendix V.) The comments on the Smith article are quite diversified. Six are from Liberty crewmembers.

PAUL FINDLEY

Former Congressman Findley argues that:

> The attack was no accident. The Liberty was assaulted in broad daylight by Israeli forces who knew the ship's identity....
>
> The public, however, was kept in the dark. Even before the American public learned of the attack, U.S. government officials began to promote an account satisfactory to Israel. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee worked through Congressmen to keep the story under control. The President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, ordered and led a cover-up so throrough that sixteen years after he left office, was still largely unknown to the public-...[129]

Findley goes on to claim that the CIA had learned a day before the attack that the Israelis planned to sink the ship.[130] He relies on the Ennes theory and spends a lot of time on the problems of Ennes in selling his book. Findley

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does not himself give any reason for the attack beyond his reference to the Ennes story. He does explain the alleged cover-up:

> Asked why the Johnson administration ordered the cover-up, [retired Admiral Thomas L.] Moorer is blunt: "The clampdown was not actually for security reasons but for domestic political reasons. I don't think there is any question about it. What other reasons could there have been? President Johnson was worried about the reaction of Jewish voters.[131]

Findley mentions Liberty again in his book, *Deliberate Deceptions*, where he claims, "It was a clear indication of how Johnson colluded with Israel."[132] He then specifically adopts the Ennes theory as the reason for the attack:

> because [the Liberty] would have picked up every word of communication between IDF headquarters and Israeli units preparing to invade Syria.[133]

DONALD NEFF

Neff's first book, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East* and his book on the 1967 war, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, are professionally written and well researched. He strives to be the reporter rather than the theorist. He notes that President Johnson immediately advised Premier Kosygin of the Liberty incident via the hot line. He goes on to say:

> While the Kremlin now knew about the Israeli attack on the Liberty, the American people did not. From the very beginning, the Johnson Administration gave every evidence of a determination to play down the attack....Although there was reported skepticism that the attack was totally accidental, the inclination of the officials was to accept Israel's version since none of them could see why the

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> Israelis would risk losing U.S. support by such a dangerous action. It may have been the result of a local trigger-happy commander, they agreed, though there was no evidence of that either. But even if that were the case, that did not amount to a hostile act ordered by the top echelons of the government.
>
> Beyond the lack of evidence, the President and his advisers were aware that they needed all the influence they could bring to bear on Israel to get it to stop fighting. A direct emotional confrontation at this time would only lessen Washington's ability to achieve a cease-fire. In the end, Clark Clifford was detailed to investigate the attack and everyone else was ordered to keep mum until his report was completed. [Neff included the following footnote - Clifford's report concluded there was no evidence of a deliberate attack and that became the official attitude of the Administration.][134]

Neff also reports the story about Dayan ordering the attack, (See Dacey supra) and the story that "Israelis do not make mistakes."[135]

He also confirms in regard to Syria that:

> Apparently the attack did not come as a surprise to the United States. In his memoirs, Lyndon Johnson asserted that 'we did know Israel's military intentions toward Syria'....could the Liberty have accomplished at least part of its task? Did its sensitive antennas pick up the orders for the Thursday attack on Syria and relay them to Washington...[136]

DEAN RUSK DOES NOT ACCEPT THE ISRAELI EXPLANATION

Secretary of State Rusk was the highest ranking member of the Johnson administration to publicly reject the explanation of the State of Israel as to the Liberty incident. Rusk learned of the event on the morning of June 8, 1967. He called the Ambassador of Israel, Avraham Harman, and the

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Deputy Chief of Mission, Ephraim Evron, to his office in the State Department and demanded an explanation and punishment of those responsible at a time when neither Ambassador Harman nor DCM Evron had learned of the attack. Rusk was bitterly disappointed that Israel had launched its preemptive strike on June 5, 1967, as Rusk believed he could resolve the crisis diplomatically with Egyptian Vice President Zakaria Muhyi al-Din[137] who had been scheduled to arrive in Washington on Wednesday June 7, 1967. Secretary Rusk had no theory of why Israel attacked the Liberty. He just refused to accept the Israeli explanation that the attack was a mistake.

ADMIRAL THOMAS MOORER
"CAN NOT SWALLOW THE ISRAELI EXPLANATION"

When the Liberty incident occurred, Admiral Thomas Moorer was in Vietnam. He returned to the United States and relieved Admiral David McDonald as Chief of Naval Operations (The Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy) on August 1, 1967. He has no personal knowledge of the event. He has formed an opinion that the attack was intentional and not a mistake because Liberty was the ugliest ship in the Navy and most unusual, and therefore the easiest of all ships to recognize."[138] Admiral Moorer also believes the attacks went on for hours and during all that time the Israelis should have identified it. When it was suggested by the author that the air attack lasted only twelve to fourteen minutes, Admiral Moorer felt that was enough time to make the identification.

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Like Secretary Rusk, Admiral Moorer has no theory as to why Israel intentionally attacked a U.S. Naval vessel but he is adamant that he can not "swallow" the Israeli explanation."[139]

JAMES M. ENNES, JR. - "ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY"

LT James M. Ennes, Jr. joined the crew of the Liberty about a month before the attack. He was on the bridge when the air attack began and was severely wounded in the leg. He published a book in 1979 titled *Assault on the Liberty.* His book claims, like Smith and others, that Israel attacked the Liberty to keep the United States from finding out that Liberty was going to open an offensive on the northern front against Syria. Additionally, Ennes has written numerous articles and appeared publicly numerous times to present his argument that the attack was not a mistake but an intentional act.[140] He, together with another former Liberty crew member, Joe Meadors, also maintain, a home page on the internet about the Liberty incident.[141]

WALTER JACOBSEN "A JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. LIBERTY"[142]

LCDR Walter Jacobsen wrote an article for the Naval Law Review titled, "A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty." This was a part of his thesis which he completed for a Master's degree in International Affairs at George Washington University. Most of his research was

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completed by letter or telephone while he was assigned as Staff Judge Advocate for the Commander, Iceland Defense Force at the U.S. Naval base, Keflavik, Iceland. His mentor on his thesis was W.T. Mallison, an individual whose sentiments toward Israel are clearly established in his writings. LCDR Jacobsen makes three conclusions about the attack on the Liberty:

> 1. Israel violated international law of Naval warfare by not rendering assistance to Liberty after the attack.
>
> 2. Israel violated international law of Naval warfare by firing at unoccupied life rafts of the Liberty.
>
> 3. Israel violated international law of air warfare by attacking Liberty with unmarked aircraft.[143]

THE OPINION OF THE TURKISH MILITARY ATTACHE'[144]

When Norman Dacey obtained the release of CIA unevaluated intelligence from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act, one of the three documents reflecting a date of June 22, 1967, stated:

> 1. The Turkish Military Attache in Tel Aviv recently returned to Turkey and briefed the Turkish General Staff (TGS) concerning the Arab Israeli War.
>
> 2. The TGS is convinced that the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty on June 8, 1967, was deliberate. It was done because the Liberty's CCNMO activity was having the effect of jamming Israeli Military communications."[145]

The identity of the person making this report remains classified. Since nothing but the opinion is stated in the

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report, it is not possible to evaluate the facts on which the Turkish General Staff formed their opinion. It is even more curious that this document was released by the CIA. Freedom of Information requests about the circumstances of the release of this and the other two unevaluated intelligence reports have been rejected by the CIA.

THE EVANS AND NOVAK SCOOP

On November 6, 1991, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote a column in the Washington Post claiming new information about the Liberty incident. The first part of the information was not so new. It was a story about the confessions of an Israeli intelligence officer, Seth Mintz. The Seth Mintz stories had been around since first reported in the *Liberty Veterans Association Newsletter* in 1984. Second, Mr. Novak interviewed retired Ambassador Dwight Porter, who was the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon in June 1967. They reported that Ambassador Porter had intercepted radio transmissions that proved the attack on Liberty was intentional.[146] The article resulted in a column in the New York Times by A.M. Rosenthal, entitled "Anatomy of a Scoop,"[147] a letter from Seth Mintz, published in the Washington Post on November 9, 1991, disclaiming the comments attributed to Mintz in the original Evans and Novak column of November 6, 1991, and a final column by Evans and Novak alleging that Mintz had written his letter to the Washington Post editor, recanting his position stated

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in the original article, only because of death threats received from Mossad.[148]

THE LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION

The Liberty Veterans Association is a diverse group of individual Americans who have differing points of view about many things, including the question of whether the attack was a case of mistaken identity or an intentional attack on a U.S. ship. When someone shoots at you and kills and wounds your shipmates, it is difficult to accept the idea that such attacks were not intentional. It is even more difficult to be objective. The Liberty Veterans Association continues to ask for a Congressional investigation of the incident. The U.S. Government has not been completely forthcoming about the incident. The Clifford report was not declassified until October of 1995, and the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry record of proceedings was kept classified for over nine years. Some members of the Association cry cover-up. In fact, the U.S. Government released a false statement as to why the Liberty was off the coast of the Sinai on June 8, 1967, and has never seen fit to correct the false statement.[149]

The Liberty crew members observed numerous overflights of their ship by Israeli aircraft. In fact, the ship was observed and positively identified as U.S.S. Liberty by the morning reconnaissance flight and the information passed to Naval Intelligence at Israeli Naval headquarters in Haifa

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prior to 0800 local time on the morning of June 8, 1967. Not all the overflights observed were concerned with Liberty. In addition, the presence of a ship off El Arish was observed and reported to Air Force headquarters by other high altitude aircraft which Liberty and her crew never saw. Liberty had a U.S. flag hoisted on its starboard halyard.[150] In his book, James Ennes tells of stressing to the Liberty's signalman the importance of flying the ships last brand new flag by quoting himself, "We must fly this new flag, I said, explaining that we were operating in a dangerous area."[151] There is some question of whether the flag was drooped or extended. Many crew members believe it was extended and should have been seen and identified by the attacking aircraft. The ship also had its Hull number painted on both sides of the bow in large white letters[152] and many crew members believe that this should have been sufficient for identification by the attacking aircraft. Also, many crew members believe that the ship with its array of antennas was so unique that it should have been identified by the attacking aircraft and motor torpedo boats. These beliefs have been held for almost thirty years and in most cases are not subject to reconsideration.

LCDR DAVID E. LEWIS - JOHNSON WON'T FIGHT AGAINST ISRAEL

LCDR David Edwin Lewis, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, was "in charge of the Research Operations Department" aboard Liberty.[153] He was wounded in the torpedo attack.[154] He told

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an interesting story in a private interview with Dale Crowley, Jr., in 1988:

> ....he told this reporter that the order to abandon the 'Liberty' planes and torpedo boats [*sic*] came from President Lyndon B. Johnson.
>
> ....Adm. Larry Geis, called him into his quarters and said to him: 'Commander, we received your calls for help, and we attempted to send our planes to the rescue'.
>
> But in the event that something happens to me, or if I am blamed for not answering your call for help, I want you to know exactly what happened.
>
> As soon as we received your radio call for help I deployed our fighter-bomber planes and radioed the Pentagon of our action.
>
> A few minutes later I received a call from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordering me to recall the planes because they were carrying nuclear arms. So I called them back.
>
> I immediately rearmed another squadron with conventional weapons, deployed it and reported to the Pentagon.
>
> A few minutes later I got another call from McNamara ordering me to recall these planes too. I was angry and mystified and exercised my prerogative to go to the next highest level of authority to have McNamara's order reversed.
>
> Seconds later President Lyndon Johnson was on the radiotelephone, and I made my case to him.
>
> I told him that 'U.S.S. Liberty' had been under attack for an hour, had radioed for help, and that I had sent out a squadron of fighter-bombers armed with conventional weapons to the rescue.
>
> Then the president said to me, I don't care if the ship sinks and every man on board drowns; we are not going to fight against our allies (Israel).[155]

James M. Ennes, Jr. tells the story of the aircraft recall differently. He says:

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> It seemed only seconds later that a new voice radio circuit was patched into the room that was now becoming the nerve center for Liberty communications. This was a high-command Pentagon circuit manned by a Navy warrant officer, but once contact was established the voice on the circuit changed. Every man in the room recognized the new voice as that of the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, and he spoke with authority: "Tell Sixth Fleet to get those aircraft back immediately," he barked, "and give me a status report."
>
> A few minutes later the Chief of Naval Operations himself came on the air. The circuit was patched through to Sixth Fleet flagship and Admiral David L. McDonald bellowed: "you get those fucking airplanes back on deck, and you get them back *now*."[156]

WILBUR EVELAND - ROPES OF SAND

In *Ropes of Sand*, Wilbur Eveland gives his version of the reason for the attack on Liberty and proposes a new theory for why the U.S. did not retaliate against what he believes was a calculated attack by Israel. Eveland states that President Johnson authorized James Jesus Angleton to inform Ephraim Evron that the U.S. would prefer Israeli efforts to lessen the tension but would not intervene to stop an attack on Egypt.[157]

> Under orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S.S. Liberty was rushed to the waters of Israel's shore to permit this sophisticated communications-monitoring vessel to follow the fighting should the Israelis attack Egypt. The Liberty wasn't sent alone, for an even more important reason. Stationed below her was the Polaris nuclear submarine Andrew Jackson, for the Pentagon knew that the CIA had aided Israel in acquiring a nuclear capability.* [Eveland cites to Anthony Pearson, Conspiracy of Silence as authority for this statement.] Moreover the U.S. had provided the Israelis with missiles, to which atomic warheads could be attached. Thus, in case a bogged-down Israeli army decided to use

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> ballistic missiles to win a war against the Soviet-equipped Egyptian army, the U.S. was in a position to warn both Israel and Russia that the introduction of nuclear warfare would produce instantaneous retaliation.... Message intercepts by the Liberty made it clear that Israel had never intended to limit its attack to Egypt.... **To destroy this incriminating evidence,** Moshe Dayan ordered his jets and torpedo boats to destroy the Liberty immediately.... Then the U.S. Government shrouded the entire Liberty matter in secrecy under a cloak of national security considerations.... Why? Defense Minister Dayan had stated his government's position bluntly: unless the United States wished the Russians and Arabs to learn of joint CIA-Mossad covert operations in the Middle East and of Angleton's discussions before the 1967 fighting started, the questions of the lost American ship and how the war originated should be dropped. That ended the U.S. protestations! [158] [emphasis added]

Eveland suggests that Israel was able to blackmail the United States to forget the Liberty incident which he alleges was ordered by Dayan to keep the United States from learning that Israel had carried the 1967 war beyond the limit previously agreed upon between the United States and Israel.

JOHN E. BORNE - REVISIONIST HISTORY[159]

John E. Borne has taught American History as an adjunct professor at Baruch and Pace Colleges in New York City. He first wrote a doctoral dissertation at New York University, Department of History which was filed in 1993. Thereafter it was published as a book in 1995. In his acknowledgements, Borne thanks James Ennes, Jr., "whose book *Assault on the Liberty* first introduced me to the subject," as well as various Liberty crewmembers. He gives "special thanks to

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Stephen St. John and also thanks to Paul McCloskey, one of the founders of CNI. The penultimate paragraph of the "Acknowledgements" to his book states:

> I attempted to balance the information from the *Liberty* men and their associates with information from their opponents, but I was less successful in this effort. I received no response from letters sent to the Israeli Embassy or to the Research Department of the Anti-Defamation League. I wrote to such commentators as A.M. Rosenthal and Herbert Druks, who claimed to have data disproving that of the *Liberty* men, but my letters were not answered. I did receive helpful letters from Dan Raviv and Yossi Melmen, authors of *Every Spy A Prince*.[160]

Borne's work is generally a review of the Ennes book and the allegations of the Liberty Veterans Association. His work offers no new evidence. He brings up a number of other historical events such as Pollard,[161] Rubitsky,[162] the death of Irish Corporal Dermot McLoughlin,[163] Iran Air Flight 655,[164] and the attack on the U.S.S. Stark.[165] He suggests that the treatment of these events by government and media was better than the treatment accorded to the Liberty incident. Borne concludes in his book:

> "Was the attack accidental or deliberate? I believe that the account of the attack given by the Liberty men is the correct and truthful one. I also believe that the attack was deliberate and that all available evidence points to this conclusion."[166]

ISRAELIS NEVER MAKE MISTAKES

The third unevaluated intelligence report obtained by Mr. Dacey in 1977, was collected by the CIA in early June 1967. The inference from this item of unevaluated intelligence is

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that Israelis never make mistakes, therefore, the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty could not have been a mistake and had to be an intentional attack cn a U.S. ship. Like the other two reports obtained by Dacey, it is redacted as to the name of the informant, the CIA station where it was received, and as to other data. The redacted text states:

> 2. [Deleted] attack on the U.S.S. Liberty by Israeli airplanes and torpedo boats. He said that 'you've got to remember that in this campaign there is neither time nor room for mistakes....

TELEVISION PRODUCTIONS

There have been four network programs produced about the Liberty Incident and one private video produced by Sligo Productions titled, "U.S.S. Liberty Survivors: Our Story."[167] In addition CBS News considered the story for 60 minutes and rejected it. It is reported by the Liberty Veterans Association that ABC news prepared a program for Nightline but never aired the program.[168] The network television treatment of the Liberty story has been a substantial disappointment to James Ennes and some members of the Liberty Veterans Association. Ennes is convinced that the power of Israel has been able to subvert the television industry against his version of events.[169]

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THAMES TV
ATTACK ON THE LIBERTY
TRANSMISSION: Tuesday January 27, 1987, 10:30 P.M.

A British private TV company called Thames Television learned of the intentional attack theory and sent a crew led by producer, Rex Bloomstein to the United States to do the story.[170] The taping, which began in the United States, starts with the allegations of a number of the surviving Liberty crew members, Lloyd Painter, George Golden, James Ennes, and Phil Tourney. Although the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry record of proceedings and the CIA report had been declassified, they were not in the Thames TV research files.[171] The Thames team became very fond of and sympathetic to the Liberty crew and early scripts of the program contemplated telling the Liberty veterans story and concluding with a few authenticity shots in Israel and a comment that the Israel Defense Forces declined comment. Until this point in time, the official Israeli position on the Liberty incident had been, "No comment." Thames went to Tel Aviv and contacted the office of IDF Spokesman. At this time the Deputy IDF Spokesman was a reserve Colonel named Raanan Gissin. Instead of responding, "No comment" as expected, Colonel Gissin and an Israeli Air Force Major, Danny Grossman and an Army Lieutenant Colonel, Matti Greenberg in the IDF Combat History Branch took the request to the IDF Spokesman and argued that it was time to tell the Israeli side of the story. They won their argument and suddenly the Thames team found themselves with a

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very large venue of Israeli military people who had been authorized to meet with them, answer questions and cooperate. A high ranking Naval Officer was assigned to provide technical assistance. The Navy provided documents and pictures. The Air Force provided gun camera film and audio tape. The more they investigated, the less confidence they had in their original script concept. The producer developed enough doubt to change the program format from the Liberty survivors allegations and an Israeli "No comment" to a presentation of the crew members story and the evidence they offered and the Israeli response without taking a position endorsing either. Near the end of the Thames program the commentator makes the following statement:

> Any examination of the conflicting arguments must first come to terms with motive. Twenty-four hours after the attack on the "Liberty," the Israelis took the Golan Heights. Was this a coincidence, or was the assault on the spy ship designed to stop it intercepting plans for the invasion?[172]

The tape then laces in the comments of Captain Ernest Castle, the U.S. Naval attache at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv in 1967, who strongly endorses the mistake theory with the reference by the commentator to the allegations that Dayan ordered the attack:

> If there was a high level conspiracy to destroy the "Liberty," an inevitable suspect was the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan. But on the 8th of June, Dayan was the only voice in the Israeli Cabinet against an attack on Syria. It was not until the next morning, when he learnt that Egypt, Jordan and Syria had agreed to a cease-fire that he gave the order to invade the Golan sixteen hours after the "Liberty" was attacked.[173]

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Both the Liberty crew members who had generated this production and the IDF Spokesman who changed his position and opened up to the Thames team were disappointed with the production as each expected it to adopt their theory or version of the event.

The Thames documentary was aired in February 1987, on Israeli television just a few weeks after it was broadcast in England. It was presented on an evening program titled Mabat Shainy[174] with the following introductory comment:

> Good evening. The tragedy of the Intelligence Ship Liberty left a deep scar on U.S. - Israeli relationship....
>
> ...as we will shortly see, former Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, claims that 'Israel's Air Force and Navy intentionally attacked the ship... this was a premeditated scheme...' This opinion is shared by many American Navy men as well as those who served aboard the Liberty along with the 171 who were injured and family members of the 34 crew members that were killed. The rest blame Israel and the U.S. for conspiring to keep the records of the incident under complete secrecy.
>
> The film we are about to see was aired by BBC 2nd network a few weeks ago. Israeli diplomats in London were concerned at the time that the program will(would) raise anti Israel feelings, especially after the recent revelation of the Vaanunu affair and the supply of arms to Iran scandal. In retrospect, these concerns were proven uncalled for. The newspaper comment after the broadcast concluded that Israel did not intentionally attack the ship, 'It was a mistake.' The work of the Thames team proved to be fair and objective and the producer, Rex Bloomstein, coordinated an outstanding investigation that we put on now for you.

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ABC
20/20
TRANSMISSION May 21, 1987

ABC News bought the rights to the Thames TV tape and produced an edited version running 30 minutes on May 21, 1987. The impetus for this program was the attack on the U.S.S. Stark which occurred a few days before. Barbara Walters made the following opening remark. "The similarities to this week's attack on the U.S.S. Stark are uncanny."[175] By the time 20/20 acquired the program, the Thames producer had changed his mind from his neutral position between the intentional theory and the mistake theory and became convinced that the incident was a mistake.[176]

Whether or not the Thames producer's opinion went with the sale of the video tape is unknown. Barbara Walters and Hugh Downs explained and commented on the footage shown and concluded the program with the following colloquy between Barbara Walters and Hugh Downs:

Barbara Walters "....You know, there are unanswered questions about the Liberty. There will probably be unanswered questions about the Stark for years to come, but Hugh, if there is a lesson, couldn't one of them be that in time of war, even if its not your war, you have to behave as if you might very well be the target, behave that way all the time?"

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Hugh Downs "Somebody once said, 'We learn from history that we do not learn from history.' I hope that's not true and I think there's a deeper lesson here, and that points to the urgent necessity of arms reduction in an age of high-tech weaponry, where a mistake can be so devastating. I think humanity has the potential to accomplish this and owes it to itself..."

Barbara Walters "Because there are mistakes."

Hugh Downs "You bet!"[177]

The Liberty News reported that "Walters and Downs.... repeatedly described the attack as a 'terrible accident.' Survivors consider the film misleading because of the absence of effective rebuttal to the Israeli arguments, and because of other omissions."[178]

NBC
THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY
TRANSMISSION: January 27, 1992

Christopher Carlson, a producer working with NBC Television, was invited to the twenty fourth anniversary meeting of the Liberty Veterans Association in Washington, D.C. A number of the Liberty crew members went on video tape on the afternoon of June 7, 1991. Captain William McGonagle, the Commanding Officer of Liberty at the time of the attack,

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met with the producer in the suite of George Golden, the president of the Association. Captain McGonagle was quite firm in his position that he would go on tape only to talk about the professionalism and heroism of his crew in saving the ship and that he would not discuss theories of the attack. The producer also obtained an on camera appearance of Michael Shiloh, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C., who responded to each allegation. The format of the program was a segment of allegations followed by the Israeli rebuttal.[179] The program included Seth Mintz telling a modified version of his story and Commander David Lewis telling his account of his conversation with RADM Geis. James Ennes, Jr., also told and repeated his story about Liberty having been promised jet air cover overhead in ten minutes in the event of trouble.[180]

The Liberty veterans had high hopes for this production. They were extremely disappointed with the program which seemed to refute all their claims and support the mistake theory. The program began with the following opening statement of the commentators:

Jane Wallace "On the fourth day of the six day war, an American ship, the Liberty, was patrolling off the coast of the Gaza Strip."

Richard Kiley "Simultaneously reports came in that a nearby Israeli position was being shelled from the sea. The Israeli high command believed they

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were under attack by Arab forces. Naval and Air units were sent to investigate and a counterattack was launched.

The U.S.S. Liberty was in the wrong place at the wrong time."

The program, "The Story Behind the Story," consisted of three segments on January 27, 1992. The first segment was the story of the U.S. Air Flight 1493 ground accident with Sky West Flight 5569 at Los Angeles International Airport on February 1, 1992, where thirty four passengers lost their lives. (Ironically, thirty four Liberty crewmen lost their lives.) Then the Liberty segment and finally a segment about the literary hoax, "Naked Came the Stranger." The Liberty segment contains a number of misstatements of facts.

GERALDO
NOW IT CAN BE TOLD
TRANSMISSION: April 14, 1992

An independent producer, Justin Sturken, heard the Liberty veterans' story and was very much persuaded by it. He taped the comments of two Liberty crewmen who told the intentional story. He drove from New York to Washington, D.C. and taped the Israeli Embassy public affairs officer, Ruth Yaron, at the Embassy of Israel in response. The program ran about 7 minutes 48 seconds and was aired on April 14, 1992, on the Geraldo program, "Now It Can Be Told."[181] Geraldo introduced the tape with the comment, "The year was 1967, and

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the tiny state of Israel was in a battle for its very existence. Surrounded by Arab enemies who cut off vital supply routes and then promised to push the Jews into the sea, Israel launched a blitz that became known as the Six Day war. On the fourth day of that intense and bloody conflict, Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats attacked an American spy ship that was located in the Mediterranean Sea. Thirty-four Americans were killed. Scores more were wounded. As our Craig Rivera now reports, many survivors believe this incident has been covered up for political reasons ever since that awful day." Craig Rivera then commented "It's been almost a quarter of a century since the U.S.S. Liberty left American shores and began its fateful voyage to the Middle East... and for all those years, Israel has maintained that the attack on the Liberty was a tragic case of mistaken identity. But now, more than ever, the Liberty survivors and their backers think otherwise." The program does little more than present the allegations of two crew members, James Kavanaugh and Richard Sturman interviewed by Sturken with voice over by Craig Rivera and the response of the Embassy of Israel public affairs officer. Neither the reporter nor Geraldo, the anchor, takes a position in support of either the intentional theory or the mistake theory. This is surprising in consideration of the very strong view held by the producer in favor of the intentional theory.[182] Geraldo concluded the program by saying "Israeli officials admit their confusion at the time

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including the identification of the Liberty at one point as a Russian vessel. Israeli sources also mention the fact that their war planes bombed and strafed their own troops in an incident just before the Liberty attack. That is further evidence of a tragic mistake that can often occur in the heat and fog of war."

SLIGO PRODUCTIONS
"U.S.S. LIBERTY SURVIVORS: OUR STORY"
TRANSMISSION:None

This tape was written and directed by Patrick King of Sligo Productions.[183] The credits list James Ennes, Jr., as responsible for research. To the knowledge of the author, it has never had a network airing. Rather than a story, it is a series of interviews with Liberty crew members and others who support the intentional theory. It does contain some footage of the Liberty and some pictures relating to the incident. It does not present or even refer to the mistake theory.

CNN

The author of this dissertation was contacted by CNN on November 13, 1991, about the Liberty incident. CNN did not air a news item or story.[184]

CBS
"60 MINUTES"

CBS, "60 Minutes" associate producer Richard Bonin learned of the Liberty intentional attack theory[185] prior to

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1987, and sent a camera crew to Maine to tape Seth Mintz. "60 Minutes" was not satisfied with Mintz's credibility and did not produce a program.[186]

The *U.S.S. Liberty Newsletter* carried the following report of a mention of Liberty on 60 MINUTES:

> HARRY REASONER: Our story [last week] about the Israeli Air Force brought several letters like this one from a U.S. Navy veteran: 'Is this the same Air Force that strafed the U.S.S. Liberty...and murdered 34 of my shipmates...' /s/ B.J. Taylor, Ocala, Florida
> REASONER: The Israelis have acknowledged that such a regrettable incident did indeed occur in 1967, but insisted that the strafing was accidental. The United States Government accepted their apology and $3,000,000. [*sic*] in compensation.[187]

ABC
NIGHTLINE

The *U.S.S. Liberty Newsletter*, under the caption "U.S.S. Liberty in the News," carried the following in 1981:

> ABC NIGHTLINE, the national late-evening news show from ABC studios in New York, has offered to release Ennes's *Defense Electronics* story about the attack on the Liberty to coincide with the release of the magazine. That broadcast, barring possible schedule changes, should be aired Wednesday, October 7.[1981] This will be the first mention on national television of any crewmembers's version of the attack.[188]

In 1982, the *U.S.S. Liberty Newsletter* carried the following:

> Ted Koppel's Nightline
>
> Thursday afternoon a call came from a producer for Ted Koppel's nationally broadcast late night television news program, ABC NIGHTLINE. Nightline had heard about the reunion and wanted to do a story. Could four of us come to the ABC studio at

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> 7:00 p.m.? So that evening Jim Ennes, Don Blalock, Joe Meadors and Mike Schaley spent three hours under television lights answering questions about the attack, the heroism, and the cover-up, while ABC collected eleven reels of tape. But that wasn't enough. To round it out the Nightline crew spent the next three days attending reunion activities, interviewing other men at the hotel, tracking down archive films of the ship's battered arrival in Malta, and editing it all into a logical story sequence. It was to be a thirty minute segment which would occupy the entire Nightline broadcast on June 7. The schedule was considered firm, but it was not to be.[189]

A few pages later the following appeared:

> What happened to the Nightline Story?
>
> The story scheduled for Ted Koppel's NIGHTLINE was to have run on Monday evening, June 7. Unfortunately, Israel invaded Lebanon only hours before that story was to run. The Invasion was considered a bigger news story, and so the Liberty story was bumped. Liberty, in other words, was shot down by Israel again.[190]

The *U.S.S. Liberty Newsletter* of March 1983, wrote that the "Nightline" tape of the Liberty story, which cost more than $100,000. to produce, "had mysteriously disappeared without a trace."[191]

Some members of The Liberty Veterans Association are generally dissatisfied with the TV coverage of their story as indicated by the following statement: "In recent weeks we have heard from "60 Minutes," "Good Morning America," "Nightline," and Larry King. All have considered and then apparently rejected the possibility of doing live interviews with survivors. **American television, it seems, does not want to tell the Liberty story without filters, censorship, and unrebutted Israeli excuses."**[192] [emphasis added]

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Endnotes

1. 10 U.S.C. 935 creates Art. 135 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted on August 10, 1956, which reads in part:

> (a) Courts of inquiry to investigate any matter may be convened by any person authorized to convene a general court-martial or by any other person designated by the Secretary concerned for that purpose, whether or not the persons involved have requested such an inquiry.

On June 10, 1967, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., signed an order directed to Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN convening a Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5) on June 8, 1967. The order referred to section 0402 of the JAG (Judge Advocate General) Manual. The Court was "directed to inquire into all the pertinent facts and circumstances leading to and connected with the armed attack; damage resulting therefrom; and deaths and injuries to naval personnel."

2. Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., was the father of U.S. Senator John S. McCain of Arizona.

3. Merwin Staring, Staff Judge Advocate to Admiral McCain, was a perfectionist. He objected to the form of the document, but his objections were overruled by Admirals McCain and Wylie. They were much more concerned with the conclusions and with forwarding the report to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. Staring later became Judge Advocate General of the Navy, serving in that capacity from 1974 to 1976.

4. To be technically correct, it was to be delivered to the CNO at the Pentagon which is located just across the Potomac River, in Arlington, Virginia, not in Washington, D.C. It is common to refer to the Pentagon as being in Washington and the press and the public seldom make the distinction. Unless there is some significant importance to identifying the location of the Pentagon in Virginia, the common reference to Washington will be used.

5. News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C., No. 594-67, OXford 5-3176 (Info.), OXford 7-3189 (Copies), June 28, 1967.

6. Interview with Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., on April 18, 1991, at the Army Navy Club in Washington, D.C. This was the

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first of over twenty personal and telephone conversations between the author and Admiral Kidd.

7. When the author interviewed Admiral McDonald by telephone (the author was in Miami and ADM McDonald was in Jacksonville, Fl.) on June 29, 1990, the Admiral described Admiral Kidd as his "right hand man." When Ike Kidd was told of this description he commented, "I was McDonald's trash can." Interview with the author, Washington, D.C., April 18, 1991.

8. While interviewing Vice Admiral Don Engen (May 3, 1990, Washington, D.C.), Admiral Engen asked the author if he had interviewed Admiral Kidd. When advised that Admiral Kidd had a history of not talking about this subject, Admiral Engen offered to make an introduction. On April 18, 1991, the author met with Admiral Kidd at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, D.C., for the first of many meetings and telephone conversations. The assistance of Admiral Kidd in the completion of this research project has been of immense value.

9. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Intelligence Memorandum, The Israeli Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty," 13 June 1967, SC No. 01415/67. Declassified in redacted form "per # 058375" on August 31, 1977. The 13 June 1967 Memorandum consisted of 7 pages plus a chronology of 3 pages and a map of the area.

10. The chronology and the map each show local and Washington time with a spread of 7 hours. The Washington or EDT times are accurate. This confirms the conclusion that the preparers of the Memorandum overlooked the fact that Daylight time was not in effect in Israel, Sinai or the Liberty operating area. This discrepancy has been called to the attention of the CIA by the author but no corrective action has been taken.

11. CIA letters to author of October 25, 1994, signed John H. Wright, Information and Privacy Coordinator and July 29, 1996, signed Lee S. Strickland, Information and Privacy Coordinator.

12. See the CIA Liberty file.

13. The Egyptian ship is named in Arabic and when transliterated to the Latin script there is opportunity for great creativity in going from the Arabic script to roman letters. The ship has been called El Quesir, El Quiser, El Kasir.

14. Central Intelligence Agency, "Intelligence Memorandum," p. 4.

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15. Correspondence from James Abourezk to Stansfield Turner, November 18, 1977.

16. Correspondence from Stansfield Turner to James Abourezk, February 27, 1978.

17. The fact finding team was not formerly approved until June 15, 1967, when Lieutenant General B.E. Spivy, USA, Director of the Joint Staff signed a memorandum to General Russ which he received aboard the Sixth Fleet Flagship in the Mediterranean. By that date, he and his team had almost completed their fact finding mission. Specifically, the focus of what the team was to study included: the means utilized to issue and transmit operational directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the U.S.S. Liberty and circumstances attending any conflicting directives, inordinate delays in the receipt of messages or other proper orders, or their nonreceipt.

Further, the fact finding team was told:

> The court of inquiry convened by CINCUSNAVEUR to inquire into the circumstances leading to and connected with the armed attack on the USS Liberty will inquire into administrative, disciplinary, and internal matters within that command which are not within the scope of the examination by the fact finding team. This fact-finding team will not infringe upon the prerogatives of the court of inquiry.

The members of the team were:

> Major General Joseph R. Russ, USA
> Rear Admiral Francis J. Fitzpatrick, USN
> Colonel William A. Garrett, USAF
> Captain William D. Owen, USN
> Major Harlan E. Priddle, USAF

18. "INTRODUCTION" Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team, USS LIBERTY INCIDENT, 8 June 1967 (Secret).

> 5.(U) Inasmuch as the Fact Finding Team was not a legal investigative body, in conducting its examination the Fact Finding Team observed the following constraints:
>
> a. Interviews were not conducted under oath.
>
> b. Individuals were not warned of their

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> rights nor designated as interested parties.
>
> c. Interference with the Naval Court of Inquiry was avoided.
>
> d. Impact on Liberty's personnel was held to a minimum.
>
> e. Representatives of the military services were invited to accompany the team;....

Russ Report, p.3.

19. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was created by President Kennedy in 1962 following the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

20. Many of Clifford's friends in the Johnson administration were not pleased with this report because they felt it attempted to label Israel as the aggressor when it was generally conceded that Israel acted in preemptive self-defense as permitted by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and was in fact not guilty of aggression. No charge of aggression regarding the 1967 war was ever even brought in the United Nations.

21. Dean Rusk became Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs on February 8, 1949. Earlier in 1949 he had a title of Deputy Under Secretary but it is not clear if he had that title in 1948. See *Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778 - 1990*, Department of State Publication 9825, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, January 1991.

22. The Clifford Report was at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas in "National Security File, Memos to the President, WWR, "VOL 35", Box 19." The Report is identified as item 82b. The Report was declassified upon the appeal of the author on October 25, 1995. "Sanitized ED 12356, Sec 3,4; NLJ 94-389, BY CB NARA Date 10-25-95." The transmittal letter from Clifford to Rostow, item 82a, was declassified on August 30, 1995. "E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4; NHJ 94-389 BY CB NARA Date 8-30-95." The transmittal letter from Rostow to President Johnson, item 82c, remains classified with the author's appeal for declassification pending.

23. Clifford Report, pp. 4-5.

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24. Clifford Report, p. 5.

25. Clark Clifford, telephone interview with the author, February 9, 1989, the author was in Miami and Clark Clifford was in Washington, D.C.

26. "Murphy's Law" were the words of Clark Clifford. During the interview, his memory seemed quite clear and positive. In 1991, Clark Clifford published "A Memoir" titled, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*, New York: Random House, 1991. The caption reads CLARK CLIFFORD with Richard Holbrooke. On page 446 the Liberty incident is discussed:

> "It was impossible that the Liberty could have been mistaken for the El Queir [*sic*]."
>
> "There was no evidence that the highest levels of the Israeli government, headed by Golda Meir, were aware of Liberty's true identity or the fact that an attack was taking place. At the same time, however, no one could prove that they did not know."
>
> "The best interpretation from the facts available to me was that there were inexcusable failures on the part of the Israeli Defense Forces."

The comment in the book is somewhat at odds with both the actual Clark Clifford report, now declassified, and with the interview of Mr. Clifford. The book says, confusing the Liberty and the "El Queir" [*sic*] is impossible, while the CIA says one could easily be mistaken for the other. More strange is the reference to the "the Israeli Government, headed by Golda Meir" because the government was headed by Levi Eshkol, who died on February 26, 1969. Golda Meir did not become the head of the Israeli Government until after the death of Eshkol in the spring of 1969. In fact, during the 1967 war, Golda Meir was not even in the government. She was serving as Secretary General of the Mapai (Labor) Party.

The book says that President Johnson was informed of the attack two hours after it happened (p.445). This is essentially correct. But then the book says that "the White House called me at home at 6:00 A.M." This was for an emergency meeting in the situation room. The book goes on to say "We convened at 6:40 A.M." 6:00 a.m. Washington time was 1200 Sinai time. Did the White House really call Clifford to a meeting in the situation room to discuss the attack on the Liberty two hours before the attack began? Did the meeting to discuss the attack really convene one hour and twenty minutes before the attack began?

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Clark Clifford is a brilliant man with a superb memory. Did he forget or confuse all this, or perhaps, did his collaborator not consider this segment of the text important enough to research who headed the government of Israel during the 1967 war or to review the White House log for June 8, 1967, to determine that President Johnson learned the Liberty had been attacked at 9:48 a.m. Washington time and the meeting in the situation room which Clark Clifford did in fact attend that day, convened at 11:00 a.m.

27. Possibly the Situation Room in the basement of the West wing of the White House.

28. Clark Clifford, telephone interview with the author, February 9, 1989, the author was in Miami and Clark Clifford was in Washington, D.C.

29. The ship to which Secretary McNamara is referring was in Cam Pha Harbor, not Haiphong Harbor. The ship was the Soviet merchant, Turkestan. It was anchored there on June 2, 1967, and attacked by U.S. Air Force aircraft. The story is told in a chapter in the book of Phil Goulding, *Confirm or Deny*, pp. 139-167. One crewman was killed and others were injured.

The words of the Soviet Captain of Turkestan are interesting:

> We were bearing all the markings of the Soviet government, a Soviet flag was flying from the stern mast. The stack was painted with a red stripe and a hammer and sickle....The visibility was excellent. There is no possibility of talking about an accidental attack....

30. Hearings before the COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, Ninetieth Congress, First Session on S. 1872, A bill to amend the foreign assistance act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. June 12, July 14 and 26, 1967. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.

31. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session on S. 3293. The hearings were on "AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1969, AND RESERVE STRENGTH." Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 47. This hearing was held on February 1, 1968, at 2:40 p.m. in Room 212, Old Senate Office Building. Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Jackson, Connon, McIntyre, Byrd, Jr. of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, Miller, Tower, Pearson, and Dominick.

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32. Congressman Robert Lee Fulton Sikes of Florida, House Appropriations Committee Hearing Report, pp. 357-58.

33. John J. Rhodes (Az.), Committee Hearing report, p. 394.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 398-99.

35. Congressional Record - House, July 12, 1968, p. 21055.

36. Through the assistance of Florida Senator Bob Graham and his staff, the author was able to visit the restricted offices of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. During that visit, a staff member advised that a portion of the House Appropriations Committee Report remains classified as indicated.

37. Report of the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, ninety-second Congress, First Session, Under the authority of H. Res. 201. May 10, 1971, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1971. The report was submitted for printing, with deletions for security, to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman F. Edward Hebert, of Louisiana, on March 24, 1971. The committee studied the U.S.S. Liberty Incident, which occurred on June 8, 1967; the U.S.S. Pueblo Incident, which occurred on January 23, 1968; and the downing of an Air Force EC-121 aircraft by North Korea on April 15, 1969. Hearings were held and a report was published.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

39. Set forth in the letter of transmittal of the report, dated March 24, 1971, from the Committee Chair, Robert H. Mollohan to the Chair of the Armed Services Committee, F. Edward Herbert. *Ibid.*, p. III.

40. Captain Frank Snyder, the Sixth Fleet Communications Officer, who was aboard U.S.S. Little Rock with Admiral Martin on June 8, 1967, worked with Rear Admiral Fitzpatrick in preparation of his testimony before the committee. One thing Admiral Fitzpatrick told the committee which shocked them was that in June 1967, there was no protocol for the Army Communications Station in the Pentagon for sending a message to a ship. The Navy sent messages to fleet broadcast via Navy Communications daily. The Army rarely sent messages to ships and the few times it occurred, the messages were to ships off Vietnam. This is probably the reason the messages were routed to the Navy Communications Station in the Philippines.

41. Major General Roscoe M. Cougill, *"C3 During Desert Shield and Desert Storm,"* in Seminar on Command, Control and Communications, Guest Presentations, Spring 1992. Program on

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Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, August 1994.

42. Report of the Armed Services Subcommittee, pp. 3 and 4.

43. Lieutenant General Richard P. Klocko, USAF, assumed the position of Director, Defense Communications Agency on November 15, 1967. He began serving in the DCA in July 1967, as Deputy Director of the Agency and Deputy Director, National Military Command System Technical Support, (NMCSTS).

44. Report of the Armed Services Subcommittee, pp. 41-42.

45. James, M. Ennes, Jr., *Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship*, New York: Random House, 1979.

46. All three of the surviving pilots, who speak fluent English, have been interviewed in Israel by the author, face to face, without the intervention of a sheet. The author is very likely the only non-Israeli who has interviewed all three of the surviving pilots face to face. The fourth pilot was killed in an aviation accident while preparing for an air show in 1979. The interviews took place in June 1992 and June 1993.

47. In June 1982, the Israel Defense Forces, History Department, Research and Instruction Branch published "THE ATTACK ON THE 'LIBERTY' INCIDENT, 8 June 1967." Colonel Uri Algom, the head of History Department, signed the report. The report is prefaced by the following five notes:

> 1. The tragic event of the attack on the American Intelligence ship "Liberty [*sic*] (8 June 1967) became, over the years, an instrument in the hands of journalists and authors, with which to contend that Israel attacked the ship maliciously.
>
> 2. Recently, with the publication of the book, Assault on the Liberty, the American Congress appointed a committee, headed by Adlai Stevenson, for the purpose of investigating the affair and publishing the results of the investigation.
>
> 3. Immediately upon learning of the appointment of the committee, it was decided that the History Department would research the affair and submit the official version of the State of Israel.
>
> 4. The research is based upon all the primary and secondary evidence available.

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> 5. This article is the official version, written by Lt. Col. Matti Greenberg - Head of the Combat Research Branch.

The author interviewed Matti Greenberg for the first time in Tel Aviv, Israel, on August 13, 1989. Follow-up interviews were conducted in Tel Aviv on August 17, 1989; January 14, 1990; June 19, 1990; June 11, 1992; June 7, 1993; and by telephone on July 7, 1993 (the author was in Miami and Matti Greenberg was in Boston, Mass.).

48. In a telephone interview with the author, former Senator Stevenson stated that he had absolutely no recollection of the matter or the investigation. The interview took place on January 4, 1990. Adlai Stevenson was in Chicago, Ill., and the author was in Miami.

49. The author suspects that the second author of the NSA document is Walter G. Deeley.

Mr. Deeley was in the Defense establishment and most likely with NSA. He has been identified by some researchers as being with DOD (Department of Defense). NSA is within the DOD.

Deeley met with Adrian Pennink, the research editor of the Thames TV documentary "Attack on the Liberty" while Thames was shooting in Washington. The author has obtained the entire Thames TV research file which contains the following notes about Deeley, prepared by Pennink:

> 1. A list of persons from whom on camera interviews was requested. Deeley is on the list with the notation after his name, "NSA."
>
> 2. A note - "Walter Deeley, prepared report on the Liberty for the NSA. Report concentrated more on the communications snafu than anything else.
>
> > Said that it ws [*sic*] the NSA who pushed for the Liberty's recall to safer waters after hearing Amb Goldberg state in the UN that there was no US ship within 400 miles of Israel. They saw this as potentially very embarrassing for the US and managed to persuade the JCS to order a recall. 'There was a screw up all down the line on our side.' Deeley/2 cont..... Suggests that it is quite possible that the State Department and the Us [*sic*] embassy in Tel Aviv didn't know about the Liberty. 'why should we tell them?'

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> Had no direct knowledge about the Israeli attack but given his knowledge about their intelligence capabilities, there is no way that they didn't know that the Liberty was American.
>
> Says there was no US Sub accompanying the Liberty.
>
> Is considering whether to do an interview.

3. A timetable of events prepared by Pennink. The June 6th entry reads:

> US Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, states to Security Council: 'No US ships within 400 miles of conflict.' Liberty is within 24 hours sailing of this limit.
>
> Walter Deeley (NSA) says this is the reason that the NSA asked the JCS to recall the ship to safer waters.

4. A letter addressed to Adrian Pennink, dated September 2, 1986, which purports to bear Deeley's signature. In the letter Deeley declines an on camera interview and restates and answers five questions put to him by Pennink, as follows:

> 1. Why did the NSA want the Liberty recalled from its original patrol station off the coast of Sinai?
>
> For two reasons as I recall. First and foremost, NSA was concerned for the safety of the crew and ship since hostilities had begun in the area. She was unarmed and unprotected. Secondly, Ambassador Goldberg in the UN had delivered a speech stating that no U.S. military ship was within 400 miles of the area of combat. NSA requested the JCS to recall her.
>
> 2. Why did this not prove possible?
>
> Unfortunately, a number of errors (of procedure and judgment) by message handlers and duty officers resulted in the message recalling the USNS [*sic*] Liberty arriving after the attack had begun.

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> 3. Could the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv have not known about the Liberty's presence near the coast of Sinai?
>
> Quite probably. There would have been no reason to inform the Embassy since she was sent to the area prior to hostilities, was a non-belligerent, and had every right to be where she was.
>
> 4. Based on your knowledge of Israeli intelligence capabilities what seems the most likely explanation for the attack on the Liberty?
>
> I have no knowledge of Israeli intelligence capabilities other than what is openly available to any well read person. From my readings Israel has a first rate capability. She should have known what she was about.
>
> 5. What was Liberty's mission?
>
> No comment.

Adrian Pennink was also in possession of a redacted copy of the NSA document. The document recites on its cover:

> **"NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS"**
>
> and
>
> "Contents of this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminated outside the U.S. Intelligence Community without the permission of the Director, NSA/CSS. Inquires about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Office of [REDACTED] Archives and History, [REDACTED]"

The author obtained the NSA document before becoming aware that the document had been sanitized and declassified. In fact the copy obtained from Pennink did not contain any notations or stamps referring to declassification. The author tried to communicate with NSA by mail, explaining how he had come into possession of the document from a foreign national and requesting instructions on the status of the document. The usual games were played. Mail to NSA was returned marked 'undeliverable'. See endnote 50. Ultimately, the author discovered the document in the National Archives identified as

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SRH-256. It is apparently the only document in the National Archives relating to the Liberty incident.

Where else would Adrian Pennink have obtained the NSA document except from Deeley? The language used by Deeley suggests he was with NSA and Pennink indicated in his notes that Deeley 'Prepared report on Liberty for NSA.'

Based on the foregoing, the author concludes that there is reasonable cause to believe that Deeley is the co-author with Gerhard of the NSA document.

50. The document is titled "ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. LIBERTY." It was originally classified "TOP SECRET" because some of its contents were in that category. Other portions were "SECRET", "CONFIDENTIAL" and "UNCLASSIFIED." The original document marked "TOP SECRET" bore the legend "Not releasable to foreign nationals." The document was declassified per Part 3, E. O. 12356 by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS COF Date 7/11/83.

The author originally obtained a copy of the document from a foreign national, not part of any intelligence community. The copy did not reflect declassification. The author spent months trying to write to the NSA. These were the days when NSA was reputed to stand for "No such agency" and letters were either returned marked "insufficient address or not answered." Eventually it was learned that the document had been declassified and in fact is on file in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., under document number SRH-256. There are no other documents relating to the Liberty incident at the National Archives.

51. NSA report, p. 40.

52. Allen M. Blue, from Rockville, Md., a civilian technician employed by the National Security Agency, also died in the attack.

53. NSA report, p. 40.

54. See personal correspondence from Roy J. Kirk (Investigations Staff, Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services) to the author, March 6, 1992.

55. Meeting of author with Roy Kirk and Warren Nelson at 11:00 A.M. on April 29, 1992, at Room 2120, Rayburn House Office Building. Following this meeting all three named persons proceeded to the Office of Congressman Mavroules at 2334 Rayburn House Office Building for a meeting with Congressman Mavroules. Follow-up telephone interviews were conducted with Roy Kirk on June 17, 1993, and July 21, 1993.

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56. Some of the issues presented to the Subcommittee were unusual and not relevant to the factual issues of the attacks. For example, Item 21 of the 22 items on the Liberty Veterans Association list was "The American Red Cross refused to honor the Liberty survivors' requests to notify our next of kin as to our condition." What this complaint has to do with whether the Israeli attacks were intentional or a case of mistaken identity is hard to reconcile. The investigation was highly professional and in great depth. Item 5 on the list states:

> "An audio tape of conversations (in Hebrew and English) between the attacking jets and their headquarters - clearly indicating a correct identification of the ship - which was given to the Court by Lt. George Golden does not appear in the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry Report and has disappeared from U.S. Navy files."

George Golden disclaims any possession of such tapes. Admiral Kidd denies ever receiving such tapes from George Golden or anyone. Roy Kirk was told by the proponents of the investigation that there were "tapes" in the possession of one of the Liberty crew that proved the attack was intentional. Kirk was able to locate that crew member alleged to be in possession of the tape and he requested the "tape." The response was, "There is no such tape. Those guys who claim the tape exists are crazy."

57. "The Minister of Defence or the C.G.S. [Chief of the General Staff] may appoint a commission of inquiry for the purpose of investigating any matter relating to the Army, and such commission shall be competent to summon witnesses and to take evidence on oath or otherwise. A commission of inquiry may consist of one officer."

A Commission of inquiry is essentially equivalent to a U.S. Navy JAG Manual Investigation.

58. Report of COL Ram Ron to Chief of Staff, June 16, 1967, p. 1.

59. Commission of Inquiry Report (hereafter Ram Ron Report), p. 3.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

61. It was a point of interest in the Israeli Navy that the command MTB launched one rather than two torpedoes. When asked later why his boat only launched one torpedo, Gil Keren, the Commanding Officer of MTB 204 stated, "The division commander said launch torpedo, not launch torpedoes."

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62. Ram Ron was born in Poland and came to Israel as a boy. He had some legal training but at the time of his appointment to the Commission of Inquiry he was serving as an Army Officer, not as a Military Advocate General.

63. Ram Ron Report, p. 10.

64. Military Advocate General, review of the Commission of Inquiry. (English translation).

65. Ram Ron Report, p.16.

66. Customary law has always permitted the flying of false flags by warships conditioned upon the vessel flying such false flag as a "Ruse of War" to strike it (take it down) and show the true colors prior to commencing an attack.

Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions goes out of its way to preserve the time honored tradition of naval warfare to use "Ruses of War" and especially to fly false flags.

> Article 37 - Prohibition of Perfidy
> ....
>
> 2. Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.
>
> Article 39 - Emblems of nationality
> ....
>
> 3. **Nothing in this Article or in Article 37, paragraph 1 (d), shall affect the existing generally recognized rules of international law applicable to espionage or to the use of flags in the conduct of armed conflict at sea.** (emphasis added)

Ironically, such "Ruses of War" would be considered "Perfidy" if performed in land warfare. (See Article 39 1. & 2.) Of course this Protocol was not yet written in 1967.

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Neither the United States nor Israel have acceded to this Protocol as of this date.

See also Frederic De Mulinen, *Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces*, Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987, p. 96:

404	Restricted deception flag of warships G.P.I, 39	As a rule, warships hoist their national flag. Traditionally they were permitted to fly false flags at any time, under condition that they show their true flag prior to going into combat action.

67. At this point, the Military Advocate General was looking for input from the United States Navy. In an interview with Examining Judge Yerushalmi, he stated that each day he waited for an appearance from the United States. Near the end of the investigation he asked the Chief Prosecutor, "Where are the Americans? When are they coming?" He was told that the Americans are not coming.

68. Israel Defense Forces, Military Justice Law of 1955, Section 294(a)(2).

69. *Ibid.*, Section 197.

70. Letter dated Sivan 10, 5727, June 8, 1967 [*sic*]. (Colonel Ram Ron was appointed June 12, 1967, and rendered his report June 16, 1967. Therefore the June 8, 1967, date on the letter could not be the letter's date. The letter is in English and no doubt a translation of the original letter in Hebrew. The Hebrew date of Sivan 10, 5727 corresponds to June 18, 1967. The typist or the translator apparently omitted the 1 in front of the 8.) The letter is from MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS to The Chief of the General Staff.

This letter is marked "CONFIDENTIAL" and has not yet been declassified.

71. Judge Yerushalmi was born in Poland in 1920 and came to Israel in 1935. He graduated from Balfour College in Tel Aviv and went to the University of Jerusalem to study law during the British Mandate. There was no faculty of law at that time. Upon graduation in 1944 he began a required clerkship at the law firm of Seligman & Welshman under Julian Zussman who later became President (Chief Justice) of the Supreme Court of Israel. He worked as a lawyer until 1947 when he joined the army as a solider. He was transferred to the Military Advocate General and served as "JAG" to the Air Force and as "JAG" to the Navy. Then he was appointed assistant

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brigade prosecutor and ultimately became the brigade prosecutor. In 1952, he married. In 1957, he was appointed a judge on the Court of Military Appeals. He also sat as president of Courts Martial. In 1967, when he was appointed examining judge, Judge Yerushalmi had served as a judge for ten years.

72. Personal interviews with Judge Yerushalmi in Tel Aviv, Israel on June 7, 1988, and August 15, 1989.

73. Decision of Judge Yerushalmi. Israel Defence Forces, Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67. This document remains classified. It was delivered by Deputy Chief of Mission, Ephraim Evron to the number two person in the U.S. State Department Nicholas Katzenbach. The United States provided limited distribution with only four copies going to the U.S. Navy. (The Navy copies were marked for limited distribution to Code 00, the CNO; 09, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; 61, the Operations Officer in charge of Strategy, Plans and Policy and Political-Military Affairs and 92, Intelligence). Notwithstanding the continued classification, copies of the decision are not difficult to obtain.

74. Personal interview with President Meir Shamgar in his office in the Russian Compound, at the Supreme Court of Israel, Jerusalem, Israel, on June 6, 1988.

75. Interview with Meir Shamgar, June 6, 1988.

76. Endorsement of Military Advocate General to Commission of Inquiry Report of Colonel Ram Ron. See excerpts in text of paragraph 11. above.

77. Personal interviews with Ambassador Ephraim Evron in Tel Aviv, Israel, on June 7, 1988; August 15, 1989; June 4, 1993; and a telephone interview on January 16, 1990; and Nicholas de Katzenbach in Miami, Florida, on July 19, 1990.

78. "Plaint" is the word used in the English translation of the Decision. The word could also be translated "complaint" or "charge." See Decision of Judge Yerushalmi, page 4, paragraph 10.

79. The "Acting Chief of Naval Operations" was in effect the "Command Duty Officer" at Naval Headquarters at Stella Maris. He was Commander (Sgan Aluf) Avraham Lunz. He told his story to Thames TV, and they included part of it in their documentary. The author interviewed Avraham Lunz in Tel Aviv, Israel, on January 15, 1990. He remained in the Israeli Navy and achieved the rank of Rear Admiral (Tat Aluf). Upon his retirement from the military, he continued to work for the IDF at the Kirya as a civilian.

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80. It was written in Hebrew and then translated into English by LCOL Matti Greenberg, the head of the Combat Research Branch, and was published in June 1982. The Hebrew version is 32 8 & 1/2 X 14 pages and the English translation is forty-two pages. The translator did not adjust the footnotes to the longer English document and the references within the document, therefore, do not correspond but can be adjusted with a bit of searching the text.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

82. The letter from Admiral Michael Ram was published in the *Naval Reserve Association News*, 39:9 (September 1992): 19-20.

83. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of Israel from February 1, 1989, to July 1, 1992, was Michael "Micha" Ram. Admiral Ram has been most cooperative in assisting the author in research on this project in Israel.

84. Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six Day War*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, pp. 99-100.

85. Phil G. Goulding was born in San Francisco March 28, 1921. He became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs in 1965 and Assistant in 1967 serving until 1969. He gave an oral history to the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library on January 3, 1969, at the Pentagon. The oral history mentions Liberty only briefly but does furnish some insight as to Phil G. Goulding, his relationship with the president, the Defense Secretaries under whom he served, and Cyrus Vance.

86. Phil G. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny: Informing the people on National Security*, New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

87. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, pp. 93-138.

88. *Ibid.*, p.128.

89. *Ibid.*, p.128.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

91. "U.S. Carrier Mistakenly Blasts Turkish Warship," *The Miami Herald*, October 2, 1992.

At a news briefing on Tuesday, December 1, 1992, Mr. Pete Williams, ASD (Public Affairs) handled four more questions about the Muavenet Incident. He advised that 271 claims were filed by individual Turkish sailors or their families. He explained that there would not be a court martial of U.S. Navy personnel in response to the Turkish demand for same. The

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matter would be handled by Admiral's Mast, a form of non-judicial punishment.

92. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny*, p. 134.

93. Jonathan Trumbull Howe, *Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missle Age*, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971, pp. 90-157.

94. On April 1, 1997, Commander Bouchard was promoted to the rank of Captain and reassigned as Director of Policy for the National Security Council.

95. Joseph F. Bouchard, *Use of Naval Force in Crisis: A Theory of Stratified Crisis Interaction*, Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1989.

96. Joseph F. Bouchard, *Command in Crises: Four Case Studies*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

97. John Loftus and Mark Aarons, *The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People*, New York: St. Martins Press, 1994.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 268.

99. *Ibid.*, pp. 259-86.

100. Cooking is a word of art in electronic warfare. It refers to intercepting and altering enemy messages. It can be as simple as making the message unintelligible so that it is of no use to the enemy and as sophisticated as to suggest altering the message to affect the enemies action in response to the message. Many of the theories of those who doubt or do not accept the mistake theory attribute various "cooking" capabilities.

101. I. Belyayev and Ye. Primakov, "Kak Izrail Nachal Agressiyu" ["How Israel Began the Aggression,"] *Pravda*, July 27, 1967, p. 4, translated by Gregory Koldys.

102. I. Belyayev, T. Kolesnichenko, and Ye. A. Primakov, *The 'Dove' has been released, (Soviet Review of Israeli-Arab June 1967 Conflict)*, Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya Publishing House, 1968. Printed in Russian, 168 pages. Reprinted in English by Department of Commerce, United States of America, Joint Publications Research Service, Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific & Technical Information, Springfield, Virginia JPRS 45466 - 23 May 1968.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

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104. Ye. A. Primakov and I. Belyayev, "Lessons of the 1967 Middle East Crises," *International Affairs* (Moscow), Vol 3 (March 1968): 41.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

106. The author was invited by the Egyptian Armed Forces to visit the National Center for Middle East Studies in Cairo, Egypt. The visit occurred on October 18, 1994, and the author conferred with Major General Ahmed Fakhr, the director of the Center; Dr. Ali Sadek, the deputy director of the Center; Major General Ahmed M. Abdel Halim, the head of the Military Unit of the Center; Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem, a retired Ambassador; and His Excellency Amin Hewedi, the director of Egyptian Intelligence during the 1967 war. An entire day was spent discussing the Liberty incident, and the author learned that he is not strong enough to drink Egyptian coffee.

107. Ambassador Kassem was in the office of President Nasser during the 1967 War. He spent his entire career in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. His last diplomatic post was as the Egyptian Ambassador to Canada.

108. Excerpt from the unpublished manuscript of Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem. The text is from Chapter III of the book. The chapter title is "The Defeat (The Six-Day War)."

109. Personal interview with Ambassador Kassem on October 18, 1994, at the National Center for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt.

110. Samuel M. Katz, *Solider Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992, pp. 195-197. In fairness to Katz, he does attribute this story to Steven Green and cites Green's book, *Taking Sides*, which was printed in 1984. See pages 204-211.

111. Stephen M. St. John, *An Eight Part Peace Proposal for Greater Jerusalem*, 7th edition. Unpublished, 1977, 1990, Appendix C. Appendix "C" was published in the newsletter of the U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association, *Liberty News*, 9:3/4 (March/June 1991): 48-51.

112. In a letter dated "29 June 1989" addressed to Prince Mansour ibbn Khalid (of Saudi Arabia) on page 8., St. John refers to "....the real situation in the Mid-East: A Syro-Israeli understanding sustained and controlled by outside elements." He goes on, "[t]he creation of Aram will bury forever the dirty business of Syro-Israeli collusion vis a' vis The Golan Heights, which is not unrelated to Israel's attempt to sink the USS Liberty on 8 June 1967..."

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113. *Ibid.*, Appendix "C", page 1.

114. "C.I.A. Papers Cite Israelis in Attack on U.S. Navy Ship," *New York Times*, September 19, 1977.

115. See Central Intelligence Agency FOIA package on the U.S.S. Liberty incident.

116. The U.S.S. Liberty Newsletter, *Liberty News*, 3:2 (May 1984): 4.

117. Jim Anderson, "New Light Shed on Israeli Attack on U.S. Spy Ship," *United Press International*, March 18, 1984. The article does not mention Mintz by name but indicates that his name is known to UPI and to author Stephen Green. Green wrote about the Liberty incident in his book, *Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel*, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984. Green does not mention Mintz or this story in his book although Green interviewed Mintz by telephone in two calls. Green passed his notes of this interview to Rich Bonin, an associate producer with CBS News program "Sixty Minutes." "Sixty Minutes" sent a crew to Maine to tape an interview with Mintz. It was never aired on Sixty Minutes. Bonin passed the notes to the Research editor of the Thames TV production, "Attack on the Liberty," Adrian Pennink, who also interviewed Mintz but did not use the Mintz story in the Thames TV production.

118. Anthony Pearson, "The Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty, MAYDAY! MAYDAY!" *Penthouse*, May 1976.

> "Steaming through continuous twenty-four hour watches along the direct North African coastal route, Commander McGonagle had the Liberty within communications range by the early hours of June 5." p. 56.
>
> "Thus, as war began, the listening devices on the Liberty were tuned to transmissions from both the Arabs and the Israelis.... All this information was being transmitted in full to the National Security Agency in Washington. Selected parts were also passed to the United Nations in New York." pp. 144-145.

Pearson claims that the United States and Israel agreed to the 1967 war subject to certain limitations and Israel double crossed the United States and went further than agreed. Liberty was there passing all the data of the double cross to the NSA.

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119. Anthony Pearson, "The American-Israeli Conspiracy of Silence," *Penthouse*, June 1976.

> "...our government had left itself no choice but to help the Israelis sweep the entire matter under the rug." p. 60.
>
> "What no one knew -- except those at the highest levels of the Israeli and American governments -- was that Israel was violating a predetermined plan formulated by the CIA, top officials of the Johnson administration, the Israeli General Staff, and leading Israeli politicians.... But the Liberty had discovered Israel's violation of this scheme.... The transmissions from Liberty exposing the Israeli Golan attack plans could have saved Syria, if they had gone through." p. 62.

Pearson claims that the U.S. and Israel conspired to cover up the incident and that apparently they have succeeded.

120. Anthony Pearson, *Conspiracy of Silence: The Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty*, London: Quartet Books, 1978.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

122. James Taylor, *Pearl Harbor II: The True Story of the Sneak Attack by Israel upon the U.S.S. Liberty, June 8, 1967*, Washington, DC: Mideast Publishing House, 1980.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

124. Smith spent more than 12 years (including two as a Naval Reserve Officer) at sea as a marine engineer. He holds Bachelor of Science and Master of Arts degrees from the University of Illinois at Urbana, and a Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago.

125. Richard K. Smith, "The Violation of the 'Liberty'," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Volume 104/6/904 (June 1978): 62.

126. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*.

127. Smith, "Violation of the 'Liberty'," p. 64.

128. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

129. Paul Findley, *They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby*, Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1985, p. 166.

130. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

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131. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

132. Paul Findley, *Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the U.S.-Israeli Relationship*, Brooklyn, New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1993, pp. 40-41.

133. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

134. Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East*, New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1984, pp. 259-60. Footnote in original.

135. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

137. Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969, p. 277.

> Nasser planned his operation in detail right up to the moment Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin [*sic*], in Nasser's name was to back down magnanimously (over the Straits of Tiran) in response to appeals from the United Nations.

138. Thames TV script, p. 22.

139. *Ibid.*, p. 23; and personal interview with Admiral Moorer by the author, Washington, D.C., February 10, 1989.

140. The articles written by Ennes include, "The Israeli Assault on the U.S.S. Liberty," *The Retired Officer*, June 1985: 22-24; "Israeli Attack on U.S. Ship Reveals Failure of C^3," *Defense Electronics*, Vol 13 (October 1991): 60-71; "Spies Expect To Be Shot But the U.S.S. Liberty Was Humiliated," *The Dossier*, Issue 5: 5-9; "The USS Liberty," *The Link*, 25:2 (May/June 1992): 5-6; "The USS Liberty Affair," *The Link*, 17:2 (May/June 1984): 1-13; "The USS Liberty: Back in the News," *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 15 (Winter 1985-86): 19-29, 104-106; and "The USS Liberty: Israel Can't Seem To Get Its Story Straight," *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 17 (Summer 1986): 16-25, 131-40.

141. The home page is located at http://www.halcyon.com/jim/ussliberty.

142. Walter L. Jacobsen, "A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty," *Naval Law Review*, No. 36 (Winter 1986): 1-51.

143. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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144. In 1967, Turkey had a military attache' in Tel Aviv. This is unique because Turkey is a Moslem country. Nevertheless, over the years Turkey has been an active member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and an ally of the United States. Turkey has continued to look West and wishes to be considered Western. Today, Turkey and Israel have military cooperation.

145. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Cable declassified June 7, 1977. Title: The Turkish General Staff opinion regarding the attack on the USS Liberty.

146. At a State Department briefing on Wednesday, November 6, 1991, the briefer, Richard Boucher, was queried,

> "Q There's a report today that in 1967 during the -- or just prior to the attack on the USS Liberty that the United States picked up a transmission from an Israeli Mirage pilot saying, quote 'That's an American ship.' Was there such a transmission picked up and was this information in the hands of the United States at that time?
> MR. BOUCHER: Jim, I frankly don't know.
> Q Would you look into that?
> MR. BOUCHER: That's not something that I have checked on. I do remember that since I've been here we hadn't anything further to say about that incident which was more than 20 years ago and I don't think we do at this point either.
> Q Well, it still is of some interest and I wonder if you would look into it.
> MR. BOUCHER: I'll see if there's any inclination to begin addressing these things now.
> THE PRESS: Thank you."

Apparently there was no inclination to address the issue as no State Department statement was released from that day to this.

147. A. M. Rosenthal, "Anatomy of a Scoop," *New York Times*, November 8, 1991.

148. Mossad is the Israeli international intelligence agency essentially equivalent to the United States's Central Intelligence Agency.

149. The Department of Defense press release states:

> "The Liberty departy [*sic*] Rota, Spain June 2 and arrived at her position this morning to assure communications between US Government posts in the Middle East and to assist in relaying information

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> concerning the evacuation of American dependents and other American citizens from the countries of the Middle East."

"For every covert operation there has to be a cover story and that was our story for this operation." Telephone interview with Dr. Harold Saunders, March 28, 1991, the author was in Miami and Dr. Saunders was in Washington, D.C.

150. The initial flag as reported by James Ennes in *Assault on the Liberty*, pp. 51-52, was a brand new 5 foot by 8 foot flag. It was shot away in an early strafing run and replaced before the MTB attack with an 8 foot by 13 foot holiday ensign (flag).

151. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

152. The numbers are about ten feet tall and are usually white with a black background trim.

153. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 217.

154. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

> "He was in the room with the torpedo. Saw it coming through the side of the ship. The explosion burnt his eyes and burst his eardrums."

155. *News and Sentinel* (Colebrook, New Hampshire), January 27, 1988. The article recites: "Reprinted from 'Christian News.' Dale Crowley, Jr., is a Christian evangelist with his own radio program, 'The King's Business.'"

156. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 78.

157. Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East*, London and New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980, p. 325.

158. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

159. John Edgar Borne, "The USS Liberty: Dissenting History vs. Official History," Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1993. He then created "Reconsideration Press" and self-published the dissertation as a book. The book was advertised and distributed by The American Educational Trust. John E. Borne, *The USS Liberty: Dissenting History vs. Official History*, Brooklyn, New York: Reconsideration Press, 1995.

160. Borne, *USS Liberty: Dissenting History*, pp. 2-3.

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161. *Ibid.*, p. 168. Jonathan Pollard is an American Jew who was employed by U.S. Naval Intelligence and was convicted of spying for Israel.

162. *Ibid.*, p. 170. David Rubitsky was a Jew who claimed he had been wrongfully denied nomination for the Congressional Medal of Honor for claimed heroic accomplishment during World War II and received substantial congressional support for his claim. Borne writes that Liberty survivors "resented the fact that his, [Rubitsky's] cause could command such publicity and notice while the Liberty cause could not." p. 171.

163. *Ibid.*, p. 169. Dermot McLoughlin was an Irish solider serving with the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. He was killed by IDF Forces in a fire fight on January 10, 1987.

164. *Ibid.*, p. 170. An Iranian civilian airliner, (A-300) was downed by missiles fired from the U.S.S. Vincennes in 1988. The press called for a full investigation and "*Liberty News* wondered why the press did not have the courage to apply this principle to the case of the Liberty."

165. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-67.

166. *Ibid.*, p. 279; and dissertation p. 415. The dissertation and the book are almost verbatim. The Dissertation says we believe and we also believe while the book says I believe and I also believe.

167. Cheryl Faris (Producer) and Patrick King (Director), *USS Liberty Survivors* [film], Los Angeles: Sligo Productions, 1991.

168. *Liberty News*, 1:2 (September/October 1981): 4.

169. James M. Ennes, Jr., "The U.S.S. Liberty Affair," *The Link*, 17:2 (May/June 1984): 7; and James M. Ennes, Jr., "The U.S.S. Liberty," *The Link*, 25:2 (May/June 1992): 6.

170. Rex Bloomstein (Producer and Director), *Attack on the Liberty* [Film], London: Thames Television, 1987 [aired on January 27, 1987].

171. Adrian Pennink, the research editor of Thames TV was kind enough to give the Thames research files to the author.

172. In the Thames script, pp. 50-52 at items 234 through 244.

173. Thames script, p. 52.

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174. "Mabat Shainy" translates as "Second View," "Hindsight," or "Double Take." The program has a magazine format similar to 20/20 or Sixty Minutes. The tape was reduced from its original 53 minutes and 17 seconds to about 49 minutes. George Golden was cut from the tape. The program was broadcast in English with Hebrew sub titles. Translated from the original tape for this project by Oded Ben-Arie in February 1991.

175. Rhoda Lipton (Producer), "The Attack on the Liberty," *ABC News - 20/20* Show #719 [Television program, aired on May 21, 1987], New York: ABC News, 1987, transcript, p. 2.

176. Personal interview with producer in London, England, at BBC Television headquarters on September 16, 1991. Bloomstein had become very fond of the Liberty crew members and very sympathetic to their situation. He was of the opinion that some of them still suffered from post traumatic stress syndrome and that they had not been treated properly by the U.S. government.

177. "The Attack on the Liberty," *ABC News - 20/20,* transcript, p. 7.

178. *Liberty News,* 6:1 (September 1987): 3.

179. Christopher Carlson (Producer) and John Cosgrove (Supervising Director), *The Story Behind the Story* [Television program, aired on January 27, 1992], NBC, 1992.

180. Ennes states on camera:

> WALLACE: "That same day the Liberty contacted Sixth Fleet Headquarters and requested a destroyer escort."
>
> ENNES: "We got back an immediate answer from the Commander, Sixth Fleet, saying 'Thats totally unnecessary. You are a clearly marked American ship in international waters. You are not a likely target of attack by any country. And in the unlikely event that something happens' I remember the language almost verbatim, 'in the unlikely event that something happens, you will have American jet aircraft, at your defense, within ten minutes."
>
> ENNES: "We all knew that we'd been promised help within ten minutes, eh, nothing ever arrived."

There are no message records of the message Ennes

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remembers so clearly 25 years later in the Liberty's message logs or in the records of Commander, Sixth Fleet headquarters.

181. Justin Sturken (Producer), *Now It Can Be Told* [Television program, aired on April 14, 1992], syndicated program, 1992. The program was first aired by WVUE, New Orleans, Channel 8 (an ABC affiliate). It then appeared on various channels around the country which carried the "Now it Can be Told" show.

182. Personal telephone interview with Justin Sturken, the producer, (the author was in Miami and Justin Sturken was in New York) on January 28, 1992, during the time frame that the video tape was being shot. Sturken had seen the NBC program, "The Story Behind the Story" which aired January 27, 1992, and was very unhappy with the program. He felt it portrayed the Liberty crewmen in an unfavorable light. His exact words were, "it made them look like a bunch of jerks."

183. Faris (Producer) and King (Director), *USS Liberty Survivors: Our Story* [film], Sligo Productions, 1991.

184. On November 13, 1991, the author received a telephone call from Wolf Blitzer of CNN and discussed the Liberty incident for over forty minutes. The call was generated by the Evans and Novak article in the Washington Post and the A.M. Rosenthal response in the New York Times.

185. Richard Bonin, an associate producer with CBS News, "60 Minutes," was interviewed by the author by telephone (the author was in Miami and Richard Bonin was in Washington, D.C.) on March 9 and 10, 1992, and on March 17, 1992, (the author and Richard Bonin were in Miami). He stated that either James Ennes or Congressman Findley put him in touch with a freelance reporter. The reporter went with him and a crew to Maine to interview Seth Mintz.

186. Bonin did pass the information to his friend, Adrian Pennink of Thames TV. Pennink brought Mintz to Washington during the shooting of the Thames program and interviewed him. Pennink was also not impressed with Mintz's credibility and declined to include him in the Thames production. This decision on Mintz's credibility was made even before any research was done by Thames in Israel.

187. *Liberty News*, 4:4 (June 1986): 1.

188. *Liberty News*, 1:2 (September/October 1981): 4.

189. *Liberty News*, 2:1 (August 1982): 2.

190. *Liberty News*, 2:1 (August 1982): 9.

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191. *Liberty News*, 2:3 (March 1983): 2.

192. "Special Pre-Reunion Bulletin, U.S.S. Liberty Newsletter," May 6, 1987.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE ANALYSIS OF THE EXPLANATIONS

The theories to be considered regarding the attacks on the U.S.S. Liberty are:

1. It was an innocent case of mistaken identity.

The mistake theory is supported by ten official U.S. investigations and three official Israeli investigations.

The U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry (1967) did an outstanding job of collecting and analyzing evidence relating to the Liberty Incident and arriving at conclusions. While the investigation was thorough and the court had the resources of the United States at its disposal, the court did not hear directly from Israeli witnesses. Nevertheless, the conclusions of the board have stood the test of time and are supported and corroborated by later data which became available from Israel. It strongly supports the mistake theory.[1]

The C.I.A. report (1967) was put together mostly in Israel by the C.I.A. Chief of Station and his officers and agents with additional input from the U.S. Defense Attache, COL Anthony Perna, and the U.S. Naval Attache, CDR Ernest Castle. The C.I.A. analysis remains that the attack was a mistake.

The Russ Report (1967) gathered substantial data about U.S. Naval Communications but made no conclusions on the issue or whether or not the Israelis attacked by mistake. They were

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more concerned with errors and omissions on the U.S. side of the incident, but did not point a finger at any individual.

The Clifford Report (1967), though critical of Israel's "gross negligence", concluded that it was not a premeditated attack by Israel on a ship known to be American.[2]

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1967) was told by Secretary McNamara: "There is no evidence that the individuals attacking the Liberty knew they were attacking a U.S. ship."

The House Appropriations Select Committee (1968) concluded that a Navy communications foul-up led to Liberty being mistaken for an Egyptian vessel and attacked by Israel.

The House Armed Services Committee (1971) focuses on the five misrouted naval messages that left Liberty in harms way.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1979/80) made a direct inquiry into the allegations of Ennes and the Liberty veterans but laid its investigation to rest without a report.

The NSA (1981) report found "egregious errors in both command judgements and operational procedures" of the Israelis and concluded Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian ship.

The House Armed Services Committee (1991/92) concluded there was no evidence to support the allegations of an intentional attack.

The consensus of the ten official U.S. investigations conclude the attacks were an innocent mistake. Likewise, the three official Israeli investigations (the Ram Ron Commission

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of Inquiry, the Preliminary Inquiry, and the IDF History) conclude the incident was the result of a number of U.S. mistakes and a number of Israeli mistakes. A number of unofficial sources also support the innocent mistake theory.

> 2. It was an intentional attack by Israel upon a ship known by Israel to be a United States ship.

The second theory has many sub-theories. There are a number of reasons or motives from which the proponents of the intentional attack explanations infer the attacks were intentional. These intentional attack theories may be classified as follows:

> 2.a. Because the ship was assisting Egypt in its war against Israel.
>
> 2.b. It was an intentional attack by Israel with the approval of the United States to cover up the fact that the United States was assisting Israel in its war against the Arabs.
>
> 2.c. Because Israel had demanded the withdrawal of the ship and the United States had refused to withdraw it.
>
> 2.d. Because Israel did not want the United States or the world to know the extent of its success in the war.
>
> 2.e. To keep the United States from learning that Israel was about to open an offensive against Syria the following day.
>
> 2.f. Because Israel believed it had the exclusive right to conduct surveillance in this area.
>
> 2.g. President Johnson refused to defend the Liberty because he did not wish to embarrass Israel.
>
> 2.h. Because Liberty intercepted a "cooked" telephone message, sent by Israel to King Hussein, purporting to be from President Nasser to King

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Hussein and Israel did not wish the truth about that message to be disclosed.

2.i. The attack was ordered by Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan.

2.j. Because Israelis never make mistakes and, therefore, the attack could not have been a mistake.

2.k. Because the ship was clearly marked, flying a U.S. flag and with large numbers painted on the bow and had a distinctive antennae array and therefore the attackers had to have identified her as a United States ship and, therefore, the attack could not have been a mistake.

At least one thing is certain, all of the theories can not be true as some are mutually exclusive.

THE CRITERIA FOR ANALYSIS OF THE THEORIES

In order to appropriately analyze the various theories about the Liberty incident, it is necessary that a protocol be established which can be impartially applied to the evidence[3] in support of or in opposition to each theory. The Federal Rules of Evidence are helpful in some instances but perhaps too strict a criterion for academic research since the academic research must lean heavily on the literature and statements of others which would be barred by the hearsay rule in judicial proceedings.

Generally, the statement of a theory is not proof of or evidence of the theory. In Western civilization, we start with the allegations and then offer proof or evidence to establish the allegations. In Latin the term "allegata" refers to the allegations and "probata" refers to the proof.

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Thus, the probata must prove the allegata. In this analysis, first, the allegations will be separated to state the theory. Then, the evidence or proof will be examined to determine how much the evidence or proof establish the allegations or theory.

There has been much debate in the international relations field about its "rules of evidence" in the last couple of decades. The issues raised and the debate go far beyond the scope of this work. The behavioralists, in the study of international relations, have advocated since the fifties, a conversion of standards of rules of evidence to those of natural science. This school, also called "scientific," emphasized precision and search for regularities in human behavior which could, when discovered, be subject to quantification, measurement and rigorous classifications. The "traditionalists" objected by referring to the tremendous complexity of reality which makes our knowledge restricted and beyond measurement. The traditionalists argued that only techniques from philosophy, history, law and generally a reliance on judgment can be utilized.

The scientific approach continues to this date attracting those scholars that wish to construct models and use statistics and equations in search of the truth. According to

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a recent definitive work on the subject, qualitative research should abide by the same strictures as quantitative research.*

Both the "scientific" and "traditional" approach were, however, different forms of the same philosophical school of knowledge known as positivism or empiricism. For my purposes, I will use its very loose form in combination with a plain historical method.

By the method of diplomatic history that I use, I subscribe to the view that the events I try to explain are unique and singular. Authenticity rests in the surface of the event itself, rather than by reference to similar events. My purpose is not to construct a model with numerous variables which would then be compared with a historic situation in the framework of a given case. Thus, I do not propose to use, for example, the bureaucratic politics model of G. Allison** applied with mixed success to the Cuban missile crisis.

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* Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

** Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. Allison's bureaucratic-politics model builds on the organizational process model. The players taking part in the decision-making process are guided not by a master plan but by conflicting conceptions of national, bureaucratic and personal goals. The outcome depends not on the rational justification, nor entirely on the leaders on the top but on the relative power and skill of the participants in the decision-making process. The author feels that the model would not be particularly suitable for the purposes of this study since its subject-matter is not only the Liberty incident but also *its numerous explanations*.

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Instead, I will use as a rough guide for evaluating the different explanations of the Liberty incident and for my own explanation a "common sense" positivism encapsulated in the following celebrated figure called "the pattern of scientific explanation."


L1, L2, ... L_K General laws (laws)
C1, C2, ... C_K Statements of antecedent conditions
Explanans
Logical deduction
E... Description of the empirical event to be explained
Explanandum

In my case, **E** is the event that took place on June 8, 1967. The various explanations (which I am in turn trying to explain here) were put together at later dates and reflected the capabilities, purposes, and interests of their authors. Among them are the official inquiries of government agencies conducted with a superior access to what Hempel*** calls, C1, C2 ... C_K, namely, statements of antecedent conditions. Many of these reports have been only recently declassified and thus made accessible to anybody else without a privileged access. There are only about two analyses which are of a pure

*** Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Chapter 3;" in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, edited by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953, pp. 322ff.

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scholarly nature. The rest reflects the various individual agendas of the authors. The government agencies obviously consider alliance relations and the main issues of international politics as paramount. The other researchers, other than the purely academic ones, argue in a much more free fashion in terms of the evidence used.

Thus, to summarize, the disparate explanations differ tremendously in terms of what **C** they use in both the qualitative and quantitative sense. The survivors' feelings inevitably color the cast of characters and evaluations of the events.

That brings me to Hempel's **L**, the other part of his explanans. By "general laws", "laws", or "covering laws", Hempel means a repeated connection between certain events. On a more general level, these underpinning "laws" may be allegations of such allegedly repeated connections as "all foreign acts of the Soviet Union are aggressive," "no nation's military forces ever accidentally kill their own personnel," but also the famous power realist observations that "states will betray allies if it suits them" or "there are no permanent allies, only permanent interests."

Carl Hempel's account of what is involved in explaining an event has continued to be extremely influential across the social sciences. The model is known as "deductive-nomological" and Hempel argued that it is applicable to both

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social sciences and history.[****] I combine a "common sense" or "moderate" version of Hempel's positivist understanding of explanation with the falsificationism of Karl Popper. Occasionally, I also resort to confirmation. Many people prefer falsification because confirming cases may be offered as proof, while consciously or not, cases likely to contradict the theory may be avoided. Also, it can be argued that any number of confirmations can be rejected by one single case of falsification. Popper's famous example of falsification is the one black swan that disproves the thousands of instances seeming to confirm the proposition that all swans are white.[*****] Thus, to summarize, I use falsification in some tests and confirmation in others, again as dictated by common sense.

Beginning with the end, i.e., with the final verdict, it is important to appreciate that even the answer yes/no to the question whether or not the attack on the Liberty was deliberate, contains significant shades of difference based upon the state of knowledge of the attacker before the attack. The differences do not modify the tragic outcome, but are of

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[****] Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond,* edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zaleswski, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

[*****] Kenneth N. Waltz "Response to my Critics;" in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by R. O. Keohane, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p.335, citing Karl Popper, *The Logic of Discovery*, New York: Basic Books, 1935/1959, pp. 47-50, 105, and 278.

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tremendous importance for possible criminal, disciplinary and other internal charges discussed in Chapter 5.

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Types of Possibilities - Accident, Mistake, Premeditated Action 3-1



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Categorized according to their conclusions, the explanations of the Liberty incident fall into two categories: those that conclude that the Israeli attack on the Liberty was a case of mistaken identity and those that did not.

The conclusion that the attack on the Liberty was a mistake is reached by the ten official U.S. investigations and the three official Israeli investigations. A number of unofficial inquiries concur with this conclusion. Even the inquiry that did the best job (the United States Navy Court of Inquiry) suffered from faults. In this case, at fault was what is called the **K** in Hempel's **Cl** - $_{K}$, namely the range of information gathered. The U.S. Navy inquiry did not include statements of Israeli witnesses. When these were later made available, however, the conclusions of the U.S. Navy Court were corroborated. The other objection to the official reports might be that they withheld some information and classified it.

FACTS AND LOGICAL INFERENCES

When we proceed to analyze the conclusions of all explanations, we discover how sloppy they are in their logic and evidence. Some of the theories presented are merely allegations without evidence or proof. Other theories are based upon inferences drawn from alleged facts. There are two possible fallacies here, one to do with wrong inferences drawn from alleged facts, the other to do with lack of evidence for

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the alleged facts. First, even if the alleged facts might be true, inferences drawn from them might not be appropriate. Second, if the alleged facts are not true, or if there is no credible evidence supporting the alleged facts then the analysis will concentrate on the absence of evidence rather than the inferences. Some people have already made up their minds without having examined the evidence, based on the explanations or allegations they have heard or read, that the attacks were intentional or the attacks were a mistake. For those who already "know" the answer to the question under research, the material presented herein will have little meaning. For those who recognize that there are at least two sides to every dispute and sometimes more than two sides, this dissertation attempts to identify all the explanations, gather all the allegations and all the evidence as to each theory and allow the reader to follow the analysis process. Where inferences are drawn, every effort has been made to explain the process to the extent that a reader with an open mind will be able to go through the process themselves to confirm the validity of any conclusions.

The first step is to assemble an accurate description of the incident and the events immediately preceding it, i.e., gather all the uncontested evidence. There is a mountain of fact, uncontested by anyone, upon which the investigation can be based. No one contests that the incident occurred on Thursday, June 8, 1967, or that it occurred in the

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Mediterranean off the coast of the Sinai. This type of material composes the large amount of undisputed facts.

A primary source of evidence is documents or records of regularly conducted activity in one of the following forms: A memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time, by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business or professional activity, and if it was in the regular practice of that business or professional activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.[4] Also quite valuable are recorded recollections. That is a memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to fully and accurately relate.[5]

Testimony or statements of witnesses who have personal knowledge of an event is also an important resource. One must remember, however, that human memory is frail and tends to fade in direct proportion to the passage of time. For this reason, the refreshing of memory through the use of recorded recollections is most helpful.

The evidence must be relevant. Generally, "relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

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determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.[6]

In weighing evidence, it is appropriate to consider bias, prejudice, political motives, financial motives, credibility, and whether the evidence is contested by other evidence.

Every person is deemed to be competent to give evidence. However, a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.[7]

There is not a great deal of conflicting evidence. When a conflict appears, in many instances, it is possible to reconcile the conflict without any impact on the issue under study. For example, there are numerous stories of a U.S. submarine either being in the area or being deployed in tandem with the U.S.S. Liberty. Whether such U.S. submarine was in the area or not has no bearing on whether the Israeli actions were intentional or mistaken. Likewise, Clark Clifford tells, in his book written twenty-four years later, of being summoned to the White House to discuss the Liberty incident several hours *before* the incident occurred. Like the submarine, this error in fact has no bearing on the issue. When the evidence conflicts with a relative and material matter, a credibility choice must be made. In making credibility choices, every effort is made to explain the reason the accepted evidence was accepted and to explain the reasons for the rejection of the evidence not accepted.

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The same approach is used in examining the inferences drawn from the alleged motives, and an explanation of the reasons for accepting or rejecting each inference which does not accept the mistake theory is provided.

ANALYSIS OF DOUBERS EXPLANATIONS

2.a. Because the ship was assisting Egypt in its war against Israel.

This intentional theory is propounded by Loftus and Aaron.[8] The story by Loftus of the CIA sending Liberty to spy for the Egyptians with the data being collected and passed to Cairo via a British intelligence computer base on Cyprus begins by placing the Liberty off the Sinai days before she actually arrived. It describes the capabilities of her listening equipment far beyond anything that the United States or any other nation has available today, which is thirty years later. Nonetheless, the Liberty had certain extraordinary equipment, some of which remains classified today and is still in use. It is not the function of this dissertation to disclose anything that remains classified but any reading of the Elint[9] literature will establish that the Loftus claims of the listening ability of Liberty are fantasy. But let us assume that Liberty could have gathered electronic data from the Sinai to the extent claimed by Loftus. This raises some interesting questions.

How did Israel know the capability of Liberty in June 1967?

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If this capability existed and Israel knew the capability, what was to be gained by attacking on June 8? The battle for the Sinai was just about over. Israeli forces had vanquished the Egyptians, they were only mopping up in the Sinai and were in the process of taking the Suez Canal many miles from where Liberty was operating.

Finally, the Loftus book relies on unidentified "old spies" and "old" or "former intelligence officers." The only names disclosed by Loftus are of persons who are dead and, therefore, unable to confirm or deny what Loftus attributes to them. The Loftus book is interesting reading and laced with accurate historical events. Unfortunately, his allegations are not supported by anything other than his unidentified informants. His theory of the Israeli attack on the Liberty is not persuasive.

> 2.b.It was an intentional attack by Israel with the approval of the United States to cover up the fact that the United States was assisting Israel in its war against the Arabs.

Ye. A. Primakov, the present foreign minister of Russia, was an editor of Pravda in 1967. His theory of United States' involvement on the side of Israel during the 1967 war found a ready welcome in the Arab world because he claimed that Israel did not defeat the Egyptian army in the Sinai. The U.S.S. Liberty, in aid of Israel, sent false orders to the Egyptian forces in Sinai ordering their withdrawal to the Suez Canal. Thus, Arab forces were not defeated by Israel, which is

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unthinkable, but rather by the United States, a superpower, which is understandable. Although the Soviets were well linked to the Arab countries, they had little if any source of evidence about Liberty. The allegation that the United States joined with Israel in approving the attacks on the Liberty to cover up this U.S. involvement on behalf of Israel is not supported by any evidence and is not persuasive.

The Green[10] and Katz[11] theory about the United States Air Force supporting the Israeli war effort with four RF-4 photo reconnaissance aircraft and the attack's purpose being to prevent the world from learning about this support through Liberty radio intercepts is not rational.

If the United States could have kept this USAF participation secret for thirty years by merely telling the U.S. Air Force participants (and there had to be quite a number of them to support, maintain, and fly the aircraft while in Israel and to transport them and their equipment to and from Israel) to keep quiet, why could they not have followed the same procedure with the Liberty crew? Those aboard Liberty who would have had this knowledge were limited to the NSA personnel whose business was secrecy and could have surely kept this secret as well as the Air Force.

If the Liberty NSA compartment or other Liberty crewmen had in fact learned of the USAF participation in the 1967 war on behalf of Israel and became aware that they were intentionally attacked to suppress this information, is it

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reasonable to assume that no Liberty crew survivor would have come forward and told the story over the last thirty years? The Liberty survivors have been quite vocal about their own theories. If this theory is accurate, why does it not have some support from the surviving victims? Based on a total absence of evidence and the irrationally of the inferences, this theory does not persuade.

> 2.c. Because Israel had demanded the withdrawal of the ship and the United States had refused to withdraw it.

This theory is advanced by Anthony Pearson in his book, *Conspiracy of Silence* and his articles in Penthouse magazine. He tells the story of how Liberty was operating off the Sinai and exchanging radio messages with Israel for several days prior to June 8, 1967. The problem with this theory is that Liberty arrived off the Sinai coast about 0832 on the morning of June 8, 1967, and neither Liberty nor the Israelis have any record of the exchange of messages reported by Pearson. Since there is no supporting evidence and the theory is not based upon fact, it is not persuasive.

> 2.d. Because Israel did not want the United States or the world to know the extent of its success in the war.

The Richard K. Smith article, published in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, offers no supporting evidence that the attacking Israelis knew the ship was U.S. but draws its inference that the Israelis attacked to prevent the United

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States in particular and the world in general from learning of the extent of the Israeli military success as of the afternoon of June 8, 1967. The allegation is easy to make but the test of the theory is even easier for anyone to evaluate. A trip to the public libraries around the United States or in Europe will disclose what was printed as news on and before June 8, 1967. What the world knew via the press was tantamount to knowing the entire story.[12] This theory is best evaluated by Alfred Friendly, foreign correspondent for the Washington Post, who covered the 1967 war from Israel.

> "That the attack on the Liberty was ordered by the Israeli High Command to prevent American and world knowledge of the capture of El Arish, announced with fanfare in Tel Aviv more than two days before, or of further progress of the Israeli Forces to or near the Canal, also announced day by day, almost hour by hour, is a thesis that simply does not hold water."[13]

> 2.e. To keep the United States from learning that Israel was about to open an offensive against Syria the following day.

The linchpin of the theory of James M. Ennes on why the Israelis attacked the Liberty is that Israel was trying to keep the United States from learning of its plan to attack Syria on June 9, 1967. This theory about the attack on Syria suffers from a number of weaknesses. First, it must be remembered that when Liberty set sail for its patrol area off the Sinai, prior to the commencement of hostilities on June 5, 1967, the Gaza Strip was controlled by Egypt. In his book, Ennes points out that Liberty's basic capability for listening

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was only to the horizon (about 20 miles, 25 miles maximum).[14] An examination of the Liberty patrol area projected out to its 25 mile listening capability does not place Liberty's ear over any Israeli territory. Rather, it overlays the coastal road from Port Said, Egypt to the Gaza Strip. Any message traffic about Syria would have been from Israeli military headquarters in Tel Aviv to the north approximately 60 miles from the northern most listening point of Liberty's 25 mile listening Zone.

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Situation Map

The projected track of the Liberty on the day of the attack and her VHF listening range.



Map - Liberty's Patrol Area and 25 Mile Listening Zone 3-2

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If by some chance, Liberty could have listened all the way to Tel Aviv, 60 to 100 miles to the north of her, depending upon her position on her assigned patrol, a question remains as to who would do the eavesdropping. While Liberty was operating off the coast of Africa, her linguists were primarily Russian speakers headed by Marine SGT Bryce Lockwood. At Rota, Spain, Liberty took aboard Arabic speakers. There were no Hebrew linguists aboard.

But assuming that somehow Liberty overheard Israeli plans to attack Syria on June 9, 1967. How big a secret was this? Israeli armor was being withdrawn from the Sinai and transported north towards Syria on roads through Tel Aviv within a few blocks of the United States Embassy. This was observed by the CIA Chief of Station and reported to Washington.[15] Secretary of State, Dean Rusk confirmed the receipt of this information.[16]

In his television series, Israel: A Nation is Born, Abba Eban comments "I received a call from a high U.S. Official. He hinted that it would be illogical if the war were to end with the Syrians suffering no penalty for having provoked it."[17] But the final puncture to the "hide the plans for the attack on Syria theory" seems to be the London Times of June 8, 1967. About center on the front page is the lead line, "Blow at Syria Now" and an article by Charles Douglas-Home telling of the forthcoming attack on Syria with a date line of Tel Aviv, June 7, 1967. It seems that the "Syrian Attack

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Secret" could have been learned by spending six pence for the London Times rather than sending a vulnerable ship into harms way. The United States Naval Attache[18] at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv during June 1967 has commented on this theory as follows: "Let us presume the Israeli high command was so fearful that the United States would learn of what was an evident Israeli plan to take the Golan, or any other plan on the part of the Israelis, when they say, 'my golly, that will irritate the United States - our great friend - we'd better not do that, or let that happen, so let's sink their ship instead'? That - that's how I address anyone who thinks the Israelis purposely sunk [*sic*] [attacked] that ship to keep us from knowing something."[19]

2.f. Because Israel believed it had the exclusive right to conduct surveillance in this area.

The Churchill book makes reference to, but does not endorse this theory and does not provide any detail or support for it. In fact, that is what the 1967 war was all about, the attempt to close an international strait to maritime navigation. The law of Naval Warfare provides the right of innocent[20] passage for merchant ships and warships on the high seas. The theory is similar to 2.c. Neither are supported by evidence.

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2.g. President Johnson refused to defend the Liberty because he did not wish to embarrass Israel.

LCDR David E. Lewis told a reporter that Rear Admiral Geis told him that as soon as the Liberty's calls for help were received Admiral Geis deployed "fighter bombers" and "radioed the Pentagon of our action." [emphasis added] Rear Admiral Geis was the commander of the carrier division which included the U.S.S. Saratoga and the U.S.S. America. He reported to the Commander of the Sixth Fleet, Admiral Martin aboard the U.S.S. Little Rock. Admiral Martin reported to the Commander-in-Chief of United States Naval Forces, Europe, Admiral McCain in London. The chain goes back to the Chief of Naval Operations in the Pentagon and then on through the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense and ultimately to the President. It seems strange that Admiral Geis would bypass his chain of command and call the Pentagon. Lewis then quotes Geis as saying "A few minutes later I received a call from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordering me to recall the planes because they were carrying nuclear arms." There is no explanation of how McNamara was made aware of the nuclear arms aboard the aircraft. Stranger still is the question of how these aircraft could have been launched on a mission, carrying nuclear arms without the express authorization of the president, but assuming they were so launched, it is quite strange that the Secretary of Defense would give direct orders to a two star admiral in the field. Lewis says that Geis told

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him that he "immediately rearmed another squadron with conventional weapons, deployed it and reported to the Pentagon." Again, Admiral Geis is bypassing his chain of command and dealing directly with the Pentagon. Of course, Secretary McNamara was not in the Pentagon; he was in the situation room at the White House, but, nevertheless, Lewis quotes Geis further, "A few minutes later I got another call from McNamara ordering me to recall these planes too. I was angry and mystified and exercised my prerogative to go to the next higher level of authority to have McNamara's order reversed. Seconds later President Lyndon Johnson was on the radio telephone, and I made my case to him." It is hard to imagine a two star Admiral going over the head of Commander, Sixth Fleet, CINCUSNAVEUR, and CNO to deal directly with the Secretary of Defense on an issue involving the launch of a flight of aircraft and then going over the head of the Secretary of Defense and demanding to speak to the President. Since the Secretary of Defense has something to say of the future career of his flag officers, it is hard to understand how Admiral Geis went on to a brilliant career thereafter with appointment to important jobs and promotions. It could be presumed that McNamara was not vindictive and that would explain the highly successful remainder of Admiral Geis' career. What is not explained is the telephone calls between Admiral Geis, in the Mediterranean and Secretary McNamara and the President in Washington. In 1967, the United States did

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not have the ability to make a telephone link from Washington to a ship in the Mediterranean, though the Navy did have a secure telephone system in use to the Vietnam area. This system was code named Steamboat and substantially distorted the speakers voice. Let us assume that Admiral Geis and Secretary McNamara did have the ability to voice communicate by telephone. It is meaningful to look at the time line. The first distress call from Liberty (Rockstar) was received by the U.S.S. Saratoga (Schematic) at 1432 Sinai time. The first aircraft were launched from Saratoga at about 1450 Sinai time. That was 0850 Washington time. The first word of an attack on the Liberty was delivered by W. W. Rostow to the President at 0942 Washington time or 1542 Sinai time. It is hard to understand how Secretary McNamara could have been on the telephone with Admiral Geis, recalling the first flight, a few minutes after 1450, Sinai time, when word of the attack had not reached Washington until 1542 Sinai time. The second flight was launched about 1545 Sinai time and recalled a few minutes later. It was still before 1100 Washington time. The President had called a meeting in the situation room and arrived there at 1104. Secretary McNamara was already there. By the time the Secretary and the President were together, it was 1704 Sinai time and Commander of the Sixth Fleet had recalled the second flight. Secretary McNamara has stated that he never spoke on the telephone to anyone in the Sixth Fleet that day and specifically not to Admiral Geis.[21]

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Admiral Geis is deceased and could not be interviewed. However, his widow was interviewed and she has no recollection of ever being told by the Admiral of a telephone conversation with the President of the United States. Such a call would be a highly unusual event for a two star admiral. If Admiral Geis had been willing to tell this story to LCDR Lewis, an inferior and a stranger, one might infer that he would have at least told his wife about his conversation with the President of the United States. Mrs. Geis recollected that he was under the direct command of Admiral Martin, Commander of the Sixth Fleet and that Admiral Geis did what Admiral Martin told him to do.[22] How can one reconcile the story told by LCDR Lewis?

> 2.h. Because Liberty intercepted a "cooked" telephone message, sent by Israel to King Hussein, purporting to be from President Nasser to King Hussein and Israel did not wish the truth about that message to be disclosed.

Israel has developed superior ELINT capabilities and her abilities in 1967 were far superior to the Arab ELINT capabilities. Israel did for example intercept and record a telephone conversation between President Nasser of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan wherein Nasser and Hussein agreed to announce "that American and British airplanes are taking part against us from aircraft carriers."[23] The Churchills go on to say, "The fabrication about British and American air intervention was not believed by the Russians. Indeed, It is known that it made them very angry. Thus, when it had failed in its objective of dragging in the Russians on the Arab side,

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it was abandoned by Egypt and Jordan. However the peoples of the Arab countries still believe it."[24] But the interception and release of a message between Nasser and Hussein is a far cry from the "cooking" theory. Many Arabs believe that Israel recorded conversations of Nasser's speeches and spliced individual words together to create a message from Nasser to Hussein. Perhaps this would be possible for one or more opening sentences but as the conversation developed, the ability to hear a statement from Hussein, decide on the answer, locate and retrieve the individual words needed for the answer on the stored audio tapes, splice them into a sentence or phrase and transmit them is to say the least a remarkable accomplishment. Perhaps the Israelis were in fact able to accomplish this remarkable feat in 1967. If so, how did the Israelis know that the cooked message had been intercepted by Liberty? One problem with the theory is that Liberty was not yet in the area. She was steaming en route a few days away. This message was supposed to have been cooked about June 5 or June 6 at the latest. At that time Liberty was not in a position to have intercepted the cooked message. But if you wish to assume that Liberty had somehow intercepted that message, then why is it that neither the Liberty radio logs nor any other records of the U.S. Navy reflect the interception. If we presume that Israel may have had the ability to trick Egypt and Jordan with such fancy "cooking," a more interesting question is created. This information,

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intercepted by Liberty, might have been of some interest to the U.S. from a technical point of view but it had little value to the U.S. The message that Israel intercepted between Nasser and Hussein was on the same circuit, that is between Cairo and Amman. That message was of great value to the United States because it supported the U.S. position that the U.S. was not involved. In the world wide scenario, where both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were extremely sensitive about not starting World War III, this was material of the highest precedence. Liberty with its capability to have intercepted the low value "cooked" message between the same two cities somehow did not intercept and pass this information of urgent nature and high value to the United States. There has never been a suggestion or hint on the U.S. side that Liberty intercepted either of these messages. It therefore appears that this theory is not supported by any credible evidence.

2.i. The attack was ordered by Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan.[25]

This theory is supported by C.I.A. documents released to the American Palestine Committee under the Freedom of Information Act. When Dayan made a visit to the United States in September 1977, he was greeted by advertisements in the New York Times and the Washington Post stating:

Are we welcoming
the murderer
of our sons?

The advertisements quoted the C.I.A. document as follows:

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> No. 3, dated 9 November 1967 Title: "Attack on USS LIBERTY Ordered by Dayan"
>
> (Deleted) commented on the sinking of the U.S. communications ship LIBERTY. They said that Dayan personally ordered the attack on the ship and that one of his generals adamantly opposed the action and said: 'This is pure murder!' One of the admirals who was present also disapproved the action and it was he who ordered it stopped.[26] (Deletion) believe that the attack against the U. S. vessel is (deletion)[27] detrimental to any political ambitions Dayan may have.[28]

On the day the advertisements appeared, the then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral Stansfield Turner, appeared on the ABC program, "Good Morning America" with Steve Bell. It is amusing to note that the C.I.A. approved for release a transcript of that portion of the "Good Morning America" show on January 28, 1985, a mere seven plus years after it had been heard and seen by tens of millions of TV viewers.

> Transcript -"Good Morning America" 19 September 1977
>
> Steve Bell: There is a particular incident that has just come into the papers this morning; namely that a group of Palestinian supporters in the U.S. has taken out advertisements in the New York Times which use raw CIA data gained from the Freedom of Information Act. The accusation is made that Moshe Dayan specifically ordered the attack on the USS Liberty in the 1967 Middle East War. Can you give us any enlightenment on that.
>
> Admiral Turner: I certainly can and I am glad Steve, that you emphasized the word raw intelligence data. We are required under the Freedom of Information Act to produce to those who ask for it intelligence documents which can be unclassified. In those which we released there were several which indicated a possibility that the Israeli Government knew about the USS Liberty before the attack. Also, we released an evaluated

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> over-all document which said very clearly that it was our considered opinion that the Israeli Government had no such knowledge at that time.
> APPROVED FOR RELEASE
> DATE 28 JAN 1985[29]

Thereafter, the C.I.A. was queried by Senator Abourezk of North Dakota on behalf of Mr. Carl Marcy.

To the question:

> "5. Finally, could I have your judgment and that of the Agency you head, based on information acquired by the Agency from all sources, that the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was deliberate or an honest mistake?"

Admiral Turner responded on February 27, 1978:

> Comment: "It remains our best judgment that the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was not made in malice toward the United States and was a mistake."

It is interesting to evaluate the unevaluated intelligence report. The informant and the place from which the report originated are sanitized so neither of these items are of any help.

> The report states: "----- commented on the *sinking* of the U.S. communications ship, Liberty.
> Comment: The ship was not sunk.
>
> Report: "They said that Dayan personally ordered the attack on the ship."
> Comment: The issue is what weight should be given to this assertion.
>
> Report: "*One* of the admirals *who was present* also disapproved of the action."
> Comment: In 1967, the Navy of Israel had only one admiral, Shlomo Erell. The source suggests that the Navy had more than one admiral. The only admiral was in Haifa on June 8, 1967, and Dayan was en route to Hebron. There was no admiral "present" with Dayan.
>
> Report: "It was he [the admiral] who ordered it [the attack] stopped and not Dayan."

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> Comment: Dayan was known for a mercurial temper. It is difficult to imagine a subordinate countermanding his order in his presence. [In fact there were two attacks, the first by aircraft which was halted by order of the chief air controller at air force headquarters in the pit at Tel Aviv and an attack by the motor torpedo boats which was not halted from headquarters but terminated by the motor torpedo boat division commander after the torpedo attack was complete.
>
> Report: "----- believe that the attack against the U.S. vessel is also detrimental to any political ambition Dayan may have."
> Comment: Wrong again. Dayan came out of the war a hero and remained the minister of defense and number two person in the government until after the 1973 war.
>
> Conclusion: ----- was wrong or inaccurate about every other assertion made. It suggests that the assertion that Dayan personally ordered the attack suffers from a lack of credibility.

It appears that the reporter is uninformed about <u>every</u> detail in the report and the reporter's evaluation of Dayan's political future is far from the mark. How much weight should be given to the reported comment "Dayan personally ordered the attack on the ship"?

An examination of Dayan's autobiography reflects that on June 8, he learned that Hebron was captured on the morning of June 8 and he set out for Hebron.[30] His autobiography makes no mention of the Liberty incident.

The IDF History Department reports that Dayan went to Jerusalem where he had the Central Commander transport him to Hebron. It is about a 15 minute drive from the Kirya to Sde Dov airport. It is a little over thirty miles from Sde Dov to Jerusalem as the crow or helicopter flies, longer if you drive

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the twisty road. A Super Frelon Helicopter cruises at 155 mph so the flight time to Jerusalem was 12 to 15 minutes. Then south from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, less than 3 miles, on to the Etzion site where they stopped for lunch, another 5 miles and finally on to Hebron, 10 miles more.

Is there any supporting evidence?

The author interviewed General (Aluf) Uzi Narkiss,[31] the Central Commander who stated that on June 8 he was at his headquarters in Jerusalem[32] when Dayan arrived by helicopter. General Narkiss was with David Ben Gurion and was about to take Ben Gurion to the Western Wall which had just been captured. Dayan said: "No, we are going to Hebron," so Narkiss got his command car, a few half-tracks and some jeeps, and they started out for Hebron.

At that point in the interview, Narkiss said, what Israelis frequently say: "But don't take my word for it...." Life Magazine published a special edition about the 1967 War and it includes a picture of Dayan having lunch that day on the road to Hebron.

A few days later, not knowing if the picture could be found, the author mentioned this Life Magazine picture to Etan Haber.[33] Haber said, "Yes, I remember the picture, I am in it. I was with Dayan that day."

Upon the author's return to the United States, the special issue of Life was obtained and there on Page 11 was the picture.

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Life Photograph of Moshe Dayan en route to Hebron 3-3

This copyrighted picture may be seen in Life Magazine, Special Edition, June 1967, on Page 11, or in the original dissertation on file in the University of Miami Library, at Coral Gables, Florida.

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Dayan is seated on the ground next to an Israeli Brigadier General (Tat Aluf). Further research identified the General as Rechavam Zeevy (Gandi).[34] On a later trip to Israel, the author interviewed Zeevy.[35] He remembered the trip and identified the site of the luncheon as being on the foundation of a building at the "Etzion Bloc".[36]

Another soldier standing in the rear of the Life picture was identified as Yitzhack Rager.[37]

The author learned from General (Aluf) Uzi Narkiss that with him on June 8, 1967, was Private (Turai) Yaacov "Kobie" Sharet, the son of Moshe Sharet, the second Prime Minister of Israel, who served as a writer. His duty was to keep a diary for Narkiss. Kobie Sharet was interviewed[38] and confirmed making the trip with Dayan on June 8, 1967.

In an effort to learn more of Dayan, the author interviewed his long time friend and confidant, Shlomo Gazit.[39] He stated that Dayan never discussed the Liberty. He went on to tell a story about an occasion when Dayan could not remember some details of an event. Gazit told him "Dayan, you are cheating history, you should keep a journal." Dayan agreed and the next morning Dayan spent an hour writing about the prior day. Gazit said that Dayan never did it again. Instead, he appointed a man to write the journal for him. That man was Haim Israeli and he still worked in the archives of the Ministry of Defense. The author found him at the Ministry of Defense and learned that Israeli had nothing in

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his journal about Liberty on June 8, 1967. What he did have was a memory or a note that the Military Secretary assigned to Dayan on June 8, 1967 was Colonel Itzhak Nessyahu. Colonel Nessyahu was found living in Ramat Gan, Israel, and interviewed on June 20, 1990.

COL Nessyahu stated that on June 8, 1967, Dayan left the Kirya with him and went by car to Sde Dov airport where he boarded a Super Frelon helicopter and flew to Jerusalem. There he had Uzi Narkiss arrange a convoy to take them to Hebron. Dayan rode in the command car. Colonel Nessyahu rode in the lead jeep. They drove to Etzion where they stopped for lunch and then drove on to Hebron where Dayan visited the Cave of Machpelah.[40]

The convoy then drove to Beer-Sheva, which is further to the south and they returned from Beer-Sheva to Tel Aviv in the early evening. He first heard of the Liberty incident at this time. They went to the Kirya.

Dayan then left headquarters, according to Colonel Nessyahu, "to spend the night with his girlfriend."[41] He returned early in the morning and began reading the messages.[42]

Suddenly, he flew into a rage at the reserve duty officer upon reading an intercepted message between Nasser and Hussein which he interpreted as meaning the war was over on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts. He called Dado[43] and ordered him to attack Syria. He then called Prime Minister Eshkol and

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advised him that he had ordered the attack on Syria and said he could still call it back. Eshkol was highly displeased and called a cabinet meeting but the attack on Syria was not halted.

The question of Dayan's involvement in the Liberty incident seemed to be clear, but one additional witness was discovered. In arranging for the use of the Life Magazine picture with Time/Life, the author learned that the photographer was David Rubinger and that twenty-five years later he still worked for Time/Life. Rubinger's diary reflects that he met Dayan at Sde Dov airport and they flew to Jerusalem in a Super Frelon helicopter. He rode with Dayan and Narkiss to Hebron on June 8, 1967 and stopped at Etzion for lunch. He remembers the command car as being an open vehicle with no radio. Cellular telephones did not exist then. He also recalls that there were no telephone booths or radios along the way and that Dayan and his party were out of communication from mid-morning until they arrived at Beer-Sheva.

An examination of the picture, shows at least two people wearing wrist watches. The author asked Rubinger if he had his negatives. He did. Could they be enlarged to show the time Dayan was eating lunch? Yes, they could.[44] The time on the watches reflects 1315, about twenty minutes before the first order was given sending Mirage IIIC aircraft in search of a warship off El Arish.[45] Therefore, Dayan could not have

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given the orders to commence the attack because at the time the recorded orders were given, he had been out of communications with the Command Center for over an hour and did not re-establish communications until late afternoon.

> 2.j. Because Israelis never make mistakes and, therefore, the attack could not have been a mistake.[46]

The rationale is irrefutable. If Israelis never make mistakes, then this incident could not have been a mistake. If the premise is not true, that is, if Israelis do make mistakes, the question remains unanswered on the issue of whether the attacks on Liberty were mistakes. What is meant by the statement, "Israelis never make mistakes?" Does it mean that Israel as a nation never makes mistakes? Does it mean that Israeli military commanders never make mistakes? Does it mean that Israeli intelligence never makes mistakes? Is it each individual Israeli that never makes a mistake? It probably is just part of the mystique that grew out of the 1967 war that Israelis are invincible. Ensuing events have demonstrated that the mystique of Israeli invincibility has been replaced with what is now referred to as the myth of Israeli invincibility.

The history of warfare has established that all military forces have been subject to mistakes which result in military forces killing or wounding their own people or the personnel of allies, friends or neutrals.

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These incidents have been given a number of names by various writers. "Friendly Fire" is in most common use. "Amicicide" was coined by Lt. Col. Charles R. Shrader of the Army War College.[47] The U.S. Navy uses "Blue on Blue." The Hebrew words used by the Israeli Defense Forces are *Esh Yedidutit*. There is a long history of comparable mistakes being made by the United States and by Israel.

During the American Civil War, on May 2, 1863, the most famous and able of the Confederate generals, Stonewall Jackson, was mortally wounded by his own troops who mistook him for the enemy.[48] During the 1948 War, on June 11, 1948, Israel lost one of its best commanders, Mickey Marcus, who was mortally wounded by his own troops who mistook him for the enemy.[49] According to Shrader, estimated losses to "Amicicide" in World War I for the French alone were 75,000 and throughout modern history the casualty rate runs about 2%.[50] In World War II, the United States shot down its own airplanes and bombed its own troops. In the early stage of this investigation the author queried the U.S. Naval Attache, CDR Tom Krupp, at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, about whether or not the Liberty Incident could have been a mistake. CDR Krupp responded that the only time in his Naval career that he was wounded was off Vietnam when his U.S. Navy Destroyer was attacked by United States Air Force F-4s.[51] In the Suez Campaign of 1956, the largest and most costly tank battle of the war took place on November 2, between two

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Israeli tank units.[52] During the Six Day War, on June 5, 1967, Israeli forces mistakenly attacked Indian U.N. soldiers serving in the U.N. Emergency Force in Gaza.[53]

The history of naval warfare is replete with incidents of Blue on Blue. According to Geoffrey Regan, "The most remarkable example of amicicide in naval history occurred in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War" when the Russian Admiral Rozhestvensky identified a British trawler fleet of one hundred ton fishing vessels as a fleet of Japanese warships and the Russian fleet attacked them with every thing they had.[54] The Russians not only shot at the British fishermen, they shot at each other and only their poor marksmanship prevented more terrible damage.

On October 15, 1918, the British Q-ship, Cymric, sank the British submarine, J-6. "Cymric noted a limp ensign flying from the submarine's flagpole, but took no notice of that--they had been fooled by false colors in the past."[55] In World War I, British submarines mistook British ships for German and tried to torpedo them three times.... Conversely, three British cruisers tried to ram British submarines, mistaking them for German U-boats."[56]

On February 22, 1940, a lone German bomber sank two German destroyers at a cost of 578 German lives.[57] The Lebrecht was struck with two bombs, broke in half and sunk.

In May 1941, the British were chasing the German battleship, Bismarck. The British cruiser, H.M.S. Sheffield,

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was in position a few miles behind Bismarck. The British carrier, H.M.S. Ark Royal, launched its Swordfish torpedo bombers. They promptly dove down through the clouds and launched their torpedoes against H.M.S. Sheffield, a vessel barely a quarter the size of the Bismarck.[58]

In 1943, an American transport was sunk by an American torpedo boat whose officer had relied on assurances that there were no friendly vessels in the area.[59]

In 1974, off Cyprus, Turkish F-4s sank their own Fletcher class destroyer with the flotilla commander aboard.

During the 1956 Suez campaign Colonel Danny Shapira was leading a flight of four Mystere aircraft near the Gulf of Aquaba. As they finished their bombing runs, they observed a Zed class destroyer[60] in the Red Sea. They immediately attacked the "Egyptian" destroyer, inflicting slight damage. Thereafter, they learned that the "Egyptian" destroyer was in fact H.M.S. Crane, a British destroyer that had proceeded to a point in advance of where the Royal Navy had advised that it would be operating.[61]

In very recent times, during the Gulf War, the U.S. forces killed more British troops than the enemy did. On April 14, 1994, on a clear day the USAF shot down two of its own helicopters clearly marked with United States flags, with the loss of 26 lives. This incident is discussed more fully in 2.k.

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> 2.k. Because the ship was clearly marked, flying a U.S. flag and with large numbers painted on the bow and had a distinctive antennae array and therefore the attackers had to have identified her as a United States ship and therefore the attack could not have been a mistake.

At this point, the notion that Israelis never make mistakes is of critical importance. If one accepts that Israelis never make mistakes and, therefore, the attacks had to be intentional attacks on a U.S. Navy ship, then there is no need to inquire further. The point is proven and the case is closed. If, however, one accepts the fact that Israelis have made mistakes in the past and are capable of making mistakes, then it is possible to move on to the more complex issues of whether or not these attacks were mistakes. The author is of the opinion that mistakes happen and historical evidence establishes that Israelis do make mistakes.

It has frequently been said that the perception of reality is more important than reality itself. To the members of the crew of Liberty who knew Liberty was a U.S. ship and who were at all times only a few hundred feet from Liberty's United States flag and who had many times looked up and clearly saw the flag, it is difficult to accept the notion that their attackers were not equally aware that Liberty was a U.S. ship. The argument that Liberty was clearly marked and, therefore, had to be immediately identified as U.S., is the basic position of the Liberty Veterans Association. Victims are seldom good judges of their own case and the author does not anticipate that this analysis of the 'clearly

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marked' theory will have any impact on the minds of the Liberty crew members whose minds have been made up for almost thirty years. For those whose minds are not made up, an analysis of the 'clearly marked' theory is appropriate.

The assumption of the argument is that "Liberty was clearly marked on a clear day sailing in international waters."

The Commander of the Navy of Israel in 1967, RADM Shlomo Erell, has responded "and the description of deliberately sailing-er- innocently or in broad daylight - This is also very picturesque, but this wasn't the case. This was the heart of the fighting - with aircraft flying overhead all the time - in the heart of a war area - and every student. Every military per - person knows - so why should I say? The American authorities were of the opinion that it was dangerous for her to be there, that she shouldn't have been there."[62]

What about international waters? Although there may be some question about whether Liberty was more than twelve miles off shore and thus on the high seas,[63] or less than twelve miles off shore and thus in Egyptian territorial waters, is not important. It shall be assumed that Liberty was at all times in international waters. What protection does this provide? Under the doctrine of Freedom of Navigation, a warship has the right to sail anywhere in international waters, but the law of Naval Warfare makes it abundantly clear that when a vessel exercises this right and sails into a war

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zone, she does so at her own risk. Was the Liberty area a war zone? The Liberty crew knew it was. LT Ennes, in his book, remembers on the evening before the attack, "by morning, we'll be smelling smoke."[64]

Indeed they were smelling smoke. They were within sight of an active war. The log entries of the Liberty describe it thus:

> At 1300 sighted explosion on coastline range 13 miles. 1330 sighted explosion on coast bearing 130, range 25 miles.[65]

Ennes describes it thus as Liberty was off El Arish:

> Suddenly a huge explosion rocked the town of El Arish....I located Captain McGonagle in the wardroom to tell him of the fire and smoke ashore....
>
> At noon, thick black smoke was extending for miles along the beach...[66]
>
> The Liberty crew knew they were in harms way.[67]

The Commanding Officer, CDR William McGonagle, considered withdrawing but hampered by a lack of knowledge about Liberty's mission he elected to remain in harms way.[68]

The National Security Agency knew Liberty was about to go in harms way and sent numerous messages trying to pull her back.[69] Sailing in international waters appears of little importance. Sailing unannounced in a war zone, on the other hand, was of great significance.

It was a clear day. Liberty could be seen twelve to fourteen miles off shore just as Liberty could see the explosions and pales of smoke on the shore. The sky was clear

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of clouds, the sea was calm and the wind was light. Conditions for observing and identifying the Liberty were as good as they could be.

The Liberty was clearly marked. What does that mean? The first and most easily identifiable marking of Liberty was her color. She was painted gray. Sometimes the color is referred to as battleship gray. The color clearly marked her as a warship and she was in a war zone.

Liberty had a flag hoisted on her starboard halyard. A bright new U.S. flag.[70] She had "GTR 5" painted on each side of her bow and her name, "Liberty" painted around her circular stern.

The official IDF history reports that the first Naval reconnaissance flight of the day spotted Liberty at 5:45 a.m. "seventy miles west of Gaza." She was positively identified as the U.S.S. Liberty[71] and the information passed to Naval intelligence at Stella Maris, Haifa. Numerous other Israeli aircraft flew over or near the ship all morning long. The presence of the ship was reported by pilots numerous times. The perception of the Liberty crew was that all these flights were surveillance on them. The fact is that the coast of Israel runs north to south and at the Sinai, it bends and runs east to west. Israeli war planes en route to and from the Sinai, the Suez Canal or Egypt cut across the elbow of the Mediterranean and flew over Point Boaz[72] outbound to war and

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homebound to Israel. Point Boaz was located quite close to Liberty's patrol path.

But the issue here is identification by the attacking aircraft and motor torpedo boats and whether they should have identified Liberty as they attacked. The issue, of whether Liberty was identified as a U.S. ship, and an attack ordered on a U.S. ship is treated elsewhere.

The first question one must ask is what could the pilots see? Whether the flag was fully extended or drooped on its halyard is immaterial to this inquiry. It shall be assumed that the flag was at all times fully extended in good light and perpendicular to the attacking aircraft. Under these conditions, how far away could the flag be seen with the naked eye. A 5'x 8' flag will first resolve (be seen) at 17,194 feet.[73]

This does not mean that the 5'x 8' flag can be identified at 17,194 feet (in excess of three miles). It means that with 20/20 vision and optimum conditions of light and weather, the 5'x 8' flag is visible as a distinct spot. It is not recognizable as a flag, only that something is there. The maximum distance that the stripes can be recognized on the 5'x 8' flag is 1,323 feet, or about a quarter of a mile from the flag. An aircraft traveling 600 mph would cover the distance in a little over 1 and 1/2 seconds.[74]

These calculations are for a static picture. Movement of the target or the viewer will have an adverse effect on the

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result, that is decrease the distance at which resolution takes place.

While the Mirage IIIC is capable of speeds up to Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound), it has never been suggested that any attacking aircraft went supersonic. Therefore, the subsonic speed of 600 KTS is used in calculations. If the actual speed was 570 KTS or 630 KTS, the impact on the calculations would be plus or minus 5% which is not deemed significant.

It seems clear that, given the speed of the planes, the attacking pilots could not have seen the 5'x 8' flag under any condition.

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What does a pilot see during a head on run at a ship?

ıe ship is steering west at 5 nautical MPH. The plane is flying east at about 600 MPH.

SHIP'S FLAG AS SEEN WITH 10 KT WEST WIND.



Wind 15 KTS from the bow. The flag is flying and is seen streaming aft. The pilot has no view of the flag.

SHIP'S FLAG AS SEEN WITH 5 KT EAST WIND.



Zero wind across the deck. If the ship is steaming west at 5 KTS, and the wind is from the east at 5 KTS, then the flag would be seen as drooped.

SHIP'S FLAG AS SEEN WITH 15 KT CROSS WIND.

(North or south illustration shows south wind.)



If the ship steamed west at 5 KTS, it would require a wind in excess of 15 KTS to extend the flag perpendicular.



Perspective from pilot's point of view through the sights. (approximation)

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Attack profile of Mirage IIIC

Aircraft flying against ship displaying 5'X8' foot flag.

The pilot could discern a 5'X8' foot shape at about 3 nautical miles out. However the pilot could not discern color, and distinguish the stripes, outside of one quarter of a nautical mile.



Critical Seconds - FAA VFR Pilot Exam-O-Gram No. 29 3-6a

CRITICAL SECONDS

Move back 12 feet from this illustration. From that position the silhouettes represent a T-33 aircraft as it would appear to you from the distances indicated in the table on the left. The time required to cover these distances is given in seconds for combined speeds of 360 and 600 mph.

The blocks on the lower left mark the danger area. for the speeds quoted, when aircraft are on a collision course. This danger area is based on the recognition and reaction times shown in the table on the lower right.



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Distance, Speed, and Time - FAA VFR Pilot Exam-O-Gram No. 29 3-6b



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But assuming the pilots were able to discern a flag on the Liberty prior to commencing attack, was that sufficient to assure the safety of the ship?

We are familiar with the United States flag consisting of red and white horizontal stripes and a field of blue. The Liberian flag also consists of horizontal red and white stripes and a field of blue and at any given time in the last half century, there were probably more ships on the high seas flying Liberian flags than U.S. flags. The Malaysian flag also has horizontal red and white stripes and a field of blue. No U.S. warship had made a port call in Israel since 1963,[75] so the U.S. flag on a ship was not something with which Israeli Air Force pilots were familiar.[76]

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Flags of the United States, Liberia, and Malaysia 3-7



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The International Committee of the Red Cross has pointed out in its Law of War Handbook[77] that a flag is not a reliable means of identifying the nationality of a warship. This is because the Law of Naval Warfare permits flying a false flag as a "Ruse of War."[78]

In the most famous naval battle ever fought by the United States Navy, Captain John Paul Jones sailed the Bonhomme Richard alongside the British ship, Serapis, with Bonhomme Richard flying a British flag which he struck[79] before commencing firing.

During World War II, Captain Hans Langsdorff flew a French flag on the pocket battleship Graf Spee while approaching his targets and struck the French flag and raised a German flag before attacking.[80]

It is respectfully suggested that the identification of a warship by means of its flag is not conclusive.

To further complicate the situation, the United States had announced to the world on the floor of the United Nations only a few days before that it had no warships within hundreds of miles of the combat zone. The United States had been accused by President Nasser of Egypt of aiding the Israelis with both planes and ships and the U.S. was engaged in an active public relations campaign to stress that it was not involved and had no ships or planes near the combat zone. A press conference was scheduled aboard the aircraft carrier,

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America CV-66 on June 8, 1967, at almost the time of the air attack on the Liberty.[81]

It is interesting to note the comments of the Captain of the Soviet ship Turkestan which was mistakenly attacked by U.S. Air Force jets in Cam Pha Harbor, Viet Nam on June 2, 1967.

> We were bearing all the markings of the Soviet government... A Soviet flag was flying from the stern mast. The stack was painted with a red stripe and a hammer and sickle. The Turkestan was about 400 meters from shore. The visibility was excellent. There is no possibility of talking about an accidental attack. The American pilots aimed their guns at the central superstructure where the crewmen live and work.[82]

Equally to the point but just as tragic was the incident that occurred on April 14, 1995. It was broad daylight. The weather was clear. The visibility was unrestricted. Two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters were flying in a non-combat zone. Each had United States flags prominently displayed on both sides. They were shot down by United States Air Force F-15's with state of the art avionics and weapons systems and state of the art IFF (Identification Friend or Foe Transponders) on the helicopters and state of the art AWACS[83] radar coverage.

Whatever is argued on the 'clearly marked' theory regarding the Liberty incident is more aggravated in the Black Hawk incident.

What can a pilot see of a ship under attack? Some Liberty crew members insist that as Israeli planes flew over the ship that morning they could see the faces of the pilots.

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This is perhaps possible in the case of the NORD 2501 which observed Liberty at dawn on June 8, 1967. That pilot had a reputation for getting down low. However, seeing the pilot's face while standing on the Liberty in morning sunlight and looking through the window into the shaded cockpit of the NORD 2501 as it flew by at over 200 MPH,[84] seems hard to comprehend.

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Silhouette of NORD 2501 - NORATLAS 3-8



Nord 2501 Noratlas.

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As a measure of understanding the problem, look at the picture of the Piper J-3 towing a banner which says "Happy Birthday Elly, Love, Jay."[85] The aircraft was at an altitude of 700 feet moving only 32 MPH about two thousand feet south of the camera. It does not appear that one is able to observe the pilot's face. The banner, with its seven foot high letters, is readable as long as it is perpendicular to the viewer and in good light. This phenomenon can be verified by going to any beach or stadium where banner planes fly by and observing the plane (especially looking for the pilots face). The tow plane is traveling at one-twentieth to one-tenth the speed of a jet fighter.

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Photograph - Plane Towing Banner 3-9

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What about Admiral Moorer's suggestion that Liberty was the ugliest ship in the U.S. Navy and she should have been recognized quickly by the Israeli pilots? First, Israeli pilots in 1967 did not study U.S. Navy ships. Second, there was no reason to know U.S. Navy ships. There hadn't been any in Israeli waters in many years.

However, for other reasons than how the ship looked, the Israeli flight leader of Royal Flight and the chief air controller identified a problem twelve to fourteen minutes into the air attack which resulted in Royal Flight being ordered to "leave her" and Nixon Flight, two Mirage III C's armed with iron bombs, being diverted from Liberty to the northern command.

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Endnotes

1. The U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry record of proceedings was kept classified for over 9 years.

2. The Clifford report was not declassified until October of 1995, when declassification was obtained by the author.

3. Evidence generally means "something that makes another thing evident." In a legal sense it is sometimes defined as "a statement of a witness or an exhibit bearing on or establishing the point in question."

4. This criteria is very close to the "Business Records" or "Records of Regularly Conducted Activity" rule of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).

5. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5), Recorded Recollection.

6. Federal Rule of Evidence 401.

7. Federal Rule of Evidence 602.

8. Loftus, John and Mark Aarons, *The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

9. Elint. The common acronym for Electronic Intelligence.

10. Stephen Green, *Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel*, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984.

11. Samuel M. Katz, *Soldier Spies, Israeli Military Intelligence*, Novato, Ca: Presidio Press, 1992.

12. See headlines of United States and international newspapers in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

13. Alfred Friendly, review of "The Violation of the Liberty," by R.K. Smith, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, (January 1979): 88.

14. James M. Ennes, Jr., *Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship*, New York: Random House, 1979, pp. 44-45.

> McGonagle, too, was uncomfortable with the order to operate within sight of the war. He was prepared to exercise his prerogative to move away from possible danger, but before doing so he consulted with Lewis.

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> "How would it affect our mission if we stayed farther out at sea, say, fifty miles from Gaza?" he asked.
>
> Lewis was concerned about our proximity to the war, but he was *more* concerned about our mission. "It would hurt us, Captain," he said. "We want to work in the UHF [ultra-high-frequency] range. That's mostly line-of-sight stuff. If we're over the horizon we might as well be back in Abidjan. It would degrade our mission by about eighty percent." [emphasis in original]

15. Personal interview of [CIA Chief of Station, Tel Aviv, Israel in June 1967] by the author. Name and date and place of interview not to be disclosed.

16. Personal interview of Secretary Dean Rusk by the author, Athens, Ga., April 5, 1989. A follow-up interview was conducted on July 13, 1991.

17. Abba Eban, "Israel: A Nation is Born," [television documenatry], Program 4, Part 1, (Duration 22 Minutes 47 seconds) Tele Cine London, England, October 6, 1992.

18. Captain Ernest Castle USN Retired. He was a Commander in 1967.

19. Castle, as quoted in the Thames TV documentary, "Attack on the Liberty." On the same video he also said:

> "Let us presume it was a premeditated plan - for whatever reason - to get rid of a United States ship that was a threat to Israel. Then the nation that had just, in 22-minutes, destroyed an entire Egyptian air force - had captured all of the Egyptian amour in the Sinai - if they had decided they had to sink a United States ship, I believe they would have done so. And I think it would have been done with ruse de guerre, and done during the night, so that there was never any real evidence of who had done it - if the Israelis had really wanted to sink a United States ship."

20. Perhaps the right of "innocent" passage is better expressed in French than in English. The French use the word "inoffensive" passage instead of innocent passage.

21. Personal interview of Secretary Robert McNamara by the author, December 17, 1993.

22. Personal interview of Mrs. Lawrence Geis by the author, March 14, 1994.

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23. Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six Day War*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, pp. 89-90. On Thursday June 8 an Israeli spokesman revealed a telephone conversation which they had monitored between Nasser and Hussein on 4:50 on the Tuesday, the second day of the war. The conversation went as follows:

> Nasser: How are you? The brother wants to know if the fighting is going on all along the front.
> Nasser: Will His Majesty make an announcement on the participation of the Americans and British?
> Hussein:(Answer not clear.)
> Nasser: Hello, We will say the US and England or just the US?
> Hussein: The US and England.
> Nasser: Does Britain have aircraft carriers?
> Hussein: (Answer not clear.)
> Nasser: Good. King Hussein will make an announcement and I will make an announcement.
> Nasser: We are fighting with all our strength and we have battles going on every front all night and if we had any trouble in the fighting it does not matter, we will overcome despite this. God is with us. Will His Majesty make an announcement on the participation of the Americans and the British?
> Hussein (Answer not clear.)
> Nasser: By God, I say that I will make an announcement and you will make an announcement and we will see to it that the Syrians will make an announcement that American and British airplanes are taking part against us from aircraft carriers. We will issue an announcement. We will stress the matter and we will drive the point home.
> Hussein: Good. All right.
> Nasser: A thousand thanks. Do not give up. We are with you with all our heart and we are flying our planes over Israel today. Our planes are striking at Israel's airfields since morning.

24. Churchill and Churchill, *The Six Day War*, p. 91.

25. The Central Intelligence Agency document released under Freedom of Information Act request on June 7, 1977. This document if part of the CIA Freedom of Information Act response package.

26. Though not material, but in the interest of accuracy, it should be noted that there is a discrepancy between the wording in the ad and the actual message. In the actual message this sentence reads: "One of the admirals who was present also disapproved the action and it was he who ordered

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it stopped and not Dayan." The ad omits the last three words from the end of this sentence.

27. The actual message does not contain a deletion here, instead it contains the word "also".

28. The author is not aware of why this document (along with two other documents) was released and is not aware of any other release of unevaluated intelligence reports. A Freedom of Information query to the C.I.A. on this issue was not answered.

29. "Good Morning America," ABC television, September 19, 1977.

30. Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life*, London: Sphere Books, Ltd., 1976, pp. 372-74.

> Shortly before noon on Thursday, Central Command reported to General Headquarters that its Jerusalem Brigade had linked up with Southern Command, having advanced south from Jerusalem and seized Bethlehem, Hebron, and Dahariah. I promptly set off for Hebron, meeting Uzi Narkiss in Jerusalem and driving south with him. p. 372.

31. Telephone interview of General Uzi Narkiss by the author, in Tel Aviv, June 19, 1990. General Uzi Narkiss was an officer in the High Command and commander of the central front during the Six Day war. He lead the brigades that captured Jerusalem and the Wailing Wall. Uzi Narkiss, *The Liberation of Jerusalem*, London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1983.

32. The command post, called Biny Anea Haooma, is located in the basement of a convention center at the entrance to Jerusalem.

33. Etan Haber is a noted Israeli author and was one of the closest persons to Yitzhak Rabin. He will probably be remembered for his participation in the Rabin funeral where he produced and read from the blood-stained paper containing the Song of Peace that Rabin had in his pocket at the time of his assassination.

34. Rechavam Zeevy (Gandi) is now the curator of the Museum of Israel and a Member of the Knesset. He is head of the Moledet (Homeland) party and is considered to be to the political far right.

35. The interview took place in Tel Aviv, on June 11, 1992.

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36. The site of some Israeli settlements captured and destroyed by Jordan during the 1948 War.

37. Presently the Mayor of Beer-Sheva and a Battalion Commander in 1967. The author interviewed Rager in Miami, Florida, in January 1992, and he confirmed his identity in the picture.

38. Telephone interview of Kobie Sharet by the author, July 13, 1991, the author was in Miami and Kobie Sharet was in Tel Aviv.

39. Shlomo Gazit is a former military governor of the West Bank and author of *The Carrot and the Stick*, Washington, DC: B'nai B'rith Books, 1995.

40. Dayan was very interested in antiquities and archeology. According to the Book of Genesis, Chapter 23, the Cave of Machpelah is where the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and their wives are buried. The cave was originally purchased by Abraham from Zohar for 400 shekels of silver to bury his wife Sara.

41. Interview of Colonel Itzhak Nessyahu by the author, Tel Aviv, June 20, 1990.

42. Going through the message traffic that had been received at the command post during his absence.

43. General David Eleazar, the northern commander, who had been begging for authorization to attack Syria for several days.

44. Fax correspondence from Rubinger to the author, February 10, 1992, stating time on watches.

45. The question can be asked, perhaps the order was given before this time but research does not disclose any radio transmission of prior orders, logs of prior orders, or anyone with knowledge of prior orders.

46. The Central Intelligence Agency intelligence document released under Freedom of Information Act request on June 7, 1977. Part of the CIA Freedom of Information response package.

Following the caption "Comment on Known Identity of USS Liberty" and the caveat "THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION" the document states in part: "you've got to remember that in this campaign there is neither time nor room for mistakes....and

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again reiterated that Israeli forces can not make mistakes in their campaign."

47. LCOL Charles R. Shrader, *Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982.

48. Geoffrey Regan, *Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire*, New York: Avon Books, 1995.

49. Ted Berkman, *Cast a Giant Shadow: The Story of Mickey Marcus a Soldier for All Humanity*, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1967.

50. Shrader, *Amicicide*, p. viii.

51. Personal interview of CDR Tom Krupp by the author, at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, August 16, 1989. On April 16, 1972, the U.S.S. Worden (DDG-18) was inadvertently hit by Shrike Missiles fired by U.S. aircraft. Letter to author from Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, dated May 14, 1990, Ser AR/1498 and declassified Commanding Officer's Narrative Report on Surface Missile Systems and Associated Equipment Report, Symbol 8810.5 Fourth Quarter, FY 1972, Section I c. A follow-up interview was conducted in Tel Aviv on June 20, 1990.

52. George W. Gawrych, *Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990, p. 60.

53. Israel Domestic Service, Jerusalem, in Hebrew, 0930 GMT 16 June 1967; in *Foreign Information Broadcasts Service, The Middle East*, June 16, 1967.

54. The Dogger Bank Incident. Regan, *Blue on Blue*, pp. 202-207.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 207-208.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 215-218.

58. David Howarth, *Famous Sea Battles*, London: Artus, 1981, pp. 138-49; Regan, *Blue on Blue*, p. 219; and Oliver Warner, *Great Sea Battles*, New York: Exeter Books, 1981, pp. 272-81.

59. Regan, *Blue on Blue*, p. 219.

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60. Destroyers of the Zed Class were manufactured by Great Britain. The Egyptian Navy in 1956 was composed of Zed class and Hunt class destroyers, both of British manufacture. Later the Egyptians also obtained Skouri class destroyers from the Soviets.

61. Personal interview of Danny Shapira by the author, at Hatzerim Air Force Base in Israel, on June 21, 1990. Danny Shapira was one of four graduates of the first class of the Israeli Air Force. Among his classmates was Mordechai Hod (Commander of the Israeli Air Force during the 1967 war). He flew combat in every war from 1948 until his retirement a few years ago. He flew the first Soviet MIG 21 which the Israelis obtained and turned over to the United States. He was also the Chief test pilot for the Israeli Air Force and Israel Aircraft Industries. He developed the Mirage IIIC in France and personally flew 53 of them to Israel. He was the first Israeli pilot to break the sonic barrier and to exceed Mach 2. In September 1995 he was inducted into the prestigious Society of Experimental Test Pilots (S.E.T.P.) at the Beverly Hilton in Hollywood, California.

When the story of this mistake was told to the author, it included the sad comment that six British sailors died in the attack. The author went to the British Ministry of Defence at Whitehall, London and obtained the original British records of this incident. With pleasure and delight the author was able to report back to Danny Shapira that no British sailors had been killed in the attack. The human toll was one broken tibia.

Eight follow-up interviews were conducted in Tel Aviv and one in Miami.

62. "Attack on the Liberty," Thames T.V. script, Item 233, p. 49.

63. In international waters.

64. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 41.

65. Liberty deck log, 8 June 1967.

66. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 56.

67. Ennes quoted a conversation of Liberty officers over a stainless steel pot of rum and whiskey beverage a few hours prior to arriving at the Gaza strip, "I hate to think where we would be now if we had been sitting off the Gaza strip when the war broke out. We'd all be on the bottom, someone volunteered. 'Yeah'"; the group agreed. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

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68. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

> After dismissing Lewis, he carefully reread his night orders to the officer of the deck. Captain's night orders are usually quite routine; they advise the conning officer of course and speed changes, landmarks expected and so forth. Tonight, McGonagle added this note: "Keep gun crews/lookouts alert. Call me for all challenges received, or in the event air or surface contacts approach in a suspicious manner.

69. See "Review of Department of Defense World Wide Communications," Report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

70. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 51.

> David hauled his last new flag high on the ship's mast. I watched it fly freely, then instructed David and both lookouts to check the flag regularly to assure that it remained free and unfouled.

71. Personal interview by the author with the Israeli Naval Intelligence Officer assigned to the Kirya from June 7, 1967 at 8:00 a.m. to June 8, 1967 at about 8:00 a.m., Uriel Meretz. The interview took place in Tel Aviv, June 16, 1990. Meretz confirmed that he positively identified the ship as the U.S.S. Liberty by looking up the ships bow marks in Jane's Fighting Ships. He passed the information to Naval Intelligence in Haifa with the warning that this ship looks like the Egyptian ship El Quesir and to make certain not to mix up the two. He stated that when he returned to duty twenty four hours later, he was shocked. Follow-up interviews were conducted in Tel Aviv, on June 11, 1992, and by telephone in Tel aviv on June 18, 1990, and June 6, 1993. [Meretz later became Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. He attributed the attack to "trigger-happiness and the operational rush to get a piece of the war."]

72. Point Boaz is located at 31-36.5 North Longitude and 33-15 East Latitude.

73. The formula is 5/.0002908 = 17,194. Visual Acuity. A person with 20/20 vision is able to see lines 1 minute of arc apart. If the lines are closer than 1 minute of arc, they are indistinguishable.

If the lines are black and white, they appear grey.
If the lines are red and white, they appear pink.

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Degree of arc is measured by lines extending from the target to the eye.

To compute 1 minute of arc, measured in radians, the formula is:

$$\frac{2}{60 \times 360} = \frac{6.28318}{21600} = .0002908$$

The reason we convert to radians is the angle times the distance is equal to the arc length.

linear distance — length of arc

We are interested in the straight line distance but we are dealing with the arc distance.

With angles this small, it makes little difference which we use since the length of the arc is not significantly different from the linear distance.

Dealing with a United States flag 5' X 8.'

The flag will first resolve (be capable of being seen by a person with 20/20 vision at

$$\frac{5}{.0002908} = 17{,}194 \text{ feet}$$

This is the maximum distance that a 5' X 8' object can be seen by a person with 20/20 vision. This does not mean it could be identified at this distance, only that it would appear as a distinct spot. It is not recognizable as a flag, only that something is there.

On a 5' X 8' United States Flag, the stripes are .3846153 of a foot.

Thus $\frac{.3846153}{.0002908} = 1323$ feet

1323 feet is the maximum distance that stripes on a 5' X 8' United States flag can be resolved. (seen by a person with 20/20 vision).

$$\frac{.6153846}{.0002908} = 2116 \text{ feet}$$

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2116 feet is the maximum distance that stripes on a 6' X 13' United States flag can be resolved. (seen by a person with 20/20 vision)

These computations are for static pictures. Movement of the target or the viewer would have an adverse effect on the result.

An aircraft approaching at 1000 feet per second (600 miles per hour) would have a little over 2 seconds to see and identify a flag before impacting the same.

74. See U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, *How to Avoid a Midair Collision*, FAA-P-8740-52, AFS-800-0687 pp. 6 & 7. (Reprinted from FAA VFR Exam-O-Gram No.29). See also, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular, "Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance," dated 3/18/83, AC No. 90-48C, Initiated by AFO-820, Appendix 1. p.9/10.

75. After 1963, a U.S. ship did not visit Israel until 1976, when the U.S.S. Mahan visited Haifa. Personal correspondence from Aluf Zeev Almog to the author, January 30, 1992.

76. On June 22, 1990, the author boarded Pan Am flight 134 from Tel Aviv to Paris and sat in seat 6A. The occupant of seat 6B was Colonel Joseph P. Koz, USAF, the U.S. Defense and Air force Attache' at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. The author had just visited his colleague, Commander Thomas Krupp, USN, the U.S. Naval Attache'. The conversation led to the Liberty Incident and COL Koz volunteered "That could never happen today." The author asked why and was told that in the 1967 era, no U.S. Navy ships visited Israel while in the year 1989 more than fifty U.S. Navy ships visited Israel and Israeli pilots are now familiar with U.S. Navy ships while in 1967 they were not.

77. COL Frederic de Mulinen, *Handbook of the Law of War for Armed Forces*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987, p. 96.

404	Restricted deception: flag of warships G.P.I, 39	As a rule, warships hoist their national flag. Traditionally they were permitted to fly false flags at any time, under the condition that they show their true flag prior to going into combat action. These days, recognition of the nationality

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> of a warship rarely in practice takes place by virtue of its flag as sole criterion.

78. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, [NWP-9], Washington, DC: Naval Warfare Publications, 1989, p. 12-1.

79. Samuel Eliot Morrison, *John Paul Jones, A Sailors's Biography*, Boston - Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1959, p. 229.

> ....Captain Pearson hailed, 'What ship is that?' Paul Jones, in order to get into close action, was flying British colors....She hailed again, 'Answer immediately, or I shall be under the necessity of firing into you.' Jones struck his British colors, caused a big red white and blue striped American ensign to be raised, and gave the word to fire his starboard broadside.

Striking a flag means lowering the flag or taking it down.

80. Howarth, *Famous Sea Battles*, p. 131.

> Now Langsdorff used a new technique. He steamed straight at his victims, believing rightly that they would not recognize him head-on as a German and would probably think he was French. Sometimes he flew the French flag, and changed it at the last moment for the German swastika.

Dudley Pope, *The Battle of the River Plate*, New York: Avon Books, 1956, p. 71.

> The Graf Spee's crew ran to action stations with the prospect of the first bit of excitement for more than three weeks. Again the French Tricolor was hoisted, and the 5.9-inch guns were loaded-...

81. See America Cruise Book.

82. Phil G. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security*, New York: Harper & Row, 1970, p. 144.

83. Airborne Warning and Control System.

84. The Nord Noratlas 2501 cruised at 208 MPH (335 kph) and had a maximum speed of 273 MPH, (440 kph). Bill Gunston, *An Illustrated Guide to The Israeli Air Force*, New York: Arco Publishing Co. 1982, p. 58.

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85. The author engaged Aerial Signs company at North Perry Airport, Pembroke Pines, Florida to tow a banner to wish his wife a happy birthday on February 6, 1989. The picture is of that tow plane flying past the author's home at an altitude of 700 feet.

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CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORIOGRAPHY

The Liberty incident generated ten official U.S. investigations and three official Israeli investigations, all arriving at essentially the same conclusions, plus a collection of theories that reject the official conclusions. This chapter takes over from where Chapter 3 left off. Here the motivations that drive the various theories will be considered. In each case, the proponents of a theory established by an investigation may have had political, national, economic, or emotional motives for advancing a particular theory.

It is at this point that positivistic political scientists, including Charles Hempel whose framework of explanation is used here, would tune out. The objective of positivistic political scientists is a search for objective knowledge not marred by any prior ideological, cultural, emotional values of the author. The positivists believe in the separation of the reality that exists independently of the subject, who - as it were - is also capable of a detachment from his inquiry. Most of the argument in this Chapter, in other words, would be viewed by positivists as "contaminated" evidence useful for inclusion in a book of fiction but not in a scholarly study.

Fortunately, the attitudes in social sciences are changing. It is now quite fashionable to loosen the strict

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standard and recognize that "theory is always for a purpose" and that the value judgments of a writer are impossible to suppress in the same manner in which the separation of the object and the subject to achieve "objective" scientific knowledge is also impossible. It is now recognized how a personal identity of an author might influence his "memory" and how, therefore, there is never only one, but always many "histories."

In this work, the evidence of the "harder," more objective nature was discussed in the previous chapter while the "softer" evidence, that having to do with ideologies, emotions, views, and values of writers and witnesses, is discussed in this Chapter. Of relevance also are different understandings of the Cold War related perceptions of what was or was not in the U.S.'s or Israel's national interests. The motives for these theories often reveal their author's implied beliefs in the nature of politics, particularly those colored by power realist considerations of the conflictual nature of politics, and the mistrust and treachery even amongst close allies.

Often there is no way of testing any of these assumptions by Popper's falsification method. Their clear identification and isolation, however, is helpful in the search for the final judgment in the Liberty Incident.

This chapter is called "Historiography" to indicate that writing history, as the term denotes, is the art of, or

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employment of historical material. This chapter examines how and why the historical accounts of the Liberty were made. It also offers the author's account and reveals the author's biases in evaluating the Liberty historiography. The argument is, of course, that the more factual evidence you have, the harder it is to slant the explanation.

The U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry - 1967

This investigation was required by Navy regulations. While some individuals in the Navy may have had personal or emotional concerns because a number of Navy personnel were killed and wounded and one of the Navy's ships was severely damaged, the Navy as an institution had no personal interest. Whenever one life is lost, it is a very serious and important matter. We treasure "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." But to better understand this event, we must remember that we were in the Vietnam time period when the United States was in the process of losing the lives of 55,000 of its military personnel. In fact, 187 other U.S. military died in Vietnam that same week and the numbers of the wounded were astronomical. So the loss of lives and the woundings during the week of June 5, 1967 were neither unusual nor unfamiliar events. The Navy wanted to know what happened from the Navy's point of view. The concern of the Navy was operational, not political. Naval Regulations require fact finding in circumstances such as these, purportedly to analyze

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the performance of its men, its ship, its communications, and its command and control.

Since a foreign government was involved and that government was not an enemy, there were political considerations which were not within the province of the Navy's investigation. Today, everyone is aware of the strong and close connection of the U.S. military and the Israeli military. In 1967, the relationship, though cordial, was neither so strong nor so close, except perhaps at the most attenuated points of each military where actual contact was made; such as the relationship of Air Force COL Anthony Perna, the U.S. Defense Attache, and his counterpart, Brigadier General (Tat Aluf) Y.S. "Shyke" Bareket, the Israeli Air Force Chief of Intelligence, or the relationship of Navy CDR Ernest Castle, the U.S. Naval Attache with his counterpart, LCOL Michael Bloch, the IDF Foreign Military Liaison Officer.

The Chief of Naval Operations selected one of his best and brightest Rear Admirals, Isaac C. Kidd[1], to serve as President of the Court of Inquiry. He also appointed two highly-qualified and respected Navy Captains to serve on the Court, CAPT Bernard J. Lauff, USN, 097651/1100 and CAPT Bert M. Atkinson, Jr., USN, 447058/1100, both Naval Academy graduates. RADM Kidd requested CAPT Ward Boston, Jr., USN, 419063/1620, as Counsel for the Court.[2] Boston brought two special assets in addition to his skill as a Navy lawyer. He had been a Naval aviator in World War II and a line officer,

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and, therefore, had insight beyond that of one qualified only in the law. Also, Kidd knew him as a man of integrity by virtue of Boston having been willing to bump heads with Kidd on an earlier matter when Boston felt doing the right thing was more important than currying favor with the senior who would write his fitness report.

The Court had the full resources of the United States behind it and did a remarkably complete and accurate job. The Board was not permitted nor did Navy Regulations require it to take evidence from the Israeli side of the equation.[3] The Court took testimony only from U.S. personnel and studied the ship and U.S. physical exhibits. The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry are an absolute required starting point for any inquiry into the Liberty incident. The Court did its duty as prescribed in Naval Regulations. It had no apparent political motives. If, as some suggest that the Court's decision was for a political motive, it is difficult to understand why that Report was then classified for over 10 years. It is much more reasonable to assume that the Report was classified for both security and political reasons rather than its conclusions were politically motivated. For example, the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Richard Henry Nolte, sent a secret Flash cable[4] to the Secretary of State, advising the need to get out "our story" and admonishing that "It better be good." The story was not good but the concern of our diplomats in Arab countries was that the U.S. would be perceived in the war on

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the side of Israel. The concern was well founded. The Court had no economic interest in the contents of its findings. Was there an emotional interest? Clearly, Admiral Thomas Moorer[5] has an emotional interest. He was a close friend of the father of LT Steve Toth, who died in the air attack. Moorer and CAPT Joe Toth, Steve's father, were Naval Academy graduates and Admiral Moorer knew Steve Toth as a boy before Steve went to the Naval Academy. Admiral Kidd was also a Naval Academy graduate and a friend of Steve's father. The Toth family and the Kidd family grew up together and Admiral Kidd took care of Steve Toth as a baby. But Admiral Kidd does not appear to have been influenced by emotion. His report appears to be that of a Naval professional, based on the facts and apparently not influenced in the performance of his duty by his personal feelings and close relationship with LT Toth and his family.

The CIA Report - 1967

The CIA has a primary purpose of gathering intelligence outside the United States and providing its assessments of that intelligence to its User Groups, i.e., the President, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and sometimes others. The function of the CIA is to gather intelligence, evaluate the material gathered and disseminate its work to its customers. While some may dispute whether the CIA works for the national interest, the individual members of the CIA

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generally believe that they work of the national interest of the United States. There were no apparent economic or emotional influences on the CIA in the preparation of its Report. If there was any political influence, it does not appear in the report.

The JCS Fact Finding Team - The Russ Report - 1967

The JCS was very much concerned with doing its job which was to find out the reason for the inability of the U.S. Military Communications System to prevent this event. While this investigation gathered a very important compilation of U.S. messages, its focus was on failures and responsibility for the failures in the U.S. Communications System. In an interview with a member of the original Rusk committee, it was suggested that this research project has come close to where a very smelly body was buried. The JCS Report did not mention that buried body, and it is not the function of this research to dig up something that the Russ Report left buried, if that is a fact. General Russ and ADM Fitzpatrick were highly regarded in their field when they were selected for this task, and the author does not wish to second guess them thirty years after the fact. In addition, if there was some heretofore undisclosed fault or failure in the U.S. Communications System, it has no bearing on the subject of this research which is whether the Israelis attacked a U.S. ship by mistake or whether they intended to attack a U.S. ship. Since neither

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the scope nor the conclusions of this investigation address Israeli intentions, any economic, emotional, or political motivations which may have shaped the Report would have been irrelevant to the issue.

The Clifford Report - 1967

Clark Clifford, on record since 1948 as a friend of Israel, was charged by the President to determine whether the attack on the USS Liberty was intentional or a mistake? Clifford clearly became emotional about the event as evidenced by his language at the National Security Council meeting on June 9, 1967. According to the minutes of the NSC Special Committee meeting, Clifford is quoted as follows:

> My concern is that we're not tough enough. Handle as if Arabs or U.S.S.R. had done it. Manner egregious. Inconceivable that it was accident. 3 strafing passes, 3 torpedo boats. Set forth facts. Punish Israelis responsible.

Notwithstanding the emotion which is evident in his Report to the President, it does not affect his conclusions which he based on a factual examination of materials provided mostly by the Department of Defense. Clifford acted as a high government official in the performance of his duty. As a supporter of Israel and as an American outraged by the attack, his emotions were pulled in both directions. At least four presidents thought highly enough of Clifford to seek his advice and counsel during their administrations; therefore, at least they believed he acted in the national interest.

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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations - 1967

Certainly there is politics in the Congress of the United States but in days gone by, the United States generally prided itself on a bi-partisan foreign policy. Reading the reports of testimony before Congressional Committees, it is apparent that all Senators or all Congresspersons do not share the same views about Israel. The friendly questions are as obvious as are the unfriendly questions, but the testimony at this hearing, apparently satisfied the participating Senators, all of whom were acting in performance of their elected duties, that the attacks were made by mistake. It may be argued that the national interest would be served by a cover up of some sort but the bipartisan nature of the inquiry would seem to exclude Israeli motives, as the reports of the testimony clearly establish that support of Israel was not bipartisan.

Senate Armed Services Committee - 1968

The transcripts of hearings indicate a genuine bi-partisan concern for developing information about Military Command and Control (in 1968, C^2 was used to refer to Command and Control. The United States military evolved to C^3, Command, Control and Communications and then ultimately to C^4I, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence). There is no indication that the investigation of this committee was anything other than fact finding in the performance of their elected duties. Again, we have a

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bipartisan situation, but the bipartisan support did not extend to support for Israel.

House Appropriations Committee - 1968

Like the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, this Committee appeared acting in performance of their elected duties, seeking solutions to U.S. military problems which the committee believed to be in the national interest.

House Armed Services Committee Investigation - 1971

This investigation seems to be the culmination of the interest in U.S. military communications first developed by the JCS/Russ Report in 1967, and expanded upon by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1968, and the House Appropriations Committee in 1968. The communications problems had been exacerbated by the additional losses of the USS Pueblo in 1968 and a USAF EC-121 on April 14, 1969. The Report is focussed on fact finding and the text does not reflect any political, economic or emotional motives. It seeks to deal with inadequacies in U.S. Military Worldwide Communications as a national interest.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1979/1981

There were dual driving forces behind this investigation. The Ennes book[6] had been published in 1979 and the Smith

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article had been printed in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in June 1978.[7] Political motivation andperceived national interest were no doubt the catalysts that started this inquiry. What is clear is that when a United States Senator speaks to a segment of government, the Senator's voice is heard, and when a Senate Committee speaks the power is even more obvious. When the Committee speaks to an agency over which the Committee has oversight, the sound of that Committee's voice is overpowering. What is quite clear is that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence began an investigation of the Liberty incident which took its staff to Israel. It is the only time that any official U.S. investigation dealt with the State of Israel regarding fact finding on the Liberty incident. The Committee heard the allegations and began gathering evidence. The Committee never issued a formal report and almost no record or institutional memory of this investigation can be found.[8] There is considerable correspondence between the CIA and various Committee Members. Various Israeli Defense Force Members[9] recall the investigation and visits of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to Israel. Failing to issue a Report suggests that the investigation either did not find proof of the charges and the Committee saw no reason to report, or that there was some highly classified equipment which they did not wish to disclose. It is also possible that the committee might have been split on how they read the evidence and,

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therefore, agreed not to make a final judgement; however, in view of the broad spectrum of political positions on the committee, it is very likely that such a debate would have been leaked to the press. Another alternative would be that somehow political pressure was brought to bear on all of the United States Senators on the committee, on both sides of the aisle which caused them to suppress the report. The Senators on the committee were:

Birch Bayh (D IN)
Adlai E. Stevenson (D IL)
Walter D. Huddleston (D KY)
Joseph R. Biden (D DE)
Daniel P. Moynihan (D NY)
Daniel K. Inouye (D HI)
Henry M. Jackson (D WA)
Patrick J. Leahy (D VT)
Barry M. Goldwater (R AZ)
Edwin (Jake) Garn (R UT)
John Chafee (R RI)
Richard G. Lugar (R IN)
Malcom Wallop (R WY)
David Durenberger (R MN)
Charles McC. Mathias (R MD)
Ex Officio: Robert C. Byrd (D WV)
Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R TN)

It is unlikely that political pressure was brought to bear on all of these U.S. Senators, it is more likely that the investigation did not find proof of the charges. Two other events occurred in this time frame which seem to further support the former conclusion. First, the IDF history prepared and published an official Israeli version of the Liberty incident. This document makes specific reference to a Committee of the U.S. Congress created to investigate the Liberty incident. Although it remains classified by Israel,

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it was delivered to the United States and was the beginning of Israel's relaxation of security and release of information about the Liberty incident. Also, within this time frame, the United States, through the Department of State, finally settled the Liberty incident with Israel by an exchange of diplomatic notes which accept the Israeli position that Israel refused to accept total blame for the incident. Did the Department of State receive any data from the Senate Select Committee? State Department documents declassified to date do not indicate such a passage of information from the Committee to the Department of State.[10]

National Security Agency/Central Security Service - 1981

Like the Navy, the NSA has an emotional connection with the Liberty incident. Their man, Allen Blue, was killed aboard Liberty and the NSA mission to gather information suffered as a result. It would be easy to understand the NSA rejecting the Israeli explanation, as a result of the direct personal impact of the event on the Agency and the fact that many members of the Agency probably knew Allen Blue. Nevertheless, as the text of the report indicates, the NSA sublimated its own emotions to conclude that Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian ship as a result of miscalculations and egregious errors.[11]

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House Armed Services Committee - 1991/1992

In June 1991, on the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Liberty incident, the Liberty Veterans Association held their annual reunion in Washington, D.C. The Chief of Staff to President Bush, John Sununu, was most hospitable to the Liberty veterans and arranged to meet them in the Rose Garden of the White House. There was high anticipation that they would have an audience with President Bush and an opportunity to present their grievances about the Liberty incident to the President. The President did not join them in the Rose Garden that day. In fact, the President already had a position on the Liberty incident.[12] Through Mr. Sununu, the Liberty veterans were referred to Congressman Nicholas Mavroules, Chair of the House Armed Services Sub-Committee on Investigations and they forwarded a letter dated July 1, 1991 to Congressman Mavroules requesting an investigation of the Liberty incident. The letter contained 22 specific allegations. (A copy is included as Appendix VII.) Many of the allegations have little to do with the issue of whether or not the attack was a mistake. For example, the next to the last item on the list is, "The American Red Cross refused to honor USS Liberty survivors' requests to notify our next of kin as to our condition."[13] The request, supported by the President's Chief of Staff, clearly carried some political weight. The investigation was begun in an apolitical manner with the Congressman obtaining a disinterested investigator

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from the General Accounting Office. The investigation was conducted for almost a year by Roy J. Kirk of GAO and other Committee staff. While the genesis of this investigation was partially political, the investigation itself appears to have been conducted in a highly professional manner and does not appear to have been influenced by politics, economics or emotion. When concluded, the sub-committee did not issue a report of its investigation. The action of the Investigations Sub-Committee suggests that they found no evidence to support any of the 22 allegations in the letter which initiated the investigation.

Israeli Investigations

The Ram Ron Investigation
The Examining Judges Investigation
The IDF History Department Investigation

These three investigations may be considered together because the arguments as to motivation are the same for all three. No one would doubt that there was at least some national interest in learning the details of what happened that day. It is clear that there was no economic or emotional motivation driving these reports. The important question is whether the reports were driven by a political motive. Israel, since it came into existence in 1948, was very much alone in an indifferent or hostile world. In 1948, the United States recognized Israel as a state and immediately enacted an arms embargo against Israel. France was engaged in fighting Arabs in Algeria and provided classic proof of the age old

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Middle East proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." From 1948 through the mid-1960's, France was Israel's only consistent supporter. It supplied arms to the Air Force, first the Ouragan and Fouga, then the Mystere, Super Mystere and finally, the Mirage IIIC. The motor torpedo boats which attacked Liberty were constructed in and supplied by France to the Navy. But in the mid-sixties, Charles de Gaulle made peace in Algeria and France no longer had Arab enemies. In fact, France began actively courting Arab business and friendship and so the French friendship and support of Israel withered.

In 1956 and 1957, following the Suez caper, Israel felt the power of the United States when the U.S. compelled Israel to withdraw from the Sinai, which it had captured. Israel's only benefit achieved from the Suez adventure was a U.S. agreement, confirmed by Egypt, that a closing of the Straits of Tiran would be a causus belli (an act of war). So in the mid-sixties, Israel was cut loose by its former French connection and it was on its own. The Administration of John F. Kennedy developed some sympathy for isolated Israel and sold Israel some defensive Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. In 1966, an interesting event occurred. The Israeli Mossad[14] were able to come into possession of a Soviet MIG-21, Which at that time was the top of the line Soviet fighter. Israel checked it out and after a few weeks, turned the MIG-21 over to the U.S. Air Force. The U.S. was very grateful and

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responded by selling a few air-to-air misseles to Israel. (Whether any of the U.S. missiles were on Kursa flight on June 8, 1967, is not known.) This was followed by a visit to the United States by Israeli Prime Minister, Levy Eshkol, who was invited to the Johnson ranch and left with promises of substantial additional military sales (aid came later) including A-4 aircraft. This was the beginning of the close relationship between the U.S. and Israel which came into existence just prior to the 1967 war.

It is obvious then that Israel had a vital political interest in maintaining its new relationship with the United States. Israel desperately needed the source of military hardware because it no longer had any source. The support of the U.S. in the international arena, including the United States' veto on the security council at the United Nations was extremely important. In view of Israel's desperate need of the United States relationship, it is easy to argue that Israel would lie to protect that relationship. However, in view of the need of Israel for the United States relationship, it is easier to argue that Israel would not attack a known U.S. ship for fear of losing the relationship. Many who argue that Israel is lying in all its investigations, answer that issue by claiming that Israel has such total control over the United States that it has no fear of losing the relationship. That argument makes one wonder why an Israel with such total control over the U.S. allowed the U.S. to send Liberty to the

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Sinai in the first place. It is difficult to understand the argument that the Israelis did not want to irritate the United States by allowing the U.S. to learn of an Israeli plan to attack Syria, which the U.S. would have learned of the next day anyhow, so they attacked a U.S. ship on the assumption, that the attack would not irritate the U.S.

The answer to whether Israel is lying and covering up an attack on a known U.S. ship for political reasons is probably best answered by Admiral Shlomo Erell (Erell was the officer in command of the Israeli Navy in 1967), who points out that Israel is a democracy with democratic process. When four Arab terrorists seized Bus 300 and the incident was ended in a fire fight at the cost of the lives of 32 innocent Israeli bus riders, the GSS (Shin Bet)[15] announced that all four terrorists had died in the fire fight. Shortly thereafter, an Israeli newspaper published a picture of two of the terrorists alive and in the hands of Shin Bet agents standing behind the shattered bus. Further investigation disclosed that the Shin Bet agents had beaten the terrorists to death. Certainly, there was no constituency of supporters in Israel for two terrorists captured with the blood of 32 innocent Israelis on their hands. And yet, the incident provoked a national outrage. The Attorney General lost his job and the government almost fell. Erell asks, if Israel could not cover up this incident involving only a few persons, how could Israel cover up an event like Liberty with at least hundreds of people

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involved (it has become popular to say, "In the loop."). Is it possible to keep a secret in a country that has freedom of the press?

It appears that Israel had overwhelming reasons not to attack a known U.S. ship. The argument that Israel did it for political reasons and then successfully covered it up is contrary to the U.S. and Israeli evidence and is not persuasive.

John Loftus - The secret war against the Jews

The Loftus argument that the U.S.S. Liberty was involved in the 1967 War on the side of Egypt, fighting against Israel, provides a legitimate reason for Israel to attack her. Under the Law of Naval Warfare, a belligerent may be attacked anywhere (except in neutral waters) and a neutral aiding a belligerent, is subject to the same rule. The Loftus book is interesting and incorporates a lot of undisputed history. The book supports its claims by footnote reference to undisclosed sources and only seems to identify individuals who are deceased. The general thesis of the Loftus book is that intelligence organizations throughout the world have, throughout modern history, conducted covert operations against the Jewish people. While some of the claims are probably all or at least partially true, and invidious anti-semitism is a historical fact, it is suggested that the book is far from the mark regarding the relationship of the CIA and the Mossad.

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Loftus spends his time traveling around the United States lecturing at synagogues and to Jewish audiences that are generally emotionally receptive to his thesis. There are no national or political motives involved. The driving motive seems to be economic. Loftus makes a living telling Jewish audiences what they want to hear and a great deal of what he says is historically accurate. His chapter on the Liberty incident (Chapter 12) is not documented and not accurate.

Primakov - Soviet Cooking

The Primakov story that the U.S. was involved in the 1967 War on the Arab side is a mirror of the Loftus story except that it was prepared for Arab audiences rather than Jewish audiences. The content of the Primakov stories is emotionally pleasing to Arab audiences who find it difficult to accept a smashing defeat at the hands of Israel, but find defeat at the hands of the United States, a super power, more palatable and less demeaning. The Primakov story served the national and political interests of the Soviet Union in their quest to establish inroads and influence in the Arab world (especially Egypt and Syria) at the expense of their Cold War antagonist, the United States.

Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem - Egyptian cooking

The Egyptian perception is the flip side of Soviet cooking. The motivation to accept the explanation of a defeat

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at the hands of the U.S. is emotionally desirable to the acceptance of defeat by "little" Israel. National pride is assuaged. Perhaps, national interests are not served by refusing to accept or face reality. From the point of view of the leadership of Egypt, who knew or should have known the reality, a political motive exists; i.e., maintaining public support by focusing blame on an insurmountable outside entity. Economics does not seem to play a part.

Stephen Green & Samuel M. Katz
The U.S. RF-4C's

Two writers tell a story of a covert "arrangement" between the U.S. and Israel. On the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Green is clearly on the Arab side and Katz is on the Israeli side. In fairness, Katz cites Green as his source. In either case, both Green and Katz are selling a book. It is, therefore, possible that both Green and Katz each have some economic motive relating to the successful sales of their books.

Stephen St. John - The Madrid Pact

Stephen St. John is a personable, young gentleman with an apparent sincere desire to accomplish peace in Greater Jerusalem. A reading of his eight-part Peace Plan shows that it consists of a voluntary dissolution of the State of Israel and a turnover of "Greater Jerusalem" to Arab control. His motives do not seem to be nationalistic or economic. His

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appeal is partly emotional and a review of his resume reflects his membership in the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee[16] which suggests that his lot is cast with the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict and his motivation is, therefore, political.

Norman Dacy - "Dayan did it."

It is clear that the proponents of this theory have taken a position in the Arab-Israeli conflict on the Arab side. This does not in itself discredit their theory. It does provide a political motive for a theory that would have a negative effect on U.S. Israeli relations. It is appropriate to examine all the evidence offered in support of this allegation with the understanding that the conclusion is one that would be preferred by an entity opposing rather than supporting Israel. Included in the newspaper claims that Dayan ordered the attack were two pieces of "evidence," unevaluated intelligence reports obtained from the CIA under a freedom of information request. The position of the CIA on the issue and on these reports has already been discussed. Since the reports were released in sanitized form without any indication of the identity or history of the person or persons who gave the information, it is not possible to evaluate the motivation of the original reports. It is clear that the publication of the reports in the advertisements in the New York Times and Washington Post was a political act, intended

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to negatively affect the relations between the U.S. and Israel.

Seth Mintz

It is difficult to evaluate the motivation behind Seth Mintz. He has told so many conflicting stories that it is also difficult to decide what is the Seth Mintz story. He is unable to offer any evidence to support his claim that he was an intelligence officer in the IDF. The Israel Defense Forces claim he was never an intelligence officer and the identity Mintz claims to have been using, Giora Dagan, was not in intelligence in the IDF but rather a driver in the motor pool. Mintz failed the credibility test with a producer from ABC 20/20 and with a producer from Thames T.V. but was able to convince the producer of the NBC program "The Story Behind the Story" to include him in the program where he told a radically different story from prior tales told. The author would follow the credibility of choices of the ABC and Thames producers and not rely on any story told by Mr. Mintz whose motivation remains a mystery.

Anthony Pearson

The validity of the Pearson story wilts on the time line. Pearson places Liberty in times and places where she was not. He is a writer, and a good one, and tells how he took on the story as a writing assignment when he was broke and needed

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money. His motivation seems to be economic. He does indicate that in college he had Palestinian roommates and friends but there is nothing to suggest a political motive in his work -- just a pen for hire. An article that the official reports were sound and the incident was a mistake would not have sold very well to Penthouse Magazine or as a book.

Jim Taylor

Mr. Taylor's privately published book makes it abundantly clear that he is an Anti-Zionist. He obviously is politically motivated. A reading of the early pages of his book should make his feelings clear to any reader.

Richard K. Smith

The Smith article published in U.S. Naval Institute proceedings was the genesis of a bundle of articles and comments that were published in the Proceedings over several years and which are included as appendix V. Whether the Smith motive was political or emotional is not known. His choice of a title, "The Violation of the Liberty" certainly has an emotional ring to it. His thesis is easily refuted by merely looking at newspaper headlines of June 1967 in any research Library. The responses provoked by his article range from the rational to the emotional.

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Paul Findley

Mr. Findley was a U.S. Congressman from Illinois who was one of the first U.S. Congressmen to embrace the PLO and the Arab-Side of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.[17] Mr. Findley wrote in a letter dated July 16, 1993:

> So many readers wanted to do something about the influence Israel exerts over U.S. policy in the Middle East that I joined other former congressmen and diplomats in founding the Council for the National Interest.[18]

In an abstract of a videotape offered by Isis TV Forum[19] "Mr. Findley maintained that the real battle to be fought and won was that in the United States, between the American people and the Israeli lobby in the U.S. that was ensuring unconditional monetary and military U.S. support for the Israelis." His sentiments are quite clear and spelled out in his books. In October 1990, Paul Findley joined with former Congressman Pete McCloskey, former Congressman John Anderson, former Congressman David Bowen and former Congresswoman Martha Keys to form the Council for the National Interest. The avowed purpose of the group was to oppose the "Israel Lobby."[20] Congressman Larry Smith was quoted at the time, "This is the same old group over and over and I have a strong belief that it is anti-semitic."[21] The CNI position is clear. It sought to end aid to Israel in 1994.[22] Its literature is anti-Israel and its own selected enemy, AIPAC described it in 1991 as "an anti-Israel propaganda front, put together by people who have made careers of Israel-Bashing."[23] Findley has entered the

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Arab-Israeli conflict on the Arab side and his position is clearly political.

Donald Neff

Mr. Neff is an excellent writer who generally sticks to facts but usually seems to interpret the facts in a negative manner towards Israel. He is a member of the National Council of Americans for Middle East Understanding. His motive appears to be political or emotional. He seems to have taken a position on the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Because of his talent as a writer and his ability to express himself in a rational manner, he is a strong voice for his chosen side of the conflict.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk was great American and was widely respected for his integrity and his dedication to the United States. It was refreshing to hear even contemporaries who may have disagreed with him from time to time, sing his praises. Rusk was initially opposed to the U.S. recognizing the State of Israel in 1948. He never was favorably inclined toward Zionism or Israel. He felt the best interests of the United States were with the Arabs and Arab oil. He refused to accept the Israeli explanation of the attacks or the official reports on the subject. When queried by the author about the official reports he responded, "I did not make a career of studying the

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evidence."[24] His position was both emotional and what he believed to be in the national interest of the United States. Notwithstanding his rejection of the Israeli explanation, he put it behind him and moved on.

Admiral Thomas Moorer

Admiral Moorer was a genuine hero in World War II. When the Liberty incident occurred, he was in Vietnam. He became Chief of Naval Operations on August 1, 1967, and has no personal knowledge of the incident. He is emotionally attached to the victims of the attack. He knew LT Steve Toth personally and was a fellow Naval Academy colleague of CAPT Joe Toth, the father of Steve Toth. When he was CNO he did not talk to the President[25] or the Secretaries of State or Defense. Admiral Moorer has maintained the notion that the first airplanes launched from the U.S.S. Saratoga were armed with nuclear weapons as claimed by James Ennes and some others sources. All available evidence points to the contrary.[26] The author and Admiral Moorer share a common distaste for the portion of the Ennes book that brands LCDR Philip Armstrong as a violator of Navy regulations by virtue of drinking alcoholic beverages aboard Liberty. LCDR Armstrong died in the air attack. He was never charged with a drinking violation. There is not the slightest suggestion that he ever failed to properly perform his duty because of an alcohol problem and the record suggests that he performed his duty as Executive

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Officer of Liberty well and had the respect of the crew. He is not able to respond to the allegations and whether or not the allegations are true have absolutely nothing to do with the issue of whether or not the attacks on the Liberty were with knowledge that a U.S. ship was the target. Admiral Moorer speculated that the inclusion was probably to aid sales of the Ennes book. He also commented on the efforts of Mr. Ennes to sell the movie rights. Admiral Moorer says he refuses "to swallow" the Israeli story although he does not have a story of his own to tell. He stated that he has been accused of being anti-Israel and anti-semitic and that he is not anti-Israel or anti-semitic, he is just pro-United States.[27] Admiral Moorer's main argument is that Liberty was the ugliest ship in the Navy and that an attacking pilot had to recognize it as the U.S. Navy ship Liberty, and could not confuse it with an Egyptian ship. It is entirely possible that Admiral Moorer, with his expertise could not fail to recognize the Liberty at once. The CIA report differs from the Admiral's assessment and specifically states that the Liberty could be mistaken for the Egyptian ship, El Quesir.[28]

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Silhouettes of Liberty and El Quesir 4-1



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The Israeli pilots of Royal Flight and the chief air controller did recognize a problem with the target after only 10 to 12 minutes and terminated the air attack.

The Moorer position fluctuates between "not swallowing" the Israeli story and that the Israeli pilots should have identified the ship as U.S. He does not explain why Israeli pilots, whose experience in naval aviation was extremely limited, should have been expert in U.S. ship identification.[29] In fact, they were far more likely to have identified Liberty as a Soviet intelligence gatherer since there were six such Soviet ships in the vicinity and no U.S. warship had visited Israel in many years. It is suggested that Admiral Moorer is motivated by an emotional loyalty to the crew and his perception of the national interest of the U.S.

James M. Ennes, Jr.

LT Ennes was badly wounded in the leg during the first few minutes of the air attack and taken to sick bay below deck where his personal knowledge of the remainder of the air attack and the naval attack was obtained from what he heard.

The Ennes position was established in June 1967 as he lay wounded in a Naval hospital bed in Malta. According to his book the Israeli Ambassador came to the hospital to visit him and Ennes refused to see the Ambassador because, in his own words, "Anyway, I was convinced that the attack was

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deliberate, premeditated murder."[30] Six days after the attacks, without research or information at his disposal, Mr. Ennes reached his conclusion. He then researched the matter and wrote his book. In the book he concedes, regarding the official reports of investigation, that "Each of the reports either concluded that the attack was probably conducted in error, or avoided making conclusions by lamely reporting that it could find no evidence that the attack was deliberate."[31] A victim is seldom a good judge of his or her own case. Lack of evidence is generally not considered a lame excuse but rather a valid reason for not finding guilt.

Ennes ended his book on a conciliatory tone when he stated:

"Author's Note"

> A few days after the Liberty attack, Jim O'Connor's wife, Sandy, called upon a Jewish neighbor and found the woman almost in tears. "Oh, Sandy," the neighbor said, "I'm so sorry. I wanted to come see you, but I've been too ashamed."
>
> Sandy was surprised and saddened to learn that her friend identified so closely with Israel that she felt guilty for Israel's crime. "Jews didn't attack Liberty," Sandy explained. "An Israeli officer gave the order, and he is the one who should be ashamed."
>
> I expressed a similar view in a letter written from the hospital. "Although someone who happens to be Jewish is criminally responsible for what happened to our ship," I wrote, "we must not blame Jews generally or even Israelis generally. Probably some field commander made the decision. We should blame him. Maybe even the Israeli top leadership made the decision. If so, we should blame them. But no one should blame every Jew or every Israeli. Jews died on that ship too."[32]

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The Ennes position has not mellowed with time. The Ennes book was received with open arms by several Arab organizations. An Ennes article, *The USS Liberty Affair*, was published by *The Link*, a publication of Americans for Middle East Understanding. For a period of time, letters to *The Link* inquiring about the Liberty incident, were answered with Liberty material by Ennes. Letters to Ennes, received a response which included a copy of Vol. 17, No. 2 of *The Link*.[33] The entire edition is devoted to the Ennes article with the exception of two book reviews. They are, *Taking Sides: American's Secret Relations With a Militant Israel*, by Stephen Green and *Warriors for Jerusalem: Six Days That Changed The Middle East*, by Donald Neff, two authors that have been previously discussed herein.

Who are Americans for Middle East Understanding? The organization was founded in 1967[34] as a charitable organization. It becomes clear from only a cursory reading of *The Link* and other materials distributed by AMEU that they are on the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli equation. A glance at the masthead of *The Link* discloses some familiar names as members of the AMEU board of directors.

Paul Findley and Paul (Pete) McCloskey, Jr., both former U.S. Congressmen who were initial founders of CNI,[35] Ulric S. Hayes, Jr., former Ambassador to Algeria, Talcott W. Seelye, former ambassador to Syria and Marshall W. Wiley, former Ambassador to Oman are on the board as well as Jack B.

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Sunderland, President of the American Independent Oil Co. On the National Council of AMEU there can be found Dr. W.T. Mallison and George Lenczowski, from academia as well as the writer David Nes and James F. Akins. Mr. Akins served as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1973 to 1975. His attitude on Middle East Policy is reflected in a quote:

> Although American policy is dominated by concern for Israel, real American interests lie in the Arab world for the rest of this century.[36]

According to Goott and Rosen, Akins was dismissed from the foreign service in 1975 by Henry Kissinger for being too compliant with Saudi demands.[37]

AIPAC,[38] the Israel lobby describes AMEU as seeking "to influence the public and U.S. government officials to adopt policies favorable to the Arab countries and detrimental to Israel."[39]

The Washington Post disclosed in 1975 that AMEU had been created by the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) as a non-profit organization that ARAMCO could control.[40]

Over the years, the position of Mr. Ennes has taken a harder and harder line against Israel. He has joined forces with those who sought to oppose assisting Soviet Jewry to immigrate to Israel, those who have sought to deny the existence of the holocaust and many other anti-Israel and anti-semitic causes which appear to have no connection whatsoever with the Liberty incident. He has gone public on Prodigy with statements like, "...The fact is Israel would

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have no enemies if they did not constantly raid their neighbors, steal their land, take their water and kill their children." (James M. Ennes, Jr. Prodigy, account DRNV11F, July 22, 1992.) He has joined with Joe Meadors, another Liberty crew member in creating a Liberty home page on the internet. The address is WWW.HALCYON.COM/JIM/USSLIBERTY/. Mr. Meadors was employed for almost ten years in Saudi Arabia by ARAMCO.[41] He becomes very defensive when this is mentioned and questions what his ARAMCO employment or his sojourn in Saudi Arabia has to do with his objectivity towards the Liberty investigation and towards Israel.

After exchange of several letters, the author called Mr. Ennes on July 14, 1988 and requested an interview. Mr. Ennes agreed to meet and requested a telephone call from the author upon arrival in Seattle, Washington on August 5, 1988, to arrange an appointment on August 6, 1988. Upon the author's arrival in Seattle, Mr. Ennes declined to take his telephone calls and the interview never took place.[42]

It is respectfully suggested that a brief perusal of the Ennes/Meadors Liberty home page on the internet will provide adequate data for an easy determination of their position in the Arab-Israeli conflict and give some indication of their objectivity or bias. The Ennes motivation is a combination of bitter personal emotion and economics. He has substantial financial interest in the sale of his book and its movie rights. Joe Meadors shares the bitter personal emotion. It

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is not known if he still has any financial connection to ARAMCO.

Walter Jacobsen

Mr. Jacobsen was a career Naval Officer in the Judge Advocate General Corp.[43] He was selected for a one year program at George Washington University and wrote his thesis on the Liberty incident. The thesis was modified into his law review article titled, *"A Judicial Examination of the Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty."*[44] His mentor was W. T. Mallison, a member of the National Council of AMEU and author of articles titled, *"The Zionist-Israel claims to Constitute 'The Jewish People' National Entity and to Confer Membership In It: Appraisal in Public International Law,"* [45] *"Freedom from Religious Discrimination."*[46] In these articles Dr. Mallison argues that the United State should reject Zionism and that the U.S. Constitution requires the U.S. to reject the concept of a "Jewish People." Dr. Mallison has written, *"The Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons: An Analysis of its Application in the Arab Territories under Israeli Occupation"* which argues that Israel violated the 1949 Geneva Convention IV. Another article by Dr. Mallison, *"Settlements and the Law: A Judicial Analysis of the Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories"* was printed and distributed by The American Educational Trust.[47] (One wonders where LCDR Jacobsen got the title for his article, *"A Judicial*

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Examination of the Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty.") The Arab League's Arab Information Center and the Institute for Palestine Studies have sponsored other articles by Dr. Mallison. He is a prolific writer and he writes and speaks well and clearly. Reading his articles or listening to him, will leave no doubt of his position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author spoke to LCDR Jacobsen about his article and asked what led him to his conclusions. LCDR Jacobsen replied that the conclusions were easy, based upon what facts were used as a starting point. It is suggested that the facts used by LCDR Jacobsen as his starting point as well as his conclusions were influenced to some degree by the position and philosophy of his mentor, Dr. W.T. Mallison.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Robert Novak is a talented and skillful writer and performer. He is seen frequently on CNN Crossfire where he speaks from the right. Mr. Novak is of Jewish origin but usually takes positions that are anti-Israel. The Evans and Novak article of November 6, 1991 in the Washington Post, retold one of the early Seth Mintz stories about how he was an Israel Defense Force intelligence Major and observed the issuance, by unknown Israeli Air Force officers, of the order to attack a known U.S. ship. It appears that the article was based upon a brief telephone interview with Mintz which was never cross checked or verified in any way and resulted in a

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rejection of the story by Mintz in a letter to the Washington Post, published on November 9, 1991. Evans and Novak later explained the Mintz recantation in a column which suggests that the Israeli Mossad threatened Mintz with death if he did not recant the story. These are the types of tales that capture the imagination of the reading and viewing public and sell newspapers and boost TV ratings, regardless of the truth of the tale that is told. The author has no access to the Israeli Mossad and, therefore, cannot state with certainty what communications did or did not take place between Mossad and Mintz. The author is able to take a stronger position on the other part of the story. Evans and Novak also interviewed the Honorable Dwight Porter, who was the United States Ambassador to Lebanon in June 1967. That interview was also by telephone and brief. The Evans and Novak story that was printed is substantially different than the story which Ambassador Porter told the author when the author interviewed Ambassador Porter on November 21, 1991. The Ambassador was gracious enough to allow the author to make an audio tape of the interview and it is clear that either the Ambassador changed his story for the second interview with the author or the story told to Evans and Novak in their interview, if it was the same, was either misunderstood or intentionally altered to the printed story. Ambassador Porter has a fine reputation and a distinguished career as a diplomat representing the United States. At the time of the interview,

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he was alert and competent. If a credibility choice is necessary between Ambassador Porter and Robert Novak, the author would believe that the Ambassador told the truth and that Robert Novak did not report the truth.[48] The nickname by which Evans and Novak are known in their industry appears justly earned. They are frequently referred to as ERRORS and NO FACTS.[49] The motivation of the Evans and Novak articles appears to be a combination of negative emotion towards Israel and an economic talent for selling a widely read column.

The Liberty Veterans Association

Generally the Liberty Veterans Association is a fine group of people. Thirty-four of their shipmates gave their last full measure of devotion and they should always be remembered and respected as military heros who gave their lives while serving their country. As servicemen during the Vietnam era, they did not receive the welcome home and tender loving attention that was showered on their predecessors in World War II. This was not because they were involved in the Liberty incident, but because the mood of America was turning against the Vietnam involvement. The Liberty Veterans were treated very much like their colleagues who returned from Vietnam. It was not right. It was not fair. It had nothing to do with Liberty. The Thames TV producer who listened to their story and spent a great deal of time with them in 1986 became very fond of them. It was his opinion that some of the

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survivors were still suffering from post traumatic stress syndrome.[50] The Liberty Veterans confirmed this as recently as their Newsletter of 2nd & 3rd Quarter, 1996, where they carried an article titled, "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder."[51] For this reason alone, the creation of the Association was and is beneficial for its members. It has become a support group of great value to those members that still suffer post traumatic stress syndrome and should be encouraged to maintain bonds of friendship and camaraderie between its members.

Unfortunately, the Association has been manipulated by persons and organizations who have their own agenda which has resulted in the Association taking political positions which have detracted from both its image and its credibility. The Association is grateful for the help it received from former Congressmen Findley and McCloskey. These gentlemen are among the founders of The Council for the National Interest, CNI, an organization that from its announced formation made it clear that its function was to oppose the Israel lobby and support the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. CNI offered support to the Liberty Veterans and they accepted. CNI advertised in the Liberty Veterans Newsletters of March-June 1990[52] and of March-June 1991.[53] This issue also reflects[54] that CNI sponsored a "Coffee" for the Liberty Veterans Association at the Marriott Hotel in Washington, D.C. during the annual meeting of the Association on June 8, 1991. These newsletters were the only ones in the history of the

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Association that were 50+ pages in length. The CNI advertisements sought new members for CNI and argued against the efforts to assist Soviet Jewry to emigrate and escape from the Soviet Union. How this issue is connected to the Liberty incident is difficult to understand. CNI members were present during the remembrance ceremony on the 27th anniversary of the attack.[55]

People are judged by the company they keep. The CNI affiliation placed the Liberty Veterans Association squarely on the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was not the first time that they put their nose in that tent. In 1987 through 1989, the Association found itself in the middle of a media blitz over the dedication of a public library in Grafton, Wisconsin. (See Appendix VIII.) There is certainly nothing inappropriate in dedicating a building in honor of deceased military personnel. In Wisconsin, two brothers named Theodore Grob[56] and Benjamin Grob came forward as major supporters of the project. The Grob brothers had a reputation as Neo Nazi ideologues and the situation became a media battle between the Association and the Grobs on one side and the Jewish community of Wisconsin on the other side while all those that supported the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict sat back and smiled. It is interesting to note that the issue of naming a small town library in the U.S. midwest was news as far away as Kuwait.[57] Was this overt disrespect for the deceased Liberty Veterans by the Israel supporting

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Jews of the Milwaukee area, or was this a victory in the public relations war between the Arabs and Israel?

Some aspects of the public relations of the Liberty incident were poorly handled by the Navy and by the United States. The Liberty Veterans do have some legitimate complaints. In the United States, since 1967, public support for Israel has remained strong, Congressional support for Israel has remained strong and military cooperation between the U.S. military and the IDF has continued to grow warmer.

Being identified with CNI and the Grob brothers does not put the Liberty Veterans Association in the mainstream and commingling their legitimate complaints with the agendas of others that have a different goal in mind is not helpful to them as an organization.

The motivation of the Association and many of its members is emotional and they have been used by persons and organizations for purposes in which they have no interest.

David E. Lewis

David E. Lewis was badly burned in the torpedo attack. He describes the necessity of a doctor cutting his eyelids open.[58] He clearly has an emotional motive connected with his story. An analysis of his story suggests that he has allowed imagination to fill in some of the gaps in his memory of the event.

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Wilbur Eveland

Professional reviews of the Eveland book are critical and doubt that he had plausible access to information to back up some of his "revelations."

John E. Borne

John E. Borne became acquainted with the Liberty incident through the Ennes book and his dissertation relies heavily on the book for authority. His independent research was somewhat limited and he relies on a number of unrelated anecdotes to support his argument that the attacks were made with knowledge that the target was a United States ship. Mr. Borne's book was self published by Reconsideration Press whose mailing address and telephone number are the same as Mr. Borne's in Brooklyn, N.Y. The book is being distributed by The American Educational Trust. Since 1982, AET is the publisher of *"The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs."* The Washington Report masthead lists Andrew J. Kilgore, who is also the President of AET, as the publisher of the Report. The AET was founded By Edward F. Henderson, a former British Ambassador to Qatar. Mr. Kilgore held U.S. Government posts in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Iran before becoming the U.S. Ambassador to Qatar. According to Goott and Rosen, Mr. Kilgore wrote a study for the U.S. State Department which concluded: "this close relationship with Israel creates political problems for the U.S. wherever the world's 800 million Muslims live...and

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puts heavy strains...on U.S. relations with 20 Arab countries."[59] The AET claims to be "a non-profit foundation incorporated in Washington, D.C. by retired U.S. foreign service officers to provide the American public with balanced and accurate information concerning U.S. relations with Middle Eastern States."[60] They have not made any effort to print and distribute the findings of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, The CIA report, The Clark Clifford report or the NSA report. Given their bias as set forth above, AET's decision to assist in the distribution of the Borne book suggests that the book has a political leaning to the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Before a final evaluation of the accuracy of the different stories of Liberty can be made, we must proceed to the author's story of Liberty which examines the totality of the evidence, much of which was not available at various times in the past. This 'complete' story has the advantage of thirty years of hindsight and of being able to take into consideration all of the Liberty stories analyzed in this chapter. It also has the advantage of access, for the first time, to some previously secret information that the author, in the course of his research, managed to have declassified.

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Endnotes

1. Hindsight confirms the talent and ability of ADM Kidd. He rose to the highest rank, four star admiral, and was seriously considered for the number one naval officer position of his country. ADM Kidd remains highly respected today and is frequently consulted by the senior commanders of the Navy for his advice and counsel.

2. Lieutenant Commander Allen Feingersch, USN, 612119/1100 was designated as assistant counsel to the Court in the letter From Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Europe to Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN, 11645/1100, which created the Court of Inquiry in accordance with section 402 of the JAG Manual. It is interesting to note that while Ward Boston was a lawyer, qualified in the sense of Article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Allen Feingersch was not so qualified and held the designator of a line officer.

3. The Court did receive communications from Israel usually routed through the Israeli Foreign Military Liaison Officer (LCOL Michael Bloch) to the U.S. Naval Attache' (CDR Ernest Castle).

4. Department of State, Incoming Telegram, 081545Z FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO, TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH:

> WE HAD BETTER GET OUR STORY ON TORPEDOING OF USS LIBERTY OUT FAST AND IT HAD BETTER BE GOOD. NOLTE BT

This note is marked that it was passed to the White House at 12:50 p.m. 6/8/67.

5. See Chapter Two.

6. James M. Ennes, Jr., *Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship*, New York: Random House, 1979.

7. R.K. Smith, "The Violation of the 'Liberty'," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, (June 1978): 62-70.

8. The author visited the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence offices in Washington, D.C. and was unable to locate any public record of the investigation. The Author interviewed former Senator Adlai Stevenson who claimed no memory of the investigation (telephone interview, January 4, 1993, the author was in Miami and Senator Stevenson was in Chicago). The author wrote to each of the Senators who served

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on the Committee in 1979/1980/1981 time frame seeking information on the investigation. No Senator responded.

9. The author interviewed two Israeli officers attached to the IDF Spokesman who have personal recollections of the interviews. They are COL Ranaan Gissin (the first interview took place over the telephone, on June 7, 1988, both the author and COL Gissin were in Tel Aviv. Since then, three in-person interviews were conducted in Tel Aviv and two in Miami) and MAJ (now LCOL) Danny Grossman (Tel Aviv, June 7, 1988. Thirteen follow-up interviews were conducted). The author also confirmed the interviews with Kursa flight leader and Royal flight leader.

10. A Freedom of Information request filed by the author on this point is pending with the State Department.

11. NSA Report - R. 40.

12. Letter from The White House to the author dated September 5, 1991, states in part:

> As I stated in my letter to Mayor Grant of Grafton, Wisconsin, of June 19, 1989, a thorough investigation into the USS Liberty incident was conducted and the conclusion was that it was a tragic case of mistaken identity.

The letter is signed, Debra Rae Anderson, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs.

A letter from the Clinton White House to the author states in part:

> The current U.S. position regarding this matter is consistent with that in previous Administrations. While questions regarding Israeli motives in attacking the Liberty have been raised over the years, there is no information available that demonstrates that the assault was deliberate.

The letter is signed, Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President.

Both letters are in the author's files.

The positions of Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan have remained consistent on this matter.

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13. See Appendix VII, letter from the U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association to The Honorable Nicholas Mavroules dated July 1, 1991, and signed by Joseph L. Meadors, Chairman.

14. The Mossad is the Israeli foreign intelligence service. They are the counterpart of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

15. The G.S.S. (General Security Service), (in Hebrew, the Shin Bet) is the Israeli government internal security organization, which is essentially equivalent to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

16. The 1991 resume of Stephen St. John, lists under the caption "Experience" - Member, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Los Angeles, 1983 to 1990. Recevied by the author from Stephen St. John.

17. See Paul Findley, *Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the U.S.-Israeli Relationship.* Brooklyn: Lawrence Hill Books, 1993. Stephen Zunes, a visiting professor in politics and government at the University of Puget Sound in Tocoma, Washington, and Director of the Institute for a New Middle East Policy, reviewed Findley's book in *Z Magazine*, (July/August 1994): 10. Zunes concludes:

> Finally, his over-emphasis on the role of the pro-Israel lobby as the key factor in U.S. Middle East policy and his down-playing of the agenda of the U.S. government's own national security elites to use Israel as a surrogate paints far to [*sic*] benign a picture of our own government's role in the region and an overly malevolent portrait of the American Jewish community. He tends to view the United States as a victim of Israel, rather than the other way around. Those interested in "facing the facts about the U.S.-Israel relationship" form [*sic*] a more progressive analysis than offered by this Republican former Congressperson might do better to read Noam Chomsky or other writers rooted in a more critical analysis of U.S. foreign policy.

Paul Findley, *They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby*, Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1985. Reviewed by John Yemma, in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Book Review Pullout Section, August 2, 1985, p. B5. Yemma opens saying:

> One suspects that former Congressman Paul Findley is anything but impartial when the subject is the power of Israel's lobby in the United States.

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Reviewed by Antony T. Sullivan in *Middle East Insight*, 4:4 and 5 (1986): 57. Sullivan opens saying:

> For almost two decades, criticism in America of Israel has largely been a monopoly of the Left. Now, Paul Findley has altered the contours of the debate. *They Dare To Speak Out* is an effective dissection of American policy by a moderately conservative Republican devoted to his county and its future. Findley draws on 22 years of service in Congress to demonstrate convincingly how a foreign country now controls U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and prevents America from acting in its own national interest.

18. Paul Findley, "Findley's Answer to Questioner," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, (September/October 1993): 8.

19. *ISIS Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia, 1990, p. 30. See "The Question of Palestine: Where Do We Go From Here?," *ISIS TV Forum*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia, 1990.

20. AIPAC - American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

21. *The Miami Herald*, October 24, 1990, p. 15A.

22. CNI - Special Newsletter - Council for the National Interest, June 1994, p. 1.

23. *Near East Report*, 35:43 (October 28, 1991): 184.

24. Personal interview by the author of Dean Rusk, Athens, Georgia, April 5, 1989. Confirmation of Rusk "not making a career of studying the evidence" is his his reference to only ten deaths on Liberty instead of the actual 34 on page 338 of his book, *As I Saw It*. This is no doubt the result of reference to a very early report on Liberty which reported ten dead. The Liberty Veterans have assigned dark motives to President Johnson for citing only ten dead in his book, *The Vantage Point*. Very likely Johnson and Rusk looked at the same early report and both made the same mistake.

25. Admiral Moorer told the author during an interview in Washington, D.C., on February 10, 1989, that as CNO he moved in much lower circles and it was only in later years when he became Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he talked to the President or to the Secretaries of State or Defense. A follow-up interview was conducted on May 3, 1990, at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, D.C.

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26. Under United States law, only the president may order a nuclear attack. The author interviewed Admiral Jerry Johnson (on April 19, 1991, at the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.), who in 1967 was strike operations officer aboard the Saratoga and who armed and fueled the "ready" aircraft launched in the first launch. He says there were no nuclear weapons on the aircraft. Rear Admiral Max Morris, who was Navigator of the Saratoga at that time confirms the armament was not nuclear (telephone interview, on August 30, 1991, the author was in Miami and RADM Morris was in Jacksonville, Fl., three follow-up interviews by telephone were conducted). The author also interviewed one of the A-4 pilots launched from Saratoga (CDR Brad Knickerbocker), who confirmed they carried only Bullpup missiles, and one of the A-4 pilots launched from the America (CDR James Kneale) and the widow of another (CDR Thomas Frank). Brad Knickerbocker was interviewed by telephone on September 26, 1995, the author was in Miami and CDR Knickerbocker was in Ashland, Oregon. CDR Kneale was interviewed by telephone on August 8, 1991, the author was in Miami and CDR Kneale was in Washington, D.C. Alicia Dorsie-Frank was interviewed in Miami on August 18, 1993.

27. These statements were made to the author during an interview with Admiral Moorer in Washington, D.C., on February 10, 1989.

28. Intelligence Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, June 13, 1967, p 4.

29. In the 1948, war two Israeli pilots tried to bomb an Egyptian ship from a single engine V tail Beechcraft Bonanza. They crashed into the sea and both were lost. In 1956, two Israeli Ouragan jets strafed the Egyptian destroyer, Ibriham al Awal, off Haifa, and COL Danny Shapira led an attack by a flight of four Mystere aircraft against HMS Crane in the Red Sea upon the mistaken assumption that HMS Crane was Egyptian.

That is the history of Israeli naval aviation up to the 1967 war.

30. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 137.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

33. James M. Ennes, Jr., "The USS Liberty Affair," *The Link*, 17:2 (May/June 1984).

34. *The Link*, 30:2 (April/May 1997): p. 1.

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35. Council for the National Interest.

36. *Saudi Report*, May 25, 1981; as cited in Amy Kaufman Goott and Steven J. Rosen, eds., *The Campaign to Discredit Israel*, first edition, Washington, DC: The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1983, p. 97.

37. Goott and Rosen, eds., *The Campaign to Discredit Israel*, p. 97.

38. American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

39. Goott and Rosen, eds., *The Campaign to Discredit Israel*, pp. 60-61.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 60; and Steven Emmerson, "The ARAMCO Connection," *The New Republic*, May 19, 1982.

41. For many years the address of Joe Meadors appeared on the masthead of the USS Liberty Newsletter as:

> Joe Meadors, C/O ARAMCO, P.O. Box 1168,
> Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

42. Mr. Ennes wrote a letter dated July 16, 1988, to the author and it was received in Florida on July 19, 1988, after the author had left on the trip that took him to Seattle on August 5, 1988. In the last sentence of his letter dated July 16, 1988, Mr Ennes states:

> I may be able to answer one or two short written questions by mail, but beyond that I am afraid I simply cannot afford the time your project seems to require of me.

The author responded by letter to Mr. Ennes dated August 14, 1988, and put the following two questions to Mr. Ennes:

Question One: Please identify the person or persons, who in your opinion knew in advance that the target was USS Liberty, a US Navy ship, yet ordered or participated in the attack?

Civil Dayan
****
Military Rabin

other at chief of staff level
XXX Head of Navy

other at Navy

XXX Head of Air Force

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other at Air Force

XXX Head of Intelligence

other at Intelligence

The controllers who ordered the air strike
The pilots of the aircraft
The controllers who ordered the MTB strike
The MTB commanders
Crew members of the MTB's

any other person or persons

Question two: Please identify any specific item of evidence that proves or tends to prove the knowledge prior to or at the time of the attack, or before it was stopped, of any one in Israel, that the target of the attack was a United States ship.

Mr. Ennes never answered either question.

43. Walter Jacobsen was promoted to Commander and assigned to the Central Command. During the Gulf war, while serving in the Gulf, he was stricken with cancer and Medevacuated back to the United States where he passed away.

44. Walter L. Jacobsen, "A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty," *Naval Law Review*, No. 36 (Winter 1986): 1-51.

45. W.T. Mallison, *George Washington Law Review* (June 1964): 983-1075.

46. W.T. Mallison, *George Washington University Magazine* (1965).

47. Goott and Rosen, eds., *The Campaign to Discredit Israel*, p. 121.

48. In addition to the interview with Ambassador Porter, the author did additional research in the form of a Freedom of Information request to the Department of State based on the Evans and Novak article and the recollections of the Ambassador. Additional documentary evidence was obtained but it did not resolve all the issues. It did not support the Evans and Novak story.

49. See Hirsch Goodman, "Messrs. Errors and No Facts," *Jerusalem Report*, November 21, 1991, p. 42.

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50. Interview of Thames TV producer, Rex Bloomstein, by the author in London on September 16, 1991. A follow-up telephone interview was conducted on June 25, 1992, the author was in Miami and Rex Bloomstein was in London.

51. John Hrankowski, "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder," *Liberty News*, 14:2/3 (2nd & 3rd Quarter 1996): 7.

52. *Liberty News*, 8:3/4 (March/June 1990) was 52 pages in length and carried the CNI advertisement on page 46.

53. *Liberty News*, 9:3/4 (March/June 1991) was 60 pages long and carried the CNI advertisement on page 54.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

55. *Liberty News*, 12:1, (3rd Quarter 1994): 1.

56. Theodore (Ted) Grob died on July 4, 1996. *Liberty News*, 14:2/3 (3rd Quarter 1996): 1.

57. The Kuwait News Agency carried a story by David Walsh on June 7, 1988, titled "Liberty Memorial."

58. See the appearance of LCDR Lewis on the SLIGO Productions video "USS Liberty Survivors: Our Story."

59. Goott and Rosen, eds., *The Campaign to Discredit Israel*, pp. 55-56.

60. The quote is taken from the masthead of the *Washington Report*, July 1992.

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CHAPTER FIVE

WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY?

Following the 1956 Suez adventure, the Israeli Air Force recognized the need to move its Headquarters from Ramla (about twelve miles south of Tel Aviv) to the Kirya in Tel Aviv where it was installed next to the Headquarters of the Chief of Staff. The Israeli Navy Headquarters remained in Haifa, over sixty miles away and linked to the Kirya by telephone. Following the 1967 War, the Navy recognized this weak link in its Command and Control, and moved its Headquarters to the pit at the Kirya. One can only speculate on whether or not an earlier consolidation of Navy Command and Control at the Kirya would have prevented the tragedy of the Liberty incident.

The following account of the incident is based upon the process of elimination by falsification* of evidence allegedly supporting the renditions of the Liberty incident conducted in the two previous chapters. Evidence presented in support of wide ranging renditions of the Liberty incident was eliminated by validation or falsification. The following account is based only upon the evidence that passed the test. In the judgment of the author it comes as close to objectivity as can be hoped for and represents the most comprehensive available account of what happened to the U.S.S. Liberty on June 8, 1967.

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* Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Enquiry*, London: Hutchinson, 1959. See also R. O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 123, 172, and 334.

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Liberty arrived at Point A at 0832 and began her patrol sailing to the west with her bow pointed in the general direction of Port Said. She knew she was in a dangerous position. Her Captain considered pulling back, but because he was "not in the loop," that is, he did not know the purpose of the Liberty mission, he was not given the opportunity to make the correct decision and elected to remain in harms way. The NSA recognized the danger of the position and sent at least five messages ordering Liberty to pull back. Because of the ineptness of U.S. communications at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the messages were missent and did not arrive until after the attacks.

When the situation appeared urgent in Washington and the JCS tried to send a plain language voice message to Liberty via the Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), the JCS Officer, Marine Major Breedlove did not have the rank to impress Navy Captain Hanley in London with the urgency of the request. The request itself sounded quite routine and CAPT Hanley, who had been embarrassed a day before by executing an oral order, declined to act on it and requested a confirmation in writing with a date/time group.[1]

So there was Liberty, in eye view of the war, painted battleship gray and sporting four inadequate gun mounts in an area where the previous day the U.S. Defense Attache had advised Washington by message that Israeli Forces had been shelled from the sea.[2]

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On that morning of June 8, 1967, at El Arish, the Israelis held the ground. They also controlled the air above. But explosions were occurring at El Arish.[3]

So the Israeli Army at El Arish concluded that, like the day before, they were being shelled from the sea. The conclusion was wrong. In fact, Egyptian sappers, operating behind Israeli lines, were detonating Egyptian ammunition dumps and this was the cause of the explosions and columns of smoke along the coast at El Arish.

Perhaps, if Liberty had not been in plain sight, about fourteen miles from the coast, the Israeli Army might have come to another conclusion. Of course, Liberty's guns could not reach the beach from fourteen miles, much less cause explosions, but details like gun tubs are not discernable at that distance. The Army at El Arish advised the Kirya that they were being shelled from the sea. At the Kirya, this was determined to be a Naval matter. A call was placed to Naval Headquarters at Stella Maris and the Navy was asked to investigate.

The War Log at Naval Headquarters indicates the call was received at 1124, and that the Navy first ordered two destroyers to go to El Arish. That order was canceled and a new order directed MTB Division 914[4] which was in the vicinity of Ashdod to proceed to El Arish.[5]

MTB Division 914 steered for El Arish at top speed, a distance of about fifty miles. The seas were variously

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reported at less than one foot and in some places two feet. At 1330, the Division Commander was advised that "El Arish is being shelled from the sea."[6] At 1341,[7] a target was detected at the extreme limit of their radar, which the Israeli radarman called about 22 nautical miles.[8] Using the map from the Official IDF History Report on the Liberty incident and the times indicated in that Report, it took the MTBs about 44 minutes to close from 22 miles from Liberty to 2 miles from Liberty. With the MTBs moving at 36 to 38 KTS per hour towards Liberty and with Liberty moving away from the MTBs at about 5 KTS, the relative motion between the two was about 31 to 33 KTS. It would therefore take about 41 to 44 minutes to traverse 20 or 21 nautical miles. The figures are not precise and suggest that the speeds may have been a Knot or two different than reported by the MTBs or by Liberty or that the times may have been off a minute or two or a combination of both. This would suggest that at the time of the initial radar sighting, the MTBs were indeed about 22 nautical miles from Liberty.

The radarman, Gulli,[9] a young enlisted man, accurately reported the target steering west (the actual heading was 283 degrees) to the CIC officer together with a range. The CIC officer then calculated the speed of the target as 30 KTS. This was inaccurate. How could such a mistake have been made? The radar operator had a round screen shaped much like a large dinner plate before him. The center of the screen represents

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the position of his boat. A line from the center of the screen to the top indicates the direction the MTB is traveling. The reflection of the radar waves from the target causes an image or "blip" to appear on the radar screen. A sweep swings around the screen usually sweeping 360 degrees. Each time the sweep passes the target, the target is illuminated on the screen. The screen momentarily retains the illuminated image just as a television screen displays a dot of light for an instant after the T.V. is turned off. The image or target thus appears to move on the screen. If the radar is stationary and the target is moving, the calculation is easier. If both radar and the target are moving, the situation is more complex. Since the target is moving away from the radar and the radar is moving towards the target, the speeds of both are factors in the equation. The radar screen is about 18 inches in diameter. Thus, from the center (the MTB, where the radar is located), looking forward, the screen is about nine inches from center to top. If the center to the extreme range is 24 miles, then a mile is represented by 3/8 of one inch.[10] Liberty's speed of 5 KTS is 1/12 miles per minute or a deflection of 1/32 of an inch per minute on the screen.

Modern radars have cursors which can be placed on a target and the distance course and speed of the target appear in digital format. This was not the case in 1967. There was a cursor which could be projected from the center of the

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screen to the target and which provided range information. The operator viewed the scope and upon measuring the distance to the target, orally passed that data to the CIC officer. The CIC officer had an illuminated map board or plot of the area. Beneath the plot was an illuminated dot surrounded by the 360 degrees of the compass which is called in Hebrew, "shoshannot haruhot."[11] The position of the illuminated dot beneath the map of the area is stabilized by a gyroscope. It was run by an electric motor and the position was calibrated and set before leaving harbor. The accumulated error in the position usually did not vary more than one nautical mile per hour. It was customary to reset the rose[12] when a fix was obtained.

During a one minute period, on the radar scope, the MTB would move a little more than 7/32 of an inch towards the target and the target would move away from the MTB on the radar scope, 6/32 of an inch if the target travelled 30 KTS/HR or it would move away 1/32 of an inch if the target travelled 5 KTS/HR.

The speed calculations were not made on the radar scope by the radar operator, but by the CIC officer on the plotting table.[13] The initial position of the target was marked on the plotting table.

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CIC Combat Information Center aboard the MTB 204.

Room measured about 9' feet wide by 6' feet deep.



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



KELVIN HUGHES RADAR USED BY MTB DIVISION 914
CLANDESTINE IMMIGRATION AND NAVAL MUSEUM - HAIFA, ISRAEL

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Radios of Type Used on MTBs 5-3



WORLD WAR II VINTAGE HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO-INSTALLED
ON MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CLANDESTINE IMMIGRATION AND NAVAL MUSEUM - HAIFA, ISRAEL

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The calculations are not simple. A 20 year old enlisted radar operator in a dimly lighted radar compartment, in an MTB skipping across the water at 37 or 38 KTS, rushing to his first combat experience, made the initial calculation of the distance from the MTB to the target. The 20 year old CIC officer made a mark on the plotting table with a pencil to indicate the position of the target. Then in a minute or two he got another target position and marked it on the plot. Next he measured the distance of the movement with a ruler or straight edge. If he used a one minute measurement, he multiplied the distance the target moved by 60 to calculate the speed in nautical miles per hour. If he used a two minute measurement, then he multiplied by 30 and if he used a 3 minute measurement he multiplied by 20. Ahron Yifrach believes the initial radar position was in error. He initially calculated the target speed as 30 KTS. Upon request for verification, he re-calculated 28 KTS. When the first communication was received from Kursa flight, the pilot stated that the ship had a single funnel with a mast forward and a mast aft. This information was passed to Yifrach with the editorial comment that it was a Zed class destroyer.

In retrospect, accepting this report was another error because although the Egyptian Zed class destroyers had a single funnel (or stack) and masts fore and aft, the two Egyptian Zed class destroyers were in the Red Sea and could not have come back into the Mediterranean because the Suez

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Canal was closed. However, the report seemed logical in view of the report that El Arish was being shelled from the sea. Only a destroyer could have been shelling from the sea and destroyers have the capability of steaming 30 KTS.

Some persons reject the explanation that the radar painted the target at 22 miles and that the Israeli Navy miscalculated the actual speed of the Liberty. There are a number of possible explanations of the reported radar distance. A review of the electronics or radar literature will disclose a phenomenon called channeling. On dry, clear summer days, radar beams sometimes bounce, or curve, and are able to see even beyond the range claimed. June 8, 1967, was a dry, clear summer day. If channeling was not involved, the distance beyond the horizon is not significant and can be accounted for by the projection of both the radar antennae of the MTB above the surface about (25 or 30 feet) and the projection of the superstructure of the Liberty above the surface. It is also possible that the MTBs and Liberty were two or three miles closer together than the reported radar range calculation.

The report of the speed of Liberty being 30 KTS, had two important meanings. First, under Israeli Naval Doctrine, a radar target moving faster than 20 KTS was presumed to be a warship.[14] So, the hounds were off to the hunt. Ever since the Ibriham al-Awal incident in 1956, there has been a dispute between the Chail Ha Avir (the Israeli Air Force) and the

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Chail Ha Ayam (the Israeli Navy) over which service was entitled to credit for the capture of the Egyptian destroyer. The rivalry continued in 1967. Air Force controllers would not let Naval liaison officers serving with them talk on the Air Defense Net.[15] More evidence of this rivalry is apparent in the translation of the transcripts of the aircraft attacking Liberty. At 1409, Royal Flight Leader said to Air Control:

> Homeland, if you had a two ship formation with bombs, in ten minutes before the Navy arrives, it will be a mitzva. Otherwise the Navy is on its way here.[16]

Further confirmation of this rivalry is described by Abraham Rabinovich in his book, *The Boats of Cherbourg.*[17]

The rivalry between the Air Force and the struggling Navy is a fact. If the Navy believed that they could have overtaken the target, it is not conceivable that they would have called for help from the Air Force.

But they did call for help. The MTB Division determined that the target had its bow pointed at Port Said. The heading was 283 degrees and that is disputed by no one. Port Said is about 60 miles from the Liberty's 1300 (local time) position. If Liberty continued at 28 KTS and the MTBs chased at 36 KTS, they would close the 22 mile gap as the target entered Port Said. The MTB message to Stella Maris was: "Division 914 is reporting that targets are sailing west at 30 knots. An order was made to double check speed. He cannot chase them. Suggests dispatch aircraft."[18]

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Naval Headquarters at Stella Maris had been under the direct command of ADM Shlomo Erell in the early morning hours of June 8. The report of Liberty and its 0600 position came into Naval Headquarters and a wedge was placed on the plotting board marking Liberty as a skunk.[19] ADM Erell inquired about it and ordered the wedge changed to identify Liberty as a neutral. The Command Duty Officer was CDR (Sgan Aluf) Avraham "Ramy" Lunz. At 1100, the Second-in-Command of the Navy, CAPT Issy Rehav assumed tactical command. ADM Erell had gone down from Mt. Carmel to the Port of Haifa. Shortly before Rehav took over tactical command at 1100, CDR Lunz removed the wedge marking Liberty from the plotting board.[20] Not only did Lunz remove the wedge, he did not inform CAPT Rehav of its existence. Why did Lunz fail to advise Rehav? His explanation was that ships do not stand still. He was of the opinion that the ship had moved at least 75 miles from the point where it was observed. The Liberty Deck Log shows the speed of the ship at 15 KTS and that Liberty changed course at 0555, and steered 190 degrees for about ten minutes before turning to 060 degrees and correcting back on her track of 130 degrees, to Point Alpha. The Liberty's maneuvers began at the time that the first Israeli overflight took place. It appears that the maneuvers may have been undertaken to deceive the pilot into thinking that the ship he was observing was heading to Port Said, Egypt.

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Five hours on 190 degrees at 15 KTS would have put her in the vicinity of Port Said at 1100. It is not known if Lunz considered that possibility when he removed the wedge. (As a result of removing the wedge and failing to tell CAPT Rehav about it, Lunz was named a party in the Judicial inquiry by the Examining Judge.[21] The inquiry was adjourned and the chief military defense counsel, Villie Tein[22], was appointed to represent Lunz. The chief military prosecutor, (Rav Seren) Yaacov Kedmi[23], represented the government.)

The MTBs had requested air. The call went by telephone from Naval headquarters in Stella Maris to the Naval Liaison Officer at Air Force headquarters in the Kirya. That man was CDR Pinchas Pinchasy.[24] His position in Air Force headquarters was in a small room on the first floor of the command and control center in the pit. Pinchasy made his request by telephone to General (Aluf) Hod, the Air Force commander on the level above him. He was ignored.

To understand the situation in the Kirya and the attitude of General Hod, it is necessary to be aware of an event that took place on or about the night of June 7, 1967. Israel's coastal radar reported three large ship targets steaming north along the coast. The Air Force and the Navy were alerted. The Navy dispatched its three destroyers, the Eilat, the Jaffa and the Haifa to meet the enemy ships which were presumed to be Egyptian destroyers. The Air Force launched several flights of Mirage IIIC aircraft. The sky was partially

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covered by broken clouds. The aircraft reported to General Hod that through the breaks in the clouds, they could see three wakes of ships moving at high speed. They asked for permission to attack. ADM Erell on his telephone line in Haifa said no. General Hod became testy and said his planes had limited fuel and if they could not attack at once, he would pull them off. Erell insisted on illumination and reluctantly Hod ordered a plane to dive below the clouds and drop an aerial flare. A moment later everyone learned that the flare had illuminated the Eilat, the Jaffa, and the Haifa. There were no Egyptian ships. The initial radar blips had been false images.[25]

The climate was not warm between the Navy and the Air Force. Pinchasy reported his lack of success to Stella Maris and was told to be more forceful. He got up from his desk and went upstairs to confront General Hod eyeball to eyeball. Hod was annoyed. He did not wish to commit his limited air assets to another wild goose chase. Pinchasy was queried, "Do you have a target?" Pinchasy said, "Yes."

Hod passed the order to his Chief Air Controller, Shmuel Kislev, seated two chairs to his right. Kislev's deputy noted that Menorah flight, consisting of four Mirage IIICs and armed with iron bombs was outbound to the south. He asked Kislev if he should order Menorah flight to this target. Kislev said "No." Menorah was on its way to strike surface to air (SAM) sites along the Suez Canal and Kislev deemed that mission more

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important than running an errand for the Navy. Liberty did not have much luck on June 8, 1967, but this decision was Liberty's first piece of luck. In World War II, at the Battle of Midway, the United States sank three Japanese aircraft carriers in ten minutes with iron bombs. As one Liberty crew member put it, one well placed bomb and we would have been on the bottom.[26] Kislev looked over his airborne assets and noticed Kursa Flight, two Mirage IIIC aircraft armed with 30 mm guns and a few air to air missiles (or rockets) on combat air patrol over the Suez Canal and near the end of its fuel. Of necessity, Kursa would fly home over point Boaz, just a few miles from El Arish and Liberty. Kislev directed Kursa Flight to proceed to El Arish and gave Kursa Flight Leader the authority, "If you find a warship, you may hit it, but be careful, we have warships in the area." He also gave Kursa a frequency or channel on which to communicate with the Israeli ships and the code name of the division.[27]

Kursa Flight left the Suez Canal and flew towards El Arish. Upon arrival they saw a ship steering west and then observed other boats to the north. At first they thought there were only two other boats but then observed three. Although Kursa had authority to attack "a warship" in the vicinity of El Arish, Kursa attempted radio communication with the Israeli warships. Ship to air communication is not easy even today. The Israeli Navy had installed UHF radio with aviation frequencies on all three MTBs shortly before the war

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began but only MTB 206 was able to communicate with Kursa. 206 then passed the communications to the Division commander on 204.[28] Kursa Leader orbited the Liberty looking for the "Blue Max."[29] Kursa Flight Leader had carefully sorted out the non-Israeli warship from the Israeli warships. Now he called air control again for permission to attack. It was granted. Kursa Flight Leader followed by Kursa Wing rolled into shallow dives from west to east with the sun at their backs. Sailing in the Mediterranean heading west during the afternoon on a clear day is like sailing into a sea and sky of gold.[30]

There are many different accounts of the Liberty Incident and the times of the commencement of the first air attack vary from 1358 to 1405 local time. There are many reasons why the times may vary. Probably, every clock and watch in the area was not synchronized. The primary issue in this research is not deemed impacted by the time the first attack began plus or minus seven minutes. The Liberty smooth deck log, which is usually prepared after the watch, reflects 1400. The quartermasters log, which is usually written in pencil as events occur, reflects 1358. At Israeli Air Force headquarters all communications between Air control and the pilots are recorded. The recording equipment has a voice in the background repeating the time in Hebrew. The voice speaks the Hebrew number of the hours and minutes. When a voice transmission is made, the transmission blocks the Hebrew

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numbers. The author has listened to the tapes in Hebrew with translators and has received a translation of the transcripts of the tapes for the time periods 1343 to 2130. The Israeli Air Force audio tape reflects Kursa Flight Leader commencing his dive at 1357 and, therefore, it is anticipated that the first bullets fired by Kursa began to strike Liberty about 1358. Each Kursa Mirage was armed with two 30 mm guns[31] and a few air to air rockets. The two planes of Kursa Flight each made three[32] strafing runs and exhausted their ammunition by 1404 and left the target for home base. See Air Attack Kursa, Illustration 1-5.

Kislev, the chief air controller, had located another flight interdicting troops and armor over the Sinai. Royal Flight consisted of two Super Mystere jets armed with the same 30 mm guns as carried by the Mirages and each carried two canisters of napalm. Kislev had vectored Royal Flight to El Arish and following a momentary delay, Royal was authorized to attack. The Royal aircraft made their initial runs from stern to bow, dropping their napalm as they came. Three canisters missed. Then they pulled up in left turns to the west and made 180 degree turns to come back across the ship broadside from west to east, with the sun at their backs. Liberty had turned from west to north putting the sun to her port side.

As Royal Flight Leader crossed the ship firing at her amidships in an effort to hit the boilers, he observed her bow number and letters on the up sun side of the hull.[33]

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Back at Air Force headquarters at the Kirya, Chief Air Controller, Kislev, ever the professional, kept asking Royal Flight Leader, "Is there any Nun Mem?"[34] Although some sources state that Liberty fired her machine guns against the aircraft, there is no such report in the Liberty logs nor have any Liberty crew so testified. Neither Kursa Flight nor Royal Flight reported any Nun Mem. Thus 8 or 9 minutes into the air attack both Kislev and Royal Flight Leader became concerned. As Royal Flight Leader passed over the ship observing the bow marks, he said "this ship is marked P 30, I am going down for another look." At 1411 Royal Flight Leader reported, "Pay attention, this ship's markings are Charlie Tango Romeo 5 [CTR 5]." (This was also in error because the first letter was G, not C). This was grave news. Both Royal Flight Leader and Kislev knew that Arab ships were marked in Arabic, not with Roman letters. Therefore, they realized the ship was not an Arab ship.[35] At 1412 Kislev gave the terse order, "Leave her!" and Royal Flight pulled off the target and turned towards home.

Others in the Kirya who heard the report, "marked CTR 5" and who were aware that there were half a dozen Soviet intelligence gathering ships in the area, all of whose identification marks began with the letter "C" were shocked and horrified that the target might be a Soviet ship.

Liberty's Commanding Officer reported that her flag was shot away on the first strafing run. Liberty had a motor

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whale boat on its forward deck which held a can of gasoline. The initial strafing caused a large fire in the motor whale boat and it is very likely that the flames either burned through the halyard holding the flag or they may even have consumed the flag itself. In any event, there is no disagreement that the flag was gone early in the aircraft attack. There is substantial disagreement on whether or not the 5' by 8' United States flag was flying at the commencement of the attack. The United States Navy Court of Inquiry concluded, "The calm conditions and slow ship speed may well have made the American Flag difficult to identify."[36] Some Liberty crewmen who recall looking up and seeing the flag insist that it was flying. This issue is dealt with in detail in Chapter 3 in the "Clearly Marked Theory." However, the gun camera film of Kursa Flight shows quite clearly that the huge plume of smoke from Liberty ascends straight up. If the smoke goes straight up, the flag hangs straight down. In addition to the gun camera film, the Court of Inquiry record contains a number of pictures taken by CDR McGonagle during the attack. A careful examination of the pictures showing smoke corroborate the Israeli gun camera film. See Gun Camera Film, Illustration 5-4.

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Gun Camera Film 5-4

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1412 and the air attack is over. Unknown to Liberty, her second bit of good luck is taking place. At Tel Nof Air Force Base, a flight of two Mystere aircraft (Nixon Flight), armed with iron bombs is on takeoff roll, its destination, the target off El Arish. Time to target subsonic is 12 to 14 minutes.[37] Just before Nixon Flight is about to reach its target, Kislev, after ordering Royal Flight to "Leave her!", diverts Nixon Flight and assigns it to Air Control North. The second tactical unit that could have sunk Liberty in minutes, did not go to the scene and did not attack Liberty.

The Motor Torpedo Boats continue to approach from the north on a southwesterly heading. They see the aircraft depart and a ship spewing a huge cloud of black smoke now steaming out to sea on a northerly heading. The MTBs are down sun approaching the shaded side of the ship. See M.T.B. Torpedo Attack, Illustration 1-7. The MTBs stop at a range of about a mile and begin signaling to Liberty with an aldis lamp. There is no dispute about the MTBs stopping and signaling. There were clearly misperceptions on both sides about the signaling.

Aboard Liberty, all the large aldis lamps had been destroyed in the air attack. CDR Mcgonagle testified, "Saw light signals but could not understand them. Tried to signal with a hand held aldis lamp."[38] He did not say what he transmitted.

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Aboard the MTBs the Division Commander Moshe Oren has ordered the signal "AA" sent to the smoking ship. Anyone who has commanded a ship in any Navy will recognize the signal as the international query, "What ship" or "Identify yourself" or "Who are you." Moshe Oren was a Reserve Officer. A few weeks before this incident, he was working in a factory near Tel Aviv. He was not accustomed to reading Morse Code signals from flashing lights on a daily basis.

However, he was not totally without experience in this type of activity. Eleven years before, Moshe Oren, as a junior officer was the gunnery officer aboard the destroyer Jaffa when it engaged the Egyptian destroyer, Ibriham al-Awal. The Jaffa signaled "AA." Ibriham al-Awal signaled back, "AA." Moshe Oren said to himself, Deja Vu. You ask an Egyptian ship to identify itself and it sends the same signal back. Each MTB carried a book called the red book. Its formal title is "Identification of Arabian Navies."[39] The boat commanders on the other two boats each looked at their "Red Books" and identified the target as the Egyptian ship El Quesir. At this point, Oren was already certain the target was Egyptian. When he heard that the other boat commanders had identified it as El Quesir he is quoted as having said "If [C.O.203] says its the El Quesir, it is the El Quesir.[40]

Oren had twice requested "tesha vuv" from Naval Headquarters. "Tesha Vuv" is Hebrew for T = Tesha and 9 = Vuv which was authorization to launch torpedoes.[41] At each

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instance torpedomen in each boat withdrew a safety plug from each torpedo.[42] Twice the safety or arming plugs had been reinserted. Now another unfortunate event occurred. As the boats sat there signaling and trying to identify the smoking ship, Liberty opened fire upon the MTBs. This is without dispute and clearly reported in the testimony of CDR McGonagle before the Court of Inquiry and in a video taped press conference given by CDR McGonagle aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. America a few days after the Court of Inquiry. CDR McGonagle said:

> I had previously directed a man from the bridge to proceed to the forward starboard gun mount and take the torpedo boats under fire in an attempt to defend ourselves. When I saw what appeared to be the Israeli flag, I yelled to the fo'c'sle because I had no phone communications with the men -- and I yelled to him to tell him to hold fire. But before he was able to understand what I was trying to tell him, he opened fire on the boats as I had directed.[43]

There are some disputes about the number of guns that fired and if one gun fired as a result of ammunition burning (cooking) or was fired by a gunner. There are also some Israelis that say that they are not certain that the MTBs knew they were being fired upon. As early as the Ram Ron report, the Israelis mention the gun fire emanating from the Liberty and directed at the MTBs.[44]

At about 1417, Air Force Headquarters in Tel Aviv was on the Telephone with the Navy in Haifa advising that there was a question about the identification of the target.

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Oren calls Rehav on the radio and says again, "Request Tesha Vuv."

Rehav responds, "We have some question about the identification."

It is quite possible to imagine the response of Oren: You SOB, you are sitting safe and dry in an office ashore and that ship is shooting at me. I have no question about the identification.

"Request Tesha Vuv!"

It would have been difficult to deny such a request from a commander on the scene, Rehav responded, "Tesha Vuv approved."

Oren immediately began racing towards Liberty for a torpedo attack, ignoring doctrine and training. The boats were not in appropriate position and even though Liberty is not known to have taken any evasive maneuvers, only one of the five torpedoes launched, struck the Liberty.[45] The MTBs fired their guns in response to the fire from Liberty and continued firing throughout the torpedo run. As they passed by Liberty, they saw a flag[46] hanging limp amidst the smoke. They distinguished the red color and reported that they thought the target might be Soviet. As they passed the curved stern they saw the name Liberty. Boat 203 also recovered a life raft that had been put over the side. The raft had U.S. Navy painted upon it and contained some Lucky Strike cigarettes. At this point the MTBs began to suspect the ship was U.S.

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They came along side and offered help in English. The official reports say the offer of help was declined.[47]

Admiral Erell arrived back at the Navy command post after the authorization for the attack had been given but before the word of the torpedo strike was received at Navy headquarters. He immediately countermanded the order and his order was sent to the MTBs during their torpedo runs. Oren claims to have not received the order although there is some evidence it got to the radio on MTB 204 in the CIC compartment. It is not possible to know for certain if the order was given before the torpedoes were launched or whether it was not transmitted until after the torpedoes were on their way.

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

STEERING WHEEL FROM MTB 203 - INS AYA
CLANDESTINE IMMIGRATION AND NAVAL MUSEUM - HAIFA, ISRAEL

19" TORPEDO AND THROWER OF TYPE USED IN ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY
CLANDESTINE IMMIGRATION AND NAVAL MUSEUM - HAIFA, ISRAEL

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The MTBs were communicating with Stella Maris and the Air Force was communicating with the Kirya. If it were not so tragic, some of the Air Force transmissions would be funny. The Air Force had just been through a roller coaster ride, its an Egyptian ship, its an American ship, its an Egyptian ship, its a Soviet ship, its an American ship. They were quite confused on whether they were rescuing friends or capturing enemy prisoners. At one point, at about 1514, an Israeli helicopter pilot reports to Air Force Headquarters that he sees an American flag on the ship. There are many claims of the existence of a recording of an Israeli pilot stating he sees a U.S. flag on the Liberty before or during the air attack.[48] No one has ever produced such a tape. The tape of the air traffic controllers is in Hebrew and 30 to 45 minutes after the last shot was fired the Air Force was still trying to sort out the identity of Liberty. Although the air attack lasted 12 to 14 minutes and the sea attack was over by 1445, many of the Liberty crew members continued to be in terror of further attacks until after the sun went down, which was approximately four hours after the actual attacks were over.

As soon as the Israeli high command in the Kirya was certain that the Liberty was a U.S. Navy ship, Israel ordered LCOL Michael Bloch, an intelligence officer assigned as a Foreign Military Liaison Officer, to advise the U.S. Naval Attache of the facts. Bloch contacted CDR Ernest Castle and advised him of the attacks and offered to send a car to take

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him to Sde Dov airport where a Super Frelon helicopter was waiting to fly him out to the Liberty. Castle, accompanied by his assistant Naval Attache flew from Sde Dov at about 1800 and overflew Liberty about 1840. After efforts to land aboard were rebuffed (There was no voice communication as aircraft radios and ships radios do not normally transmit and receive the same frequencies.) Castle flew back to Sde Dov, arriving about 1910.[49] CDR Castle returned to the U.S. Embassy to find Ambassador Barbour awaiting his return in the reception area just inside the front door. This was rather unusual as it was usually an attache who was waiting at the door for the Ambassador. It became even more out of the ordinary when the Ambassador advised CDR Castle that President Johnson wished to talk with him at once. Castle remembers picking up the telephone and while he was speaking to the White House operator he was wondering if he should have put on his dress blue uniform before getting on the phone or if he should be standing at attention. A familiar voice came on the line and to his amazement CDR Castle heard President Johnson say to him: "Hey Boy, What the F--- is going on out there anyway?"[50]

About two weeks after the 1967 war, which has been described as the most successful war in the history of the State of Israel, CAPT Issy Rehav, the second in command of the Navy of Israel and the most likely candidate to become the next Commander in Chief of the Navy of Israel, resigned from the Navy.[51] The author asked ADM Erell if Rehav had been

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fired. Erell said no. He also said that he had a heart to heart talk with Rehav and pointed out to him that he made a serious error in judgment when he authorized the "Tesha Vuv," the torpedo attack. Erell pointed out that at 1432 on June 8, 1967, the burning ship off El Arish was no threat to Israel or the Israel Defense Forces. There were many other options, including the capture of the ship that should have been considered. So while most of Israel was rejoicing, a man who had spent his adult life working his way up to the position from which he would probably become Chief of the Navy, resigned from the Navy and went away.

What had happened? There was a catalogue of mistakes on both the Israeli and the U.S. sides that snowballed to the point where the stage was set for disaster. The disaster occurred and on the Israeli side, the responsibility falls on the Israeli Navy. The Israeli Air Force participated in the action, but at the request of the Navy with a representation that the Navy had identified a target. The repercussions of the incident carry over to this day. There is still distrust between the Air Force and the Navy over identification at sea.[52] For instance, in June 1990, a Libyan mother ship in the Mediterranean launched several outboard motor powered rubber boats manned by terrorists. The Navy detected the terrorist rubber boats and intercepted a number of the boats at sea. One terrorist boat was beyond interception by surface vessels and raced towards shore. The Israelis were tracking

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it all the way but no aircraft interdicted it. The rubber boat made it all the way to the shore where it was met by troops and the terrorists were captured. When the author questioned RADM Micha Ram, the then chief of the Navy, about why the terrorist boat was not interdicted by the Air Force, he graciously rejected the author's suggestion that this was aftermath of the Liberty Incident. The author remains unconvinced.

The analysis is perhaps best illustrated in the words of Ahron Yifrach[53] who at age 20, was the Combat Information Officer aboard MTB 204 on that 8th day of June 1967. Yifrach explained,

> On the first night of the war the Navy launched six naval commando missions. The one at Alexandria was a failure and several Israelis were captured by the Egyptians. In the north, a seal team was inserted into the Syrian port of Latakia. The mission failed and there was concern about extracting the team. MTB Division 914 was directed to go north to Latakia and assist in the withdrawal. The withdrawal was a success and all the seals were recovered. However, in the milling around during the withdrawal the bow of one of the MTBs punched a hole about the size of a dinner plate in the bow of another boat.
>
> MTB Division 914 returned to their base at Ashdod and within six hours the hole was repaired as good as new.
>
> It was now the fourth day of the six day war. The Air Force had destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq and controlled the skies; the armor had swept across the Sinai Peninsula and were cooling their feet in the Suez canal; The paratroopers had captured Jerusalem, the western wall and all of the West Bank; and the Navy had made a hole in one of its own boats. We were anxious to get into the action.[54]

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The blame for the Liberty incident in Israel is on the Navy of Israel. The Israeli Air Force is absolved. The Government of Israel resolved the international aspects of the incident by an exchange of diplomatic notes with the United States on December 17, 1980. Israel immediately apologized to the United States and offered to make humanitarian reparations. Israel made payments to the families of the killed and to the wounded in amounts determined by the United States. Israel did not question the amounts and they were paid immediately.[55] In another incident, the United States agreed to pay $132 million dollars (up to $300,000 each) to the families of each passenger on Iran Air flight 655, shot down by the U.S.S. Vincennes on July 3, 1988.[56] The United States did not agree to pay anything for the A-300 Airbus. The damage to the Liberty was not paid immediately by Israel. Under international law, the offer to pay reparations to the families of the dead and to the wounded are considered a humanitarian act and not an admission of liability. Thus, Israel had no hesitation to apologize and pay humanitarian reparations and the same was true in the Iranian airliner incident. Israel objected to paying for damage to the ship because payment for property damage is an admission of liability and Israel always maintained that the U.S. as well as Israel were both partially liable. The matter was finally resolved after many years by a diplomatic exchange that agreed the payment would not be deemed an admission of liability by

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Israel.[57] Israel then paid six million dollars for the damages to the ship and the incident was closed.

The decisions of the initial inquiry, (the Ram Ron report), and the Examining Judge, did not find conduct of anyone in the Israeli Military that rose to the level of an offense triable by a court martial. Viewed in perspective, this is not unusual. The United States did not conduct a court martial of any its military personnel in the incident where the U.S. Navy launched missiles from the U.S.S. Saratoga into the bridge of the Turkish destroyer, TCG Muavenet killing its Captain and others and injuring almost 300.

On February 20, 1997, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court decision denying the members of the Turkish Navy crew and their survivors the right to seek recovery for injuries and deaths which occurred when the Turkish destroyer, TCG Muavenet, was struck by live missiles fired from the American aircraft carrier U.S.S. Saratoga during a NATO naval exercise.

Approximately 300 Turkish Navy sailors appealed the summary judgment granted against them in the United States District Court in Jacksonville, Florida, the home port of the U.S.S. Saratoga.[58] A motion for rehearing is pending.

Likewise, the United States did not conduct any courts-martial in connection with the Vincennes incident[59] when the U.S. accidently shot down an Iranian airliner with loss of 290 lives.

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Would the result have been different if Turkey or Iran had the option of deciding whether or not to punish the U.S. individuals involved? An examination of the diplomatic correspondence immediately following the Liberty Incident discloses strong U.S. language demanding punishment or discipline for those individuals found to be responsible.[60] Ambassador Ephraim Evron told the author that he had often discussed those demands with Yitzhak Rabin, and Rabin felt that it was unfortunate for Israel that under the law they were unable to find someone to punish. He felt that the failure to punish someone of lower rank was perceived by some as a possible cover up regarding someone of higher rank.[61]

The United States did take some disciplinary action against U.S. military personnel regarding the Friendly Fire incident where the U.S. Air Force shot down two U.S. Black Hawk Helicopters.[62] The 29 year old weapons controller aboard the AWACS aircraft, CAPT Jim Wang, USAF, was charged with three counts of dereliction of duty, which together carried a maximum penalty of nine months imprisonment, dismissal from the Air Force and loss of veterans benefits and was tried by court martial.[63] He was acquitted.[64] MGEN Nolan Sklute, an Air Force legal officer said: "An incident like this does not necessarily mean that the conduct of all those involved rises to the level of criminal culpability." Seven other officers received non-judicial punishment in the form of letters of reprimand or admonishment.[65] The United States and Israel are

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probably in a very small minority of nation states that have taken disciplinary action against their own military for acts against foreign nationals.

The Liberty Incident remains an embarrassment to both the Navy and the Air Force of Israel and is deeply regretted by the Government of Israel. As time passes, fewer and fewer persons have heard of the Incident or were born when it occurred. Soon it will be the exclusive province of the historians. A review of all the available material leads only to the corroboration of the conclusions of the official inquiries. There is more and more evidence that the incident was the result of a series of mistakes of both the United States and Israel and there is no evidence to prove that it was an intentional attack on a United States Navy ship.

CONCLUSION

The most reliable source of a conclusion on whether the Liberty incident was a tragic mistake comes from five U.S. investigations, the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, the CIA Report, the Clifford Report, the House Armed Services Committee of Investigations of World-Wide Communications and the NSA Report. These investigations were all conducted by governmental officials or agencies of the United States in the ordinary course of what they saw their duty to be. They were fact finding in nature and had the power and assets of the U.S. Government at their disposal.

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The literature on International Politics is replete with the analysis of "national interest," which is undoubtedly one of its key terms. The common conclusion is that the term almost totally lacks meaning. It is argued that there is not one "national interest," but many. Each political party or group of lobbyists has its own notion of what is and what is not "in the national interest." Were it not for the fact that only the government of the day is privileged to use the term "national interest" to legitimize its actions, the government's "national interest," it is argued, is by no means "more true" than that of the others. Protagonists of different "national interests" can most sincerely believe that an action *non-A* is more "in the national interest" than an action *A* advocated by the government.

Thus, if I now conclude this dissertation with the suggestion that my research suggests that the official U.S. investigations were performed for the national interest and that those sources rejecting the conclusions of the official U.S. investigations tend to have other, clearly discernible emotional, political, or economic "interests" in mind, I will upset those readers who are political scientists. Some might say that such a statement does not mean much. It might have been in the national interest to lie, to disguise the truth to maintain the sanctity of what is perceived to be the "national interest." It might be completely legitimate to lie in the national interest because of the government's commitment to an

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ally or because of its perceived obligation to guarantee access to a region that provides access to raw materials. Either of these instances could be seen as totally consistent with the prime features of national interest, namely promoting the state's political and economic security, and thus commitment to either Israel or the Arab world.

It might disappoint the scandal mongers looking for a sensational story that would sell books and movie rights, but the official investigations had no problem in eliminating the "red under the bed," the "Israeli under the bed," or the "Arab under the bed" stories because there was simply not a scintilla of evidence to suggest their veracity. Beyond that point, the official investigations did proceed completely in accordance with what would have been anyone's national interest at the time, namely to figure out how the dreadful "orrery of errors"** could have occurred and to find out whether some of these errors were punishable due to unforgivable negligence or incompetence. Much of the official investigations were classified not to hide a hidden sinister

---

** Orrery or "planetarium" takes its name from Charles Boyle, the Earl of Orrery who commissioned a construction of a mechanical device used to illustrate with balls of various sizes the relative motions and positions of the bodies in a solar system. I think the use of the term "orrery of errors" here is appropriate. It is usually used to indicate a problem of compounding of errors sometimes referred to as "snowballing." One error carries through the orrery with devastating consequences. See also, Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism;" in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by R. O. Keohane, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 297.

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"lie" but presumably to keep its systems of naval and military communications secret, which too is undeniably in the U.S. national interest. But the fact that the official investigations remained classified for many years, inadvertently fueled the suspicions that could be set aside once the reports were declassified.

When I thus conclude that U.S. investigations were conducted in accordance with national interest, I refer to this aspect of the term national interest. The primary U.S. interest in the story to this day continues to be that the Liberty tragedy would not ever be repeated. Unlike the non-official investigations, between them, the U.S. and Israeli investigations had complete access to the information about the incident and when that information is laid out, it, in my opinion, speaks for itself. In this chapter, I "wrote the history" of the Liberty with very few details, if any, left out. This account, in its completeness, is an effort to finally dispose of all of the others by means of Popper's falsification doctrine.

It might be said that there was a potential for emotional motivation in the NSA Report. It was an NSA Mission. The NSA platform was damaged and an NSA employee, very likely known to the NSA report writers, or the persons who provided data to the report writers, died in the attack. Nevertheless, the NSA Report, as far as can be evaluated from the redacted report

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that has been declassified, appears highly professional and without findings or conclusions based upon emotionalism.

The three Israeli Reports corroborate the U.S. findings and explain many aspects that were not investigated by U.S. investigators. There is certainly an Israeli national political interest in these investigations. Israel has a combined national political interest in maintaining a good relationship with the U.S. The U.S. has been Israel's strongest supporter in the world and Israel today relies on the U.S. for about 3 billion dollars a year in aid and protection in the United Nations by the U.S. veto. Clearly, it is in Israel's best interest to maintain good relations and, therefore, a motive for their investigative conclusions of mistake exists. If Israel wants and needs good relations with the U.S., is it rational for Israel to intentionally attack a ship of its only friend in the world at the time, and then risk a coverup that might be discovered? It would be more reasonable not to attack the ship of such ally in the first instance.

The various other stories about the Liberty are not supported by any evidence and, in addition, appear to be driven by group or individual economic, political, or emotional motives. Many of the stories also follow trails to nowhere. For example, the claims of a U.S. submarine being present in the area. Whether or not the U.S. had a submarine

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positioned near Egypt sheds little light on the actions and motives of the Israelis.

Americans like intrigue, mystery, sensations, and cover ups. A spiceless story that numerous official investigations were conducted properly and came to the same correct conclusion does not make headlines or sell newspapers, books, or T.V. Nevertheless, this research project supports the validity of the conclusions of the official investigations, that the incident was the result of a series of tragic mistakes.

The term mistake, as reflected in Illustration 3-1 (entitled Types Of Possibilities - Accident, Mistake, Premeditated Action) and Illustration 5-6 (entitled Five Paths to Mistake) which follows, covers a vast range of possible failures of men, of technology, and of the man-technology interface. There is a whole literature and an army of experts dealing with the precise technical nature of the mistakes. A shift away from historiography or international politics into these areas, which would take us beyond the scope of this dissertation, does not remove or diminish in any way the tragedy of the loss of thirty-four lives. It makes possible, however, a closure of the Liberty incident as an *issue of international politics*.

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FIVE PATHS TO MISTAKE[1]
OR
WHAT HAPPENS IN A'S MIND BEFORE HE MAKES A MISTAKE[2]


PERCEPTION BY A
Misperception
Inaccurate seeing by A of X instead of Z
Pluperception
Accurate Perception by A of Z
(He sees the traffic lights have changed from green to yellow)
Self-induced
(By A himself)
Other-induced
(B convinces A so that he accepts that Z is X)
(1) Self-deception (Delusion)
A should be able to see Z but he refuses to see Z, talking himself into believing that X is Z.
[A believes in his ability to beat the lights or: A has never had a traffic accident so he believes he is not going to have one.
(2) Illusion
Sensory perception by A of an internal object involving a false belief.
(A genuinely cannot see Z and believes that X is Z)
[A has sun in his eyes believing lights have not changed]
[Another example is a lack of oxygen induces pilot to believe he is going in the right direction, but he is not.]
(3) Deception
Deliberately induced wrong idea in A's mind so that A believes that X is Z
[A told by B that he can cross at red because traffic lights have been abolished]
(4) Misrepresentation
B unintentionally conveys to A that X is Z
(B might have been himself misrepresentation subject to misrepresentation or deception)
(5) Negligence/Incompetence
[His foot slips on the gas, or he confuses gas/ brake and crosses at red light]
B knows it is not true
B believes it is true
MISTAKE
CAR COLLISION
wrong opinion, action or judgment

Who is guilty? No one. It is an innocent mistake. Only in case (5) can somebody be dismissed for negligence or incompetence; in case (1) counseled (and dismissed). Only B can be prosecuted (if he is caught) in (3).

---

[1] Developed from David A. Charters and Maurice A. J. Tugwell, eds., *Deception Operation: Studies in the East-West Context*, London: Brassey's, 1990; and Barton Whaley, *A Typology of Misperception*, draft, March 1980, as cited in M. M. Kline, "Perceptions Management in Soviet Foreign Policy," Ph.D. diss., University of Miami, 1992, p. 7.

[2] We leave out failure of machinery as a cause of mistake, transferring the responsibility to the technology and the 'man-machine interface' problem, namely, the way that operators interact with technology. This formula was used to characterize the Chernobyl accident 'splitting the difference' between human error and technology. See literature about Chernobyl and safety standards.

Endnotes

1. The Court of Inquiry was concerned enough with CAPT Hanley's action to require him to make a written statement which was annexed to the Record of the Court's Proceedings, but no disciplinary action was taken against CAPT Hanley; Court of Inquiry Exhibit No. 48, Doc. 52.

In the statement, CAPT Hanley refers to an incident of the previous day:

> I might point out that our staff is particularly sensitive to directives to move ships by phone calls during this critical period without some indication that a written directive is being forwarded. Only the previous day, or perhaps the day before, we had as a result of a phone call sent out a flash message directing the amphibs to sortie from Malta only to cancel this within the hour by another flash message a result of another phone call. This is but the latest of a series of similar incidents which would indicate that phone calls are sometimes not completely staffed.

2. Message from USDAO Tel Aviv Israel to DIA, 082100Z Jun 67. Point 4 refers to DAO 0312 reporting "Egyptian shelling attack from sea in Gaza area reported by IDF yesterday."

3. The Liberty Deck Log reports the explosions.

4. MTB Division 914 was a division of three Motor Torpedo Boats (203, 204 and 206) under command of LCDR (Rav Seren) Moshe Oren, a Reserve Naval Officer. The boats were built in France and were powered by two Napier Deltic diesel engines and capable of 42 KTS according to Jane's Fighting Ships. According to officers who served aboard these boats, they "could not do 40 kts," 38 kts is a reasonable estimate. 203 was the most recently out of overhaul and was the fastest of the three. They carried one 40 mm. and four 20 mm. guns and two German Aerial 19" torpedoes mounted on launchers or throwers. The boats had U.S. World War II Kelvin-Hughes radar, but only one boat had true motion radar. They also had UHF radios that had been installed about a week earlier. Only Boat 206 was able to use the UHF radio. Personal interviews with CDR Moshe Oren, Ahron Yifrach, Gil Keren (C.O. of MTB 204), Uri "Chera" Tsur, and the Commanding Officers of MTB 203 and 206 (who have requested not to be identified) between January 11 and 18, 1990, in Tel Aviv and Askelon, Israel.

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5. At this point, the MTB Division was not told of the reason for the order, they were told only "turn to El Arish for patrol." NAV HDQ War Log, June 8, 1967, 081205.

6. MTB Division 914 War Log 081330.

7. MTB Division 914, War Log, 081341. There is a slight discrepancy with the NAV HDQ War Log and the Air Traffic Controllers which report contact at 1343, and with the Aircraft Communications which are given the vector for the target at 1345.

8. Radar is line of sight. Therefore, a radar on the earth's surface can "see" a target on the earth's surface at a range of 19 or 20 miles because of the curvature of the earth's surface. The radar antennae on the MTB's is mounted on their masts and the Liberty hull, superstructure and masts projected about seventy feet above the surface so that the range was increased slightly beyond 20 miles. Whether the Kelvin Hughes radar could "paint," i.e. see a reflected radar image at 22 miles or whether the target was actually at 21 or 20 miles is unknown.

According to the positions reported by captain of the Liberty, its position would be 20 miles from the MTB at the time of contact.

9. Gulli is the nickname for Gullivar. He was either 19 or 20 years of age at the time and was regular Navy with the rank of Samal which is equal to sergeant in the U.S. military structure.

10. Rounded to 24 miles.

11. "Shoshannot" translates rose and "haruhot" translates winds. The term is also used in French, "rose of winds." In English we use the term, "compass rose."

12. The compass rose or rose of winds which showed the position of the ship on the plotting table.

13. The plotting table was described to the author by Ahron Yifrach, the CIC officer, in an interview conducted on January 15, 1993, in Askelon, Israel, and follow-up telephone interviews (the author was in Miami and Ahron Yifrach was in Askelon) on April 1, 1997, and April 7, 1997. He said the plotting table was about 3 feet by 3 feet and was located in the CIC compartment which was about 2 meters (a little over 6 feet) by 3 meters (a little over 9 feet). The compartment was big enough for either he or Gulli to sleep on the floor while the other stood watch. The CIC compartment was below the main

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deck and the ladder on the main deck came out just behind the bridge which was a few additional steps higher. Yifrach communicated with the bridge via an intercommunications system that consisted of a large rubber microphone with a speaker on the bridge. The intercom was a single system, not a duplexer. You could talk or listen but not both.

Communications between the MTB and Stella Maris was possible from the bridge or from CIC by VHF radio if the MTB was north of Tel Aviv. In this area, communication with Stella Maris was only by single side band, (SSB) and there was no SSB on the bridge. Yifrach believes the radio was made by Collins and was called T-618 or 618-T. Communications between MTBs was by a designated VHF frequency which was on the bridge and not in CIC. Yifrach confirmed that new VHF or UHF radios for communication with aircraft had been installed on the MTBs just before or at the very beginning of the 1967 war. These radios were on the bridge. They were new and very complicated to use. On the command boat, only Yifrach knew how to operate the air link radio and he was not near it. For that reason, the one other MTB that was able to use the air link radio talked to Kursa Flight and relayed the communications to the division commander, Moshe Oren, aboard the command MTB via surface communication VHF radio. The communications systems left a great deal to be desired.

14. U.S. Naval Doctrine at that time made the same conclusion.

15. The same procedure is followed today between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. This was confirmed to the author by U.S. Air Force officers at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, on April 5, 1995, and can be independently confirmed by merely consulting an experienced U.S. Air Force communications officer.

16. Transcript of aircraft communications between Kursa and Royal Flights, approximately 1409.

17. Abraham Rabinovich, *The Boats of Cherbourg: The Secret Israeli Operation that Revolutionized Naval Warfare*, New York: Seaver Books/Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1988, p. 69.

> Frustrated at the navy's inactivity while the army was overrunning Sinai and the West Bank and the air force was scoring its spectacular victories, the navy command had been hoping to find an enemy ship that would enable it to get in on the war.

18. War Log, Israeli Naval Headquarters, at 081347.

19. Unidentified.

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20. When the Thames TV Producer was interviewing ADM Erell, Erell made several references to "the plot." Erell was referring to the plotting board, but the Thames TV Producer thought that Erell was confessing to a "plot." After several minutes, they got on the same wave length, but for a short time Thames TV thought that Erell was confessing to a plot.

21. The same procedure is followed in the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry procedure.

22. Interview with Villie Tein by the author, Tel Aviv, August 15, 1989.

23. Interviewed with Yaacov Kedmi by author, Jerusalem, August 17, 1989.

24. On January 12, 1990, the author interviewed Pinchas Pinchasy in his office at Technion University at Haifa, Israel where he is on the development staff. He was most gracious with his time and allowed the interview to be taped. After several hours the interview ended and the author turned off the tape recorder and was putting his pad and pencils in his briefcase when Pinchasy leaned forward and said words that made the author's hair on the back of his neck stand up and sent a chill down his spine. Pinchasy said: "Now I am going to tell you something as one Naval Officer to another which I have never told to anyone else before. I am going to tell you what really happened out there that day and you may do with it what you wish."

At this stage of the research the author was still looking for the possible smoking gun, i.e., for evidence that the attacks were not mistakes but rather that they were intentional attacks on a U.S. warship. And now here it was. A confession about to be made by a senior Naval Officer who was at the Kirya at the time of the attacks. The tension was enormous.

Pinchasy went on, "What caused this terrible tragedy was the intense competition between the Navy and the Air Force."

The tension disappeared. The author thanked Pinchasy for the information but explained to him that this was not a new theory. The Rabinovich book, *The Boats of Cherbourg,* published in 1988 told that story on pages 68-70.

Though the theory was not new, it is an essentially accurate explanation of why the attacks were made.

25. The author first heard this story during an interview with RADM Shlomo Erell in Israel on August 16, 1989. There were six follow-up interviews conducted in Israel. The incident is

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corroborated by Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six Day War*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, p. 100.

26. James M. Ennes, Jr., *Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship*, New York: Random House, 1979, pp. 42-43.

27. Transcript of communications between Air Force Headquarters and Kursa flight, time 1356.

28. The code name of the Division commander was Pagoda and the code name of MTB 206 was Tower (Migdal). IDF History Report, p. 10, and transcript of aircraft communications, at 1355.

29. The "Blue Max" was the nickname or code name which the Israelis used for the mark they put on their ships and armor to identify it as Israeli rather than enemy. In 1967, the "Blue Max" was a red background with a white cross on it. In essence it is the Swiss flag. This mark was used until well after 1973.

30. Personal experience of the author sailing on a ship approximately the size of Liberty and standing on the bridge looking forward as the ship steered a westerly heading. This observation was made from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. local time very close to the place where the Liberty Incident occurred.

31. Each gun was armed with 125 rounds of ammunition, (250 rounds per aircraft). Bill Gunston, *An Illustrated Guide to the Israeli Air Force*, New York: Arco Publishing, 1982, p. 86. It is possible that they may have held 135 rounds per gun, (270 rounds per aircraft) as claimed by Peter Mersky, *Israeli Fighter Aces*, North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 1997, pp. 47-48.

32. The IDF history report stated that the "planes attacked the Liberty and executed four strafing runs." The report is not clear as to whether it means four runs each or four runs for the two aircraft. It is believed that three runs apiece or a total of 6 runs is probably the correct number based upon interviews of the two Kursa pilots and other reports.

33. Personal interview with Royal Flight Leader at Tel Aviv Israel on July 2, 1992. Four follow-up interviews were conducted.

34. "Nun Mem" is a Hebrew acronym for *Neged matossim* which translates "against aircraft" and is used as we use AA (anti aircraft) or triple A (anti aircraft artillery) or the Germans use FLAK for Flugzeugabwehercannon (cannon against aircraft).

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35. On Thames TV, Kislev said that he threw down his head set and swore, it was then that he knew it was American. (Thames TV transcript, Item 194.) Persons who were present have told the author that Kislev's exact words were, "Damn it! The Navy has F----- us again."

36. Findings of Fact (#2), the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

37. The straight line distance from Tel Nof Air Base to the vicinity of El Arish is about 138 nautical miles. The Mystere had a maximum speed of 696 MPH and could easily have flown to Liberty in this time. Its cruise speed was 488 MPH which would have added 4 or 5 minutes to its time to target. Gunston, *Illustrated Guide to the Israeli Air Force*, p. 62.

38. Testimony of McGonagle at Court of Inquiry.

39. Ironically the "Red Book" got its name when first printed and bound with a red cover. Since then, the book has been reissued with a dark green cover but it is still called the "Red Book."

In the U.S. Navy, when a pilot takes out an aircraft, the pilot signs for it and when the pilot returns the aircraft, flight time and required maintenance data is written on a document called the "Yellow sheet." Over the years the document has been yellow and it has been white but regardless of the color of the paper, it is always referred to as the "Yellow Sheet."

40. One junior officer in training stood next to [C.O. 203] as he compared the burning target with the picture of El Quesir in the "Red Book" and was not satisfied with the identification, but what is a junior in training to do when his opinion differs from that of his mentors?

41. Avraham Lunz, interview with the author, Tel Aviv, January 15, 1990.

42. The safety plug was much like the gasoline cap on a modern automobile. With the plug removed, the torpedo was "hot" or armed and ready to launch.

43. Thames TV script, Item 94, p. 19.

44. The Ram Ron Report states, "At 1435 the Torpedo boat reported seeing gun flashes from the ship's directions," p. 8. The IDF History report states that "the latter [the Division commander] discerned flashes of gunshot fire emanating from the ship, and the commander of T203 saw the fire and reported hits in the vicinity of T-206," p. 16.

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45. The torpedo that hit came from boat 203. The other torpedo from boat 203 passed ahead of the ship and was seen by some of Liberty's crew. The other three torpedoes two from 206 and one from 204 passed behind the Liberty. When the Captain of MTB 204, Gil Keren, was asked why he had launched only one torpedo he replied, Moshe Oren said "launch torpedo, not launch torpedoes."

The torpedoes were German Aerial 19" torpedoes acquired by the Navy of Israel as part of their world wide shopping effort. (Actually the torpedoes on boat 206 were 18" torpedoes which were acquired from Italy.) They launched fifty of these torpedoes. Forty eight missed. One hit the Liberty and one came back and hit the Israeli ship that had launched it. Personal interview with Biny Telem, Rear Admiral, Navy of Israel, Retired on October 20, 1994. Admiral Telem was Chief of the Navy of Israel during its most successful period of operations, the 1973 war. A follow-up interview was conducted on October 21, 1994, at sea off Port Said, Egypt.

46. Following the air attack but prior to the torpedo boat attack, the Liberty hoisted her large holiday ensign (flag) size 8' X 13'.

47. Ahron Yifrach, the CIC officer on boat 204 said, regarding the declining of the offer of help, "They sent us to hell."

48. Members of the Liberty Veterans Association told Roy Kirk of the existence of such tapes and identified another Liberty crew member of having same. When contacted by Roy Kirk, the House Armed Services Committee investigator, that crew member responded, "There are no such tapes. Those guys are crazy." See also Appendix VI, U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association letter of July 1, 1991, the fifth unnumbered complaint. Also see claims reported in Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Remembering the Liberty," *Washington Post*, November 6, 1991, attributed to Ambassador Porter. The author has an audio tape of an interview with Ambassador Porter that directly contradicts the article (November 21, 1991, telephone interview, the author was in Miami and Ambassador Porter was in Silver Springs, Md.).

49. The Super Frelon Helicopter was SA 321K. It flew from Sde Dov 230 degrees a distance of 49 miles to 31-31.11N Latitude and 34-06.32E Longitude. This position was calculated from the bearing and distance information reported by CDR Castle in 1967. The author and CAPT Castle repeated the flight 25 years later within minutes of the 1967 times. On the 1992 flight GPS was used for navigation and was accurate to within a few hundred feet. The 1967 position was computed by dead

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reckoning and, therefore, may have been less accurate than by today's standards.

50. Personal interview with CDR, now CAPT Ernest Castle on January 14 and 15, 1989, at Columbia, S.C. Seven follow-up interviews were conducted in Israel and South Carolina and three by telephone.

51. In the opinion of CDR Castle, Rehav had been an outstanding Naval Officer. He was talented, diplomatic and charismatic. In the history of the Navy of Israel, the second in command had almost always "fleeted up" and became the next Commander.

The Navy of Israel was established March 17, 1948.

		#1 Navy Commander	#2 second in command
May	48-49	Paul Shulman	
	50	Shlomo Shamir	
	50-54	Mokal Limon	Shmuel Tankos
	54-60	Shmuel Tankos	Kenan
	60-66	Yochai Ben-Nun	Yitzhak Rehav
	66-68	Shlomo Erell	Yitzhak Rehav (until June 1967) Avraham Botzer
	68-72	Avraham Botzer	Biny Telem
	72-75	Biny Telem	Suit Trosh Michael Barkaei
	75-79	Michael Barkaei	Gideon Raz
	79-85	Zeev Almog	Gideon Raz Abraham Ben-Shushan
	85-89	Abraham Ben-Shushan	Michael Ram
	89-92	Michael Ram	Ami Ayalon
	92-96	Ami Ayalon	Alexander Tal Yosi Levy
	96-Present	Alexander Tal	Shaul Horev

52. This was confirmed to the author by the Naval Attache' of Israel at the Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C., as late as 1997.

53. Ahron Yifrach is a very unusual person. He is the only person known to have left the Navy as a Naval Officer and to have become an Air Force pilot.

54. Personal interview with Ahron Yifrach at his home in Askelon, Israel, on January 15, 1990. Follow-up interviews were conducted in Israel on June 4, 1993, and by telephone on April 1, 1997, and April 7, 1997, the author was in Miami and Ahron Yifrach was in Askelon.

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55. Some Liberty veterans were not satisfied with the amount of the compensation but their complaint was with the United States which unilaterally set the amounts.

56. "U.S. and Iran Settle Financial Claims," *Washington Post*, February 23, 1996.

57. The notes were exchanged during the Carter administration on December 17, 1980, and stated:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. AO/315 of December 15, 1980 relating to the ship "Liberty," which reads as follows:

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note of 22 February 1978 and to the consequent exchange of notes concerning the physical damage to the U.S. ship "Liberty" on 8 June 1967.

Without prejudice to the legal position of the Government of Israel and to the question of liability for the tragic event the Government of Israel has the honour to propose as full and final settlement of the U.S. claim that Israel pay the United States Government the sum of $6,000,000 (six million dollars) to be paid in three annual payments of $2,000,000 each commencing 15 January 1981.

....

I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States agrees with your proposed settlement and that your note and my reply thereto constitute the agreement of our two Governments concerning this matter.

....

For the Secretary of State

58. Aktepe v. USA, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997). The Court held that the action presented a nonjusticiable political question. The court stated in conclusion:

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> This case presents a nonjusticiable political question because it would require a court to interject itself into military decision making and foreign policy, areas the Constitution has committed to coordinate branches of government. (p.1404)

A motion for rehearing was filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals prior to April 14, 1997. Thus the decision is not a final order.

59. On July 3, 1988, the U.S.S. Vincennes, with state of the art radar and transponders mistakenly shot down Iran Air flight 655 in the Persian/Arabian Gulf under the perception that the A-300 Airbus was an Iranian fighter jet flying towards the Vincennes.

> 4. Iran Air Flight 688 took off on runway 21 (heading 210 degrees true), was directed by the Bandar Abbas Tower to squawk IFF mode III code 6760, and began a normal climb out to assigned altitude of 14,000 feet for the flight, which lasted a total of 7 minutes before the plane was hit by the missiles from USS VINCENNES. The pilot remained within the amber 59 air corridor (20 miles wide, 10 miles each side of centerline), made a routine position report to Bandar Abbas departure control at approximately 0654Z, and was ascending through 12,000 feet at a speed of approximately 380 kts at the time of making his report.
>
> 5. At approximately 0654Z, the missiles fired from the USS VINCENNES impacted the aircraft....

Department of Defense, Investigation Report, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. From: Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty, USN, To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. 28 Jul 88, at p.6.

60. "[T]he Secretary of State wishes to make clear that the United States Government expects the Government of Israel also to take disciplinary measures," July 5, 1967, draft of note from U.S. Secretary of State Rusk to Israeli Ambassador Harman, "[T]he Secretary of State wishes to make clear that the United States Government expects the Government of Israel also to take the disciplinary measures," draft of note from Secretary Rusk to Ambassador Harman, "[T]he Secretary of State wishes to make clear that the United States Government expects the Government of Israel also to take the disciplinary

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measures which international law requires," State Department Telegram, from Rusk to AMEMBASSY Tel Aviv.

Also see the language of the Clark Clifford report, in paragraph f of the conclusions: "The unprovoked attack on the Liberty constitutes a flagrant act of gross negligence for which the Israeli Government should be held completely responsible, and the Israeli military personnel involved should be punished." [Emphasis added], p. 5.

61. Interview with Ambassador Ephraim Evron in Tel Aviv on January 16, 1990.

62. On April 14, 1994, the USAF shot down two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters with loss of 26 U.S. lives.

63. The court-martial was conducted at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. It began June 2, 1995. Iver Peterson, "Court-Martial Begins in 'Friendly Fire' Deaths in Iraq," *New York Times*, June 3, 1995.

64. A ten member court acquitted him of all charges on June 20, 1995. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Air Force Officer Is Acquited in Downing of Army Aircraft," *New York Times*, June 21, 1995.

65. *Ibid.*

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APPENDIX I

LIBERTY DISSERTATION
LIST OF SUBJECTS INTERVIEWED

[ ] indicates name known but not to be released without consent of individual and/or IDF Spokesman.
ATOI at time of interview

DATE/PLACE
SUBJECT **IDENTIFICATION**

4 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel, Tel Con
Zeev Schiff Journalist and author. Published an account of the Liberty incident in Atlantic Monthly.

5 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel
MAJ Moshe Fogel Major, IDF, with Office of IDF Spokesman.

5 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Oded Erez Brigadier General (ret) IDF. OE overflew the U.S.S. Liberty at about noon on 8 Jun 67.

6 Jun 88/Jerusalem, The Russian Compound, Israel
Meir Shamgar ATOI MS was Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of Israel. In 1967 MS was the Military Advocate General of the IDF.

6 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel, U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel
CDR James McDonald Commander, U.S. Navy, Naval Attache' to U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv in 87/88.

6 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel, The Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
CAPT B Captain, Israeli Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel.

6 Jun 88/ Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Joel Singer Colonel, IDF, Chief of International Law Branch of Military Judge Advocate General.

7 Jun 88/Tel Aviv TelCon AJC/TLV-RR/TLV
Ram Ron In 1967 he was a Colonel in the IDF and conducted the initial investigation into the Liberty incident as a "Military Court of

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Inquiry." ATOI he was president of the Israeli coal industries.

7 Jun 88/Tel Aviv
AMB Ephraim Evron — In 1967 he was DCM at the Embassy of Israel in Washington. He was at the State Department with the Israeli Ambassador, Avraham Harman, when news of the attack arrived. They were taken to see Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. EE was the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. in 1980 when the final letters resolving the matter between the U.S. and Israel were exchanged. ATOI he was finishing as Chancelor of the University of Haifa.

7 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel Bet Sokolow
MAJ Danny Grossman — Major, IDF, Air Force Officer assigned to office of IDF Spokesman.

7 Jun 88/Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Joel Singer — See 6 Jun 88.

7 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel Bet Sokolow
MAJ Moshe Fogel — See 5 Jun 88.

7 Jun 88/TelCon Tel Aviv, Israel Tel Con
COL Raanan Gissin — ATOI, Colonel, IDF, Deputy IDF Spokesman.

7 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel
Yeshayahu Yerushalmi — Judge who conducted the judicial Inquiry of the Liberty attack as examining Judge under sections 178(4) and 283 of Military Law, 1955. ATOI he was retired.

8 Jun 88/Ashdod, Israel
CAPT Isay — Israeli Navy - briefing on the waters off the Gaza Strip/northern Sinai.

8 & 9 Jun 88 at sea, the Mediterranean, area of Liberty incident.
CAPT Ron — Reserve officer in Israeli Navy in command of Dabour anti terrorist patrol boat.(Shark II).

9 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel Bet Sokolow
MAJ Moshe Fogel — See 5 June 1988.

9 Jun 88/Tel Aviv, Israel
MAJ Danny Grossman — See 7 June 1988.

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6 Aug 88/Seattle, Washington
James M. Ennes, Jr. Officer aboard Liberty on 8 Jun 67. Author of book, "Attack on the Liberty". JME Scheduled an appointment in Seattle with AJC but changed his mind upon my arrival and declined the interview.

16 Oct 88/Brunswick, Maine
John Hadden U.S. Embassy Staff, Tel Aviv, 1967. ATOI he was a professor at Bodin College.

6 Dec 88/Coral Gables, Florida
J. William Fulbright U.S. Senator, Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1958 to 1974.

9 Dec 88/Tel Con AJC-Miami GK-Ft. Washington, Maryland
MGEN George J. Keegan Major General, USAF, retired, former Chief of Air Force Intelligence. No personal knowledge of event.

14 & 15 Jan 89/Columbia, South Carolina
CAPT E.C. Castle U.S. Naval Attache', U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv in 1967. ATOI he was a professor at University of South Carolina.

9 Feb 89/Telcon AJC/MIA-CC/Washington,DC
Clark Clifford Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in June 1967.

10 Feb 89/Washington, DC
ADM Thomas H. Moorer Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations Aug 67 to 70, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jul 70 to Jul 74. In June 1967 he was in Viet Nam.

17 Feb 89/Coral Gables, Florida
Richard M. Helms Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 30 Jun 66 to 2 Feb 73.

5 Apr 89/Athens, Georgia
Dean Rusk Secretary of State in June 1967. ATOI DR was teaching at the University of Georgia.

8 May 89/New Orleans, LA
Barefoot Sanders Special Assistant/Legal Counsel to President Lyndon B. Johnson in June 1967. ATOI he was a Federal Judge.

28 July 89/London, England
Mary Horwood Thames TV, Production Assistant on Documentary, "Attack on the Liberty."

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28 July 89/London, England
David Hudson-Millman — Thames TV, Film Research Editor on Documentary, "Attack on the Liberty."

28 July 89/TelCon AJC/London,England-AP/London, England
Adrian Pennink Thames TV, Research Editor on Documentary, "Attack on the Liberty."

30 July 89/TelCon AJC/London, England-AP/London, England
Adrian Pennink See 28 Jul 89.

7 Aug 89/Boca Raton, Florida
David Hudson-Millman — See 28 July 89.

10,11 & 12 August 89/Atlit, Israel
CAPT Yaacov Nitzan Captain, Israeli Navy (Retired)
On June 8, 1967 he was commanding an Israeli built LST enroute from Ashdod to El Arish. He heard some of the radio traffic. In 1978 as Israeli Naval Attache' in Washington, he published an article on Liberty in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. He was also a technical advisor to Thames TV during the production of the Thames TV documentary.

11 August 89/Haifa, Israel
Naval Museum, Haifa. — Visited Israeli Naval Museum at Haifa. Found on display the wheel and bell of MTB 203, 19 (18) inch torpedo and torpedo thrower, radio equipment (Transmitter and receiver) and Kelvin-Hughes radar used on MTBs.

11 August 89/Haifa, Israel
CDR Josef Almog — Director, Naval Museum, Haifa.

13 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Matti Greenberg — Israel Defense Forces, History Department. Former Head of the Combat Research Branch. Author of the official IDF History of 'The Attack on the "Liberty" Incident' in both Hebrew and English.

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13 August 89/Telcon AJC/Tel Aviv-AR on a kibbutz in Northern Israel
Abraham Rabinovich Writer for the Jerusalem Post and author of The Boats of Cherbourg, a history of the Israeli Navy.

14 August 89/Ministry of Defense, Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
Eitan Haber Spokesman for and personal assistant to Defense Minister Itzak Rabin.

14 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel at Bet Sokolow
COL Raanan Gissin Deputy IDF Spokesman.

14 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel TelCon AJC/TLV-CB-L/Jerusalem
GEN Chaim Bar-Lev IDF Deputy Chief of Staff June 1967.

14 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel at his home in Zahala.
LCOL Michael Bloch IDF Foreign Military Liaison Officer in June 1967. He advised the U.S. Naval Attache', CDR E.C. Castle, of the attack on the Liberty.

15 August 89/Tel Con AJC/AJC/Tel Aviv-AA/Jerusalem, Israel
AMB Abraham Harman Ambassador of Israel to The United States, June 1967. ATOI Chancellor of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem.

15 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel
AMB Ephraim Evron See 7 June 88.

15 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel
Judge Yeshayahu Yerushalmi
See 7 June 88.

15 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel
Villie Tein Chief Military Defense Counsel of IDF in 1967. ATOI he was retired.

16 August 89/Haifa, Israel
ADM Shlomo Erell Chief of Israeli Navy in 1967.

16 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel Jaffe Center, Tel Aviv University
GEN Ahron Arele Yariv Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence 1967. ATOI with Jaffe Institute at Tel Aviv University.

16 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel at U.S. Embassy
CDR Tom Krupp, USN U.S. Naval Attache' at U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, 1989.

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17 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Matti Greenberg See 13 August 89.

17 August 89/Tel Aviv, Israel
Issy Rehav Second in command of Israeli Navy in 1967. He was in tactical command at Naval Headquarters at Stella Maris at 1434 on 8 June 1967 and approved the torpedo attack by the MTB Division. ATOI President of the Bank of Israel. (Similar to Chairman of the Federal Reserve)

17 August 89/Jerusalem, Israel at Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Michael Shiloh Foreign Service Officer of Israel on the North American Desk.

17 August 89/Jerusalem, at the Supreme Court of Israel
Yaacov Kedmi IDF Chief Military Prosecutor 1967. ATOI a District Judge in Tel Aviv, sitting on the Supreme Court of Israel.

30 August 89/London, England
Adrian Pennink Research Editor, Thames TV production, "Attack on the Liberty."

30 August 89/London, England
Mary Horwood See 28 Jul 89.

1 September 89/London, England Tel Con
Rex Bloomstein Producer, Thames TV production, "Attack on the Liberty."

15 October 89/Miami, Florida
RADM Michael Ram Commander in Chief of the Israeli Navy.

15 October 89/Miami, Florida
RADM Abraham Ashur Naval Attache' of Israel at Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C.

29 November 89/TelCon AJC/Miami-WWR/Austin, TX.
W.W. Rostow National Security Advisor to President Johnson in 1967.

16 December 89/TelCon AJC/Mia-LB/Annandale, Va.
CAPT Lynn Blasch Assistant U.S. Naval Attache' to Israel in 1967. He flew with CDR Castle in the Helicopter to the Liberty on the afternoon of 8 Jun 67.

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4 January 90/ TelCon AJC/Mia-ASjr/Chicago, Ill.
Adlai Stevenson, Jr. United States Senator from Illinois from 1976 to 1981. ASjr, initiated an investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence into the Liberty Incident.

10 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Oded Erez See 5 June 88

11 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
GEN Mordechai Hod Commander, Israeli Air Force in 1967

11 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
CDR Moshe Oren Commander of MTB Division 914 on June 8, 1967. Commanded the MTB attack on the U.S.S. Liberty.

11 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
Yitzhak Rabin Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces in June 1967. ATOI Minister of Defense of Israel.

11 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN David Shoval Military Assistant to the Minister of Defense of Israel.

11 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[C.O. of MTB 203] C.O. of MTB 203 on 8 Jun 67.

12 January 90/Haifa, Israel
RADM Paul Shulman First Commander in Chief of the Navy of Israel. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. ATOI, retired.

12 January 90/Haifa, Israel
Pinchas Pinchasy Naval Liaison Officer at Air Force HDQ in Tel Aviv on 8 Jun 67. ATOI on staff of Technion University, Haifa.

12 January 90/Haifa, Israel
[Chief of NavIntel] Chief of Naval Intelligence, at Stella Maris, Haifa on 8 Jun 67.

12 January 90/Haifa, Israel
Stella Maris The site of Israeli Naval Command Headquarters on 8 Jun 67.

12 January 90/Atlit, Israel
CAPT Yaacov Nitzin See 10, 11 & 12 August 1989.

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13 January 90/Caesarea, Israel
ADM Shlomo Erell See 16 Aug 89.

13 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel TelCon
MAJ Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88.

14 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel TelCon
LCOL Michael Bloch See 14 Aug 89.

14 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Matti Greenberg See 17 Aug 89.

14 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[C.O. MTB 206] C.O. MTB 206 on 8 Jun 67.

15 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Avraham Lunz Naval Command Duty Officer at Stella Maris on 8 Jun 67.

15 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Zeev Be'erly IDF Foreign Military Liaison Officer on 8 Jun 67.

15 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Raanan Gissin Deputy IDF Spokesman.

15 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
MAJ Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88.

15 January 90/Ashquelon, Israel
Ahron Yifrach CIC Officer aboard MTB 204 on 8 Jun 67. LTJG in 1967. ATOI an engineer.

16 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
GEN Yeshayahu Bareket Chief of Israeli Air Force Intelligence on 8 Jun 67.

16 January 90/Tel Con AJC Tel Aviv to AH Jerusalem
AMB Avraham Harman See 15 Aug 89.

16 January 90/the Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
MAJ Channa Israeli Navy guest relations, Re: obtaining copies of excerpts from 1967 edition of Naval Intelligence book of identification of Arabian Navies.

16 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

16 January 90/TelCon AJC/Tel Aviv-GK/Haifa
Gil Keren C.O. MTB 204 on 8 Jun 67. ATOI a merchant marine captain.

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16 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel Tel Con
AMB Ephraim Evron See 7 Jun 88.

16 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel Tel Con
CAPT Moshe Tabak Naval Liaison Officer to Air Force HDQ at the Kyria, Tel Aviv on 8 Jun 67.

16 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
ADM Chaim Shaked Former Israeli Naval Attache' to Washington.

16 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
CAPT Samek Yanay Commander of Israeli destroyer flotilla during 1956 Sinai campaign. Captured the Ibraham al Awal on 31 Oct 56.

17 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
Michael Atar IDF Foreign Military Liaison Officer in 1982. He delivered the IDF History of the Liberty Incident to the U.S. Naval Attache', Tel Aviv.

17 January 90/TelCon AJC/Tel Aviv-EW/Jerusalem
Ezer Weizman Chief of Operations of the IDF on 8 Jun 67.

17 January 90/Ramat-Hasharon, Israel
BGEN Afraim Chiram IDF Paratroops in June 1967. ATOI AC was Mayor of Ramat-Hasharon.

17 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Sagi Zuri LCOL in paratroops on 8 Jun 1967. He stopped at the pit at The Kirya to pick up COL Nadel. They were going to their unit to jump into Sharem el Sheik and were present in the pit during part of the attack on Liberty.

17 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel Tel Con
BGEN Chaim Nadel Army paratroop COL on duty in the pit at The Kirya during part of the attack on Liberty, 8 Jun 67

17 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[CDR South Air Con] Commander of South Air Control on 8 Jun 67. Directed aircraft in attack on Liberty.

18 January 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
Uri (Chera) Tsur Junior Officer in Training aboard MTB 206 during attack on Liberty.

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18 January 90/ Tel Aviv, Israel
GEN Avihu Ben-Nun Commander in Chief of Israel Air Force.

2 February 90/Miami, Florida
Pinchas Pincasy See 12 Aug 89.

7 March 90/LBJ Library, Austin, Texas
W.W. Rostow National Security Advisor to President Johnson in 1967.

2 May 90/Washington, D.C.
COL Joel Singer See 6 June 88.

2 May 90/Washington, D.C.
Lucius D. Battle Assistant Secretary of State in June 1967. Advised AMB Harman and DCM Evron of attack on the Liberty and escorted them to the office of SEC Rusk. ATOI President of the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.

3 May 90/Army-Navy Club, Washington, D.C.
ADM Thomas H. Moorer See 10 Feb 89.

3 May 90/Washington, D.C.
VADM Donald D. Engen Commanding Officer of U.S.S. America, CV-66, on 8 Jun 67. America launched aircraft to defend Liberty and on 9 Jun 67 America rendezvoused with Liberty and took aboard the wounded. ATOI President of the AOPA Safety Foundation.

3 May 90/Chevy Chase, Maryland.
Shlomo Gazit Head of Intelligence Research of the IDF in 1967. (Equivalent to our "Estimate and Evaluation Department") He was also a close friend and confidant of Moshe Dayan from 1952 until Dayan's death in 1981.
ATOI a research fellow at the Hoover Foundation at the Smithsonian Institute.

20 May 90/Miami, FL
RADM Ami Ayalon Deputy Chief of the Israeli Navy. On June 8, 1967 he commanded the capture of Sharem el Sheik (as a Samal/Sergeant).

20 May 90/Miami, FL
RADM Avraham Ashur See 15 Oct 89.

15 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel/Telcon
MAJ Danny Grossman See 7 June 88.

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16 June 90/Telcon AJC/Tel Aviv-SE/Caesarea
RADM Shlomo Erell See 16 Aug 89.

16 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
MAJ Danny Grossman See 7 June 88.

16 June 90/Tel Aviv
LCOL Michael Bloch See 14 August 89.

16 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
CDR Uri Meretz Israeli Naval Intelligence Officer at the Kirya on duty from 7 June 67 to the morning of 8 June. He received the report of the Nord 501 shortly after 0600, identified the ship as Liberty and passed the information on to Nav Intel at Stella Maris.

16 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Chaim Shaked See 16 January 90.

17 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel at Beit Sokolow
MAJ Ornit Office of IDF Spokesman.

17 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[Kursa - Wingman] Pilot of Mirage IIIC on wing of flight leader who first attacked Liberty. He flew the second pass at Liberty.

17 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[CDR Air Con Cent] Commander of Air Control Central on 8 June 1967.

18 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel at the Kyria
MAJ Chana See 16 January 90. (Received cover page of Identification Book of Arabian Navies.)

18 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Shmuel Kislev Commander Air Control IAF HDQ on 8 June 67.

18 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[CDR Air Con North] Commander Air Control North on 8 June 67.

18 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[DCDR Air Con Central] Deputy Commander Air Control Central on 8 June 67.

18 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel Telcon
CDR Uri Meretz See 16 June 90.

18 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel Telcon to Caesarea
RADM Shlomo Erell See 16 Aug 89.

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19 June 90/TelCon AJC/Tel Aviv-UN/Jerusalem
GEN Uzi Narkiss Commander of Central Command on 8 June 67. He accompanied Def Min Dayan from Jerusalem to Hebron on 8 Jun 67.

19 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[CDR Air Con South] Commander, Air Control South on 8 June 67.

19 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[DCDR Air Con South] Deputy Commander, Air Control South on 8 June 67.

19 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[DCDR Air Con Central] Deputy Commander, Air Control Central on 8 June 67.

19 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Oded Erez See 5 Jun 88.

19 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Matti Greenberg See 13 Aug 89.

20 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel at U.S. Embassy
CDR Thomas Krupp See 16 Aug 89.

20 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Itzhak Nessyahu Military secretary to Moshe Dayan and with him all day 8 and 9 June 67.

20 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel at Beit Sokolow
LCOL Y and LCOL L IDF Field Security.

20 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel at the Kirya
BGEN Nachman Shai IDF Spokesman.

20 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

20 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Ami Ayalon See 20 May 90.

21 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel & flight to Liberty attack site.
COL Danny Shapira Chief test pilot of IAF (called the Chuck Yeager of Israel). He over flew the Liberty with a flight of Mirage IIIC aircraft while returning from a mission on 8 June 67.

21 June 90/Hatserim AFB, Israel
BGEN Yacov Terner Director of IAF Museum.

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21 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
MAJ Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88. (Received IAF gun camera film from Liberty attack.)

21 June 90/Tel Aviv, Israel
[Air Def Con HDQ] Controller in charge of Air Defense at Air Force Headquarters, the Kirya on 8 Jun 67.

22 June 90/Tel Aviv aboard Pan Am 134
COL Joseph P. Koz United States Defense and Air Attache' at U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv.

29 June 90/Telcon AJC MIA/DLMcD Jacksonville
ADM David L. McDonald Chief of Naval Operations of United States Navy from 1963 until 30 July 67.

9 July 90/Miami
CAPT Yaacov Nitzin See 10,11 & 12 Aug 89.

12 July 90/Telcon AJC/MIA-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. President of U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry on Liberty incident.

19 July 90/Telcon AJC/MIA-DG/Israel
MAJ Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88.

19 July 90/Miami, FL
Nicholas Katzenbach Under Secretary of State (#2) in June 1967. Present with President Lyndon B. Johnson in the White House situation room during first meeting on Liberty. Met with DCM E. Evron on several occasions regarding Liberty.

23 July 90/Telcon AJC/MIA-/WBjr./Coronado, CA
CAPT Ward Boston, Jr. General Counsel to U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry on Liberty Incident.

30 July 90/Arlington, VA
CAPT Lynn Blasch See 16 Dec 89.

30 JULY 90/ABC TV News, Washington, D.C.
James Bamford Author of "The Puzzle Palace" the story of the NSA. The book contains comments on the Liberty Incident.

1 August 90/Telcon AJC/MIA-JR/NY
Jack Rosenthal Executive Assistant to Nicholas Katzenbach on 8 June 67. ATOI Editorial Page editor, New York Times.

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9 Aug 90/Telcon AJC/MIA-HS/DCA at Brookings Institution
Helmut Sonnenfeldt In 1967 at Department of State, Director of Soviet and East European Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

11 Oct 90/Miami, FL
COL Danny Shapira See 21 Jun 90.

21 Nov 90/Miami, FL (Follow up tel con - 23 Nov 90)
BGEN Aharon Lavran Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence Collection, Southern Command. A LCOL in 1967.

21 Dec 90/Miami Beach, FL
CAPT Yaacov Nitzin See 10 Aug 89.

22 Jan 91/Miami, FL
Dan Pincus On 8 Jun 67, he was on the staff of GEN Gavish, (Southern Command) about ten miles from the Suez Canal.

11 Mar 91/TelCon AJC/Miami-GHG/Norfolk, VA
George H. Golden Engineering Officer aboard U.S.S. Liberty on 8 Jun 67. Became acting CO on 9 Jun 67. ATOI in 1990, GHG was President of the Liberty Veterans Association.

28 Mar 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-HHS/DCA
Dr. Harold H. Saunders In 1967, Member of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council responsible for the Near East and South Asia.

29 Mar 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-RA/DCA
RADM Rafi Afel Israeli Naval Attache' at Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C. 1990/91.

1 Apr 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-AP/Browntown, Va.
COL Anthony Perna Colonel, USAF, Defense Attache' at U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv in 1967.

2 Apr 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-EEC/Columbia, S.C.
CAPT E.C. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 1989.

13 Apr 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-AP/Browntown, Va.
COL Anthony Perna See 1 Apr 91.

16 Apr 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-YN/Mexico City
CAPT Yaacov Nitzan See 10 Aug 89.

18 Apr 91/Washington, D.C.
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 19 July 1990.

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18 Apr 91/Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C.
RADM Rafi Afel See 29 Mar 91.

19 Apr 91/ABC TV News, Washington, D.C.
James Bamford See 30 July 90.

19 Apr 91/Office of VCNO, Pentagon, Arlington, VA.
ADM Jerry Johnson ATOI Admiral Johnson was the incumbent Vice Chief of Naval Operations. In 1967 he was ships company aboard the U.S.S. Saratoga. On 8 June 67, he was Strike Operations Officer. He launched the first strike aircraft from Saratoga on order of CAPT Joseph Tully.

30 Apr 91/Tel Con AJC/Mia-TLH/Washington, D.C.
Thomas L. Hughes In 1967 TLH was the Director of the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

30 Apr 91/Tel Con AJC/Mia-AH/Washington, D.C.
AMB Arthur Hartman AH became Executive Assistant to Nicholas Katzenbach in the summer of 1967. His tour overlapped that of Jack Rosenthal.

29 May 91/Tel Con AJC/Mia-DFC/Washington Navy Yard
RADM David F. Chandler CDR Chandler was C.O. of the U.S.S. Mahan, DDG 42 in the summer of 1976 when it made the first port call of a U.S. warship to Israel since about 1963.

7 Jun 91/National Archives, Washington, D.C.
John Taylor Achrivist, Military Section National Archives.

7 Jun 91/Washington, D.C. **NOT AN INTERVIEW**
CAPT William McGonagle CDR William L. McGonagle was the Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Liberty on 8 June 1967. He has not spoken about the attack since his press conference in Jun 67. We spoke of his Naval career, his flying, and the need for glasses in later years which ended his flying. His testimony before the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and his press conference on video tape are other sources of research. We shook hands on 8 Jun 91 when he was in dress white uniform and wearing his Congressional Medal of Honor.

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7 Jun 91/Washington, D.C.
George Golden See 11 Mar 91.

7 Jun 91/Washington, D.C.
Lloyd Painter On 8 Jun 67, LTJG Painter was an officer aboard U.S.S. Liberty assigned to the Research Unit and also Qualified as OOD underway. He was on the bridge when the attack began.

7 Jun 91/Washington, D.C.
Richard J. Brooks Leading Chief/Chief Machinist Mate aboard U.S.S. Liberty. He was in the Engine room with George Golden.

7 Jun 91/Washington, D.C.
John Borne Mr. Borne is a doctoral candidate at NYU. His dissertation is on the U.S.S. Liberty incident.

8 Jun 91/Washington, D.C.
CAPT J.M. Tully, Jr. In 1967 CAPT Tully was the Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Saratoga (CV-60).

8 Jun 91/Washington, D.C.
Bryce Lockwood On 8 Jun 1967, Staff Sgt Bryce Lockwood, USMC was the senior enlisted linguist in the research compartment aboard U.S.S. Liberty. He is a russian speaker. He was the last man out of the research compartment after the torpedo hit.

8 Jun 91/Washington, D.C.
Patrick King He is the director and producer of a video tape titled, "The Liberty Survivor's Story" which is marketed through Silgo Productions.

8 Jun 91/Washington, D.C.
Steve Richards Seaman Steve Richards was a crewman aboard U.S.S. Liberty on 8 Jun 67.

13 Jul 91/Miami, FL
GEN Uzi Narkiss See 19 June 1990.

13 Jul 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-CS/Tel Aviv, Israel
Cobie Sharet Cobie Sharet is the son of Moshe Sharet, the second Prime Minister of Israel. In 1967 he was a private (Turai) in the IDF and assigned to GEN Narkiss. His duty was to keep a diary of the activities of the general. He was with Gen Narkiss and Dayan on the trip from Jerusalem to Hebron on 8 June 67.

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19 Jul 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-GC/Austin, Texas
George Christian — Press Secretary to President Lyndon B. Johnson on 8 June 1967.

7 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Va
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. — See 12 Jul 90.

7 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-KCS/Corpus Christi, TX
K.C. Spayde — CDR Spayde was Executive Officer of VA-64, embarked aboard U.S.S. America on 8 Jun 67.

8 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-JK/Washington, D.C.
James E. Kneale — CDR James Kneale was C.O. of VA-64, aboard America on 8 June 67. He launched in an A-4 section with his Ops Officer on his wing, enroute to Liberty and was recalled. He bingoed to Soudha Bay, Crete. He provided a copy of his flight log for this hop.

21 Aug 91/Miami, Fl
Anthony Perna, Jr. — Tony Perna is the son of COL Anthony Perna, USAF, the Defense Attache' at the U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv in 1967. He has no personal knowledge of the event but was in Israel in late 1967 and knew a number of persons directly involved. He was 21 in 1967.

27 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-JEK/Washington, D.C.
James E. Kneale — See 8 Aug 91.

28 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-WIM/Alexandria, Va.
VADM William I. Martin — On 8 Jun 67, VADM Martin was Commander of the Sixth Fleet and aboard his Flagship, Little Rock.

29 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-QCC/Wetumpka,Alabama
Quentin C. Crommelin — In the summer of 1967, CAPT Crommelin relieved CAPT Miller, Chief of Staff to RADM L. Geis, in port at Naples, Italy. He served one week until RADM Geis was detached and then remained as COS to RADM Geis's successor. He was not on America on 8 Jun 67.

30 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-MKM/Jacksonville, Florida
RADM Max K. Morris — CDR Max K. Morris, USN (RET) was a LCDR assigned as navigator to the U.S.S. Saratoga on 8 June 1967. He was on the

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bridge with CAPT Tully when the message from Liberty was received by Saratoga.

31 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-IRL-at NBC News, Washington, D.C.
Irving R. Levine IRL interviewed RADM Isaac Kidd at Naples, Italy, in June 1967 on behalf of NBC TV News. This is reported to be the only interview granted by the Navy.

31 Aug 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-KCS/Corpus Christi, TX
K.C. Spayde See 7 Aug 91.

16 Sept 91/London, England, at BBC headquarters.
Rex Bloomstein See 1 Sept 89.

8 Nov 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-SM/Houlton, Maine
Seth Mintz NOT AN INTERVIEW. SM claimed to be an Israeli Intelligence Major in June 1967. He was determined not credible by Thames. He was the subject of an article by Evans and Nowak in the Washington Post on 6 Nov 91. He refused to comment except to refer to a letter to the Washington Post to be printed 9 Nov 91. He appeared on camera on NBC on 27 Dec 92 with a new story.

13 Nov 91/TelCon WB/Arlington, VA-AJC/Mia
Wolf Blitzer CNN Pentagon correspondent called AJC. In course of discussion WB advised that he interviewed U.S. Ambassador Wally Barbour in 1976. Barbour told Blitzer the Liberty incident was a tragic mistake.

20 Nov 91/TelCon AJC/Mia-DP/Silver Springs, MD
AMB Dwight Porter In 1967 he was the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon and at the U.S. Embassy at Beirut. It is his recollection that while the Embassy was under attack by a street mob, he was shown some English translations of transmissions by Israeli pilots. He can not recall the date or time of day. He read them under great pressure and they were burned.

17 Dec 91 Miami, Florida
Yitzhack I. Rager On June 8, 1967 at 1320 he was photographed with Dayan, having lunch on the road to Hebron. Life Magazine Sp Jun 67 Issue page 11. He commanded the battalion that captured Bethlehem and

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Gush-Etzion. ATOI he was Mayor of Beer-Sheva.

28 Jan 92/Telcon AJC/Mia-JS/New York
Justin Sturken Producer, "Now It Can Be Told"

11 Feb 92/LTR fm AJC & FAX response rec this date
David Rubinger In 1967 he was a photographer for Life magazine. He was with Dayan all day on 8 Jun 67 and at 1320, he took the picture of Dayan on page 11 of the Life Special Edition, Jun 67. ATOI he was still a photographer with Time/Life.

12 Feb 92/Telcon AJC/Mia-DR/Jerusalem
David Rubinger See 11 Feb 92.

12 Feb 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-RR/Los Angeles
Ran Ronen Retired General, IAF. In June 67 he was commander of a Mirage IIIC squadron based at Tel Nof AFB. (Only secondary knowledge)(ATOI he was Israeli Counsel General in Los Angeles)

21 Feb 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-GWG/Ft. Levenworth, Kansas
Dr. George W. Gawrych Dr. Gawrych is a member of the faculty of the Combat Studies Institute of the Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Levenworth, Kansas. He is an expert on the IDF and known for his publication, "Key to the Sinai."

25 Feb 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-WND/Chapel Hill, NC
William N. Dale In 1967 he was Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.

27 Feb 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-ZA/Haifa, Israel
Zeev Almog Admiral Almog was Chief of the Israeli Navy from 1979 to 1985. He has no personal knowledge of the Liberty. During his tenure the IDF History report on Liberty was delivered to ADM Hayward, CNO of the U.S. Navy. ATOI he was General Manager of Israel Shipyards, Ltd. and gave data on U.S. ship visits to Israel.

28 Feb 92 Miami, FL.
Raanan Gissin See 7 June 1988.

28 Feb 92TelCon AJC/MIA-RK/Washington, D.C.
Roy Kirk Staff, House Armed Services Committee, Investigations Sub Committee.

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29 Feb 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-MM/Jacksonville, FL
RADM Max Morris See 30 Aug 91.

9 Mar 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-RB/Washington, D.C.
Richard Bonin Associate Producer with CBS 60 Minutes. He did some research on Liberty Incident. ATOI he was a CBS 60 Minutes associate producer.

17 Mar 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-RB/Miami
Richard Bonin See 9 Mar 92.

3 Apr 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 Jul 90.

4 Apr 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 Jul 90.

8 Apr 92 Miami Beach, FL
RADM Micha Ram See 7 June 88.

8 Apr 92 Miami Beach, FL
RADM Rafi Afel See 22 Mar 91.

28 Apr 92/Telcon AJC/Mia-JS/New York
Justin Sturken See 28 Jan 92.

29 Apr 92 Washington, D.C. Washington Navy Yard
Naval Historical Center Obtained COMSIXTHFLEET Command History (Bldg 44) and VA 64 Command History (Bldg 175)

29 Apr 92 Washington, D.C.
Joel Singer See 6 June 1988.

29 Apr 92 Washington, D.C.
RADM Abraham Ben Shoshan ATIO ABS was the Defense Attache' at the Embassy of Israel in Washington. On June 8, 1967 he was the commanding officer of the Israeli submarine Tanin (Alligator) operating off Alexandria, Egypt.

29 Apr 92 Washington, D.C. United States Institute of Peace
Eugene V. Rostow Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in 1967.

4 & 5 May 92 Charleston, South Carolina
CAPT E.E. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 1989.

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7 May 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-BMA/Ormond Beach, Florida
CAPT B.M. Atkinson CAPT Bert Milton Atkinson was a member of the Liberty Court of Inquiry in 1967.

22 May 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-BMA/Ormond Beach, Florida
CAPT B.M. Atkinson See 7 May 92.

23 May 92/TelCon AJC/MIA-AP/Browntown, VA
COL Anthony Perna COL Perna was the Defense Attache' as well as the Air Attache ' at the U.S. Embassy at Tel Aviv in 1967. He participated in the investigation of the incident.

29 May 92/TelCon AJC/MIA-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 17 Jul 90.

29 May 92 TelCon AJC/MIA-MKM/Jacksonville, FL
RADM Max K. Morris See 30 Aug 91.

2 Jun 92 TelCon AJC/MIA-MKM/Jacksonville, FL
RADM Max K. Morris See 30 Aug 91.

5 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Danny Shapira See 21 Jun 89

5 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
CAPT E.C. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 89.

6 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

6 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
Michael Coren In 1967, Michael Coren was a Segan (LTJG) in the Israeli Navy and flew as a Naval Observer on Nord 2501 reconnaissance flights.

6 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
Raphael Raz In 1967, Raphael Raz was a Seren (LT) in the Israeli Navy and an MTB Commander in Division 914. He was with one other boat off Syria and not at the Liberty.

6 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
Michael Elder A retired Israeli Naval Officer, now a writer. He has published nine books about Israeli destroyers, the Israeli Navy, the Sea and most recently Israeli Naval Commandos.

7 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Danny Shapira See 21 Jun 90.

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7 Jun 92/ Caesarea, Israel
RADM Shlomo Erell See 16 Aug 89.

7 Jun 92/Caesaria, Israel
[Chief of NavIntel] See 12 Jan 90.

7 Jun 92/Caesaria, Israel
CAPT E.C. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 89.

8 Jun 92/U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel.
CDR Thomas M. Lukitich U.S. Naval Attache' Tel Aviv, 1992.

8 Jun 92/U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel.
COL James F. Carney U.S. Defense Attache' and Air Attache' Tel Aviv, 1992.

8 Jun92/U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel
CAPT E.C. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 89.

8 Jun 92/Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
ADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

8 Jun 92/Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
The Pit The Naval Command Post at the Kirya (Israeli version of the pentagon). This site was not in operation in 1967.

8 Jun 92/Sde Dov(Dov Hos) Tel Aviv, Israel to a point at sea
Memorial Flight Flew from Sde Dov, lifting off within minutes of the time on 8 June 1967 that CDR E.C. Castle was lifted from Sde Dov, and flew to the point in the Mediterranean where ALUSNA Castle overflew Liberty in 1967. Returned for landing within minutes of the time Castle landed at Sde Dov in 1967. CAPT Castle accompanied on this flight.

8 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

9 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Raanan Gissin See 14 Aug 89.

10 Jun 92/Stella Maris, Haifa, Israel
Stella Maris The 1967 war room of the Israeli Navy. An underground bunker built by the RAF during the Palestine Mandate and taken over by Israel in 1948.

10 Jun 92/Stella Maris, Haifa, Israel
LT Yotam Israeli Naval officer at Stella Maris.

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10 Jun 92/USO, Haifa, Israel
Gilla Gerzon In 1967 she was an 18 year old private in Moyedin who was on duty in the Herzlia intelligence base when the Liberty was attacked.(ATOI she ran the Haifa USO for visiting American and Canadian sailors)

10 Jun 92/Haifa, Israel
Naval Museum Israeli Naval Museum. See 11 Jan 90.

10 Jun 92/Haifa, Israel
[Chief of NavIntel] See 12 Jan 90.

10 Jun 92/Haifa, Israel
CDR Joe Almog See 11 Aug 89.

10 Jun 92/Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
MGEN Hertzel Bodinger Commander in Chief, Air Force of Israel.

10 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
[Kursa Flt Leader] In 1967, he was a Seran(CAPT IAF) and the flight leader of Kursa Flight. He made the first attack on U.S.S. Liberty.

10 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
CAPT E.C. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 89.

10 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Michael Bloch See 14 Aug 89.

10 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Danny Shapira See 21 Jun 90.

10 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
MAJ Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88.

11 Jun 92/Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Ilan Tal IDF Spokesman.

11 Jun 92/Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Moshe Fogel See 5 Jun 88.

11 Jun 92/Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
MAJ Natan Rothenberg Major, IDF, with IDF Spokesman's office.

11 Jun 92/Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Nachman Shai Former IDF Spokesman.

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11 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
Alon Pinkus Military writer for the Jerusalem Post.

11 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Matti Greenberg See 13 Aug 89.

11 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Avraham Ze'evi In 1967 he was Assistant G3. He was sent by GEN Rabin to accompany Defense Minister Dayan to Hebron on 8 Jun 1967. ATOI a Cabinet Minister and member of the Knesset.

11 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
Uri Meretz See 16 Jun 90.

11 Jun 92/TelCon-Tel Aviv, Israel
Moshe Barnea Naval Intelligence Officer at Stella Maris in 1967. He had night watch.

11 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

12 Jun 92/Tel Aviv and Haifa, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

12 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Oded Erez See 5 Jun 88.

13 Jun 92/Kochav Yair, Israel
MAJ Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88.

13 Jun 92/TelCon AJC/TLV-GG/Haifa
Gilla Gerzon See 10 Jun 92.

13 Jun 92/Tel Aviv, Israel
CAPT E.C. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 1989.

13 Jun 92/TelCon AJC/TLV-YBP/TLV, Israel
LCOL Yoel Ben-Porat IDF Intelligence Officer on duty at an intel center near the Kirya during the Liberty attack in 1967.

25 Jun 92/TelCon-AJC/Mia-RB/London, England
Rex Bloomstein See 1 Sep 89.

25 Jun 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, Va.
ADM Isaac C. Kidd,jr See 12 July 90.

25 Jun 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-ECC/Columbia, S.C.
CAPT E.C. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 89.

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26 Jun 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-REH/Arlington, VA
CAPT Raymond E. Hill — In 1967, CAPT Hill was Chief of Staff to RADM Geis, COMCARDIVFOUR. He was on the Flag Bridge of America from about 1435 on. RADM Geis was in OPCON.

27 Jun 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-YN/Mexico
CAPT Yaacov Nitzan — See 10, 11 & 12 August 1989.

2 Jul 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-RoyalFltLdr/Israel
[Royal Flt Ldr] — Flight Leader Royal was the pilot of the third aircraft to attack Liberty. He made the seventh run on the ship. He also was mainly responsible for its identification at 1412.

15 Jul 92/TelCon AJC/London-MH/London
Mary Horwood — See 28 Jul 89.

5 Aug 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-ML/Jerusalem
Micha Limor — Limor was a Reserve MTB commander who left the navy in 1962. In 1967 he was a war correspondent for Maariv and aboard MTB 204 at time of the attack. He wrote an article on the Liberty incident for Maariv which was reprinted in the New York Times on July 7, 1967 at p. 3. ATOI he was the director of Channel 2 TV in Israel.

6 Aug 92/LTRdtd26jun92AJCtoDM/TelCons5Aug&6Aug92 and FAX6Aug92DMtoAJC
MGEN Daniel Matt — ATOI MGEN Matt is the ombudsman for the IDF. It was suggested he might be the "GEN Beni Motti" (Dani Matti) referred to by Seth Mintz. MGEN Dani Matt confirms he is not and does not know Mintz or Dagan.

30 Sep 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-RoyalFltLdr/Israel
[Flt Ldr Royal] — See 2 Jul 92.

18 Oct 92/TelCon AJC/Mia-RoyalFltLdr/[Place not to be disclosed]
[Flt Ldr Royal] — See 2 Jul 92.

22 Oct 92/Fort Lauderdale, Florida
RADM Michael Ram — See 15 Oct 89.

23 Oct 92/Fort Lauderdale, Florida
RADM Michael Ram — See 15 Oct 89.

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24 Oct 92/Fort Lauderdale, Florida
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

26 Oct 92/Fort Lauderdale, Miami, Florida
Radm Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

29 Oct 92/Miami, FL
Alex Katz On October 31, 1956, as a ten year old boy, AK viewed the shelling of Haifa by Ibriham al Awal.

2 Nov 92/Mexico, D.F.
Nitzan, Yaacov See 10, 11, & 12 Aug 89.

3 Nov 92/Mexico, D.F.
Yaacov Nitzan See 10, 11, & 12 Aug 89.

4 Nov 92/Mexico, D.F.
Yaacov Nitzan See 10, 11, & 12 Aug 89.

24 Mar 92/Miami, FL
Dan Pincus See 22 Jan 91.

26 Mar 93/TelCon AJC/Miami-MS/Washington, D.C. Israeli Embassy
Michael Shiloh See 17 Aug 89.

29 Mar 93/TelCon AJC/FtLaud-CFS/Paris,France.
Carl F. Salins On September 21, 1967, Carl F. Salans, an attorney in the office of the legal advisor to the Department of State prepared a comparison of "the decision of the Israeli Judge....the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and the Clifford Report." ATOI he was the senior partner of an international law firm with offices in Paris, London, New York and Moscow.

9 Apr 93/TelCon AJC/Mia-McGB/NY
McGeorge Bundy McGB was appointed Special Consultant to the President and Executive Secretary of a Special Committee of the National Security Council on June 7, 1967.

19 Apr 93/New York, N.Y.
McGeorge Bundy In June 1967, LBJ called McG. B. to the White House as a Special Consultant on the Middle East. He had previously served as National Security Advisor to JFK as well as LJB. His appointment was announced to the press about 18 hours before the Liberty incident occurred. He was involved with the Predident on a daily basis.

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18 May 93/Miami, Florida
Dante Fascell In 1967 DF was a member of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee. He eventually became Chair of that Committee. He spent 38 years in congress.

1 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

2 June 93/U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel
CDR Thomas M Lukitich See 8 Jun 92.

2 June 93/The Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88.

2 June 93/Bet Sokolow, Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Moshe Fogel See 5 Jun 88.

2 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
Kursa Flight Leader See 10 Jun 92.

3 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

3 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
Avner Kore On June 8, 1967 AK was the Commanding Officer of MTB 207 with MTB Division 915.

4 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
Royal Flight Leader See 2 July 92.

4 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
AMB Ephraim Evron See 7 Jun 88.

4 Jun 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

5 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Danny Shapira See 21 Jun 90.

5 June 93/Kochav Yair, Israel
LCOL Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88.

5 June 93/Kochav Yair, Israel
COL David Yahav Deputy Military Advocate General of the IDF.

5 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

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6 June 93/The Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Ami Ayalon See 20 May 90. ATOI AA was Commander in Chief of the Navy of Israel.

6 June 93/The Kirya, Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Zeev Lachish Chief of Israel Air Force Archives and History.

6 June 93/Bet Sokolow, Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Moshe Fogel See 5 Jun 88.

6 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Danny Grossman See 7 Jun 88.

6 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Michael Bloch See 14 Aug 89.

6 June 93/TelCon AJC/TLV-UM/TLV
CDR Uri Meretz See 16 June 90.

6 June 93/TelCon AJC/TLV-SE/Caesarea
RADM Shlomo Erell See 16 Aug 89.

7 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Matti Greenberg See 13 Aug 89.

7 Jun 93/TelCon Tel Aviv, Israel
Kursa Flight Leader See 10 June 92.

7 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel, TelCon
Semis Harari On 8 June 1967 SH was a Nord 2501 pilot and flew the paratroops to Sharem al Sheik.

7 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
[CDR MTB 204] See 14 January 90.

8 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Oded Erez See 5 June 88.

8 June 93/Tel Con AJC/TLV-MS/Jerusalem
Meir Shamgar See 6 June 88.

8 June/93 TelCon Israel
[CDR MTB 203] See 11 January 90.

8 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

8 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Danny Shapira See 21 June 90.

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8 June 93/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Danny Grossman See 7 June 88.

13 June 93 TelCon AJC/Mia-JB/Brooklyn, N.Y.
John Borne See 7 June 91.

17 June 93/TelCon AJC/Mia-RK/DCA
Roy Kirk In 1991 RK investigated the Liberty Incident for the House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Sub Committee. ATIO he had returned to his regular position in the General Accounting Office.

18 June 93/TelCon AJC/Mia-WN/DCA
Warren Nelson Lead staffer of the House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Sub Committee. WN supervised the 1991 Liberty Incident investigation in conjunction with Congressman Nicholas Mavroules. He has top secret clearance and reviewed both the "Clifford Report" and the classified portions of NSA document #SRH-256.

7 July 93/TelCon AJC/Mia-MG/Boston, Mass
Matti Greenberg See 13 Aug 1989.

21 July/93 TelCon AJC/MIA-RK/Washington, D.C.
Roy Kirk See 28 Feb 92.

8 August 93/Yarmouth, Maine
John Hadden See 16 Oct 88.

18 August 93/Miami, Florida
Alicia Dorsie-Frank AD-F is the widow of CDR Thomas P. Frank who flew from America in an A-4 to aid Liberty. She has provided his flight log and her memory of his account of the Flight.

10 & 11 September 93/Miami, Florida
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

26 October 93/Telcon AJC/Mia-JB/Mia
John Bedrosian In 1967 he was a CIA analyst and was on duty at the CIA command center when the Pueblo incident occured.

15 November 93/Coral Gables, Florida, (North-South Center)
Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense in 1967.

16 November 93/Coral Gables, Florida
Robert S. McNamara See 15 Nov 93.

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17 November 93/TelCon AJC/Mia-AG/The Pentagon
Dr. Alfred Goldberg ATOI AG was the Historian for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is the author of "The First Fifty Years of the Pentagon"

17 December 93/TelCon AJC/Mia-RSMcN/Washington, D.C.
Robert McNamara See 15 Nov 93.

31 January 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr See 12 Jul 90.

5 March 94/Miami, FL
CAPT Ari Gavish ATOI Gavish was the Naval Attache' at the Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C.

9 March 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr See 12 Jul 90.

14 March 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-JG/Jacksonville, FL
Mrs. Lawrence Geis Mrs. Geis was married to Rear Admiral Geis in 1967 and discussed the Liberty event with him. RADM Geis died in 1981. ATOI she was remarried to CAPT Thomas Blackburn, USN (ret)

21 March 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr See 12 Jul 90.

23 March 94/Arlington, VA (The Pentagon)
Dr. Alfred Goldberg See 17 Nov 93.

23 March 94/Washington, D.C.
David Ginsburg DG was a personal friend and confidante of President Johnson. He relayed a message about the Liberty incident from DCM Evron to Nicholas Katzenbach.

24 March 94/Washington, D.C. Embassy of Israel
AMB Itmar Rabinovitch ATOI IR was the Ambassador of Israel to the United States. On June 8, 1967 he was on duty in the Kirya as an intelligence officer. He has no direct knowledge of the Liberty incident.

24 March 94/Washington, D.C.
CAPT Ari Gavish See 5 Mar 94.

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25 March 94/Washington, D.C. Hart Senate Office Bldg Suite 211
Al Cumming Staff member - Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

25 March 94/Alexandria, VA Hoffman Bldg - 9N33
David Maier Civilian staff - Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy - Investigations.

29 March 94/Exchange of Correspondence AJC/Mia-CRV/NY,NY
Cyrus R. Vance CRV was the number 2 at the DOD in June 1967 and SecDef directed that all press releases on Liberty be cleared by him.

29 March 94/Telcon AJC/Mia-JDW/Austin, TX, LBJ Library
John D. Wilson ATOI JDW was an Archivist at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

30 March 1994/Miami, Florida
Ruhama Hermon In 1967 RH was a captain (03) in the IDF attached to the general staff. On 8 June 1967 she was in the pit at the Kirya with Chief of Staff, Itzhak Rabin. ATOI she was the Consul General of Israel in Miami.

31 March 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-CM/Washington, D.C.
Clyde Mark Congressional Researcher at Library of Congress.

6 April 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-LH/Austin, TX
Linda Hansen ATOI LH was an Archivist at the LBJ Library.

11 April 94/Miami, Florida
MGEN Giora Romm ATIO GR was Defense Attache' at the Embassy of Israel in Washington. In June 1967 he was a Mirage IIIC pilot flying mostly air to air missions from Tel Nof and was the first Israeli to down five enemy aircraft.

18 April 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-HS/Washington, D.C.
Hugh Sidey In 1967, HS was a correspondent for Time/Life assigned to the presidency. He interviewed LBJ in the White House on June 9, 1967 and discused the Liberty. ATOI he was still a Time correspondent assigned to the presidency.

10 June 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 July 90.

16 June 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-DDE/Alexandria, VA
VADM Donald D. Engen See 3 May 1990.

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24 June 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-JH/Brunswick, Maine
John Hadden See 16 October 1988.

7 July 94/In the North Sea, aboard Statendam
Robert C. McFarlane RCMcF was the National Security Advisor to President Ronald Regan. He is an expert on the Middle East. He has no personal connection to the Liberty incident but was very helpful in providing sources of information.

2 August 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 July 90.

6 August 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-JFB/San Diego, CA
CDR Joseph F. Bouchard CDR Bouchard completed a dissertation at Stanford "Use of Naval Force in Crises" and published a book "Command in Crises" both of which involve the Liberty incident.

27 August 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 July 90.

31 August 94/Washington, D.C.
Joseph J. Sisco In 1967 JJS was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations.

31 August 94/Embassy of Israel, Washington D.C.
CAPT Machita Mor Naval Attache' of Israel

1 September 94/Arab Republic of Egypt, Military Mission, Washington, D.C.
MGEN A. Z. M. H. Abdin ATOI MGEN Ahmed Zaki Mohamed Hassan Abdin was the Defense Attache' of the Arab Republic of Egypt. In June 1967 he was a junior officer fighting in the Sinai.

1 September 94/Washington, D.C.
VADM Donald D. Engen See 3 May 90.

12 September 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-JFB/aboard U.S.S. Oldendorf in SDV
CDR Joseph F. Bouchard See 6 Aug 94.

16 September 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-JFB/aboard U.S.S. Oldendorf in SDV
CDR Joseph F. Bouchard See 6 Aug 94.

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16 September 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-JB/Mia
John Bedrosian See 26 Oct 93.

20 September 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-JB/Brooklyn, N.Y.
John Borne See 7 June 91.

22 September 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-AZMHA/Washington, D.C.
MGEN A. Z. M. H. Abdin See 1 Sep 94.

14 October 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-AG/The Pentagon
Dr. Alfred Goldberg See 17 Nov 93.
17 October 94/U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel
CDR R. A. Holzknecht U.S. Naval Attache, Tel Aviv

17 October 94/U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel
LCDR Richard Weiner Assistant U.S. Naval Attache, Tel Aviv

17 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 October 89.

18 October 94/National Center Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt
MGEN Ahmed M. Halim ATOI AH was retired and head of the military unit at the National Center for Middle East Studies. In 1967 he commanded an armor unit in Baghdad.

18 October 94/National Center Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt
AMB Mahmoud Kassem ATOI MK had just retired as Ambassador to Canada. On June 8, 1967 he was in the foreign ministry and at the office of President Nasser.

18 October 94/National Center Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt
MGEN Ahmed Fakhr In 1967 F was in command of a SAM-2 unit at El Arish. On 7 Jun his unit withdrew to the Suez canal. ATOI F was Director of the Center.

18 October 94/National Center Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt
Dr. Aly Sadek ATOI AS was Deputy Director of the Center. On June 8, 1867 he was an international lawyer at Egyptian general headquarters with President Nasser.

18 October 94/TelCon AJC/Cairo-AH/Heliopolis
Amin Hewedi ATIO AH was a member of the Center. On June 8, 1967 he was Chief of Intelligence for the

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Egyptian Armed Forces and after the 67 war he also became Defense Minister.

18 October 94/U.S. Embassy, Cairo, Egypt
CAPT Gordon Smith ATOI GS was the U. S. Naval Attache in Cairo.

19 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
Rafi Har-Lev In 1967 RH-L was Deputy Commander of the Israeli Air Force. ATOI he was President of El Al Airlines.

19 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Danny Shapira See 21 June 90.

19 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 October 89.

19 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Meir Elran In 1967 ME was a junior officer in intelligence. He later became chief of intelligence. ATOI he was on the Israeli/Jordanian peace negotiation team.

20 October 94/Haifa, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 October 89.

20 October 94/Haifa, Israel
RADM Ami Ayalon See 20 May 90.

20 October 94/Haifa, Israel
RADM Shlomo Erell See 16 Aug 89.

20 October 94/Haifa, Israel
RADM Zeev Almog See 27 Feb 92.

20 October 94/Haifa, Israel
RADM Biny Telem On June 8, 1967 BT was in the navy command center at Stella Maris standing behind CAPT Issy Rehav. In 1973 he was chief of the Navy.

20 October 94/Haifa, Israel
Ezer Weizman ATOI EW was President of Israel. See 17 January 90.

20 October 94/at sea off Port Said, Egypt
[Chief, Naval Intel] ATOI Chief of Naval Intelligence. In 1967 he was in school.

21 October 94/at sea off Port Said, Egypt
RADM Biny Telem See 20 October 94.

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21 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 October 89.

22 October 94/flew to northern Israel and the Golan
COL Danny Shapira See 21 Jun 90.

22 October 94/Herzilia, Israel
LCOL Danny Grossman See 7 June 88.

22 October 94/Herzilia, Israel
CAPT Ari Gavish See 5 March 94.

23 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
BGEN Oded Erez See 5 June 88.

23 October 94/TelCon AJC/Tel Aviv-AB/Tel Aviv, Isreal
RADM Avraham Botzer AB became chief of the navy after Shlomo Erell.

23 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
CAPT Yaacov Nitzan See 10,11,12 August 89.

23 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
COL Danny Shapira See 21 June 90.

23 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
Gila Gerzon See 10 June 92.

24 October 94/U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel
CDR R.A. Holzknecht See 17 October 94.

24 October 95/U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel
LCDR Richard Weiner See 17 October 94.

24 October 94/TelCon AJC/Tel Aviv-AB/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Avraham Botzer See 23 October 94.

24 October 94/TelCon AJC/Tel Aviv-MF/Tel Aviv, Israel
LCOL Moshe Fogel See 5 June 88.

24 October 94/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 October 89.

18 November 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-ICkjr/Alexandria, Va
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 July 90.

21 November 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-AZMHA/Washington, D.C.
MGEN A.Z.M.H. Abdin See 1 Sep 94.

29 November 94 Miami, Florida
AMB Itmar Rabinovich See 24 Mar 94.

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30 November 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-MR/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

13 December 94/TelCon AJC/Mia-AZMHA/Washington, D.C.
MGEN A.Z.M.H. Abdin See 1 Sep 94.

16 DECEMBER 94 Miami, Florida
AMB Adnan S. Abu Odeh Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations.

23 January 95 Jacksonville, Florida
ADM Jonathan T. Howe ATOI ADM JTH had recently retired from the navy. He served as Deputy National Security Advisor, CINCUSNAVEUR and CinC of the U.S. Operation in Somalia. He is the author of "Multicrises" (1971) which includes substantial research on the Liberty incident.

7 February 95/TelCon AJC/Mia-AG/The Pentagon
Dr. Alfred Goldberg See 17 Nov 93.

14 February 95 Miami, Florida
Alicia Dorsie-Frank See 18 Aug 93.

16 February 95 Miami, Florida
RADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

19 February 95 Miami Beach, Florida
RADM Micha Ram See 15 Oct 89.

21 March 95 TelCon AJC/Mia-JH/Brunswick, Maine
John Hadden See 16 Oct 88.

27 March 95 TelCon AJC/Mia-ECC/Columbia, SC
CAPT E.C. Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 89.

29 March 95 TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 Jul 90.

2 April 95 TelCon AJC/Mia-JFBjr/Falls Church, VA
CDR Joseph F. Bouchard See 6 Aug 94.

6 April 95 Cambridge, Massachusetts (Harvard-JFK School)
CAPT Frank Snyder On 8 Jun 67 FS was Sixth Fleet Communications Officer aboard U.S.S. Little Rock. He heard some of the HiCOM from Liberty. ATOI FS was a Professor Emeritus at Naval War College, Newport, RI.

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10 April 95 TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 Jul 90.

18 April 95 TecCon AJC/Mia-RG/Austin Texas
Regina Greenwell ATOI RG was a Aenior Archivist at the LBJ Library.

27 April 95 Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 Jul 90.

27 June 95 National Maritime Intelligence Center, Suitland, MD
Norman Polmar Internationally known naval warfare analyst.

19 July 1995 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, Rhode Island
Captain Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 95.

19 July 1995 TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 July 90.

28 July 1995 TelCon AJC/Mia-DG/Washington, D.C.
David Ginsburg See 23 March 94.

21 September 1995 TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 July 90.

26 September 1995 TelCon AJC/Mia-BK/Ashland, Oregon
Brad Knickerbocker On 8 Jun 67, BK was an A-4 pilot in VA-216 embarked aboard Saratoga. He was armed and ready to assist Liberty but he did not launch. ATOI BK was a staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor.

3 October 1995 TelCon AJC/Mia-RG/Austin, Texas
Regina Greenwell See 18 Apr 95.

12 October 1995 Coral Gables, Florida
AMB Fayez A. Tarawneh ATOI FAT was the Ambassador of Jordan to the U.S. and Head of the Jordanian Delegation to the Middle East Peace talks.

13 October 1995 Miami Beach, Florida
AMB Fayez A. Tarawenh See 12 Oct 95.

13 October 1995 Miami Beach, Florida
MGEN Ron Goren ATOI RG was Chief of Manpower for the IDF. In June 1967 as segan he flew Vatours.

16 October 1995 TelCon AJC/Mia-JFB/Arlington, VA(Pentagon)
Joseph F. Bouchard See 6 Aug 94.

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16 October 1995 TelCon AJC/Miami-YT-C/Tel Aviv, Israel
Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto On June 8, 1967 at about 1200 Noon, While returning from a missle suppression mission over Port Said YT-C overflew Liberty at 30,000 ft flying a Vatour.

17 October 1995 TelCon AJC/Mia-BK/Ashland, Oregon
Brad Knickerbocker See 25 Sep 95.

24 October 95 TelCon AJC/Miami-DH-M/London, England
David Hudson-Millman See 28 July 89.

3 Nov 95 TelCon AJC/Mia-RG/Austin, TX
Regina Greenwell See 18 April 95.

5 Nov 95 Arlington, VA
CDR Joseph F. Bouchard See 6 Aug 94.

10 Nov 95 TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd,jr. See 12 Jul 90.

18 Nov 95 TelCon AJC/Mia-PETjr/Pensacola, Florida
RADM Paul E. Tobin,jr. In 1967 PETjr was a LTJG and chief engineering officer on the DD Davis. He went aboard Liberty on the morning of 9 June 67 and got her underway. He received the bronze star for his efforts. ATOI PETjr was Vice Chief of Naval Education and Training.

5 Jan 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-AB/Mia
Avi Bitan In 1967 AB was in FIGHTER SQUADRON 101/113?, the squadron that launched Kursa Flight. He retired as a Tat Aluf.

10 Feb 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. See 12 Jul 90.

13 May 96 Miami, FL
COL Raanan Gissin See 7 Jun 88.

6 Jun 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, Rhode Island
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 1995.

12 Jun 96 Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 1995.

12 Jun 96 Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
RADM Robert P. Hilton,Sr. In June 1967 RPH,Sr. was the commanding officer of the

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U.S.S. Davis, the first U.S. destroyer to reach U.S.S. Liberty on June 9, 1967. ATOI he was on the staff of the Institute for Defense Analyses.

13 Jun 96 Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 1995.

13 Jun 96 Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
RADM Robert Hilton,Sr. See 12 Jun 1996.

5 Sep 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, Rhode Island
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 95.

5 Sep 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-FJF/McLean, VA-FS/Newport, RI
RADM F. J. Fitzpatrick Francis J. Fitzpatrick was the number 2 person on the JCS Fact Finding Team with BGEN Russ. FJP was Deputy J-6 in 1967.

12 Sep 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-FJF/McLean, VA
RADM F. J. Fitzpatrick See 5 Sep 96.

12 Sep 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, RI
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 95.

11 Oct 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-FJF/Alexandria, VA
RADM F.J. Fitzpatrick See 5 Sep 96.

11 Oct 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-ICK,JR/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd,jr. See 12 Jul 90.

25 Oct 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, RI
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 95.

28 Oct 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-MR/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Michael Ram See 15 Oct 89.

28 Oct 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-AP/London, England
Adrian Pennink See 28 Jul 89.

29 Oct 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-AP/London, England
Adrian Pennink See 28 Jul 89.

4 Dec 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-JS/Washington, DC
COL Joel Singer See 6 June 1988.

10 Dec 96 TelCon AJC/Mia-WB/San Diego, CA
CAPT Ward Boston See 23 July 1990.

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28 Feb 97 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, RI
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 95.

10 Mar 97 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, RI
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 95.

1 Apr 97 TelCon AJC/Mia-AY/Askelon, Israel
Ahron Yifrach See 15 Jun 90.

7 Apr 97 TelCon AJC/Mia-AY/Askelon, Israel
Ahron Yifrach See 15 Jun 90.

15 April 97 TelCon AJC/Mia-EC/Columbia, SC
CAPT Ernest Castle See 14 & 15 Jan 89.

24 April 97 TelCon AJC/Mia-MR/Tel Aviv, Israel
RADM Micha Ram See 18 Oct 89.

8 May 97 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, RI
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 95.

13 May 97 TelCon AJC/Mia-FS/Newport, RI
CAPT Frank Snyder See 6 Apr 95.

16 May 97 TelCon AJC/MIA-ICKjr/Alexandria, VA
ADM Isaac C. Kidd See 12 Jul 90.

[Dates not to be disclosed]/[Places not to be disclosed]
[CIA Station Chief] CIA Station Chief, Tel Aviv, Israel in June 1967.

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APPENDIX II

TIME LINE

Liberty Incident 8 June 1967

Sinai Area. Bravo (B) time zone. Local time is Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) plus 2 hours.
GMT Greenwich Mean Time. Zulu time zone.
DCA Washington, D.C. Normal Washington time is Eastern Standard Time (EST) and is Greenwich Mean Time minus 5 hours.

On June 8, 1967, Washington was on Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) which is Greenwich Mean Time minus 4 hours. Thus Washington time was 6 hours earlier than Sinai time. In recent years, Israel has adopted Daylight Time but does not always change on the same day as the United States. Thus today, time differential is usually seven hours except for the few days when the United States and Israel are out of sequence.

The time line lists in chronological order the significant events that occurred from January 1967 through 16 December 1980. The first time column is in local time off the coast of Sinai. The second column is Greenwich Mean Time. (All naval messages use date/time groups in Z or GMT). The third column is Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) which is six hours earlier than local Sinai Time and four hours earlier than Greenwich Mean Time. When Washington, D.C. is on Eastern Standard Time (EST) the differential between Washington and Sinai is seven rather than six hours. In some instances where a reference source states "in the morning" or "in the afternoon" an arbitrary time has been estimated and indicated by "E" after such time. When the source indicates an approximate time it is indicated by "A" after such time. An * before an endnote indicates varying reports on the exact time the described event occurred. The variations are described in the endnote. The time line reflects the author's conclusion as to the precise time. There are no instances where the variations are important.

LIBERTY/GMT/EDT +2 Z -4	EVENT
1967	
Jan, Feb, Mar	Terrorist intrusions into northern Israel across the Syrian border increase. Retaliation and counter retaliation escalates from fire fights to tank and artillery duels.[1]

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7 Apr	Israel shoots down six Syrian MIG aircraft.[2]
11 May	U Thant speaks at UN and warns of the Middle East erupting into World War III.[3] Israel briefed foreign military attache's at Tel Aviv.[4]
14 May	Egyptian Forces put on full alert.[5]
15 May	Egyptian Forces begin moving en mass into the Sinai. 30,000 troops, 200 tanks.[6] Israel celebrates Independence Day (Yom Ha'atzmaut).[7]
16 May 2200 2000 1600	UN General Rikhye, at Gaza, receives a note from the Egyptian Chief of Staff, requesting immediate withdrawal of the UNEF from Sinai.[8]
17 May	Egyptian Forces reach El Sabha and El Amr, UNEF posts near the Sinai/Israeli border.[9]
18 May	Egyptian Foreign Minister, in Cairo, tells Ambassadors of India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark and Norway that UNEF forces must withdraw.[10] HMS Hermes departs Aden for Singapore.[11]
1800 1600 1200	Egyptian Ambassador at UN requests UNEF withdrawal.[12]
19May 18May 18May 0100 2300 1900	U Thant cables Cairo. UNEF will be withdrawn.[13]
19May 19May 1700 1500 1100	UNEF ordered withdrawn. Israel advised.[14] Israel orders large scale mobilization.[15]
20 May	Syrian Defense Minister, Hafez Assad speaks of "a disciplinary blow to Israel."[16]
21A May	Egypt occupies Sharm el-Sheik.[17]
21 May	Egypt announces total mobilization and accepts Iraq's offer to send troops.[18]

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22 May			U Thant leaves New York for Cairo.[19] President Nasser orders **BLOCKADE** of Straits of Tiran.[20]
23 May			President Nasser announces **BLOCKADE** of the Straits of Tiran.[21] U Thant arrives in Cairo after **BLOCKADE** is announced.[22] Israel and the United States make statements on the blockade. The Soviet Union makes a formal statement on the crises threatening the Soviet Union will provide "strong opposition" to aggression.[23] U.N. Security Council meets in New York.[24]
	22 May		
0345	0145	2145	Israeli Chief of Staff, Rabin is awakened with word of the **BLOCKADE.**[25] Sixth Fleet carriers ordered to eastern Med. HMS Victorious enters Med via Suez. U.S.S.R. requests passage for ten warships to Med.[26]
24May	24May	23May	
0330	0130	2130	Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, leaves for Paris. Meets with President de Gaulle. Goes on to London. Meets with Prime Minister Wilson.[27] U Thant, President Nasser and General Rikhye meet in Cairo.[28] U.S.S. Liberty ordered to Eastern Med.[29] British Forces alerted in Med.[30]
	24 May		
1630	1430	1030	UN Security Council convenes in emergency session in New York.[31]
25May	25May	25May	Iraqi troops arrive in Syria.[32] Cairo announces: "The Irrevocable will of the Arab peoples is to wipe Israel off the face of the earth.[33]
27May	26May	26May	
0100	2100	1900	Foreign Minister Eban meets President Johnson at the White House.[34] Egyptian Defense Minister Badran meets with Soviet leaders in Moscow.[35]
28May	28May	28May	Secretary Rusk advises Israel that the U.S. and Britain were working on a naval escort plan and Holland and Canada had promised to join.[36] Israeli cabinet votes in favor of a further short wait.[37]

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Prime Minister Eshkol makes "stumbling" speech to the nation.[38] Damascus announces: The elimination of Israel is the imperative goal."[39]

30 May — President Nasser declares, "The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel." King Hussein of Jordan flies to Cairo.[40] Egypt and Jordan sign a mutual defense pact.[41] Jordanian troops are placed under Egyptian command.[42] Premier Eshkol assured President Johnson that Israel would wait as much as two weeks for international action to open the Gulf of Aqaba.[43] U.S.S.R. announces augmentation of Mediterranean Fleet.[44] Prime Minister Wilson of Great Britain confers with President Johnson about a declaration on freedom of navigation.[45]

31 May — Liberty arrives at Rota, Spain.[46] President Nasser announced that his Vice President, Zakaria Mohieddin would visit Washington on June 7, 1967.[47] U.S.S. Intrepid departs Med for Vietnam. HMS Hermes at Aden.[48]

1 Jun — Moshe Dayan appointed Minister of Defense.[49] Menachem Begin also joined the government.[50] Liberty receives change to MOVORD 7-67.[51]

2 Jun
1430 1230 0830 — Liberty sails from Rota, Spain en route to 32-00N, 33-00E.[52] ETA on station 080300Z[53] France expresses strong reservations about Anglo-American declaration on freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran.[54] United States Air Force F-105 aircraft, by mistake, strafe and bomb the U.S.S.R. merchant ship, Turkestan, in the port of Cam Pha, North Viet Nam.[55] U.S. ASW task force ordered to the Med.[56]

3 Jun — Soviet Ambassador in Cairo tells President Nasser that Israel's non-resistance is assured.[57]

4 Jun — Israeli Cabinet votes unanimously to go to war.[58] Iraqi delegation signs defense

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	pact with Egypt in Cairo. Iraqi troops placed under Egyptian command.[59]
5 Jun	
0715 0515 0115	Israel launches preemptive strike.[60] Israeli Air Force strafes UN convoy in vicinity of Kahn Yunis, killing three Indian soldiers. Also two UNEF camps came under artillery fire. (8 killed - 14 wounded)[61]
1240 1040 0640	Hot Line message from U.S.S.R.[62]
1305 1105 0705	White House releases appeal to all parties to bring about cease-fire.[63]
1400 1200 0800	Hot Line message from U.S.S.R.[64]
1447 1247 0847	Hot Line message from U.S. to U.S.S.R.[65]
1630 1430 1030	UN Security Council assembles in New York.[66]
1630A 1430A 1030A	Hot Line message U.S. to U.S.S.R.[67]
1900A 1700A 1300A	Israeli Naval force of one DD and several MTB's attacked Egyptian OSSA missile boats off Port Said.[68]
2215 2015 1615	Commander Sixth Fleet orders all surface and air units to stand off at least 100 miles from the coasts of all belligerent nations.[69]
6 Jun	
0020 2220 1820	Hot Line message U.S.S.R. to U.S.[70]
0030 2230 1830	U.N. unanimous vote on cease-fire.[71]
0437 0237 2037	Cairo radio broadcasts: "It has been fully proved some British and U.S. aircraft are carrying out wide scale activities in helping Israel."[72]
1200A 1000A 0600A	Six Israeli frogmen captured at Alexandria.[73]
1400A 1200 0800	President Nasser charges U.S. and Great Britain with air war intervention; breaks diplomatic relations with U.S.[74]; closes the Suez Canal.[75] President Nasser summoned the Soviet Ambassador and

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			complained that the Americans had taken part in the destruction of the Egyptian Air Force.[76] Syria attacks and shells northern Israeli border settlements.[77] Israel moves to within 18 miles of Suez Canal, captures Jerusalem and West Bank.[78] Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria break diplomatic relations with U.S.[79]
2100A	1900A	1500A	Israeli Navy attacks Egyptian submarine off Rosh Hanikra (Lebanese border).[80] Israeli Navy attacks one Egyptian submarine south of Haifa and one near Ashdod.[81]
7Jun 0201	7Jun 0001	6Jun 2001	USS Liberty CHOPS from CINCUSEUR TO CDR6thFLT.[82]
0300	0100	2100	Hot Line message U.S. to U.S.S.R.[83]
0800	0600	7Jun 0200	Liberty position 33-04.5N, 28-32.1E.[84] Egyptian shelling attack from sea in Gaza area reported by IDF.[85]
1200	1000	0600	Liberty position 32-56.1N, 29-29.1E.[86]
2000	1800	1400	Liberty position 32-06.8N, 31-23.1E.[87] Iraq breaks diplomatic relations with the U.S.[88]
8Jun 0000	7Jun 2200	7Jun 1800	Liberty position 31-59N, 32-24E.[89]
0030	2230	1830	**MSG** 072230Z Jun 67 FM JCS TO CINCEUR directing initial pullback drafted.[90]
0041	2241	1841	**MSG** 072230Z released to the Army Communications center in the Pentagon.[91]
0055	2255	1855	**MSG** 072230Z transmitted.[92]
0100	2300	1900	Liberty position 31-59N, 32-35E.[93]
0139	2339	1939	JCS became more concerned about safety of Liberty.[94]
0150	2350	1950	**TELCON MSG** JCS (Major Breedlove)[95] telephone call to CINCUSNAVEUR duty officer (CAPT Hanley)[96] and verbally

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			ordered Liberty to be withdrawn to no closer than 100 miles.[97] (Hanley requested a formal message.[98]
8Jun 0200	8Jun 0000	7Jun 2000	Liberty position 31-58.5N, 32-47.8E.[99]
0300	0100	2100	Liberty position 31-58N, 33-00E.[100]
0310	0110	2110	**MSG** **IMMEDIATE** 080110Z Directed Liberty to remain 100 miles clear and canceled MSG 072230ZJun67.[101]
0400	0200	2200	Liberty position 31-57N, 33-10E.[102]
0410	0210	2210	IAF morning Nord 2501 reconnaissance aircraft launches.[103]
0411	0211	2211	**MSG** 080110Z Transmitted to CINCEUR.[104]
0412	0212	2212	**MSG** 080110Z Received by CINCEUR.[105]
0500	0300	2300	Liberty position 31-47N, 33-20E.[106]
0514	0314	2314	Sunrise.[107]
0525	0325	2325	**MSG** 080110Z Relayed by telephone to CINCUSNAVEUR.[108]
0545	0345	2345	Israeli Nord 2501 sights Liberty.[109] Liberty changes course and then returns to course.[110]
0550	0350	2350	Israeli Naval HQ receives a report from Nord that "probably a destroyer is sailing in the direction of Gaza, course 120."[111] **MSG** 080110Z Transmitted by Army communications in the Pentagon to Liberty as information addressee.[112]
8Jun 0600	8Jun 0400	8Jun 0000	Liberty position 31-41N, 33-30E.[113] Israeli Navy HQ orders two MTBs to standby.[114]
0603	0403	0003	Second report from Nord received.[115] Ship identified as U.S. Navy ship.[116]
0615	0415	0015	**MSG** 080415Z FM CDR6thFLT to CINCUSNAVEUR acknowledged receipt of 080110Z.[117]

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0655	0455	0045	**MSG** 080455Z FM CINCUSNAVEUR to CDR6thFLT confirmed CDR6thFLT receipt of 08110Z.[118]
0700	0500	0100	Liberty position 31-38N, 33-35E.[119]
0718	0518	0118	**MSG** 08455Z Received by CDR6thFLT.[120]
0800	0600	0200	Liberty position 31-34N, 33-50.8 E.[121]
0825	0625	0225	**MSG** 080110Z Released by CINCEUR.[122]
0830	0630	0230	Liberty reports position 31.27.2N, 34-00E, Point Alpha.*[123]
0850	0650	0250	Liberty reports being orbited by two delta wing jets.[124]
0900	0700	0300	Liberty sends msg to 6th Fleet.[125]
0935	0735	0335	**MSG** 080110Z Received at CINCUSNAVEUR and CDR6thFLT.[126]
0900	0600	0300	Israeli Navy Chief is advised of Liberty sighting at 0603 position during a break in action with Egyptian submarine off Atlit. He orders it marked neutral.[127]
0930	0630	0330	Liberty makes visual sighting on minaret at El Arish.[128]
0940	0740	0340	Israeli DD's Jaffa & Eilat ordered to investigate ship off El Arish.[129]
0941	0741	0341	Israeli pilot debrief reports "target" aiming at El Arish. Pilot not sure if he was fired upon.[130]
0942	0742	0342	Israeli DD's called back to their positions.[131]
1000	0800	0400	Liberty position 31-27N, 33-51E.[132]
1025	0825	0425	Jordan accepts cease fire.[133]
1056	0856	0456	Liberty reported a Nord 2501 aircraft circled the ship.[134]
1100	0900	0500	CDR Lunz gives order to erase Liberty from CCC control table at Stella Maris.[135] Liberty position 31-24N, 33-41E.[136]

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			Liberty reports to Naval Security Station Command that she has destroyed all superseded May publications.[137]
1117	0917	0517	COMSIXTHFLEET releases **MSG** ordering Liberty at least 100 miles away from the coast. Message not transmitted until 1035Z and not received by Liberty prior to the attack.[138]
1120	0920	0520	MTB Div 914 sails from Ashdod to patrol from Ashdod to Askelon.[139]
1124	0924	0524	Navy HQ receives report from Air Ops that El Arish is being shelled from the Sea.[140]
1127	0927	0527	GHQ Tel Aviv receives report from Southern Command that a ship is shelling El Arish.[141]
1130	0930	0530	Liberty achieves Point Bravo, 31-31N, 33-00E, changes course to 283 degrees.[142]
1145	0945	0545	GHQ Tel Aviv receives second report of Ship activity off El Arish.[143]
1158	0958	0558	MHMSPI [acronym referring to someone in high command] reports two targets aiming at El Arish.[144]
1159	0959	0559	Liberty sights explosions at El Arish.[145]
1200	1000	0600	Liberty position 31-22.2N, 33-41.1E. Heading 283 degrees, speed 5 knots.[146] U.S.S. America position 33-54.6N, 520.1E.[147] U.S.S. Saratoga position 34-15.2N, 23-39.3E.[148] U.S.S. Little Rock position 35-51.5N, 24.5E.[149]
1205	1005	0605	Navy second in command orders MTB 914 to proceed in the direction of El Arish.[150]
1215	1015	0615	MTB Division 914 receives orders to patrol 20 miles north of El Arish.[151]
1235	1035	0635	**MSG** 080917 FM CDR6thFLT TO Liberty, ordering her to remain 100 miles clear transmitted from U.S.S. Little Rock to Army DCS station at Asmara for forwarding to Liberty.[152]

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1259	1059	0659	Garbled **MSG** 080110Z placed on fleet broadcast.[153]
1300	1100	0700	Liberty sighted explosion on coastline, range 13 miles.[154] Liberty position 31-23N, 33-35E.[155]
1310	1110	0710	Captain of Liberty orders General Quarters. GQ All hands man your battle stations.[156]
1317	1117	0717	MTB advised by Navy HQ of the shelling of El Arish.[157]
1318	1118	0718	MTB Division reported to be 22 miles west of Ashdod.[158]
1330	1130	0730	Liberty sights explosion on coast, range 25 miles.[159] Israeli Navy HQ advises Oren of shelling of El Arish from sea.*[160]
1341	1141	0741	MTB Division detects target on its radar at extreme range.[161]
1342	1142	0742	IAF plane reports 3 MTB in flames off Khan Yunis.[162]
1345	1145	0745	MTB Div ordered to go in and identify target.[163]
1345	1145	0745	Liberty secures from General Quarters, set modified condition 3. Takes radar fix on El Arish minaret, bearing 142 degrees true, 25.5 miles.[164]
1347	1147	0747	MTB reports target sailing west at 30 knots. Told to double check speed. MTB Division reports they can not chase it, suggests dispatch of Air.[165]
1348	1148	0748	Navy asks Air Force for Air assistance.[166] Liberty secures from General Quarters.[167]
1349	1149	0749	Captain McGonagle compliments the Liberty crew on a fine battle stations drill. Black smoke obscures El Arish.[168]
1350	1150	0750	MTB Div reports target at 17 miles, speed 28 knots. MTB Div requests Air. Aircraft

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			dispatched. Div told to tune air frequencies.[169]
1355	1155	0755	MTB Div 914 reports target turned to course 300.[170]
1359	1159	0759	Div 914 asked if they can see planes. Response, they hear planes.[171]
1400	1200	0800	Air attack commenced.*[172] Liberty position 31-35.5N,33-29E. (SECDEF Msg 082248Z) **MSG** 080917Jun67 FM CDR6thFLT TO LIBERTY ordering 100 mile pullback arrived at Army DCS station Asmara.[173]
1401	1201	0801	MTBs ordered to proceed fast to target.[174]
1403	1203	0803	Liberty deck log reports a loud explosion portside amidships.[175]
1404	1204	0804	Kursa Flight leaves Liberty.[176] MTB Div reports two more targets east of previous target. Aircraft hit one target. The two new targets are aircraft.[177]
1405	1205	0805	Liberty sounds General Quarters. Large fire near frame 85-01 All ahead flank.[178]
1406	1206	0806	Royal Flight attacks Liberty.[179] MTB Div reports range to target 11 miles, requests aircraft leave area.[180]
1408	1208	0808	MTB Div reports range 8.5 miles.[181]
1411	1211	0811	MTB Div 914 is advised that the planes are on their final run and now the MTBs are to attack.[182]
1412	1212	0812	Col Kislev orders Royal flight "Leave her." The air attack is over.[183] MTB Div reports it seems aircraft have left.[184]
1414	1214	0814	Aircraft reports seeing P 30 on ship. MTB range 5 to 6 miles. MTB Div going in. Air Force reports ship marked C T R 5.[185]
1417	1217	0817	Air Force reports men jumping over side of Ship. Air Force is sending rescue

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helicopters. MTB DIV told not to attack, possible mis-identification. Might need to give help.[186]

1418 1218 0818 — MTB Div CDR orders torpedo attack.[187]

1420 1220 0820 — Air Command at Kirya tells Naval Command at Stella Maris that there is doubt about identification.[188] Stella Maris orders MBT not to attack.[189] Chief of Israeli Navy (No. 1) arrives at Stella Maris command post.[190]

1423 1223 0823 — MTB Div reports no clear eyeball identification. Range to target is 4 miles (8,000 yards).[191]

1424 1224 0824 — Liberty lookout sights MTB Division.[192] MTB Div CDR reports ship may be commercial or a supply vessel. Not sure.[193]

1425 1225 0825 — MTB Div 914 arrives at about 1 mile.*[194]

1427 1227 0827 — MTB Division tries to signal Liberty.*[195] Liberty fires on motor torpedo boats.[196]

1432 1232 0832 — Liberty sends Flash message to CNO via "HI COM" Liberty under attack at 31-23N, 33-25E.[197] First message of attack received by Saratoga. COM CAR DIV 4 assumed tactical command of TF60.[198]

1433 1233 0833 — MTB Div reports target looks commercial.[199]

1434 1234 0834 — One torpedo passed astern Liberty.[200]

1435 1235 0835 — USS Saratoga relays Liberty message to CTF 60 (Saratoga msg 081235Z Jun 67)[201] Sara advises Car Div it will launch ready aircraft. Liberty lost electrical power.*[202]

1437 1237 0837 — Torpedo strikes Liberty.[203] Saratoga relays from Liberty, "UNIDENTIFIED GUN BOATS APPROACHING ... NOW"[204]

1440 1240 0840 — Liberty observes Hull number 206 on one MTB.[205] Liberty dead in the water.[206]

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1445	1245	0845	Saratoga relays from Liberty, "UNDER ATTACK AND HIT BADLY", "HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD SIDE LISTING BADLY NEED ASSISTANCE"[207]
1449	1249	0849	IDF orders search for survivors.[208]
1450	1250	0850	Sara launches "Ready Group" of aircraft.*[209]
1500	1300	0900	RADM Geis recalls Sara aircraft.[210]
1503	1303	0903	MTB offers help to Liberty.*[211]
1507	1307	0907	Helicopters bearing 'Star of David' approach Liberty to within 500 yards and hover.*[212]
1511	1311	0911	CINCEUR telephones NMCC in pentagon and advises of the attack.*[213]
1515	1315	0915	NMCC telephones NSA and advises of the attack.[214]
1516	1316	0916	CTF60 implemented CDR6FLT order to "destroy or drive off any attackers who are clearly making attacks on the Liberty."[215]
1519	1319	0919	Liberty's power is restored, (except rudder). Fires extinguished.[216]
1520	1320	0920	MTB Division Commander advises Navy HQ at Stella Maris that ship is identified as American.*[217] CDR6FLT informs CINCEUR of attack and that aircraft are deployed. ETA on scene "1715".[218]
1534	1334	0934	Liberty listing to starboard 9&1/2 degrees.[219]
1537	1337	0937	Three MTBs approach starboard side to range of 5 miles.*[220]
1549	1349	0949	CDR6FLT relayed to CNO & CINCUSNAVEUR his instructions to America and Saratoga on use of force.[221] NSC Advisor W.W. Rostow advises President Johnson by telephone that Liberty is under attack.[222] COMSIXTHFLT advises USCINCEUR that Israel advised USDAO of erroneously attacking U.S. ship. Israelis send abject apologies.[223]

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1550	1350	0950	Rostow memo to President.[224]
1600	1400	1000	LCOL Michael Bloch of the IDF advises CDR Ernest E. Castle, U.S. Naval Attache' of mistaken attack. Castle immediately sends Flash message to White House, NMCC and others.[225] Liberty communications restored.[226]
1610	1410	1010	CTF63 recommends that Fleet Ocean Tug Papago, ATF-160 be sent to aid Liberty.[227]
1614	1414	1014	Rostow phones President but call not taken.[228] USDAO, Tel Aviv message to White House. ALUSNA advised Israelis erroneously [*sic*] attacked U.S. ship.[229]
1615	1415	1015	Rostow memo to President.[230]. U.S. advises Soviet Charge' of attack on Liberty and dispatch of aircraft to scene.[231]
1624	1424	1024	Rostow talks to President by telephone.[232]
1625	1425	1025	CDRSIXTHFLT advises CINCUSNAVEUR "UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH LIBERTY ON ANY CIRCUIT".[233]
1630	1430	1030	Sara launches second "Ready Group" of aircraft.
1633	1433	1033	MTB 204 and two others approach Liberty close abeam on port side. C.O. said: "Boats are believed to be Israeli."[234]
1641	1441	1041	USDAO Tel Aviv message that Israelis erroneously [*sic*] attacked Liberty.[235]
1645	1445	1045	Liberty received message from COMSIXFLT "Assistance is on the way."[236] Castle msg received at White House, NMCC.[237]
1655	1455	1055	Liberty's list has increased to 10 degrees.[238]
1700	1500	1100	Liberty stops all engines.[239] Rostow talks to President by telephone. McGeorge Bundy calls on telephone for President but he is talking to Rostow.[240]

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Hot Line message on Liberty sent by President to Kosygin.[241]

1701 1501 1101 US phoned Soviet Charge' and informed him that Israelis hit ship and U.S. planes being called back.[242]

1704 1504 1104 MTB Division ordered to return to Ashdod.[243] Liberty all engines 1/3.[244] President Johnson to Oval Office accompanied by George Christian.[245]

1705 1505 1105 Liberty all engines 2/3, 17 fathoms under keel.[246]

1706 1506 1106 President to Situation Room to meet with: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk Chairman, Foreign Intel Adv Bd Clark Clifford, UnderSecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Ambassador to Russia Llewellen Thompson, McGeorge Bundy, and National Security Advisor W. W. Rostow[247]

1710 1510 1110 Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv sends "Secret Expedite" message to Secretary of State. "....Israelis obviously shocked by error...."[248]

1713 1513 1113 Liberty logs Torpedo boats "have now retired from sight.[249]

1714 1514 1114 Sunset.[250]

1715 1515 1115 Sec McNamara sends order to recall second "Ready Group" from Situation Room of White House. CINCUSNAVEUR advises JCS//CNO//USCINCEUR of situation.[251]

1718 1518 1118 Liberty has 26 fathoms under keel.[252] Destroyers U.S.S. Davis and U.S.S. Massey detached to proceed under verbal orders of CTF60.[253]

1724 1524 1124 Hot Line Message is received in Moscow.[254]

1725 1525 1125 **MSG** 080917Jun67 FM CDR6thFLT TO Liberty transmitted on fleet broadcast.[255]

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1736 1536 1136	Secretary of State sent "FLASH" message to American Embassy, Moscow. RE: Liberty.[256]
1745 1545 1145	President leaves Situation Room.[257] Ambassador Nolte, in Cairo sends "Flash" message. "We better get our story on torpedoing of USS Liberty out fast and it had better be good."
1750 1550 1150	MTB loses radar contact with Liberty.[258] Liberty receives message from 6th Fleet that escort is on the way.[259]
1757 1557 1157	Liberty receives message from 6th Fleet, "Escort proceeding Max speed of Destroyers."[260]
1800 1600 1200	Liberty experiences great difficulty in controlling ship.[261]
1810 1610 1210	JCS orders aircraft withdrawn.[262] CDR Castle off Dov Hoss (Sde Dov) airport by Super Frelon helicopter bound for Liberty.[263]
1820 1620 1220	Hot Line Message from Kosygin to President.[264]
1840 1640 1240	Helicopter marked SA 321-K approaches Liberty.[265]
1846 1646 1246	**MSG** 080110Z Placed on Fleet Broadcast at Asmara for transmission to Liberty.[266]
1849 1649 1249	CDR6FLT reports all aircraft accounted for.[267]
1852 1652 1252	Castle in helicopter drops message on Liberty.[268]
1900 1700 1300	Castle helicopter departs Liberty for Dov Hoss (Sde Dov).[269]
1915 1715 1315	Liberty sends msg to CNO.[270]
2000E 1800E 1400E	Regular scheduled weekly meeting of top Defense Officials and Pentagon press corps.[271]
2136 1936 1536	Johnson to Kosygin - via Hot Line - re U.S.S. Liberty.[272]

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2300 2100 1700	Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance notifies CINCUSNAVEUR, all news releases will come from Washington.[273]
2311 2111 1711	President Johnson enters an OFF RECORD meeting of the Armed Services Policy Council in the Cabinet room. He departs at 1800.[274]
2335 2135 1735	**MSG** 072230Z placed on Fleet Broadcast.[275]
9Jun 8Jun 8Jun 0110 2310 1910	President Johnson to the Situation Room where he met with: Secy Rusk Secy McNamara Secy Fowler Hon Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Under Secy of State Gen Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, JCS Director CIA - Richard Helms Chairman, FIAB Clark Clifford Under Secy of State Eugene V Rostow Asst Secy of State Lucius D. Battle National Security Advisor W.W. Rostow Special Consultant McGeorge Bundy Assistant NSA Harold Saunders The President leaves the meeting at 1940.[276]
9Jun 9Jun 8Jun 0440 0240 2240	Liberty sights Russian ship.[277]
0550 0350 2350	President Johnson goes to bed.[278]
9Jun 9Jun 9Jun 0627 0427 0027	Liberty rendezvous with U.S.S. Davis, DD973.[279]
0715 0515 0115	Liberty heaves to.[280] Pentagon initiates investigation of Liberty attack.[281]
1600E 1400E 1000E	OSD made a press release of additional information on the U.S.S. Liberty.[282]
10 Jun	Israel offers compensation for loss of lives and for those wounded in Liberty attack.[283]
1505A 1305A 0905A	Hot Line message U.S.S.R. to U.S.[284]

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1530A 1330A 0930A	Hot Line message U.S. to U.S.S.R.[285] President Johnson tells SecDef to move Sixth Fleet towards Syria.[286]
1600A 1400A 1000A	Hot Line message U.S.S.R. to U.S.[287]
1612 1412 1012	Hot Line message U.S. to U.S.S.R.[288]
1730A 1530A 1130A	Hot Line message U.S.S.R. to U.S.[289]
1830 1530 1230	Hot Line message U.S. to U.S.S.R.[290]
1830 1630 1230	Israel and Syria agree to final cease fire. War ends.[291]
1900 1700 1300	High speed movement towards Syria by Sixth Fleet stopped.[292]
11 Jun	Seaman Kenneth Ecker, 18, a wounded Liberty crewman, answered questions at a press conference aboard America.[293]
15 Jun	Israel expresses regret over deaths and woundings of Indian UNEF troops on 5 June 67 and offers humanitarian compensation.[294]
22 Nov	United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 242.[295]
1980 16 Dec	United States, Department of State, accepts GOI note No. AO/315 of December 15, 1980 as "full and final" settlement concerning the Liberty matter. Israel agrees to pay $6,000,000 without prejudice to the question of the liability for the tragic event.[296]

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Endnotes

1. Abba Eban, *My Country*, New York: Random House, 1972.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

3. Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1984, p. 67.

4. Eban, *My Country*, p. 199.

5. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 62-63. Dean Rusk says the Egyptian forces were mobilized and moved into the Sinai on the 14th. Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1990, p. 384.

6. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 68.

7. Eban, *My Country*, p. 195 and Jacques Soustelle, *The Long March of Israel*, New York: American Heritage Press, 1969, p. 240.

8. Eban, *My Country*, p. 201; Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 65; and Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press and The American University in Cairo Press, Egypt, 1983, p. 275; and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers and the War in the Middle East*, New York: Praeger, 1987, p. 240.

9. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 68.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

11. Jonathan Trumbull Howe, *Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1971, p. 149.

12. BGEN S. L. A. Marshall, *Swift Sword: The Historical Record of Israel's Victory, June, 1967*, New York: American Heritage Publishing, 1967, p. 18; Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 384; and Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, p. 94.

13. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 71; and Rusk, *As I Saw It*, p. 384. Rusk states the withdrawal was on May 18, 1967 which is correct from his perspective in Washington. It was already May 19, 1967, in the Sinai when U Thant ordered the withdrawal.

14. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 72.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

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16. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

17. Numerous reports confirm Egypt in control of Sharm el-Sheik by May 22. The actual occupation occured after May 20 before May 23 and, therefore, the date of May 21 is used.

18. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 88.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

20. Eban, *My Country*, p. 205; Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 89; Soustelle, *Long March of Israel*, p. 241; Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, p. 102; and Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six Day War*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, p. 38.

21. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 19.

22. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 96.

23. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, p. 107.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

25. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 90.

26. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 149.

27. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, pp. 120-121.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 129; and James M. Ennes, Jr., *Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship*, New York: Random House, 1979, p. 13.

30. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 149.

31. Eban, *My Country*, p. 206.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

33. Soustelle, *Long March of Israel*, p. 241.

34. Eban, *My Country*, p. 210; Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, pp. 144-47; Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 19; and Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, p. 114.

35. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, p. 107 n. 101.

36. Eban, *My Country*, p. 212.

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37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

39. Soustelle, *Long March of Israel*, p. 241.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Goldschmidt, *Concise History of the Middle East*, p. 275; and Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, p. 121.

42. Eban, *My Country*, p. 211; Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 19; and Rusk, *As I Saw It*, p. 386.

43. Rusk, *As I Saw It*, p. 386.

44. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 149.

45. Churchill and Churchill, *Six Day War*, p. 53.

46. U.S.S. Liberty Deck log.

47. Rusk, *As I Saw It*, p. 386. Dean Rusk had high hopes for settling the crises with Mohyi-al Din on June 7, 1967. He makes this clear in his book although he relies in part on hindsight and some remarks made by President Nasser after the Six Day War. ("Ironically, later that summer Nasser told one American he had no problem with reopening the strait." p. 387.) Rusk's bitterness was evident in a personal interview with the author in Athens, Georgia, on April 5, 1989. He felt that Israel should have waited. Nevertheless, he says in his book at p. 387:

> I don't think highly of the doctrine of preventive self-defense, because it is too easily abused. But if there ever was a justification for preventive action, the Six- Day War might have been the case for it.

It should probably be noted that the book was written and copyrighted by Richard Rusk, his son. The cover of the book states, "as told to Richard Rusk."

48. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 149.

49. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 183. Goldschmidt places the Dayan appointment as June 2, *Concise History of the Middle East*, p. 275. However, June 1 seems to be the correct date.

50. Soustelle, *Long March of Israel*, p. 242; and Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, pp. 123-24.

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51.Naval Message. From CINCUSNAVEUR, TO USS LIBERTY, 011305 June 67

52. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log; and Intelligence Memorandum of Central Intelligence Agency, "The Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty," 13 June 1967, SC No. 01415/67, p. 7. (The Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 13 June 1967, Intelligence, S.C. No. 01415/67, titled "The Israeli attack on the USS Liberty" reports the attack began at 8:05 a.m. (Washington Time) which is correct but reflects 3:05 p.m. Sinai or local time. The entire report is out of synchronization between Washington and the Sinai by one hour. The usual time differential is seven hours but it becomes six hours in summer when Washington goes on Daylight Saving Time, EDT. The CIA report was completed on 13 June 1967, only five days after the event and no doubt the effect of the Daylight Savings time change was not calculated in the preparation of the report. In all time line entries, a correction for the one hour discrepancy in the CIA Report has been made by the author.

53. Naval Message 080300Z, and Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 150.

54. Eban, *My Country*, p. 214.

55. Phil G. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security*, New York: Harper & Row, 1970, p. 138.

56. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 150.

57. Eban, *My Country*, p. 232.

58. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem*, p. 194.

59. Eban, *My Country*, p. 211.

60. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 21.

61. United Nations Documents S7957 and S7989.

62. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 100.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*

66. Stevenson, William. *Israeli Victory*. London: Corgi Books, 1967, p. 41.

67. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 100.

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68. Churchill and Churchill, *Six Day War*, pp. 94-95.

69. House Armed Services Committee, REVIEW OF WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS, Phase I, Report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Ninety Second Congress First Session, Under Authority of H. Res. 201, May 10, 1971.

70. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 100.

71. *Ibid.*

72. Stevenson, *Israeli Victory*, p. 51.

73. Churchill and Churchill, *Six Day War*, p. 95.

74. United States Department of State, *Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1990*: Department of State, Washington, 1991, p. 81.

75. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 142.

76. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, pp. 282-83 n. 245.

77. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 143.

78. *Ibid.*

79. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Super Powers*, p. 151.

80. Churchill and Churchill, *Six Day War*, pp. 95-96; and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Official History, p. 6.

81. Churchill and Churchill, *Six Day War*, pp. 95-96.

82.House Armed Services Committee Report, May 10, 1971. CHOPS = Changes Operational Command, from CINCUSNAVEUR = Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Europe to CDR6thFLT = Commander Sixth Fleet.

83. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 101.

84. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

85. Naval Message from USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL (United States Defense Attache at U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv - COL Anthony (Bud) Perna) to DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) 070812Z Jun 67 as cited in Naval Message from USDAO Tel Aviv to DIA, 082100Z Jun 67. Court of Inquiry Document 64, Exhibit 48.

86. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

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87. *Ibid.*

88. U.S. Dept of State, *Principal Officers*, p. 103.

89. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, Exhibit 19, the U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5) DRT Log.

90.House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

91. *Ibid.*

92. *Ibid.*

93. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, Exhibit 19, the U.S.S. Liberty DRT Log.

94. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

95. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

96. *Ibid.*

97. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

98. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and Central Intelligence Agency Report. But for the refusal of a Navy Captain to take the oral order of a Marine Major, the Liberty tragedy would never have occurred. See Statement of Captain Hanley in U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry record, Document 52, Exhibit 48.

99. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and Liberty DRT Log.

100. *Ibid.*

101. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

102. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and U.S.S. Liberty DRT Log.

103. IDF Official History.

104. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

105. *Ibid.*

106. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and U.S.S. Liberty DRT Log.

107. Expert Astronomer Computer Program. Also verified on Garman GPS 95 Sunrise/Sunset program.

108. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

109. IDF Official History.

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110. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log. 0553 c/c to 190, 0613 c/c to 060, 0630 c/c to 123. It is possible that Liberty picked up the Nord on its radar and made its course changes in an effort to confuse the Nord regarding its course.

111. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

112. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

113. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and U.S.S. Liberty DRT Log.

114. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

115. IDF Official History.

116. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

117. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

118. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

119. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and U.S.S. Liberty DRT Log.

120. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

121. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and U.S.S. Liberty deck log and DRT log. The Liberty DRT Log shows the 0800 position at 31-34N, 33-50E. The Liberty Deck Log shows the 0800 position at 31-34N, 33-50.8E. The Deck Log indicates the position was determined by dead reckoning navigation. The .8 discrepancy (approximately 1600 yards) is not deemed significant.

122. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

123. National Security Agency Report. The IDF History shows Liberty at Point Alpha at 0845.

124. Central Intelligence Agency Report.

125. National Security Agency Report. According to the NSA Liberty reported to the 6th Fleet "two delta wing aircraft orbited three times at 5000 feet." Position 31-27N, 34-00E. This is Point Alpha.

126. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971. The report refers to this message, 080110Z, as being received on June 7th and then goes on to refer to the information copy for Liberty being delayed 11 and 1/2 hours and going on fleet broadcast to Liberty on June 8th at 1646Z. This must indicate a typographical error of 7th for 8th of June. It is not possible that a message sent on June 8th would arrive on June 7th.

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127. IDF Official History.

128. National Security Agency Report.

129. IDF Official History and Israeli War Log - Navy War Room. The Israeli Navy War Room log differs from the IDF History. The War Room log shows that two destroyers were ordered south at 0606 or 0608 and directed to resume original positions at 0942. The IDF History has the destroyers ordered south at 0940 and makes no comment on time they were turned back.

130. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

131. *Ibid.*

132. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

133. IDF Official History.

134. National Security Agency Report.

135. IDF Official History.

136. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

137. National Security Agency Report.

138. Central Intelligence Agency Report.

139. IDF Official History,

140. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

141. IDF Official History.

142. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty.*

143. IDF Official History.

144. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

145. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty.* Ennes reports the explosions as occurring "before noon" at El Arish, p. 56.

146. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry and U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

147. U.S.S. America Deck Log for Thursday June 8, 1967. The position was established by celestial, electronic and D.R. navigation.

148. U.S.S. Saratoga Deck Log for Thursday, June 8, 1967. The position was established by electronic navigation.

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149. U.S.S. Little Rock Deck Log of June 8, 1967.

150. IDF Official History and Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

151. IDF Official History.

152. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

153. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971. According to the testimony of Rear Admiral Fitzpatrick before the House Armed Services Committee, if Liberty received this message, she probably could not read it and if she could read it, the message referred to another message that she did not have so it would not have provided any information or guidance.

154. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

155. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

156. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log and National Security Agency Report.

157. IDF Official History. Navy War log indicates "Shelling of El Arish from the Sea continuing. Moshe Oren (MTB Div CDR) was ordered to tune channels 86 and 186 as our aircraft are enroute." This entry conflicts with IDF History which indicates only that Oren was advised of the shelling at this time. A similar entry in the war log indicates the same thing at 1330 and this is closer to the probable time of this relay.

158. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

159. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

160. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room. The War Log entry states that HQ instructs Oren to tune to frequencies 86 and 186 "as our aircraft are enroute." The Navy did not get air support for another 18 minutes, 1348, and this same entry, tuning to 86 and 186 are repeated in the War Log at 1350.

161. IDF Official History. The MTB Division were equipped with Kelvin-Hughes Radar. Only MTB 206 had true motion radar. Normal range of this type radar mounted on an MTB type vessel is line of sight, 15 to 19 miles. On a dry day (low humidity) an effect called ducting may occur. The radar pulse skips between layers of air and range may more than double. June 8, 1967, was a clear day. Not a cloud in the sky. This suggests a possible low humidity and appropriate conditions for ducting.

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162. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room. The third digit of this time entry is blurred on the Israeli War Log. The entry appears between entries of 081330 and 081343 and therefore it could also be 1332.

163. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

164. National Security Agency Report.

165. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

166. IDF Official History.

167. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

168. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*, p. 59.

169. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

170. *Ibid.*

171. *Ibid.*

172. The generally accepted time of the initial attack is 1400 Sinai time. It is the authors opinion that the first Mirage IIIC rolled into its run at about 1357 and began firing about 1358. The Liberty handwritten Quartermaster Log indicates attack began at 1358. Israeli Air Force Audio tapes indicate 1358. Liberty smooth Deck Log (Reconstructed) indicates 1400. IDF Official History indicates 1400. SECDEF MSG 082248Z indicates 1405. CIA report indicates 3:05 p.m. which is 1505 as the local time of the attack. The Washington time of the CIA report is 8:05 a.m.(0805) which is essentially correct. It is presumed that the CIA report, prepared in five days failed to account for the change from seven to six hours of time differential between Washington, which was on daylight time, where the report was prepared and times received in real time and the Sinai time which was not on daylight time.

173. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

174. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

175. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

176. Israeli Air Force Audio Tapes.

177. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

178. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

179. Israeli Air Force Audio Tapes.

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180. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

181. *Ibid.*

182. IDF Official History.

183. Israeli Air Force Audio Tapes, Israeli War Log - Navy War Room, and IDF Official History. The IDF History indicates the planes left the area at 1416 (p. 15).

184. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

185. *Ibid.* Flight Leader Royal reported this information to Air Force HQ prior to 1412. It apparently is not relayed to and logged by the Navy until another two or three minutes later.

186. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

187. IDF Official History.

188. *Ibid.*

189. *Ibid.*

190. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

191. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

192. National Security Agency Report.

193. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

194. *Ibid.* Israeli Navy War room log indicates MTBs reported range 2 miles, 4,000 yards at 1428. The CIA Report indicates that the torpedo boat attack occurred at 1425.

195. IDF Official History. The CIA report has the torpedo boats commencing run on Liberty. This is probably 5 minutes early.

196. CIA Report and testimony of CAPT McGonagle before U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

197. National Security Agency Report.

198. U.S.S. AMERICA Deck Log, Thursday, June 8, 1967. U.S.S. Saratoga is 3000 yards away. Task force in Carrier ready formation.

199. Israeli War Log - Navy War Room.

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200. National Security Agency Report.

201. CIA Report and National Security Agency Report. The CIA report indicates COMSIXTHFLEET reports Liberty hit by torpedo at 1430 which was 0830 Washington time(1230Z). The first Liberty message was received on Saratoga at 1432 Sinai time, 1232Z, 0832 Washington. The message was not specific about the nature of the attack. Naval Message From USS Saratoga To CINCUSNAVEUR 081235Z Jun 67 stated:

> FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR
> I AM UNDER ATTACK MY POSIT 31 23N 33 25E. I HAVE BEEN HIT.
> REQUEST IMMED ASSISTANCE
> BT
> (This message was sent UNCLASSIFIED)
> (Court of Inquiry Document 87, Exhibit 48.)

The CDR6thFLT message to DIRNSA or NMCC was sent at 081349Z which was 1549 Sinai Time and 0949 Washington time. It was received shortly thereafter.

202. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log. Probably 1437 after rather than before torpedo strike. [Editors note: here again the clocks are a few minutes out of synchronization.]

203. IDF History has the torpedo attack authorized at 1437, commencing at 1443 and the torpedo strike at 1447. [Author's note: these times are about five or six minutes late, probably due to watch or clock settings on the MTBs.] The NSA Report has the torpedo strike Liberty at 1435. THE PROBABLE TIME OF THE ATTACK IS 1437.

204. Naval Message From CINCUSNAVEUR To JCS/CNO/USCINCEUR 081400Z Jun 67. Court of Inquiry Document 77, Exhibit 48.

205. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

206. National Security Agency Report.

207. Naval Message From CINCUSNAVEUR To JCS/CNO/USCINCEUR 081400Z June67. Court of Inquiry Document 77, Exhibit 48.

208. IDF Official History.

209. LBJ Library, National Security Files and CIA Report. CIA report indicates "COMSIXTHFLEET orders carriers to provide air cover for Liberty." It is doubtful that COMSIXTHFLEET knew of the attack at 1450. CAPT Joe Tully of Saratoga launched his ready group at 1450. Sara was steaming independently of CDR6tfFlt who was on the Cruiser Little Rock in formation with America approximately 400 miles away. This appears to be

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confirmed by the next entry of the CIA chronology which states. 1452 - "Liberty reported under attack to COMSIXTHFLEET." A MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD prepared by Raymond A. Moore, Rear Admiral, USN, Deputy Director for Operations, (NMCC), on the letterhead of The National Military Command Center, in paragraph 5. indicates that at **080850 EDT**, "COMSIXTHFLT ordered USS America to launch four armed A-4's and USS Saratoga to launch four A-1's...." This is also two minutes before CDRSIXTHFLT knew of the attack. Most likely, the launch described in this memo is the initial launch of the ready group from Saratoga which was recalled by Rear Admiral Geis. This memorandum was prepared in the NMCC in the pentagon on 9 June 67 at 1526EDT.

210. Personal interviews with CAPT Joseph Tully, Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Saratoga, and RADM Max Morris, Navigator of U.S.S. Saratoga.

211. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log. The Liberty deck log shows the offer of help at 1503. The Liberty rough and smooth radio logs show the offer of help at 1427. 1427 was before the torpedo attack and is clearly inaccurate. The author speculates that the 1427 time came from a message from the U.S. Defense Attache' to the White House, 081414Z Jun 67, 1614 Sinai time, 1014 Washington time. This message stated that the time of the offer of help was 1427Z. The original Liberty logs were probably written without a time entry or the time entry was obliterated and the "1427" time added in the reconstruction of the radio logs at the Court of Inquiry. It is also possible that in the heat of the situation, the time entry on the rough log was entered incorrectly. IDF Official History indicates help was offered at 1640. The 1503 seems to be the more accurate time as it is undisputed that Israel informed the U.S. Naval Attache' of the attack at 1600. This would not have been possible if the MTB Div did not confirm the identity until 40 minutes later.

212. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log, CIA Report, and Israeli Air Force Audio Tapes. The CIA report indicates the helicopters arrived at 1455 or 12 minutes earlier than the Liberty Deck Log reports their arrival.

213. LBJ Library, National Security Files, National Security Agency Report, and CIA Report. The CIA report confirms the time the call was received at NMCC as 0911. It reflects the Sinai time as 1611 which is in error by one hour.

214. National Security Agency Report.

215. *Ibid.*, and CTF 60 message 081316Z Jun 1967.

216. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

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217. IDF Official History and CIA Report. CIA reports this event at 1512 or 8 minutes earlier.

218. National Security Agency Report.

219. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

220. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log and National Security Agency Report. The NSA shows this event one minute earlier at 1536.

221. National Security Agency Report.

222. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967, and National Security Agency Report. Confirmed by personal interview with W.W. Rostow at Austin, Texas on March 7, 1990.

223. Naval Message From COMSIXTHFLT To CINCEUR 081439Z Jun 67.

224. National Security Agency Report and LBJ Library - National Security Files.

225. Central Intelligence Agency Report and National Security Agency Report. Actions by LCOL Bloch and CDR Castle confirmed by personal interviews with both.

226. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log and National Security Agency Report.

227. National Security Agency Report.

228. National Security Agency Report and White House Presidential Diary June 8, 1967.

229. LBJ Library - National Security Files.

230. National Security Agency Report and LBJ Library - National Security Files.

231. LBJ Library - National Security Files.

232. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967.

233. Naval Message from COMSIXTHFLT, to CINCUSNAVEUR, 081425 JUN 67. The message also relayed an exact quote of the Rules of Engagement issued to the pilots enroute to Liberty.

234. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

235. Naval Message from CINCUSNAVEUR to JCS//CNO//CINCEUR 081515Z Jun 67.

236. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

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237. National Security Agency Report.

238. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

239. *Ibid.*

240. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967.

241. *Ibid.*, and National Security Agency Report.

242. LBJ Library - National Security Files.

243. Central Intelligence Agency Report and IDF Official History. CIA report indicates Israeli helicopters and MTB's continued to search the area until 1704 which coincides with the Liberty deck log report of the withdrawal of the MTB Division.

244. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

245. White House Diary of June 8, 1967.

246. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

247. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967.

248. LBJ Library - National Security Files.

249. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

250. Expert Astronomer Computer Program.

251. Naval Message From CINCUSNAVEUR, to JCS//CNO//USCINCEUR 01515Z Jun 67. Court of Inquiry Document 66, Exhibit 48.

252. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

253. U.S.S. America Deck Log 16-18 Thursday, June 8, 1967.

254. National Security Agency Report.

255. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

256. LBJ Library - National Security Files.

257. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967.

258. IDF Official History.

259. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log and National Security Agency Report.

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260. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

261. *Ibid.*

262. National Security Agency Report. This is probably an entry of action already completed earlier.

263. *Ibid.*

264. Presidential White House Diary of June 8, 1967, from LBJ Library and NSA Report. The NSA reports a hot line message from Kosygin to Johnson at 1210 and another at 1220. The Presidential Diary shows only one hot line message from Kosygin in this time frame and the time is 1220. Most likely the Presidential Diary is correct.

265. U.S.S. Liberty Deck log. National Security Agency has the Castle Helicopter over Liberty at 1835.

266. House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.

267. National Security Agency Report.

268. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

269. National Security Agency Report.

270. *Ibid.*

271. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny*, p. 114.

272. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967.

273. National Security Agency Report.

274. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967.

275. House Armed Services Committee Report of 1971.

276. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967.

277. Entry in U.S.S. Liberty Deck log. No such ship name is listed in Jane's Fighting Ships, 1967/1968. The translation = Proletariat.

278. White House Presidential Diary of June 8, 1967.

279. U.S.S. Liberty Deck log. NSA has the time of rendezvous as 0625. Position 33-01N, 31-59E. Goulding states the time of rendezvous at "about 0630", *Confirm or Deny*, p. 111.

280. U.S.S. Liberty Deck Log.

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281. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 143.

282. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny*, p. 119.

283. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 143.

284. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 111.

285. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

286. *Ibid.*

287. *Ibid.*

288. *Ibid.*

289. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

290. *Ibid.*

291. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, p. 143.

292. Howe, *Multicrises*, p. 113.

293. *American Spirit*, CVA 66 America newsletter of July 1967, 3:6, p. 8.

294. United Nations Documents S7957 & S7989.

295. Rusk, *As I Saw It*, p. 388-89.

296. Department of State document declassified January 24, 1983.

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APPENDIX III

House Armed Services Subcommittee Report
May 10, 1971

"COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING U.S.S. LIBERTY"
JUNE 7-8, 1967

Hostilities commenced between Israel and the United Arab Republic on June 5, 1967. On that same day at 2015 hours, the Commander, 6th Fleet, ordered all his surface and air units to stand off at least 100 miles from the coasts of the belligerent nations. At the time of that order, U.S.S. Liberty was not assigned to the 6th Fleet, but was under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief Europe. On June 7th, at 0001 hours, u.s.s. Liberty was transferred to the operational control of Commander 6th Fleet. At the time of her transfer, her operational orders, dated June 1st, directed that the closest permissible approach to the coast of the United Arab Republic would be 12.5 nautical miles, while she could approach no closer than 6.5 nautical miles to the coast of Israel. No action was taken by the Commander, 6th Fleet, on June 7th to cause U.S.S. Liberty to conform to his order previously issued to all other 6th Fleet surface and air units.

During the afternoon of June 7th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to reposition U.S.S. Liberty to move her farther from the coasts of the belligerent nations. In implementing that decision, a series of messages from JCS to U.S. Commanders in the European Command were directed to U.S.S. Liberty and other addressees. None of those messages had reached Liberty by 1200Z hours on June 8th, 13 1/2 hours after the first message was released for transmission. The circumstances surrounding the misrouting, loss and delays of those messages constitute one of the most incredible failures of communications of the Department of Defense.

Those five messages will be discussed seriatim. Each is described according to its date-time-group, a six-numeral designation assigned by the originator of the message reflecting the date, hour, month, and year of its release. At the time of the U.S.S. Liberty incident, the date-time-group was not an accurate reflection of the time the message had been released by the sender to the communications center, although, in most instances, the difference in the time was an interval of only a few minutes, e.g. JCS 072230Z was released to the communications center at 072241Z. Each date-time-group includes the letter "Z" designating the Greenwich time zone, thus all times are standardized.

JCS 072230Z JUNE 1967 to CINCEUR

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This message contained the first directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the relocation of the U.S.S. Liberty. It was directed to the Commander-in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR), for action. Information copies of the message were addressed to Commander-in Chief, Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR); Commander U.S. 6th Fleet; Commander Task Force 64; U.S. Liberty; and others. This message modified the operational orders of the U.S.S. Liberty by directing that her closest permissible approach to the coasts of the United Arab Republic and Israel should be 20 nautical miles and 15 nautical miles, rather than 12.5 and 6.5 nautical miles, respectively. [end of page 6]

This message was released from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Army Communications Station, at the Pentagon, for transmission 2241Z hours, June 7th. The action copy of that message to CINCEUR was not transmitted from the Army communications station until 1255Z hours June 8th, more than 14 hours after its receipt in station. The information copies, addressed to Commander Task Force 67[1] and U.S.S. Liberty, were not transmitted until 1315Z hours, June 8th, and then were incorrectly routed to the Naval Communications Station, Asmara, where they were placed on Fleet Broadcast at 2135Z hours, June 8th, 23 hours after the date-time-group of the message, and about 9 1/2 hours after the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty.

This message lost some of its significance, since it was canceled by subsequent message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described in the next section.

JCS 080110Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCEUR

Preliminary telephone call

One hour and nine minutes after releasing the above 072230Z message for transmission, the Joint Chiefs became more concerned about relocating U.S.S. Liberty and decided that 20 and 15 nautical miles was too close to the coasts of UAR and Israel for safety. At 072350Z hours June 7th, a JCS representative made a telephone call to the Command Center Duty Officer at Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). In that call, a verbal directive was issued to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center duty officer to order U.S.S. Liberty to operate no closer than 100 nautical miles to the coasts of the belligerent. The duty officer at CINCUSNAVEUR

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[1]Department of Defense has informed the subcommittee that the original message was addressed to CTF64, but that an apparent operator error caused it to be addressed CTF67 when it was prepared for transmission.

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was also told that a message formalizing the verbal directive would follow later. However, the JCS might as well have omitted that telephone call since it proved completely ineffective in accelerating action at CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters. It is true that, as a result of the telephone call a message incorporating the original directive was prepared at CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters for dispatch to Commander, 6th Fleet; but despite the urgency indicated by the JCS call, the release of that message for transmission was delayed until the formal notification message from JCS had been received.

Formal message

The promised confirmatory message was not released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 080110Z, more than an hour after the telephone call to CINCUSNAVEUR. That delay is not necessarily significant since JCS could reasonable expected an immediate and intelligent response to its telephone directive. This message, JCS 080110Z, canceled the earlier JCS 072230Z message and directed that U.S.S. Liberty should remain at least 100 nautical miles from the coasts of any of the belligerent nations.

An immediate precedence[2] was assigned to this message, whereas the 072230Z message had been assigned a priority precedence, thus [end of page 7] indicating the increased concern of the Joint Chiefs concerning the repositioning of U.S.S. Liberty. The message was also released to the Army Communications Station at the Pentagon for transmission. The action copy of this message was again addressed to Commander-in Chief, Europe, with information copies addressed to CINCUSNAVEUR; Commander 6th Fleet; Commander, Task Force 64' and U.S.S. Liberty, among others. A delay of 44 minutes occurred in the Army Communications Station, Pentagon, before the message was transmitted to CINCEUR, the action addressee at 080211Z. Real [*sic*] Adm. Francis J. Fitzpatrick, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Communications testified before the subcommittee that he thought 44 minutes was an inordinate amount of time for processing such a short message.

The delay in processing the action copy of the message is insignificant, however, when compared with the deplorable handling of the information copies addressed to Commander,

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[2]There are four Department of Defense precedence categories: flash, immediate, priority and routine, in diminishing order. Those designations indicate the desired speed of delivery. They serve as a guide to operating personnel in processing, transmission and delivery of the message.

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Task Force 64, and to U.S.S. Liberty. First, there was a delay of 2 hours, 23 minutes before those messages were transmitted from the Army Communications Center, Pentagon, at 080350Z. The only explanation for that delay was that messages of equal or higher precedence were awaiting transmission before this message arrived in station. The Department of Defense, however, was unable to furnish the subcommittee with any documentary evidence that would support that explanation.

The information copies of the message, addressed to U.S.S. Liberty and Commander, Task Force 64, were finally transmitted at 0350Z, but once again, those messages for addressees in the Mediterranean area were misrouted to Naval Communications Center, Philippines. A subcommittee witness testified that the misrouting was due to an erroneous routing indicator which had been assigned to the message by a civilian in the Army Communications Center, Pentagon. Upon its arrival at the Naval Communications Station, Philippines, the error was recognized, the routing indicator was corrected to Naval Communications Station, Morocco, and the message was retransmitted within the hour. That correction should have taken the copies of the message to the Mediterranean area and ultimately to the addressees, except that the message was routed to pass through the Army Communications Station, Pentagon. That station, instead of transmitting the messages to Navy Communications Station, Morocco, to which they were addressed, sent them to National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Md., where they were filed without further action. The only explanation given for this inexcusable conduct was that clerical personnel had misread the routing indicator. Needless to say, those messages had not reached either U.S.S. Liberty or Commander, Task Force 64, by 1200Z hours, June 8, 1967.

USCINCEUR 080625Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCUSNAVEUR

JCS message 080110Z was received at CINCEUR headquarters at 0212Z hours, June 8th. That headquarters, in a telephone conversation with CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters at 0325Z hours, directed CINCUSNAVEUR to take the JCS message action. That oral order was confirmed by a formal message directed to CINCUSNAVEUR for action, with information copies to Commander, 6th Fleet and U.S.S. Liberty, among others. The formal message, how [end of page 8] ever, was not released until 0625Z hours. No explanation has been offered for the 3-hour delay in preparing that message at CINCEUR headquarters. A further delay of 46 minutes occurred in the message center at CINCEUR before the message was transmitted.

In order to ensure getting this message to its addressees, it was transmitted concurrently over two alternate relay paths. The necessity for the alternate transmission was quickly demonstrated by the loss of the message at the

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Pirmasens, Germany, Army DCS relay, the first station on one of the transmission paths. As a result of that loss, there was no further transmission of that copy of the message. The explanation proffered for the loss of that message was that the

***station was being operated under a combination of adverse conditions caused by the consolidation and relocation of units from France. Heavy traffic volumes resulted from the extensive relocation of units and retermination of teletype circuits. The number of qualified personnel was inadequate to ensure error-free processing of traffic.

The second transmission route succeeded in getting the message to CINCUSNAVEUR and to Commander, 6th Fleet, by 0735Z hours on June 7th. The information copy directed to U.S.S. Liberty, however, had to pass through additional relay stations before it could be placed on fleet broadcast for dissemination to U.S.S. Liberty. That meandering route through relay stations consumed another 9 hours. During that time, there were long in-station delays for processing of the message, and there was a delay of more than 2 1/2 hours in passing the message from an Army DCS Communications Station at Asmara to the Navy Communications Station located within a mile of the Army Station. Finally the message was placed on the fleet broadcast at 1646Z hours, June 8th[3] at which time U.S.S. Liberty was limping back to port with her dead and wounded, and so severely damaged that she was subsequently scrapped.

CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z TO COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET

The headquarters, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) received three separate messages directing the repositioning of U.S.S. Liberty. Those messages and the times of their receipt were:

(a) A telephone call from the JCS reconnaissance center at 2350Z, June 7th.

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[3] A garbled version of this message was placed on fleet broadcast at 1059Z, June 8th, and there was some question whether it had been received by U.S.S. Liberty. But as Rear Admiral Fitzpatrick testified, "It is a moot point whether the ship received it or not for two reasons: If it did receive it, it was probably useless to them, and number two, even if they had received it, it wouldn't have made any sense to them because all it said was to take some other JCS message for action, some higher commander, and they wouldn't have known what that other message was because, as we know, that other message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which they had the information copy on, didn't get to them."

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(b) An information copy of JCS 080110Z message which was received at this headquarters at 0312Z hours, June 8th.

(c) A telephone call from CINCEUR at 0325Z hours June 8th.

Despite the urgency which must have been obvious by that time, no action was taken at that headquarters for more than 3 1/2 hours after the initial telephone call. It was not until after receipt of the telephone call from CINCEUR at 0325Z hours, June 8th that CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters stirred into action. At that time, the duty officer directed that a teletype conference be established with Commander, 6th Fleet. That conference circuit was established, and [end of page 9] at 0445Z hours, Commander, 6th Fleet, acknowledged receipt of the order to take action on the JCS message. The teletype order was confirmed by CINCUSNAVEUR formal message 080455Z which was received by Commander, 6th Fleet, at 0518Z hours, June 8th. For some unexplained reason, Liberty was not informed of either of these messages to Commander, 6th Fleet.

COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET 080917Z JUNE 1967 TO U.S.S. LIBERTY

Upon receipt of the messages from CINCUSNAVEUR, the only action remaining for Commander, 6th Fleet, was issuance of an order to U.S.S. Liberty to comply with the minimums directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was not until 0917Z hours, June 8th, however, more than 4 hours after his receipt of the order, that he released his action message directed to U.S.S. Liberty. Although his superiors had manifested their concern about repositioning U.S.S. Liberty by telephone calls which gave him advance notice of the order, The Commander, 6th Fleet chose not to use the voice circuit when he passed the order to the ship. Rather, he used the normal communications system for transmission of his message.

After its release to the communications center aboard the 6th Fleet flagship, Little Rock, that message was delayed for more than 1 hour and a quarter before it was transmitted at 1035Z hours. The explanation for that delay was that there were one flash and seven immediate messages being prepared for transmission at the time the message was received in the message center U.S.S. Little Rock. The message arrived at the Army DCS station Asmara by 1200Z hours, June 8th. That station, however, instead of delivering it to the nearby Navy station for fleet broadcast, missent it to the Navy Communications Station, Greece. It was returned to Army DCS station at Asmara and finally delivered to the Navy Communications Station at 1510Z hours, June 8th, 6 hours, 8 minutes after its release by Commander, 6th Fleet and more than ten hours after he had been ordered to act upon the Joint

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Chiefs of Staff instruction. The message was transmitted on fleet broadcast at 1525Z hours, June 8th, more than three hours too late to alert U.S.S. Liberty to the danger of her position.

The circumstances surrounding the transmission of those five messages could be considered a comedy of errors were it not for the tragic results of the failure to move U.S.S. Liberty. At 1210Z hours, June 8, 1967, U.S.S. Liberty was attacked by Israeli aircraft and, at 1235Z hours, she was torpedoed by Israeli patrol boats. As a result of these attacks, 34 officers and men were killed, while 75 were wounded, and the ship sustained such severe damages that it was never restored to duty. At the time of those attacks, U.S.S. Liberty, through no fault of hers, had not received any of the above-described messages. If the communications system had been responsive, she should have had several hours during which she could have placed some distance between herself and the coast, thereby probably avoiding the attack.

Should there be any doubt that those failures of the communications system were critical, the following findings of fact of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened to inquire into the circumstances the attack on U.S.S. Liberty, would appear to conclusively resolve them: [end of page 10]

Liberty's position at the time of the attack had been previously ordered changed farther seaward by JCS; however the messages relating to these changes were not known to the ship before the attack took place***

The communications delays and misrouting errors, which caused these several nondeliveries, combined with delays in initiating followup actions on operational instructions received, all contributed to the ship itself being unaware of plans and decisions made for her repositioning***

*** Liberty received no directive, prior to the attack, that higher authority desired that the ship operate at least 100 miles from the coastline of the UAR***

Pertinent to the findings of fact is the matter of communication conditions regarding U.S.S. Liberty during the period 1 and 8 June. The ship is known not to have received at least five messages sent prior to the attack, each of which was not only important but, in that respect, critical to the events which terminated in the aggravated attack on this ship on June the 8th.

Higher authority modified Liberty's original operational guidance between June 1st and the attack on the 8th which, if

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she had received it, would have resulted in her being further off shore.

Combination and compounding of many delayed communication deliveries related to Liberty incident denied the ship the benefit of command decisions actually made prior to the attack which, among other things, would have caused the ship, as a minimum to be heading further off shore from her 081200Z actual position*** [end of text on middle of page 11]

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APPENDIX IV

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY OF ISRAEL
Letter of Admiral Michael Ram
Naval Reserve Association News
September 1992, Vol. 39, No. 9

As General Officer in Command of the Navy of Israel, I read with pain and sorrow the article published in the June issue of the Naval Reserve Association Newsletter. On June 8, 1967, the U.S.S. Liberty sailed into the middle of our Six Day War. That she did so was a mistake on the part of the U.S. Navy, as has been thoroughly established by an extensive investigation of the House Armed Services Committee of the Ninety Second Congress, under authority of H. Res. 201, published by the Superintendent of Documents in 1971. It is undisputed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Agency believed that it would be dangerous for Liberty to approach the Sinai Coast, and sent at least five Naval Messages to her directing her to remain clear of the area. These messages were misdirected by the Naval Communications system, and were not received by Liberty until after the tragedy had occurred. The next mistakes were ours, and a series of blunders on our part resulted in our attacks on a naval vessel of our best friend in the world at that time.

We immediately accepted humanitarian responsibility, offered our apology and condolences and paid humanitarian reparations to the dead and the wounded in amounts set by the United States Government.

Thereafter we settled the remaining issues regarding Liberty with the United States at the diplomatic level.

Mere words can never ease the pain of young lives lost in their prime. We sent you our words of condolence in 1967 full knowing that words are not enough, Still today, twenty five years later, we share your grief and pain. Again I express to you our apology and condolences. I regret the tone of the author of your June 1992 article. I fully understand his bitterness, and my sympathy for him and his shipmates is in no way diminished by his perhaps less than objective perspective.

We made the mistake, we admitted it and we remain extremely sorry and distressed.

There have been at least ten official investigations of the incident both in Israel and in the United States. Every official investigation, yours and ours, has concluded that the event was a tragic mistake. There have also been numerous unofficial investigations, such as those conducted by Thames TV, ABC News, and NBC News, to name a few. These unofficial

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investigations, after examining the evidence, have also concluded that the event was a tragic mistake. The published article confirms this with the words "after filming was completed...(the) producers slanted the story to favor the Israeli version." The "story" does not favor Israel. An examination of the facts merely confirms the tragic mistake.

Confirmation of the true version of events is readily available in the record of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry or the CIA report, both of which are now declassified and available to you.

Israel and the Navy of Israel have a great debt to the United States and the United States Navy. Our first General Officer in Command of the Navy of Israel, the equivalent of your CNO, was a U.S. Naval Academy graduate. Your traditions are our traditions. In this case, your grief and your loss are also our grief and our loss.

With my deepest respect,

Michael Ram
Commander in Chief
Israel Navy

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APPENDIX V

RESPONSES TO THE RICHARD K. SMITH ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN *THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS*

September 1978, Scott C. Truver

"But his article falls short of offering proof that the Israeli government knew in advance that the ship its aircraft and torpedo boats attacked was American and that the attacks were indeed intended by the government to suppress any knowledge of Israeli successes against Egypt." p. 91.

October 1978, Norman Polmar[1]

"Indeed, on 4 September 1950, U.S. Navy fighters shot down a Soviet bomber type aircraft over international waters while the Red plane was flying reconnaissance against a U.S. carrier in the Yellow Sea.... Thus despite the requirements of international law, the real world of the last three decades has demonstrated that intelligence collection platforms are operated at risk when near or over another nations territory." p. 88.

November 1978, Yaacov Nitzan[2]

"In fact, the attack was due to a tragic error, and given the circumstances at the time, it is explainable." p. 111.

December 1978, Virgil L. Brownfield[3]

"Of all the material I've collected and read through the years, it is the most accurate." p. 104.

December 1978, Paul E. Tobin[4]

RADM Tobin tells a dramatic story of the highly professional damage control efforts that saved the ship. He states: "In this discussion, there is no attempt to speculate on the events surrounding the attack."[5] pp. 104-107.

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January 1979, William L. McGonagle[6]
The Skipper of Liberty during the attacks wrote only of the professionalism and gallantry of his crew. Since his video taped press conference aboard U.S.S. America he has refused to comment on the incident. p. 88.

January 1979, Alfred Friendly[7]
Friendly reported the war from Israel as correspondent for the Washington Post. He states that days prior to the attacks on Liberty, all the news of the Israeli success was common knowledge around the world. To the Smith claim that it was a part of the Israeli war plan to keep the world from knowing of israel's victories, Friendly responds: "That the attack on the Liberty was ordered by the Israeli High Command to prevent American and world knowledge of the capture of El Arish, announced with fanfare in Tel Aviv more than two days before, or of further progress of the Israeli Forces to or near the Canal, also announced day by day, almost hour by hour, is a thesis that simply does not hold water." p. 88.

February 1979, Dale Tapp
"I am in general agreement with Mr. Truver's critique of Dr. Smith's article. Lacking definite proof of Israeli intentions, it is somewhat presumptive to reach any firm conclusion, but one is on reasonably safe ground in noting that the "fog of war" can be foggier than Dr. Smith seems to realize..." p. 86.

June 1979, Douglas H. Robinson, M.D.
Dr. Robinson is hard pressed to understand the comments from Mr. Truver and Mr. Polmar. He finds the comment of Captain Nitzan more understandable. He suggests that the Anthony Pearson book, *Conspiracy of Silence*, "offers an intriguing and dismaying (but not impossible) explanation of the Liberty incident." He concludes by suggesting that the U.S. foreign aid to Israel would be better spent on our own Navy.
pp. 90-91.

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August 1979, Frank G. McGuire[8]

Mr. McGuire tells of a press conference at the Hilton Hotel in Tel Aviv, Israel on June 5, 1977, where he, as a journalist, asked Israeli Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman about the unpaid claim for damage to the Liberty. Weizman responded that he was unaware of it: "never had an account pushed on my desk, and if it comes along, we'll take it with due respect, as we take everything that comes on our desk from the United States Government." p. 96-97.

September 1979, RADM Kemp Tolley, U.S. Navy (Retired)

"A U.S. diplomat on the ambassadorial level gave me his opinion of the incident based on what he considers solid information and service in the area at the time.... The U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5) was an ear to the world in general and the United States in particular that had to be deafened if the Israeli plan were to succeed." pp. 26-27.

December 1979, Lee Wetherhorn

"I assume that the United States has more sophisticated and reliable command and control than the Israeli's and yet the U.S. Navy was not able to prevent attacks on American and Australian warships off the coast of Vietnam. If ComSixthFlt was not kept fully aware of the Liberty's operations and movements, how can one expect the Israeli's to have known?
...There is no requirement to ascribe questionable motives to either side. The argument that the Israelis should have communicated the presence of the Liberty from the surveillance aircraft to the torpedo boats in the course of some eight hours falls flat in the face of the U.S. Navy's being unable to deliver the order to the Liberty to remain 100 miles clear from the coast. That message was sent with considerably longer lead time."
p. 91.

January 1980, Lloyd C. Painter[9]

Mr. Painter starts by saying: "...I can assure your readers that an accurate, informed account of the affair has yet to

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be published." He goes on to advise that "John [*sic*] Ennes' *Assault on the Liberty*, will reveal at last what *really* happened to our ship." p. 24.

February 1980, Charles Cocnavitch[10]
Mr. Cocnavitch found the Smith article interesting but mixed up on one minor point and failing to mention an important action. He believes that one of Liberty's guns fired on the motor torpedo boats, hit one of them and caused them to swerve thus spoiling the aim of the torpedo boats. But for this "We would all be on the bottom of the Mediterranean today, instead of wondering if the attack was a 'mistake' or not, the world would be arguing about who sank the Liberty with all hands." p. 24.

March 1980, Donald Blalock & Mrs. Blalock[11]
This article purports to be a review of both the Pearson book, *Conspiracy of Silence* and the Ennes book, *Assault on the Liberty*. It is also laced with the personal experience of Mr. Blaloch who was aboard Liberty during the attacks. He says "Pearson's research seems sloppy." He concludes, "[a] better book is Assault on the Liberty..." He finds the Ennes explanation as to why the Israelis attacked (to prevent the United States from having prior knowledge of a planned Israeli assault on Syria) to be "not only reasonable but...virtually the only military explanation." pp. 108-109.

June 1980, David E. Keough
Mr. Keough believes the Ennes book was not adequately received by the media. "What concerns me now is how this book... has been so blatantly ignored by all facets of the press..." He feels that "Even 'Watergate' pales next to the Liberty attack." He refers to "this vicious attack" and "the deliberateness of the attack" and "this shameful affair." He highly commends Mr. Ennes "for his excellent and long-awaited book." p. 85.

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September 1980, Virgil L. Brownfield[12]
This second article by Mr. Brownfield compliments the article by Mr. Blaloch and concludes, "my shipmates and I are still hoping for a serious congressional investigation of the attack and the cover-up." p. 24.

September 1980, Stan White[13]
Mr. White congratulates the Proceedings "on a fine review of an unpopular subject." p. 24.

September 1980, Gip D. Oldham
Mr. Oldham writes "At least one CIA report lists an unconfirmed report that the then Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered the attack on the Liberty." He references the Lavon affair and that Lavon was framed and that "either Dayan or another was the culprit." p. 24.

September 1980, E. H. Katz
Mr Katz "found Mr. D. E. Keough's comments concerning the publication of the book disturbing, and to encounter these remarks in the June 1980 issue of the *Proceedings* even more disturbing. He argues that "there is a conspiracy to cover up the book...." Katz goes on to argue that the evidence offered in support of this theory is flawed.
pp. 24-33.

December 1980, Thomas Moorer[14]
Admiral Thomas Moorer was a genuine hero in World War II and is held in high esteem by many. Admiral Moorer writes, "The attack on the *Liberty* by Israeli aircraft and ships could not possibly have been a case of mistaken identity. The ship was savagely strafed and fired upon as well as torpedoed in good visibility while she was flying the American flag at a clear silhouette that could not possibly have been a case of mistaken identity." p. 85.

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December 1980, W. C. Eveland[15]

> Mr. Eveland wrote: "I denounce the attack on the Liberty in my book.... I have, nonetheless, disclosed other aspects of this sordid affair..." He makes reference to "Americas tacit agreement to a 1967 attack on Egypt (only!)..." He tells many things of his experiences in the middle east but only alludes as indicated above to the Liberty incident." p. 85.

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Endnotes

1. Norman Polmar was the editor of Jane's Fighting Ships and is a recognized expert on naval warfare and a prolific writer on naval subjects. He is presently an editor of the *U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings*.

2. Captain Yaacov Nitzan, Israeli Navy, Assistant Defense and Armed Forces Attache, Navy, Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C.

3. Virgil L. Brownfield was a crew member of the U.S.S. Liberty and was on the bridge as Captain McGonagle's telephone talker during the attack.

4. Commander Paul E. Tobin, U.S. Navy, a career Naval Officer, was a Lieutenant Junior Grade and the engineering officer aboard the U.S.S. Davis (DD-937) in 1967. Davis was the first U.S. Navy ship to reach Liberty after the attacks. Tobin was put aboard and got the ship underway and to Malta under its own power. He was awarded the Bronze Star for this accomplishment. He was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral and served as Vice Chief of Naval Education and Training until March 20, 1996, when he was assigned the position of Oceanographer of the Navy. Personal interview by the author on November 18, 1995.

5. At the United States Naval Academy Tobin was a classmate of Steven Toth. LT Toth died in the air attack on the Liberty. When Tobin came aboard Liberty he was randomly assigned a stateroom. It was the stateroom of his classmate, Steve Toth.

6. Captain William L. McGonagle, U.S. Navy (Retired), Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5), in June 1967.

7. Alfred Friendly won the Pulitzer prize for foreign reporting for his coverage of the 1967 War.

8. Frank G. McGuire is the editor of *Helicopter News*.

9. Lloyd C. Painter was Liberty's deck officer at the time of the attack.

10. Charles Cocnavitch was a member of the ship's company during the Israeli attack.

11. Donald Blalock (according to the masthead of his book reviews in the Proceedings) was employed in the U.S. intelligence community for ten years, including six years as a civilian in the Department of Defense. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Maryland with emphasis

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in Middle Eastern Studies. Mrs. Blalock, who served in the Department of Defense as a writer and editor for eight years, collaborated with her husband on this review. The article indicates that Mr. Blalock went aboard Liberty at Rota, Spain, and that he was in the NSA compartment at the time of the torpedo strike. This suggests that he was one of the Arabic linguists who boarded Liberty at Rota.

12. See above *U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings*, December 1978, p. 104.

13. Master Chief Petty Officer Stan White, U.S. Naval Fleet Reserve. Mr. White was a Liberty crewmember at the time of the attack. He is an active member of the Liberty Veterans Association. He was working for Ennes as his electronics division chief at the time of the attack.

14. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy (Retired) Chief of Naval Operations 1967 (after six day war)-1970, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970-1974. Admiral Moorer was in Vietnam on June 8, 1967, and became the CNO on August 1, 1967. He has no first hand knowledge of the attacks. He does maintain that the initial aircraft launched from the Saratoga to defend Liberty were armed with nuclear weapons. Many disagree with this position.

15. Wilbur C. Eveland is the author of *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1980.

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APPENDIX VI

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Incumbent Officers on June 8, 1967
Involved or with knowledge of Liberty Incident

Secretary of State	Dean Rusk
Deputy Secretary of State	This position was created by Congress in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-352, 86 Stat. 490) Prior to 1972 and extant in 1967, the number two position at the Department of State was, Under Secretary of State.
Under Secretary of State	Nicholas deB Katzenbach
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs	Eugene Victor Rostow
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs	Foy D. Kohler
Counselor for the Department of State	Robert R. Bowie
Ambassador at Large	W. Averell Harriman Henry Cabot Lodge
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs	Lucius D. Battle
Legal Adviser of the Department of State	Leonard C. Meeker
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs	Dixon Donnelley
Chief of Protocol	James W. Symington
Director of the Foreign Service Institute	George V. Allen
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs	Joseph John Sisco
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs	William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of State	

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for Intelligence and Research	Thomas Lowe Hughes
Inspector General of the Department of State and the Foreign Service	Fraser Wilkins
Executive Secretary	Benjamin H. Read
Director of the U.S. Information Agency	Leonard H. Marks
Ambassador to Egypt	Richard H. Nolte[1]
Charge' d'Affaires to Iraq	Enoch S. Duncan[2]
Ambassador to Israel	Walworth Barbour
Ambassador to Jordan	Findley Burns, Jr.
Ambassador to Lebanon	Dwight J. Porter
Ambassador to Syria	Hugh H. Smythe[3]

1.AMB Nolte replaced AMB Lucius D. Battle who left on 5 March 1967. AMB Nolte proceeded to post but did not present his credentials. He left post on 10 June 1967, Egypt having broken diplomatic relations with the U.S. on June 6, 1967. (David G. Nes was serving as Charge' d'Affaires when the break occurred.)

2.Iraq broke diplomatic relations with the U.S. on 7 June 1967. No Ambassador was posted at the time.

3.Syria severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. on 6 June 1967. Amb Smythe left post on 8 June 1967.

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APPENDIX VII

U.S.S. LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION

Stan White, Chairman — Joyce Casale, Secretary/Treasurer
Joseph L. Meadors, President — Paul N. McCloskey, Legal Advisor
Robert Casale, Vice President — James M. Ennes, Jr., Historian

P.O. BOX 789. WOODINVILLE, WASHINGTON 98072

July 1, 1991

The Honorable Nicholas Mavroules
United States House of Representatives
2334 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Mavroules:

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us concerning the USS Liberty incident during our June 25th trip to Washington.

At your request we have prepared the following list for you to consider. We hope that these items, when coupled with the information we provided during our meeting and that which you may obtain from other sources available to you, will prove sufficient to convince you that the incident does warrant the complete and comprehensive Congressional investigation we are asking you to initiate.

- When USS Liberty crewmen responded to the request from the bridge to "Prepare to abandon ship," life rafts were dropped over the side. Those life rafts were deliberately destroyed by machine gun fire from the attacking torpedo boats.

- After machine gunning our life rafts, the torpedo boats took one life raft aboard and immediately departed the scene without offering any assistance whatsoever. (These first two items have been described as "Grave Breeches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention.)

- Admiral Isaac Kidd who headed the US Navy Court of Inquiry solicited and received statements (both written and verbal) from over 65 USS Liberty crewmen. Those statements do not appear in the US Navy Court of Inquiry Report and have disappeared from US Navy files.

- A detailed deposition by then-Lt. James M. Ennes, Jr. (Officer of the Deck during most of the daylight hours preceding the attack) given from his hospital bed to an officer of the Court does not appear in the US Navy Court of Inquiry Report and has disappeared from US Navy files.

- An audio tape of conversations (in Hebrew and English) between the attacking jets and their headquarters - clearly indicating a correct identification of the ship - which was given to the Court by Lt. George Golden does not appear in the US Navy Court of Inquiry Report and has disappeared from US Navy files.

- The US Navy Court of Inquiry violated Navy Regulations and ignored rules of evidence and procedure. The Court failed to interview bridge lookouts, gunners mates, signalmen, key conning officers, and the ship's surviving second-in-command, and failed to review such vital documents as the ship's deck log, weather log and quartermaster's notebook.

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- Although otherwise ignored by the Court, the ship's official deck logs were rewritten and refiled with the Navy without the knowledge or permission of the officers who actually stood the watches. And the ship's weather log was specifically excluded from the record.

- The US Navy Court of Inquiry Report contains Findings of Fact that are not supported (i.e., are speculative) - or are contradicted - by evidence and testimony in the report.

- The legal advisor for the convening authority - Adm. Melvin Starring (later to become the US Navy Judge Advocate General) - rejected the completed Court of Inquiry report as inadequate and advised his boss not to sign it. But his advice was ignored and the report was officially approved.

- We were promised support within ten minutes and were under fire and in need of support for 2-1/2 hours. Yet the support never came. The USS Saratoga sent jets to our assistance at 2:09, nine minutes after the attack started and about 25 minutes before the torpedo explosion. Those aircraft might have arrived in time to save at least 25 lives, but they were recalled while we were still calling for help. And no one in authority has ever wondered why rescue aircraft, dispatched from the carrier Saratoga in time to prevent the torpedo attack, were called back while the ship was still under fire.

- Neither Captain Joseph Tully, Commanding Officer of the USS Saratoga nor his Executive Officer Max Morris have ever been contacted by the US Navy to provide testimony concerning their launch of two flights of rescue aircraft. Indeed, the US Navy denies two flights were launched.

- USS America catapult launch personnel have indicated the aircraft they launched were armed with nuclear weapons. No testimony has ever been solicited by the US Navy from USS America or USS Saratoga personnel.

- In the briefing in preparation for the second launch from the USS Saratoga, briefers used large maps of Egypt, pointing out surface-to-air missile sites, antiaircraft emplacements, port facilities, and other military locations.

- Survivors have twice produced Israeli citizens who claim to have observed the attack from the Israeli side and who have offered to testify that it was deliberate. No government official has ever been willing to listen.

- Glaring discrepancies between the US Navy Court of Inquiry Report and the report prepared by the government of Israel were specifically identified by State Department Legal Advisor Carl Salans in his memorandum of September 21, 1967. No effort has ever been made to resolve those discrepancies.

- Public discussion of the USS Liberty incident by those of us who survived the incident or by members of our families are routinely met with cries of "anti-Semitic" and "NAZI." As are our efforts to memorialize the

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sacrifice of our shipmates and the suffering of their families. And our efforts to enlist the services of Jewish and pro-Israeli organizations (both local and national) to help us remove the incident from the arsenal of people and groups with an agenda that is inimical to the Jewish Community or the State of Israel have proven unsuccessful.

- Efforts to memorialize our shipmates are routinely met with stiff opposition. The committee coordinating the construction of a memorial in Poughkeepsie, New York commemorating the ultimate sacrifice of its citizens in all this Country's battles doggedly refused to include the name of Richard Keene (KIA-USS Liberty) on its monument until faced with the threat of public humiliation by the USS Liberty Veterans Association. Efforts to memorialize Francis Brown have had to overcome the same resistance in Troy, New York. And a plaque honoring our fallen shipmates was found to be unworthy to be placed in Veterans Park in Flint, Michigan alongside others honoring our country's battle deaths.

- The citizens of Grafton, Wisconsin were subjected to two years of outrageous and vitriolic condemnation by opponents to their naming their new public library in honor of our shipmates.

- USS Liberty survivors giving a presentation about the incident to Grafton's Rose-Harms American Legion Post had to be met at the airport and escorted to town by plainclothes police officers and the memorial service held in Grafton prior to the dedication of the library had to be protected by an armed police SWAT team due to terrorist threats to disrupt the ceremony.

- The United States Naval Academy at Annapolis was unwilling to honor its graduates who were killed on the USS Liberty. It took the direct intervention of the Secretary of the Navy to persuade them to include the names of Philip Armstrong and Steven Toth in their Hall of Heroes which commemorates its alumni who have given their lives for our country.

- The American Red Cross refused to honor USS Liberty survivors' requests to notify our next of kin as to our condition.

- The Medal of Honor was presented to the USS Liberty's Commanding Officer William L. McGonagle during a spur-of-the-moment ceremony at the Washington Naval Shipyard instead of at the White House by the President as was customary during the Vietnam War era.

This list is admittedly brief but hopefully sufficient to convince you that the USS Liberty incident does, indeed, warrant a complete and comprehensive public Congressional investigation.

We will be happy to provide you with further information that you may require.

Sincerely,

Joseph L. Meadors, Chairman
4322 Wood River Drive
Corpus Christi, TX 78413
(512)387-6699

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APPENDIX VIII

GRAFTON, WISCONSIN LIBRARY CATALOGUE OF NEWS CLIPS AND CORRESPONDENCE

Oct. 1987	*Special Edition*, "The Liberty Lobby Network" (Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith)
Mar. 1988	*Liberty News*, "Memorials - New Projects Underway."
Mar. 1988	*Liberty News*, "Action Alert - The Liberty Memorial Library Project Is Under Attack."
May 15, 1988	*Chicago Tribune*, "What's In a Name? Controversy" by Rogers Worthington.
May 18, 1988	*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, "Stark Remembered" P-I News Service (with note from Jim Ennes endorsed).
May 20, 1988	*Community News Reporter*, "Liberty Tag Irks Wisconsin Jews" by Leon Cohen
May 27, 1988	*Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle*, "Milwaukee to Ignore USS Liberty Day" by Leon Cohen.
May 28, 1988	Letter from James M. Ennes to Milwaukee Jewish Council.
Jun. 1988	*Liberty News*, "Memorials - Update."
Jun. 6, 1988	Letter from American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, Inc. to Jim Grant, Mayor of Grafton.
Jun. 7, 1988	*Kuwait News Agency*, "Liberty Memorial" by David Walsh.
Jun. 9, 1988	*Ozaukee Press*, three letters to the editor.
Jun. 10, 1988	*Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle*, "Honor Liberty Without Anti-Semitism" a letter from Joseph L. Meadows, President of the U.S.S Liberty Veterans Association.
Jun. 19, 1988	*The Milwaukee Journal*, "Liberty Issue Puts Grafton In Middle of National Debate" by Michael Krenn.

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Jul. 8, 1988 *Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle*, "Grafton Boards Approve Liberty Library Name" by Leon Cohen.

Jul. 8, 1988 *Milwaukee Jewish Chronicle*, "Controversy's Benefits," editorial.

Jul. 9, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "The 2 Sides In Flap Over Library Name."

Jul. 10, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "Library Donor Gave Money To Ex-Klan-Leader" by Michael Krenn and John W. Kole.

Jul. 11, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "Official Reacts to Library Story" by Michael Krenn.

Jul. 12, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "How Honorable Grafton Turned Ugly" an editorial.

Jul. 12, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "So, What's In A Name?" by Joel McNally.

Jul. 19, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "Grafton Library Panel to Discuss Name Dispute" by Michael Krenn.

Jul. 26, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "Too Much Read Into Name?" two letters to the editor.

Jul. 29, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "Let's Close the Library Book," letter to the editor.

Jul. 29, 1988 *The Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle*, "Grafton Launches Library" by Leon Cohen.

Aug. 3, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "Library Debate Offers Instruction on Liberty" by Marshal Lev Dermer.

Aug. 7, 1988 *The Milwaukee Journal*, "Why must Grafton Kowtow to the Grobs?" an editorial.

Aug.3/9, 1988 Ozaukee County [ ], letter from a Liberty Lobby supporter.

Sep. 1988 *Liberty News*, "The Grafton Library Saga".

Dec. 15, 1988 Letter from Joseph L. Meadows, Chairman of the U.S.S Liberty Veterans Association.

Jan. 6, 1989 *The New York Times*, "Library's Name Brings Talk of Anti-Semitism" by Dirk Johnson.

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Jun. 1989 Liberty News (Major portion of newsletter devoted to dedication of the Library).

Sep./Dec. 1990 Liberty News (Exchange of correspondence regarding Library).

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APPENDIX IX

AL AHRAM

FIRST EGYPTIAN NEWS REPORT OF LIBERTY INCIDENT

اهتمام كبير بمحادثات بومدين في موسكو

الاتجاه السائد بين الدول العربية هو ضرورة عقد مؤتمر طارئ للقمة والموعد يتحدد بعد أن تتبلور مجموعة من العوامل

الاتصالات العربية أسفرت عن ضرورة عقد اجتماع القمة

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مهمة السفينة الامريكية التى ضربتها اسرائيل خطأ قرب سيناء التقاط رسائل غرفة العمليات وفك رموزها ونقلها على الفور

ثبت ان السفينة الامريكية « ليبرتى » التى كانت راسية على بعد ١٥ ميلا من شاطىء سيناء ، كانت مهمتها التقاط الرسائل التى تصدر من غرفة العمليات فى جبهة سيناء وفك شفرتها على الفور ونقلها . وهذه السفينة هى احدث « قطع التجسس » فى الاسطول الامريكى السادس وهى مزودة باجهزة الكترونية وتستطيع الاتصال باى مكان فى العالم عن طريق الاقمار الصناعية .

ولم يكتشف وجود هذه السفينة الا بعد ضرب زوارق الطوربيد الاسرائيلية لها عن طريق الخطأ .

وقد اكدت هذه الحقيقة مجلة «نيوزويك» الامريكية وان كانت قد كتبت موضوعه بطريقة تحاول فيها تغطية التواطؤ الامريكى .

تساءلت « نيوزويك » هل ضرب زوارق الطوربيد الاسرائيلية للسفينة «ليبرتى» الراسية على بعد ١٥ ميلا من ساحل سيناء كان ضربا مقصودا ام خطأ كما تقول امريكا واسرائيل . وتضيف المجلة ان « ليبرتى » سفينة ابحاث مخصصة لجمع المعلومات والتقاط الاذاعات واجهزة الرادار الاسرائيلية والمصرية وجمع رسائل كل جانب الصادرة من غرفة العمليات

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A Jay Cristol was born in Fountain Hill, Pennsylvania, on September 25, 1929. His parents were Samuel Cristol and Mae Stein Cristol. He received his elementary education at Fountain Hill, Pennsylvania, and at South Beach Elementary School, Miami Beach, Florida, and his secondary education at Miami Beach High School. In September 1947, he entered the Liberal Arts College of the University of Miami but left to enter Navy flight training in November 1951. He earned his Navy wings in April 1953. During the Korean conflict, he flew day and night missions from the aircraft carrier, Princeton, in the Western Pacific. He was a flight instructor at the Fleet All Weather Training Unit, Pacific. He returned to the University of Miami in 1956 and graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in February 1958. He obtained his Juris Doctor, cum laude, from the University of Miami, School of Law, in February 1959. In the Naval Reserve, he became a four-engine transport plane commander. In the 1960s, he flew volunteer airlift missions to Vietnam. After eighteen years as a naval aviator, he became a Navy lawyer and served on active duty in the Pentagon, including the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and OP-616 during the Stark incident. The Department of Defense also sent him to the

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International Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo, Italy, where he taught Law of Naval Warfare to senior military officers from numerous countries. He retired from the Naval Reserve as a captain in 1988 after thirty-eight years of service.

As a civilian, he practiced law for twenty-five years, and in April 1985, he accepted appointment as a federal judge. He is now the Chief Judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Florida, which encompasses the lower part of the state and has a larger population than thirty-two of the United States. He teaches as an adjunct professor at the University of Miami Law School. He was appointed to the Bankruptcy Rules Committee of the Judicial Conference by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. He has taught U. S. Bankruptcy Law to Judges in the Czech Republic, in Slovenia, and in Thailand. He also has taught Judges from Russia, India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and South Africa, under various programs for the State Department, USAID, the American Bankruptcy Institute and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. He has published numerous articles on law, aviation, history and other subjects.

In September 1986, he was admitted to the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Miami and to the Ph.D. program in the Spring of 1990. On June 20, 1997, he was granted the degree Doctor of

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